University of Michigan Law School

University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository
Michigan Legal Studies Series

Law School History and Publications

1947

The Conflict of Laws: A Comparative Study. Volume Two. Foreign
Corporations: Torts: Contracts in General
Ernst Rabel

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/michigan_legal_studies
Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons, Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, Conflict
of Laws Commons, Contracts Commons, and the Torts Commons

Recommended Citation
Rabel, Ernst, The Conflict of Laws: A Comparative Study. Vol. 2. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan
Press, 1947.

This Book is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School History and Publications at University of
Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Legal Studies Series
by an authorized administrator of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

MICHIGAN LEGAL STUDIES

THE CONFLICT OF LAWS
A Comparative Study

PUBLISHED UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN LAW
SCHOOL (WHICH, HOWEVER, ASSUMES NO RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE VIEWS
EXPRESSED) WITH THE AID OF FUNDS DERIVED FROM GIFTS TO THE UNIVERSITY
OF MICHIGAN BY WILLIAM W. COOK.

MICHIGAN LEGAL STUDIES
Hessel E. Yntema, Editor

DISCOVERY BEFORE TRIAL

George Ragland, Jr.
ToRTs IN THE CoNFLICT oF LAws

Moffatt Hancock
THE AMENDING oF THE FEDERAL CoNSTITUTION

Lester B. Orfield
REviEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE AcTs

Armin Uhler
THE PREVENTION OF REPEATED CRIME

John Barker Waite
THE CoNFLICT OF LAws:

A

CoMPARATIVE STUDY

Volumes One and Two
Ernst Rabel
UNREPORTED 0PINIO~s oF THE SuPREME CouRT oF
MICHIGAN

1836-1843

William Wirt Blume, Editor
PROBLEMs IN PROBATE LAw: MoDEL PROBATE CoDE

Lewis M. Simes and Paul E. Basye

THE CONFLICT OF LAWS
A Comparative Study
by
ERNST RABEL

VoLUME Two

Foreign Corporations: Torts: Contracts in General

Ann Arbor
UNIVERSITY oF MicHIGAN LAw ScHooL

Chicago
CALLAGHAN & CoMPANY

1947

CoPYRIGHT, 1947
BY

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

EDITORIAL NoTE: The research represented in the present volume
has been made possible by grants to the author from the McGregor
Fund, the Davella Mills Foundation, the American Philosophical
Society, and the Emergency Committee in Aid of Displaced Foreign
Scholars, supplemented by substantial provision for assistance by the
University of Michigan. The generous support from these sources is
gratefully acknowledged.
The author feels much indebted for kind and valuable information
respecting foreign corporations that he received from Professor Laylin
K. James of Ann Arbor and Messrs. Thomas G. Long, Attorney,
and Vice-President Theodore Sirene of the Corporation Trust Company, both of Detroit. Professor Moffatt Hancock, then in Toronto,
obligingly read the manuscript of the part "Torts" and has enriched it
by various suggestions.
The volume speaks in general as of December, I 945, when the
manuscript was completed; the delay that has occurred in publication,
however, has enabled the author to include various references to later
materials. The editor is under special obligation to Professor Hobart
Coffey for patient assistance in revising the text, as well as to Mr.
John H. Hoffman and Mrs. Dorothy D. Bray, respectively, for the
care taken in verifying citations and in the detailed preparation of the
manuscript.

Table of Contents

PAGE

PART SIX. CORPORATIONS AND KINDRED
ORGANIZATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
CHAPTER I

8.

I

TYPES OF ORGANIZATIONS, NATIONAL-

ITY, AND DoMICIL . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . .

I. Categories of Organizations . . . . . . . . . .
I. Survey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Private Business Organizations
.......
3. Public Legal Persons . . . . . . . . . . . .
States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Public corporations . . . . . .
.......
4· Foundations and Trusts . . . . . . . . . .
5. Associations for Non profit Purposes . . .
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6. Legal Persons with International Purposes
Supranational legal bodies . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Plurinational centralized legal bodies . . . .
Plurinational decentralized legal bodies . .
Cartels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
International public corporations for economic purposes . . . . . . . . .
II. The Nationality of Corporations . . . . . . . . .
I. Difference of Purpose from Conflicts Law
2. Where Unity of Criterion Desirable . . . . .
3. Separate Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
III. The Latin-American View . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
IV. Domicil of Corporations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
vii

3
4
4
7
Io
10
I I

I3
4
I 5
I 5
I 5
I 5
I 5
I

I6
17

7
7
I9
I

I

20

24

27

TABLE OF CONTENTS

viii

PAGE
CHAPTER

19.

THE PERSONAL LAw oF BusiNESS CoR........... .

3I

I. Law of the State of Incorporation .. .
Anglo-American law ............. .
Other countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
II. Law of the Place of Central Control
r. Countries . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Significance of the Principle .
3· Concept of Central Office ..... .
4· Real Existence of the Central Office
II I. Exceptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
I. To the Law of Incorporation ....
2. To the Law of the Central Office
IV. Renvoi . . . . . . . .
. ................ .
V. Transfer of Central Administration to Another
Country .......................... .
I. Law of Central Control
......... .
2. Law of Incorporation ............... .
VI. Theory of Control .................... .
War seizures and restrictions ............ .
Mixed arbitral tribunals ................ .
Postwar controversy in France . . . ....... .
VII. Rationale ........................... .

31
31

PORATIONS

32
33
33
37
39
42

45
45
46

so
so
so

54
56
57
57
59

62

CHAPTER 20. THE ScoPE oF THE PERSONAL LAw oF
CoRPORATIONs

....................... .

Existence and Legal Character . . .
2. Capacity (Powers) ........ .
3. Internal Organization
Certificates ....
Seizures . . . . . . . . . . . . ................. .
4· External Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..
Liability of stockholders in the United States ...
I.

68
68
7I
74

7S
76

So
81

TABLE OF CONTENTS

lX

PAGE

Borderline problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5. Modification and End . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Soviet nationalization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

84
85
87

CHAPTER 2 I. UNINCORPORATED BusiNEss ORGANIZATIONS

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

I. Method of Legal Construction . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. The Old Antithesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Gradation of Corporate Character . . . . . . .
3· Purposes of Construction ......... , . . . .
II. Personal Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. Civil Law Doctrine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Need for a personal law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Law and treaties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Conflict with domestic classification . . . . . .
2. American Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(a) Quasi corporations . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(b) Partnerships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3· Contacts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(a) Law of the seat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(b) American quasi corporations . . . . .
(c) American general partnerships . . . .
III. Scope of Personal Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
I . General Aspects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Partnership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3· The Right to Be a Party . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
IV. Quasi Nationality of Partnership . . . . . . . . . .
CHAPTER 22. RECOGNITION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

I. Theories of Recognition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. The Territorial Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. The International Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3· Reactionary Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

93
93
93
95
96
IOO
IOO
IOO
IOI
I03
I07
107
III
I I3
I I3

3
4
I I5
I I 5
I I6
119
I I

I I

122

I24
I 24

124

127

130

X

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE
4· Concept of Recognition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I 3 I
II. Conditions for Recognition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I 32
I. Unconditiomil Recognition . . . . . . . . . . . . .
132
(a) For all organizations . . . . . . . . . .
133
(b) For trading associations. . . . . . . . . . . . I 35
(c) For nonprofit corporations . . . . . . . . . 136
(d) Foundations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I37
(e) Partnerships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
I 37
2. Special Conditions for Recognition . . . . . . .
138
(a) Authorization in case of reciprocityFrance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
Other countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I 40
(b) Special authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . r 40
3· Treaties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
III. Effects of Recognition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
I. Full Effect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
142
2. Minimal Effect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
142
(a) Capacity to be a party . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
(b) Single acts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I 4 7
3· Is the Extent of Recognition Determined by
Domestic Law? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I49
IV. The Powers of the Corporation and its Agents I 57
I. Powers of Corporation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
I 57
2. Legal Restrictions on the Capacity of Corporations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I 64
(a) Acquisitions by gift or will . . . . . . . . . I64
(b) Taking of land . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I 66
3· Authority of Agents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I67
CHAPTER 23. DoiNG BusiNESS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
I. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
I. Regulation of Foreign Corporations . . . . .
2. Concept of Doing Business . . . . . . . . . . . .

I73
73
I 73
I 75
I

TABLE OF CONTENTS

xi
PAGE

3· Categories of Business Places . . . . . . . . . . .
II. Survey of Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
r. Unconditional Admittance . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Business Without a Permanent Place . . . .
3· Business Under Domestic Law . . . . . . . . .
4· Qualifying for Authorization . . . . . . . . . .
5. Discretionary Grant of Authorization . . . .
6. Domestication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
7· Reciprocity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
III. The Position of Permanent Establishments in
Conflicts Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
r. Principle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Scope of Personal Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3· Territorial Law Governing According to
General Conflicts Rules . . . . . . . . . . . .
IV. Statutory Impositions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
I. Service of Process and Jurisdiction . . . . . .
2. Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3· Publications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4· Guarantees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5· Application of the Internal Law . . . . . . . .
6. Special Purposes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
V. Sanctions of Territorial Impositions . . . . . . . .
I. Failure to Obtain Authorization to Do
Business . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Other countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Appraisal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Failure to Register . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
VI. Treaties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
I. Existing Treaties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(a) Commercial clause . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(b) Special clauses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

I76
I 79
I79
I So
I8o
I 8I
I 83
I 85
I87
I87
I 87
I 88
89
I9I
I 9I
I94
I96
I 97
I97
I

20I
20I

202
202

2 I2
2 I3
2I5

2I7
2I7
2I8
2I8

TABLE OF CONTENTS

xii

PAGE

(c) Most-favored-nation clause . . .
(d) Clause of reciprocity . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Draft Proposals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
VII. Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
PART SEVEN. TORTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2I8

219
220
220

227

24. THE PRINCIPLE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229
I. The Meaning of Tort . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229
I. Delict and Quasi Delict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
229
2. Characterization of Tort . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232
II. The Principle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 235
r. The Dominant Principle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 235
2. Lex Fori . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 237
3· Rule of Similarity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 237
American cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 37
British rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 238
4· Harm Done in a Territory Not Belonging
to Any Country . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 244
III. Limitations on the Principle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 244
I. Law Common to the Parties . . . . . . . . . . . .
244
2. Local Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 246
3· Protection of Defendant Nationals of the
Forum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247
4· Public Policy as a General Limitation . . . . 248
5· Rationale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 250

CHAPTER

25. THE ScoPE oF THE PRINCIPLE . . . . . .
The Law of Wrong Governs Capacity to Commit a Tort . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Unlawfulness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(a) Illicit conduct . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(b) Authorized acts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

CHAPTER
I.

2.

255

255
255
256

256

TABLE OF CONTENTS

xiii
PAGE

3· Causation and Fault . .
...........
(a) Causation
..........
.........
(b) Fault . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(c) Contributory negligence . . . . . . . . . . . .
Characterization
............
4· Proper Plaintiff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(a) Beneficiary of the tort claim . . . . . . . . . . .
(b) Indirect harm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(c) Plaintiff in own name on behalf of the injured . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5· Proper Defendant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(a) Co-obligors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(b) Claim against the insurer of the tortfeasor
6. Influence of Family Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . .
7· Vicarious Liability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(a) Principle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(b) Persons out of state . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(c) Other effects of public policy
8. Damages for Tort . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Influence of lex fori . . . . . . . . . . . .
9· Other Sanctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
10. Relation to Procedural Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(a) In general . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(b) Burden of proof . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
American law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(c) Conditions of bringing suit . . . . . . . . . . .
I 1. Relation to Contractual Obligations . . . . . . . . .
(a) Distinction in the municipal laws . . . . . . .
(b) Conflicts law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Stipulations for exemption from liability . . .
I2. Statutes of Limitation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
I3. Industrial Property . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(a) Territorial limitation of protected interests

257
257
258
258
260
261
261
262
262
263
263
263
265
267
267
268
'2 7 5
276
278
280
2 8I
2 8I
283
2 85
286
287
287
290
293
294
295
295

xiv

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE

(b) Unfair competition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

295

26. THE PLACE OF WRONG . . . . . . . . . . . .
I. Survey of Solutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
I. Theory of the Place of Injury (The American Rule) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Theory of the Place of Acting (The Civil
Law Rule) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3· Elective Concurrence of Claims (The
Reichsgericht Rule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4· Mixed Solutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(a) Influence of the law of the place of
acting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(b) Influence of the law of the place of
effect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(c) Differentiated solutions . . . . . . . . . . . .
5. Differences of Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
II. The Place of Acting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. Preparatory Acts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Acts and Omissions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(a) Omissive torts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(b) Accomplices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3· Acting in Several States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(a) Separate torts in several countries . . .
(b) Single tort committed by partial acts in
several states . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4· Acting at a Distance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(a) Means of acting in foreign jurisdictions
(b) Letters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(c) Suppliers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(d) Broadcasts, newspapers, and the like .
III. The Place of Injury . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. Injury and Damage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Deceit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

30I
30I

CHAPTER

301

303
304
306
306
308
308
309
3r I
3I I
3I 2
3I 2
3I 3
3I4
3I 4
3I 5
3I 7
3I7
318
3 I9
3 20
323
323
325

TABLE OF CONTENTS

XV

PAGE

2. Injury and Acting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Damage by aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
IV. The Structure of Torts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. Liability Without Proof of Fault . . . . . . .
(a) Absolute liability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(b) Strict liability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Neighborhood Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(a) Flood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(b) Mine damage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3· Fault . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(a) Intentional acts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(b) Negligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
V. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

327
32 8
328
328
328
3 29
330
330
332
332
332
333
333

27. MARITIME AND AERONAUTIC ToRTs . . .
I. Survey of Principles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
r. General Maritime Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
England . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Modern Principles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
II. Unification of Substantive Laws . . . . . .
Collision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Navigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Aerial law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
III. Torts Done Within a State Territory . . . . . . .
r. Torts in Territorial Waters . . . . . . . .
(a) Rule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(b) Exceptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Collision of Aircraft Flying over State Territory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
IV. Torts on the High Seas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. Torts on Board One Vessel . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Collision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

336
336
336
33 6
338
339
340
340
341
341
342
342
342

CHAPTER

345
345

346
346
347
347

TABLE OF CONTENTS

XVI

PAGE

3· Other Torts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
V. Special Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
r. Rules of Navigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Extent of Damages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3· Public Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4· Formal Requirements of Suit . . . . . . . . . .
PART EIGHT. CONTRACTS IN GENERAL
CHAPTER

I.
II.

III.

IV.

28.

351
351
351
351
354
354
355

CHOICE OF LAw BY THE PARTIEs (Party

Autonomy) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Problem of American Law . . . . . . .
The Theories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
I. Theory Negating Choice of Law by the
Parties . .
................
2. Proper Law Theory . . . . . . . .
3· Theory Permitting Agreement of Parties on
the Applicable Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Present Systems . . . . . . . .
r. Outside the United States
Autonomy recognized . . . . . . .
Austrian Civil Code
Latin America . . .
Other jurisdictions rejecting party autonomy
................ · . .
2. United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3· Express Agreements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4· Implied Agreements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5· Scope of the Agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(a) Problem of renvoi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(b) Nullity by choice of law . . . . . . . . . . .
Choice of Several Laws . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

357
357
360

360
363
367
368
368
368
369
3 70

373
374
376
3 84
387
387
387
388

TABLE OF CONTENTS

XVIJ

PAGE

r. Special References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Nature of Special References . . . . . . . . . .

2.

CHAPTER

29.

THEORIES RESTRICTING PARTY Au-

TONOMY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . · · · · · ·

I. Doctrines of General Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
I. Doctrines Reserving Imperative Rules . . . .
(a) Imperative rules of predestined law . .
(b) Lex loci contractus necessarily governing validity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(c) Illegality under lex loci contractus invalidating the contract . . . . . . . . . .
(d) Prevailing rule . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Evasion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(a) Fraudulent evasion . . . . . . . . . . . .
(b) Contracts without foreign elements . .
(c) Lex fori in imperative role . . . . . . . . .
(d) American law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3· Requirement of Substantial Connection . . .
I I. Special American Doctrines . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
r. Usury Statutes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Stipulation for a law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Insurance Statutes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
III. Exemptions from Liability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Municipal laws and unifications . . . . . . . . .
Conflicts law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Extraterritorial effect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
International needs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
IV. Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
CHAPTER

30.

3 88
391

394
3 94
394
394

395
397
3 99
400
400
400
40 I
401
402
408
408
410
412
415
415
418
424
42 5
427

RuLES IN ABsENCE OF PARTY AGREE-

MENT

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

A. Judicial Choice of Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

430
430

xviii

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE

I. Individualized Choice of Law .......... .
I. Presumed Intention of the Parties .... .
. " Th eory .............. .
2. "Ob'JeCtlve
3. Rationale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
II. General Rules ...................... .
I. Prima Facie Rules ................ .
2. Rigid General Rules .............. .
3· "No Rule" ...................... .
4· The Most Characteristic Connection .. .
B. Contacts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
I. Historical Note . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
II. Law of the Place of Contracting ....... .
r. To Govern the Entire Contract ..... .
By logical necessity .............. .
By presumed intention . . . . . . . . . . . .
By fixed conflicts rule . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. To Govern the Making of Contracts ..
Impracticability of the division ..... .
3. American Law .................. .
4· Determination of the Place of Contractmg ......................... .
Contracts between absent persons ... .
United States ................... .
Binding force of offers ........... .
Various cases treated in the Restatement
Discretionary assumptions . . . . ..... .
Contracting in another state ....... .
5. Rationale ...................... .
III. Law of the Place of Performance
I. Historical Note . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Countries ...................... .
United States ................... .

430
430
436
437
440
440
440
441
442
442
443
443
445
445
445
446
447
448

450
451
452
453
456
457
457
459
459
460
462
462
463
464

TABLE OF CONTENTS

XIX

PAGE

3· Mode of Fulfillment . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4· Several Places of Performance . . . . . .
5. Lack of a Certain Place of Performance
6. Characterization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
7· Rationale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
IV. Law of the Debtor's Domicil . . . . . . . . . .
V. The Law Most Favorable to the Contract
VI. Renvoi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
VII. Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
I. Specialized Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. The Law of the Contract . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

464
466
470
471
472
473
474
480
480
480
483

31. FoRM oF CoNTRACTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
I. The Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

485
48 5
48 5
48 5
486
487
490
490
490
49 I
49 I
491
492
493
493
493
493
49 5
496
496
498

CHAPTER

1.

2.

Lex loci contractus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Locus regit actum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

(a) Compulsory rule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(b) Optional rule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(i) Lex causae imperative . . . . . . . .
(ii) Lex causae optional . . . . . . . . . .
(iii) Lex loci contractus optional. . . .
( iv) Lex loci contractus obligatory . .
3. Lex causae . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Other countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4· Exceptional Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(a) National law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(b) Cumulated tests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(c) Law of the forum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(d) Preponderance of lex causae . . . . . . . .
II. Scope of the Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. Concept of Formal Requirements . . . . . . . .
:2. Form and Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

TABLE OF CONTENTS

XX

PAGE

(a) Statute of Frauds . . . . . .
(b) Exclusion of nonwritten evidence . . .
(c) Parol evidence . . . . . . . . . . . .
3· Form and Revenue Law . . . . . . . . . . . .
4· Determination of the Place of Contracting
(a) Contract by correspondence . . . .
(b) Determination by the parties . . . . . .
III. Operation of the Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
r. Solemnities Prescribed by Lex Causae . . . .
2. Form Agreeable to Lex Loci Contractus . .
Public policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3· Renvoi . . . . . . .
.......... .......
4· Defective Form . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
IV. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
32. ScoPE OF THE LAw
I. Formation of the Contract

CHAPTER

oF THE CoNTRACT

Consent in Form . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Conflicts rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Consent in Fact
.............
The problem
.....................
Conflicts rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3· Want of Consideration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
II. Nature and Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
I. The Nature of the Contract . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Intended and Legal Effects . . . . . . . . . . . .
3· Interpretation of Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Rules of interpretation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Ascertainment of true meaning . . . . . . . . . .
Reference to local conceptions . . . . . . . . . .
III. Legality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
IV. Nonperformance of the Contract . . . . . . . . . .
I.

498
501
503
503
505
50 5
so6
506
so6
510
51 1
513
5I 3
514
5I 8
5I9
5I 9
5I 9
520
523
52 3
524
52 7
528
528
530
532
532
533
533
535
539

TABLE OF CONTENTS

XXI

PAGE

In General . . . . . . . . . .
Sanctions of Nonperformance
Rescission . . . . . . . .
...... .
Damages
Penalties .......................... .
Moratory interest allowed as damages ... .
3· Burden of Proof ................ .
V. Change of Law ....................... .

539
542
542
542
544
545
545
546

33· PuBLIC PoLICY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
I. The Law of the Forum . . .
. ........... .
A. The Present Situation ........... .
Uncertainty .................. .
Full Faith and Credit Clause .... .
Due Process Clause . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
American repugnance to the use of the exception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Recent European reaction . . . . . . . . . .
B. The Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
I. Policy of Public, Especially Administrative Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Public law of the forum
.......
Sunday contracts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Foreign governing law . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Policy of Private Law . . . . . . . . .
C. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
I. Wagering Contracts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Lotteries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Indorsed gaming notes . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Various Contracts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Champerty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Other examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Protection of personality . . . . . . . . . . . .

549
549
549
549

I.

2.

CHAPTER

553
554

55 5
556
558
559
562
564

565
566
568
568
573
574
576
576
577
577

xxii

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE

3· Immoral Transactions . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Bribery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Lease of a gambling house . . . . . . . . .
D. Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
II. Violation of Foreign Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Smuggling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Generalizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
International treaties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

580
580
580
58 I
584

585
589

BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

590
593
595

TABLE OF STATUTES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

6II

TABLE OF ANGLO-AMERICAN CASES . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

653

TABLES

List of Abbreviations
Abh.
A.C.
Adl. Clem.

AG.
Ala.
Ala. App.
Allen
All E.R.
AUg. BGB.
Allg. HGB.
A.L.R.
Am. Dec.
Am. Bar. Asso.
Jour.
Am. J. Int. Law
Am. J. Int. Law,
Supp.
Am. Jur.

Am. Marit. Cas.
Am. Rep.
Amtl. S.

Abhandlungen.
Appeal Cases, English Law Reports.
Sammlung von Entscheidungen zum Handelsgesetzbuch, zusammengestellt von Adler
und Clemens, fortgesetzt von Friedlander
(Austria).
Amtsgericht (Germany).
Alabama Reports.
Alabama Appeals Reports.
Allen, Massachusetts Supreme Court Reports,
vols. 83-96.
All England Law Reports, Annotated.
Allgemeines Biirgerliches Gesetzbuch (Austria).
Allgemeines Handelsgesetzbuch (Austria).
American Law Reports, Annotated.
American Decisions (Select Cases).
American Bar Association Journal.
American Journal of International Law.
American Journal of International Law, Supplement.
American Jurisprudence. A Comprehensive
Text Statement of American Case Law, as
Developed in the Cases and Annotations in
the Annotated Reports System, Being a Rewriting of Ruling Case L~PW to Reflect the
Modern Developments of the Law. San
Francisco-New York, 1936.
American Maritime Cases.
American Reports.
Entscheidungen des k.k. Obersten Gerichtshofs
in Zivt1- und J ustizverwaltungssachen veroffentlicht von diesem Gerichtshofe, Fortsetzung der von Nowak begriindeten
Sammlung (Austria).

xxiii

xxiv

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Annales de Droit
Commercial
Ann. Cas.
Annuaire
Annual Digest
Annuario Dir.
Comp.
App.
App. Cas.
App. Civ.
App. D.C.
App. Div.
Arch. Civ. Prax.
Arch. Jud.
Ariz.
Ark.
Atl.
Atl. (2d)
Barb. S.C.
Barn. & AI.
Barn. & C.
Bay. ObLG.
Bay. ObLGZ.

BBl.
B.C.
Beav.

Annales de droit commercial et industriel
fran~ais, etranger et international, fondees
par M.E. Thaller, Paris, 1887.
American Annotated Cases.
Annuaire de l'Institut de droit international.
Annual Digest of Public International Law
Cases, London.
Annuario di diritto comparato e di studi legislativi.
Corti d'appello (Italy), Cour d'appel
(France).
Appeal Cases, English Law Reports, I 8761890.
Appella~ao civil (Brazil).
Appeal Cases, District of Columbia.
New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division Reports.
Archiv fiir die civilistische Praxis (Germany).
Archivo Judiciario (Brazil).
Arizona Reports.
Arkansas Reports.
Atlantic Reporter (National Reporter System, United States).
Atlantic Reporter, National Reporter System,
Second Series.
Barbour's Supreme. Court Reports, New
York, 67 vols.
Barnewall & Alderson, English King's Bench
Reports.
Barnewall and Cresswell, English King's
Bench Reports.
Bayerisches Oberstes Landesgericht.
Sammlung von Entscheidungen des Bayerischen Obersten Landesgerichts in Zivilsachen.
Bundesblatt der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft.
British Columbia Reports.
Beavan, English Rolls Court Reports.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
Belg. Jud.
Bell C.C.
BG.
BGB.
BGE.
Bing.
Bing. N.C.
B.J.
Bl. f. Zlirch. Rspr.
Bli. N.S.
Bl. IPR.

Bolze
Bost. U. L. Rev.
Brit. Year Book
Tnt. Law
Brown Ch. C.
Brown Pari. Cas.
Bull. Inst. Beige
Bull. Inst. Int.

Bull. Soc. d'Etudes
Leg.
Bull. Soc. Ugisl.
Comp.
Burr.
BW.
C.A.
Cal.
Cal. App.
Cal. Dec.

XXV

Belgique judiciaire. Gazette des tribunaux
belges et etrangers.
Bell, English Crown Cases Reserved.
Bundesgericht (Switzerland).
Biirgerliches Gesetzbuch (Germany).
Entscheidungen des Schweizerischen Bundes. gerichtes, Amtliche Sammlung.
Bingham, English Common Pleas Reports.
Bingham, New Cases, English Common Pleas.
Boletfn judicial (Dominican Republic).
Blatter fur zurcherische Rechtsprechung.
Bligh, English House of Lords Reports, New
Series, I I vols.
Blatter fur Internationales Privatrecht, Beilage
der Leipziger Zeitschrift fiir Deutsches
Recht.
Die Praxis des Reichsgerichts. Herausgegeben
von Bolze (Germany).
Boston University Law Review.
British Year Book of International Law.
Brown's Chancery Cases (England).
Brown's Cases in Parliament (England), 8
vols.
Institut beige de droit compare, Bulletin trimestriel. (See also Revue Inst. Beige.)
Bulletin de l'Institut juridique international,
Ley de. Originally: Bulletin de l'Institut intermediaire international.
Bulletin de la Societe d'etudes legislatives
(France).
Bulletin de la Societe de legislation comparee
(France).
Burrow, English King's Bench Reports.
Burgerlijk W etboek (the Netherlands).
Court o~ Appeals.
California Reports.
California Appeals Reports.
California Decisions.

xxvi

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Cal. L. Rev.
Cambr. L. J.
Cam. Com. de la
Cap.
Cam. Fed. de la
Cap.
Can. Bar Rev.
Can. L.R.
Can. Sup. Ct.
Cass.

C.B.
C.B.N.S.

c.c.
C. Civ. Proc.
C. Com.
C.C.H.
Ch.

California Law Review.
Cambridge Law Journal.
Camera comercial de la capital (Argentina).
Camera federal de la capital (Argentina).
Canadian Bar Review (Toronto).
Canada Law Reports, Exchequer Court and
Supreme Court.
Canada Supreme Court Reports, 64 vols.
Cassation, Cassazione.
English Common Bench Reports (Manning,
Granger & Scott).
Common Bench Reports, New Series (Scott),
20 vols.
Civil Code, Code Civil, C6digo Civil.
Code of Civil Procedure.
Code de Commerce, Commercial Code,
C6digo Commercial.
Commerce Clearing House.
Chancery Division, English Law Reports,

1891Ch.D.
China, Int. Priv.
Law
Cin. L. Rev.
C.J.
C.J.S.
Cl. and F.
C.L.T.
Clunet
C. Marit.

C. Obi.
Col. L. Rev.
Colo.

Chancery Division, English Law Reports,
I8]6-I890·
Chinese Law of August 5, 1918, concerning
the application of foreign law.
Cincinnati Law Review.
Corpus Juris (United States).
Corpus Juris Secundum (United States).
Clark and Finnelly's Reports, House of Lords
Cases.
Canadian Law Times.
Journal du droit international. Fonde par
Clunet, continue par Andre-Prudhomme.
Code Maritime (Bulgaria).
Code of Obligations, Obligationenrecht
(Switzerland) (See Swiss Code Obi.).
Columbia Law Review.
Colorado Reports.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

XXVII

Com. Cas.
Commw. L.R.
Conn.
Consolidated Companies Act (Belgium)

Commercial Cases (England).
Commonwealth Law Reports (Australia).
Connecticut Reports.
Les lois sur les societes coordonnees (I 935)
(originally enacted May I 8, I 8 73) inserted
in the Code of Commerce as book I, title

Cornell L. Q.
Cowp.
C.&P.

Cornell Law Quarterly.
Cowper, English King's Bench Reports, 2 vols.
Carrington & Payne, English Nisi Prius Reports, 9 vols.
Cranch, United States Supreme Court Reports, vols. S-I 3·
Scotch Court of Sessions Cases.
Dalloz, Recueil periodique et critique de jurisprudence, de legislation et de doctrine
(France).
Dakota Territory Reports.
District of Columbia.
De Gex & Jones, English Chancery Reports,
4 vols.
De Gex, Macnaghten, & Gordon, English
Chancery Reports, 8 vols.
Delaware Reports.
Dalloz, Recueil hebdomadaire de jurisprudence (France).
Digestas (Roman Law).
Disposizioni Preliminari del Codice Civile
(Italy).
Deutsche Juristenzeitung.
Dominion Law Reports (Canada).
Dowling & Ryland, English King's Bench
Reports.
Deutsche Justiz. Amtliches Blatt der deutschen Rechtspflege, I 933-.
Ellis & Blackburn, Queen's Bench Reports,
8 vols.
Edwards, New York Chancery Reports, 4
vols.

IX.

Cranch
Ct. Sess.

D.
Dak.
D.C.
De G. &

J.

De G. M. & G.
Del.

D.H.
Dig.
Disp. Prel.
DJZ.
D.L.R.
D.&R.
Dt. Justiz
E.&B.
Edw. Ch.

xxviii
EG. BGB.
Eng. and Emp.
Dig.
Eng. Re.
Eng. Rep.
Entsch. kgl. Ob.
Trib.
Exch.
Ex. C. R.
Ex. D.

F.
F. (zd)
Fallos

Fed.
Fed. Cas.
Filangieri
Fla.
Foro !tal.
Foro I tal. Mass.

Foro !tal. Rep.
F. Supp.
Ga.
Ga. App.
Gall.
Gaz. Pal.
Gaz. Trib.
Geller's Zentralblatt

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
Einfiihrungsgesetz zum Biirgerlichen Gesetzbuch (Germany).
The English and Empire Digest.
English Reports (full reprint).
Moak, English Reports (American reprint).
Entscheidungen des koniglichen geheimen
Obertribunals, 1837-1879 (Prussia).
Exchequer Reports (Welsby, Hurlstone &
Gordon) I I vols.
Exchequer Court Reports (Canada).
English Law Reports, Exchequer Division.
Fraser, Scotch Sessions Cases, 5th Series.
Federal Reporter, Second Series (United
States).
Fallos de la Suprema Corte de Justicia Nacional con la relaci6n de sus respectivas
causas. Publicaci6n hecha por los doctores
D. Antonio Tomassi yD. Jose Dominguez,
Buenos Aires.
Federal Reporter (United States).
Federal Cases (United States).
II Filangieri. Rivista giuridica dottrinale
e pratica (Italy).
Florida Reports.
II Foro Italiano.
II Massimario del Foro Italiano. Raccolta
quindicinale delle massime delle sentenze
della Cassazione Civile.
II Foro Italiano, Repertorio.
Federal Supplement (United States).
Georgia Reports.
Georgia Appeals Reports.
Gallison, Reports, United States Circuit
Courts.
Gazette du Palais (France).
Gazette des Tribunaux (France).
Zentralblatt fiir die J uristische Praxis, begriindet von Dr. L. Geller (Austria). (See
also Zentralblatt.)

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
Ges. m. b. H. Ges.
Giur. Comp. DIP.
Giur. Comp. Dir.
Civ.
Giur. ltal.
GIU.

GIU. NF.
Gray
Grotius
Grotius Soc.
Gruchot's Beitrage
Hans. GZ.
Hans. RGZ.
Hans. RZ.
Hardw.
Harv. L. Rev.
Hbl.
H. & C.
HGB.

Hill
H. L. Cas.
Hof
How.
How. Pr.
H.R.
Hy. Bl.
Ida.

XXIX

Gesetz iiber Gesellschaften mit beschrankter
Haftung.
Giurisprudenza comparata di diritto internazionale privato.
Giurisprudenza comparata di diritto civi1e.
Giurisprudenza italiana.
Sammlung von zivilrechtlichen Entscheidungen des Obersten Gerichtshofes, begriindet
von Glaser und Unger (Austria).
Idem, Neue Folge (new series of the court
reports cited above) (Austria).
Gray's Massachusetts Reports, vols. 67-82.
Grotius, Annuaire international.
Transactions of the Grotius Society.
Beitrage zur Erlauterung des deutchen Rechts,
begriindet von Dr. J. A. Gruchot.
Hanseatische Gerichtszeitung. (See also Hans.
RGZ. and Hans. RZ.)
Hanseatische Rechts- und Gerichts-Zeitschrift
(Germany).
Hanseatische Rech ts-Zeitschrift.
Cases temp. Hardwicke, by Ridgway.
Harvard Law Review.
Hauptblatt.
Hurlstone & Coltman, English Exchequer Reports, 4 vols.
Handelsgesetzbuch (German Commercial
Code).
Hill, Reports (New York).
House of Lords Cases (Clark), I I vols. (England).
Gerechtshof (the Netherlands).
Howard, United States Supreme Court Reports.
Howard, New York Practice Reports, 67 vols.
Hooge Raad (the Netherlands).
Henry Blackstone's Reports, Common Pleas
(England).
Idaho Reports.

XXX

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Ill.
Ill. App.
Ill. L. Rev.
Ind.
Ind. App.
Indisch Tijdsch.
Inst. Dr. Int.
Int. Jahrb. Schiedsgerich tswesen

Illinois Reports.
Illinois Appellate Court Reports.
Illinois Law Review.
Indiana Reports.
Indiana Appellate Court Reports.
Indisch Tijdschrift von het Recht (Batavia).
Institut de droit international.
Internationales J ahrbuch fiir Schiedsgerichtswesen in Zivil-und Handelssachen, herausgegeben von Dr. Arthur Nussbaum. Berlin,

Int. Priv. Law
Introd. Law
Iowa
Iowa L. Rev.
IPRspr.

International Private Law.
Introductory Law.
Iowa Reports.
Iowa Law Review.
Die Deutsche Rechtsprechung auf dem Gebiete des internationalen Privatrechts. Beilage der Zeitschrift fiir auslandisches und
internationales Privatrecht (Z. ausl. PR.).
Jahrbuch des Deutschen Rechts.
J ahrbuch hochstrichterlicher Entscheidungen
(Austria).
Jahrbuch fiir Entscheidungen des Kammergerichts (Germany).
The Commercial Code of Japan Annotated.
Published by the Codes Translation Committee, the League of Nations Association of
Japan. Tokyo, 1931.
Japanese Law No. 10, of June 21, 1890, concerning the application of laws.
J uristische Blatter (Austria).
Jherings J ahrbiicher fiir die Dogmatik des
biirgerlichen Rechts (Germany).
Johnson's New York Cases, 3 vols.
Journal of Comparative Legislation and International Law. Formerly Journal of Society of Comparative Legislation (England).
Journal des societes civiles et commerciales
( Librairie du Recueil Sirey, Paris).

1926-.

Jahrb. DR.
Jahrb. HE.
Jahrb. KG.
Japan C. Com.
Ann.

Japan, Int. Priv.
Law
J. Bl.
Jherings Jahrb.
Johns. Cas.
Journ. Comp. Leg.

Journ. Soc.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
Jur. Arg.
Jur. Com. Brux.
Jurid. Rev.
Jur. Liege
Jur. Port Anvers

JW.
Kan.
K.B.
Kg.
KG.
Ky.
La.
La. Ann.
La. App.
La Ley
La. L. Rev.
L. of N. Treaty
Series
Law and Cont.
Probl.
Law Q. Rev.
L. c. J.
Ld. Raym.
L. Ed.
Leipz. Z.
LG.
L.]. (Ch.)
L.J. Exch.
L.J.N.S.
L.J. (P.C.)
Ll. L. Rep.
L.R.A.

XXXI

Revista de Jurisprudencia Argentina (Buenos
Aires).
Jurisprudence commerciale de Bruxelles.
Juridical Review (Scotland).
Jurisprudence de la cour d'appel de Liege.
Jurisprudence du Port d'Anvers (Belgian
Court Reports).
J uristische W ochenschrift (Germany).
Kansas Reports.
English Law Reports, King's Bench.
Kantongerecht (the Netherlands).
Kammergericht (Germany).
Kentucky Reports.
Louisiana Reports.
Louisiana Annual Reports.
Louisiana Courts of Appeal Reports.
La Ley. Revista Juridica Argentina.
Louisiana Law Review.
League of Nations Treaty Series.
Law and Contemporary Problems, Duke U niversity.
Law Quarterly Review (England).
Lower Canada Jurist.
Lord Raymond, English King's Bench Reports, 3 vols.
Lawyer's Edition, United States Supreme
Court Reports.
Leipziger Zeitschrift fiir Deutsches Recht.
Landesgericht (Austria, Germany).
Law Journal Reports, Chancery (England).
Law Journal Reports, New Series, Exchequer, 1831- (England).
The Law Journal, New Series, 1831- (London).
Law Journal Reports, Privy Council (England).
Lloyd's List Law Reports (England).
Lawyers' Reports, Annotated (United States).

xxxii

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

L.R.C.C.R.

English Law Reports Crown Cases Reserved,

L.R. Ch.

English Law Reports, Chancery Appeal Cases,

L.R.C.P.

Mart. N.S. (La.)

English Law Reports, Common Pleas, I 866I87s, Io vols.
English Law Reports, Equity, I 866-I 87 5, 20
vols.
English Law Reports, Privy Council, Appeal
Cases, 6 vols.
English Law Reports, Queen's Bench, 10 vols.
Law Times Reports (England).
Manitoba Reports (Canada).
Les lois de la navigation ·maritime et de la
navigation interieure of I 92 8, originally enacted August 21, 1879 (inserted in the
Code of Commerce as book II, titles I-X).
Monatsschrift fiir Marken-, Patent-, und
W ettbewerbsrecht (Germany).
Nouveau Recueil general des traites et autres
actes relatifs aux rapports de droit international, publication de l'institut de droit public
compare et de droit de gens a Berlin. Continuation du grand Recueil de G. Fr. de
Martens, founded I 8 I 7.
Martin, Louisiana Reports, New Series, I 823-

Mass.
Md.
Md. L. Rev.
Me.
Mich.
Mich. L. Rev.
Minn.
Minn. L. Rev.
Misc.
Miss.
Miss. L.J.
Mitteilungen dt.
Ges. Volker R.

Massachusetts Reports.
Maryland Reports.
Maryland Law Review.
Maine Reports.
Michigan Reports.
Michigan Law Review.
Minnesota Reports.
Minnesota Law Review.
Miscellaneous Reports (New York).
Mississippi Reports.
Mississippi Law Journal.
Mitteilungen der deutschen Gesellschaft fiir
Volkerrecht (Berlin).

1866-1875·
1866-1875·

L.R. Eq.
L.R.P.C.
L.R.Q.B.
L.T.R.
Man. R.
Maritime Code
(Belgium)

Markenschutz und
Wettbewerb
Martens, Recueil

1830.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
Mixed Arb. Trib.
Mo.
Mo. App.
Modern L. Rev.
Mo. L. Rev.
Monitore
Mont.
Montreal L.R.S.C.
Moo. P.C.
Moo. P .C. Cas.
(N.S.)
M.&W.
National Conference Handbook
N.C.
N.E.
N.E. (2d)
Neb.
Neb. L. Rev.
N.F.

N.H.
N.J.
N.J. Law
N.J.Eq.
N.J.L.J.
N.J. Misc.
N.M.
Nouv. Revue
N.S.
N.S.R.

xxxiii

Mixed Arbitral Tribunal.
Missouri Reports.
Missouri Appellate Reports.
The Modern Law Review (London).
Missouri Law Review.
Monitore dei Tribunali.
Montana Reports.
Montreal Law Reports, Superior Court
(Canada).
Moore, English Privy Council Reports.
Moore's Privy Council Cases, New Series, 9
vols. (England).
Meeson & Welsby, English Exchequer Re·
ports, 1 6 vols.
Handbook of the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
and Proceedings (United States).
North Carolina Reports.
Northeastern Reporter (National Reporter
System, United States).
Northeastern Reporter (National Reporter
System, United States) Second Series.
Nebraska Reports.
Nebraska Law Review.
"Neue Folge" meaning new series, to indicate
the beginning of new numbering in periodicals, collections of court reports etc. in the
German language.
New Hampshire Reports.
Nederlandsche Jurisprudentie.
New Jersey Law Reports.
New Jersey Equity Reports.
New Jersey Law Journal.
New Jersey Miscellaneous Reports.
New Mexico Reports.
Nouvelle Revue de droit international prive.
New series, if added to court reports, periodicals, etc.
Nova Scotia Reports (Canada) •

xxxiv
N.W.
N.Y.
N.Y.L.J.
N.Y. Misc.
N.Y. St. Rep.
N.Y. Supp.
N.Y. Supp. (2d)

Oberapp. Ger.

0 Direito
OGH.
Okla.
OLG.
O.L.R.
O.N.P.
O.R.
Ore.
O.W.N.

P.
Pa.
Pac.
Pac. (2d)
Pa. D. & C.
Paige
Pand. Belges
Pand. Fer.
Pasicrisie
Pa. St.
Pa. Super. Ct.
P.D.
Peake Add. Cas.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
Northwestern Reporter (National Reporter
System, United States).
New York Court of Appeals Reports.
New York Law Journal.
New York Miscellaneous Reports.
New York State Reporter.
New York Supplement Reports (National Reporter System, United States).
New York Supplement Reports (National Reporter System, United States) Second
Series.
Oberappellationsgericht (Germany).
0 Direito. Revista Mensal de Legisla<;ao,
Doutrina e Jurisprudencia (Brazil).
Oberster Gerichtshof (Austria).
Oklahoma Reports.
Oberlandesgericht (Germany and Austria).
Ontario Law Reports (Canada).
Ohio Nisi Prius Reports.
Ontario Reports (Canada).
Oregon Reports.
The Ontario Weekly Notes (Canada).
English Law Reports, Probate Division.
Pennsylvania Reports.
Pacific Reporter (National Reporter System,
United States).
Pacific Reporter (National Reporter System,
United States) Second Series.
Pennsylvania District and County Reports.
Paige, New York Chancery Reports.
Pandectes belges.
Pandectes periodiques. Recueil de jurisprudence (Belgium).
Pasicrisie beige. Recueil general de la jurisprudence des cours et tribunaux de Belgique.
Pennsylvania State Reports.
Pennsylvania Superior Court Reports.
Probate Division, English Law Reports.
Peake's Additional Cases, Nisi Prius, 1 vol.,
1795-1812 (England).

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
Pet. S.C.
P.G.R.
Phillips
Poland, Interlocal
Priv. Law
Poland, Int. Priv.
Law
Praxis
Preuss. Ges.
Sam mi.
Priv. Int. Law
Q.B.
Q.B.D.
Que.
Que.
Que.
Que.

K.B.
Q.B.
Pr.
S.C.

R.
Rb.
Recht

Rec. Somm.
Recueil
Recueil trib. arb.
mixtes
Republica Argentina, Segundo
Congreso Sudamencano

XXXV

Peter's United States Supreme Court Reports,
vols. 26 to 41.
Liechtensteinisches Zivilgesetzbuch, Personenund Gesellschaftsrecht.
Phillips, English Chancery Reports.
Polish Law of August 2, I 926, on Interlocal
Private Law.
Polish Law of August 2, I926, on International Private Law.
Die Praxis des Bundesgerichts (Switzerland).
Preussische Gesetzsammlung.
Private International Law.
Queen's Bench, English Law Reports, 189I-.
English Law Reports, Queen's Bench Division, I 876-1890.
, King's Bench Reports (Quebec, Canada).
Queen's Bench Reports (Quebec, Canada).
Quebec Practice Reports (Canada).
Quebec Official Reports, Su~rior Court
(Canada).
Rettie, Crawford and Melville, (Fourth Series) Scotch Session Cases, 2 5 vols.
Rechtbank (the Netherlands).
Das Recht, Obersicht iiber Schriftum und
Rechtsprechung, begriindet I 897 von Dr.
Hs. W. Soergel, Berlin. (Since I935 Beilage zu "Deutsche Justiz" Amtliches Blatt
der deutschen Rechtspflege, Berlin.)
Recueil des sommaires de la jurisprudence
franc;aise.
Recueil des cours de 1'Academie de droit international de la Haye.
Recueil des decisions des tribunaux arbitraux
mixtes.
Segundo Congreso Sudamericano de Derecho
Internacional Privado, Montevideo 193940, ed. Republica Argentina, Ministerio de
Relaciones Exteriores y Culto, Buenos Aires

1940.

xxxvi

LIST OF

Req.
Rev. C. Obi.
Rev. de Jur.
Rev. Der. Juris.
Adm.
Revista del Foro
Revista de los Trib.
Revista Der. Jur. y
Ciencias Soc.
Revista Der. Priv.
Revista Dir.
Revista Dir. Com.
Revista Gen. Legis!.
y Jur.
Revista Jur.
Revista Sup. Trib.
Rev. Jur. Bras.
Rev. Trim. D. Civ.
Revue
Revue Crit.
Revue Dor
Revue Dr. Int.
(Bruxelles)
Revue Inst. Beige

Revue Int. Dr.
Marit.

ABBREVIATIONS

Chambre des requetes de la cour de cassation
(France).
Revised Code of Obligations, Revidiertes Obligationenrecht (Switzerland).
Revue de Jurisprudence (Quebec, Canada).
Revista de Derecho, Jurisprudencia y Administraci6n (Uruguay).
La Revista del Foro. Organo del Colegio de
Abogada; (Peru).
Revista de los Tribunales (Peru).
Revista de Derecho, J urisprudencia y Ciencias
Sociales (Chile).
Revista de Derecho Privado (Spain).
Revista de Direito Civil, Commercial e Criminal (Brazil).
Revista de Direito Comercial (Brazil).
Revista General de Legislaci6n y Jurisprudencia (Spain).
Revista Jurfdica. Doutrina-JurisprudenciaLegislac;ao (Brazil).
Revista do Supremo Tribunal (Brazil).
Revista de J urisprudencia Brasileira (Brazil).
Revue trimestrielle de droit civil (France).
Revue de droit international prive. Fondee par
A. Darras.
Revue critique de droit international.
Revue de droit maritime compare, fondee par
Leopold Dor. Paris, 1923.
Revue de droit international et de legislation
comparee. Fondee par Rolin Jaequemyns,
Asser et Westlake.
Institut Belge de droit compare, Revue tri). Originally: Remestrielle (1924vue de l'Institut de droit compare ( 19081914). Suspended 1915-1921. 1922I 924: Institut Beige de droit compare,
Bulletin trimestriel (See Bull. Inst. Beige).
Revue internationale du droit maritime, Paris,
188s-1922.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
RG.
RGBI.
RGZ.
Rhein. Arch.
Rheinische Z. f.
Zivil- und
Prozessrecht

R.I.
Riv. Dir. Com.
Rivista
Rivista Dir. Int. di
Napoli
Rivista Dir. Priv.
Rivista Italiana

R.L.
ROHG.
ROHGE.
ROLG.

R.R.
Rspr.

Rv.
Ry.

&M.

s.
Sachs. Arch.
S.A.L.R. App. D.
S.A.L.R.
Transvaal Prov.
Div.

xxxvii

Reichsgericht (Germany).
Reichsgesetzblatt (Germany).
Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichts m Zivilsachen (Germany).
Rheinisches Archiv fiir Zivil- und Strafrecht.
Rheinische Zeitschrift fiir Zivil- und Prozessrecht des In- und Auslandes, I908-1925.
Rhode Island Reports.
Rivista del diritto commerciale, Milano, I 903Rivista di diritto internazionale.
Rivista di diritto internazionale e di legislazione comparata.
Rivista di diritto privato.
Rivista italiana di diritto internazionale privato e processuale.
Revue legale (Canada).
Reichsoberhandelsgericht (Germany).
Entscheidungen des Reichsoberhandelsgerichtes (Germany).
Die Rechtsprechung der Oberlandesgerichte
auf dem Gebiete des Zivilrechts (Germany).
Revised Reports (England).
Die Rechtsprechung. Herausgegeben vom
V erband osterreichischer Banken und
Bankiers; redigiert von Bergel, LObel und
Wahle (Vienna).
W etboek van Burgerlijke Regtsvordering (the
Netherlands).
Ryan & Moody, English Nisi Prius Reports
(England).
Sirey, Recueil general des lois et des arrets
(France).
Siichsisches Archiv fiir Rechtspflege.
South African Law Reports, Appellate Division.
South African Law Reports, Transvaal Provincial Division.

XXXVlll

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

S.C.

S.C. (H.L.)
Schweiz. Verein. f.
Int. R.
Scot. L.R.
Scot. L. Rev.
S.C.R.
S. Ct.

S.E.
Seman. Jud.

Seuff. Arch.

Sem. Jud.
Sett. Cass.
SJZ.
So.
Sol. J.
SpR.
S.R.
Strange
St. R. & 0.
Sup. Trib. Fed.

s.w.
s.w.

(2d)

South Carolina Reports; Sessions Cases
Supreme Court Reporter
(Scotch);
(United States).
Court of Session Cases, House of Lords (Scotland).
Schweizerische Vereinigung fiir Internationales Recht.
Scottish Law Reporter.
Scottish Law Review.
Supreme Court Reports (Canada).
Supreme Court Reporter (National Reporter System, United States) ; Supreme
Court; Suprema Corte.
Southeastern Reporter (National Reporter
System, United States).
Semanario Judicial de la Federaci6n. Sentencias dictadas por la Suprema Corte (Mexico).
J. A. Seuffert's Archiv fiir Entscheidungen
der obersten Gerichte in den deutschen
Staaten.
La Semaine judiciaire (Switzerland).
Settimana della Cassazione (Italy).
Schweizerische Juristen Zeitung.
Southern Reporter (National Reporter System, United States) .
Solicitor's Journal (London).
Spruchrepertorium des Obersten Gerichtshofes (Austria).
Liechtensteinisches Zivilgesetzbuch, Sachenrecht.
Strange's Reports, English King's Bench, 2
vols.
Statutory Rules and Orders (Great Britain).
Supremo Tribunal Federal (Brazil).
Southwestern Reporter (National Reporter
System, United States).
Southwestern Reporter (National Reporter
System, United States) Second Series.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
Swab.
Swan.
Swiss Code Obi.

sz.
Tenn.
Tenn. App.
Tenn. L. Rev.
Terr. L. R.
Tex.
Tex. Civ. App.
Tex. L. Rev.
Themis
T.L.R.
T.R.
T. & R.

Trib. civ.
Trib. com.
Trib. corr.
Trib. Marit.
Trib. paix
Trib. Supr.
Tul. L. Rev.
U.C.C.P.
U.C.Q.B.
U.L.A.
U. of Chi. L. Rev.
U. of Detroit L. J.
U. of Pa. L. Rev.
U. of Toronto L. J.

Swabey, English Admiralty Reports.
Swanston, English Chancery Reports, 3 vols.
Das Obligationenrecht, Bundesgesetz betreffend die Erganzung des schweizerischen
Zivilgesetzbuches. March 30, 191 I.
Sammlung der Entscheidungen des 5sterreichischen Obersten Gerichtshofes in Zivilund J ustizverwaltungssachen. V eroffentlicht von seinen Mitgliedern (Austria).
Tennessee Reports.
Tennessee Civil Appeals Reports.
Tennessee Law Review.
North-West Territories Law Reports (Canada).
Texas Reports.
Texas Civil Appeals Reports.
Texas Law Review.
9ep.~; (Themis) Weekly Law Journal,
Athens, I 89o-.
Times Law Reports (England).
Term Reports (Durnford & East) (England).
Turner & Russell, English Chancery Reports.
Tribunal civH (France).
Tribunal de commerce (France).
Tribunal correctionnel (France).
Tribunal maritime, Maritime Tribunal.
Tribunal de paix (France).
Tribunal Supremo.
Tulane Law Review.
Upper Canada Common Pleas Reports.
Upper Canada Queen's Bench Reports.
Uniform Laws, Annotated (United States).
University of Chicago Law Review.
University of Detroit Law Journal.
University of Pennsylvania Law Review and
American Law Register.
University of Toronto Law Journal.

x1

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

u.s.
u.s.c.
U.S.C.A.
U.S.C.C.A.
Utah
Va.
Va. L. Rev.
Vt.

w.

Wall.
Warn. Rspr.

Wash.
Wash. & Lee. L.
Rev.
Wash. L. Rev.

United States Reports.
Code of the Laws of the United States of
America.
Code of the Laws of the United States of
America, Annotated.
United States Circuit Courts of Appeals Reports.
Utah Reports.
Virginia Reports.
Virginia Law Review.
Vermont Reports.
Weekblad van het Recht (the Netherlands).
Wallace, United States Supreme Court Reports, vols. 68-90.
Die Rechtsprechung des Reichsgerichts auf
dem Gebiete des Zivilrechts, herausgegeben
von 0. W arneyer (Germany).
Washington State Reports.
Washington and Lee Law Review.

W.Va. L. Q.
W.W.R.
Yale L. J.
Zab.

Washington Law Review.
Sir William Blackstone, English King's
Bench Reports.
Wheaton, United States Supreme Court Reports, vols. q.-25.
Wisconsin Reports.
Western Law Reporter (Canada).
Wisconsin Law Review.
English Law Reports, Weekly Notes.
West Virginia Reports.
Woods, United States Circuit Court Reports, 4 vols.
West Virginia Law Quarterly.
Western Weekly Reports (Canada).
Yale Law Journal.
Zabriskie, New Jersey Law Reports, vols.

Z. AK. deutsches R.

Zeitschrift der Akademie fiir deutsches Recht.

W. Bl.
Wheat.
Wis.
W.L.R.
Wis. L. Rev.
W.N.
W.Va.
Woods

21-24.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

xli

Z. ausl. off. R.

Zeitschrift fiir ausliindisches offentliches
Recht und Volkerrecht. Berlin und Leipzig

Z. ausl. PR.

Zeitschrift fiir auslandisches und internationales Privatrecht. Founded by Ernst
Rabel.
Schweizerisches Zivilgesetzbuch (Swiss Civil
Code).
Zeitschrift des Bernischen Juristenvereins
(Switzerland).
Zentralblatt fiir die Juristische Praxis. Continuation of Geller's Zentralblatt (Austria).
Zeitschrift fiir Ostrecht. (See also Z.osteurop.

I929-·

ZBG.
ZBJV.
Zentralblatt
Z. f. Ostrecht

R.).
Z. f. Volkerrecht
Z. Handelsr.
Z. int. R.
Z. osteurop. R.

ZPO.
Z. Schweiz. R.

Zeitschrift fiir Volkerrecht, Breslau, I 907-.
Zeitschrift fiir das gesamte Handelsrecht und
Konkursrecht, Stuttgart.
Niemeyer's Zeitschrift fiir internationales
Recht.
Zeitschrift fiir asteuropaisches Recht. (In
I927 merged with Ostrecht into Zeit~
schrift fiir Ostrecht. Continued since I 934
as Zeitschrift fiir osteuropaisches Recht. See
also Z.f.Ostrecht).
Zivilprozessordung (Code of Civil Procedure
of Germany and Austria).
Zeitschrift fiir schweizerisches Recht.

PART SIX
CORPORATIONS AND KINDRED
ORGANIZATIONS
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in 17 id. (1943) 575·

CHAPTER

18

Types of Organizations, Nationality,
and Domicil

T

HE essential incidents of the activities of any legal
entity are controlled by one municipal law, a single
ubiquitous personal law, parallel to the statute personal of individuals. This is recognized in the legislation of
all countries in the world, despite a contrary theory propounded by Pillee which has created much doctrinal confusion, and despite a useless theoretical dispute whether a
corporate entity is susceptible of "status" or of "capacity."
Even the American conflicts law, which has tended to reduce
the sphere of the law of domicil as governing the status of
individuals, gives broad effect to the law of the state in which
a corporation has been created.
This law governs existence, capacity, internal structure,
external legal relations, modifications of the charter and dissolution of the legal entity. The importance of this principle
cannot be overemphasized.
In the United States this conception is essentially, though
not to its full extent, implemented by the Full Faith and
Credit Clause of the Federal Constitution. Thus, state courts
have been required to follow the constitution, laws, and
judicial decisions of the corporation's home state in order to
determine such questions as that of stockholders' liability. 2
1

PILLET, Personnes Morales 46 §§ 341f.
Converse v. Hamilton (1912.) :z.z4 U.S. 243; Selig v. Hamilton (1914)
234 U. S. 652. CORWIN, "The Full Faith and Credit Clause," 81 U. of Pa. L.
Rev. (1933) 371, 386 ad n. 65, classifies this case into the formula of Mr.
Justice Holmes, that relationships ought to be governed by the law under which
they were formed. But this idea does not explain why the law of the corporation and not that of the stockholder governs.
2

3
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But the criterion determining this personal law may take
either of two forms. While, in common law countries and a
few others, the law of the state of incorporation controls, in
most civil law countries a corporate entity is subject to the
law of the state in which it has its permanent central office of
management (headquarters, domicil, "seat"). 3
The details of this contrast will be discussed later. At
this place we consider, with the help of elementary comparative observations respecting the municipal laws, what organizations are potentially susceptible of having a personal law.

I.
I.

CATEGORIES OF ORGANIZATIONS

Survey

The Restatement/ in an elaborate chapter on "corporations," declares "incorporation" to be the process by which
official representation is substituted for individual action in
causing liability of members, whether limited or unlimited
and whether in contract or tort. 5 This description has its origin
in the theory that a corporation is nothing else than the members acting in their capacity as a corporate body. 11 Whatever
the merits of this theory may be (and it may have some virtue
as an antidote for the noxious fiction theory likewise adopted
in the Restatement), representation will not serve as an exclusive mark of incorporation because, on the one hand,
partners also may be represented by administrators, possibly
widely empowered, and, on the other hand, a membership
corporation may reserve all important decisions to the general meeting of the members.
3 In English, the expression "seat" has been repeatedly used to translate the
French siege social, German Geschiiftssitz, and officially in the English text of
Pan-American documents, particularly so in the Presidential Proclamation of
August 21, 1941, 55 Stat. 1201, 1204, on the juridical personality of foreign
companies.
4
As in the first volume, "Restatement" means the Restatement of the Law of
Conflict of Laws (1934).
5
Restatement § xs:z comment e.
8
Restatement § 1 sz comment a.
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Thus, the concept of "corporation" itself, which the Restatement fails to define, remains somewhat obscure. The
Restatement does, however, make clear that the chapter on
corporations is limited exclusively to incorporated "associations of individuals." Hence, the rules therein adduced do
not apply to foreign states, to what are called in this country
municipal corporations, nor to civil law foundations. In
modern theory, the state recognized as a legal person is an
institution, not a mere association of individuals. In fact,
although "corporation" in American terminology may denote
(I) any distinct legal entity, equivalent to "juristic person"
in the conception of civil law, ordinarily, however, it seems
either to indicate ( 2) private incorporated associations formed
by persons, or to refer (3), still more narrowly, to associations incorporated for business purposes, this being the most
common usage. The Restatement conceives of a corporation ·
as "any association of individuals," adopting thereby the
second meaning with the only difference that in speaking
of individuals the possibility of corporations being members
of a corporation is overlooked. In the further course of its
development, however, without saying it, the Restatement
gives attention almost exclusively to business corporations,
which in itself is justified. The emphasis on these corporations
corresponds with their prevalence in legal practice, and the
gaps thus left uncovered by the Restatement are not difficult
to fill.
More serious than the neglect of nonprofit corporations
and the disregard of public corporations is the silence regarding all associations that are not corporations. The Restatement
has simply provided a chapter on corporations and a chapter
on "contracts." In the latter, it has set out a few rules merely
purporting to fix the place of contracting in contracts concluded among partners (§ 342), or between partners and

6
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third parties (§§ 315, 318, 328-331), and a few rules in
which the powers of partners to act for the partnership are
identified with the authorization of any other agent (§§ 343345). Apparently, the neat old contrast of company and
partnership is responsible for this arrangement. The innumerable mixed forms of association that have developed
in the last century are ignored. Moreover, the common assumption is perpetuated that a partnership can be adequately
analyzed in terms of contractual relationship. But partnership, as it exists in England and the United States and in
commercial use all over the world, is not a societas, as in
ancient Rome (or in the German Civil Code), based on a
contract as distinguished from an association and existent
only in the person of the partners; it has entity aspects, a
fact that requires recognition in conflicts law.
To find our way through these doubts, we may be permitted to adjust the usual American terminology to a broad
classification of the organizations involved under the following scheme:
(a) Legal (or juristic, or moral) persons are entities having separate existence as subjects of rights and obligations in
private law. They include:
(i) Public legal persons, such as the state itself, and the
municipal and other public organizations created by the state
as distinct persons, as well as certain other bodies.
(ii) Private incorporated associations (corporations in the
second meaning supra), these being1. Business corporations,
2. Incorporated nonprofit associations,
3· Co-operative associations.
(iii) Private foundations, constituting independent units
after the model pia corpora of the law of Justinian. Charitable
corporations and charitable trusts may be put in this class.
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(b) Unincorporated associations/ including(i) Nonincorporated nonprofit associations,
(ii) Limited partnerships, limited partnership associations,
joint stock companies, and business trusts,
(iii) General partnerships.
(c) Contracts of joint undertaking, that is, contractual arrangements such as joint adventures (societas unius rei),
contracts of joint tenancy, et cetera.
Whatever comparisons may be made in this field, the
basic concept, valid for the legislation of every country and
every purpose, must be and is that of legal personality. This
is a very simple concept developed by the Roman jurists and
adopted everywhere. The essential feature of a legal person
is that it is a person other than an individual and entirely
distinct from any individual. An incorporated association is
"a legal person apart from its members," a notion thoroughly
familiar to American lawyers. 8 The complete independence
of the corporate person as a subject of rights and duties in
respect to third parties, and not any form of representation
of the members, is the decisive factor. Incorporation is the
process by which this legal person is brought into being; an
organization is endowe~ with personality.
It seems opportune here to mention the most important
types of business organizations in common use and, as we
shall have to concentrate mostly on commercial organizations,
to add a brief survey of the other legal persons.
Private Business Organizations
The prototype of all corporate bodies in the modern world
of private business is the regular stock corporation with transferable shares, the liability of the members being limited to
2.

7

Terminology following §

par. XIV of the Model Business Corporation

I

Act.
8 STEVENS,

Corporations, Ch.

I

§ 1.
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their contribution to the capital and the members participating in the profits and surplus according to some fixed proportion. There are varied additional characteristics inherent
in the different types of stock corporations, represented by
the usual American shareholder corporation, the English
public company, the French societe anonyme, and the German Aktiengesellschaft, but the indicated elements are the
features common to all. 11
Akin to this fundamental type are French and German
stock corporations with shares en commandite, that is, having
at least one member with unlimited personal liability for the
company's debts.
Furthermore, "private limited companies"10 have sprung
up in recent decades as younger brothers of the ordinary stock
company. Based on capital stock quotas rather than on the
personal liability of the members, these are definitely not
partnerships in the ordinary sense. But restrictions on the
transfer of shares and other measures to lessen the dangers
to the public, make it possible for legislatures to reduce the
onerous formalities and security requirements that regular
stock corporations have to bear in Europe and Latin America.
The model for all these minor forms of stock corporations
has been the German Gesellschaft mit beschriinkter Haftung
(GmbH.), introduced in 1898 and since then adopted in
almost all civil law countries with more or less modifications
(societe a responsibilite limitee, sociedad a responsibilidad
limitada, et cetera). In England, a modifi.ed form of stock
company, developed in the legal practice, has been authorized
by the Companies Acts of 1913 and 1929.11
9 G. HAMBURGER, 2 Rechtsvergl. Handworterbuch 59 at 6o, u6. Cf. also
STREICHENBERGER, Sociches anonymes de France et d'Angleterre (Lyon 1933)
JI.
10
ScHUSTER, The German Commercial Code (London 191I) 235.
11 See WRIGHTINGTON, ''Private Companies," xo Am. Bar Asso. Jour. (1924)
475 who advocated a similar type for this country to unburden private business
in restricted associations.
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Where an organization did not satisfy all the conditions
of incorporation, the traditional theory saw in it nothing but
some kind of contractual arrangement. The Restatement, as
indicated, conforms to this tradition. It was also adopted in
the highly elaborate provisions of the German Civil Code,
framed toward the end of the last century. These prescribed
that associations not having obtained juristic personality
should be treated under the rules on "society," the members
of which, among other particulars, may not be changed and
are liable for the debts (BGB. § 54, sent. 2 ). The German
courts, however, were not long embarrassed by this awkward
construction; through ingenious interpretations, they arrived
at conclusions ascribing to various "unincorporated associations" almost every attribute of incorporated associations.
This perhaps most outstanding example of law, judge-made
against the express direction of the legislature, appeared indispensable for the many thousands of groups that otherwise
would have operated in a dubious legal status. Parallel developments can be found in the adjudications of all the other
countries, such as, for instance, the various types of the socalled de facto corporations.
There is a rich variety of instances in which corporate and
partnership elements appear mixed in one combination or
another. Many doubts and learned discussions have arisen
concerning the two questions: (I) whether a mercantile
partnership is an aggregate or a legal unit and ( 2), if this is
denied as by the dominant theory of the common law or the
German law, then nevertheless whether a partnership should
not be assimilated to fully incorporated bodies in certain important respects or for certain purposes. There have been
analogous disputes about the nature of business trusts, de
facto corporations, and other organizations "hybrid in nature,
savoring of both corporations and partnership.m2
12

Oklahoma Fullers Earth Co. v. Evans

Pac. (zd) 899, 901,

(I 9 3 7)

I

79 Okla. 124, 12.5, 64
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Among the particular reasons for emphasizing the corporate elements of these mixed types, is the fact that on the
existence of such entity aspects may depend a decision whether
a personal law is to be ascribed to a business organization.
Then too, significant conflicts problems are produced by the
diversity of legal conceptions according to which parallel organizations are differently classifi.ed. For instance, mercantile partnerships are regarded as legal persons in the French
doctrine, followed in Belgium, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Brazil,
Mexico, and most other Latin countries, whereas AngloAmerican, German, Swiss, Dutch, Argentine, and other
courts prevailingly regard partnerships under their respective
laws as mere aggregates of individuals.
Modern theory has paved the way to do justice to every
one of the many types of combined structure. If doctrinal
prejudices are avoided, it will become possible to formulate
the conflicts rule applicable to partially corporated bodies. 13
It is significant that in the legal language of all civil law
countries one finds a single comprehensive term to embrace
corporations, partnerships, and all intervening types, such
as French societes, Spanish sociedades, Italian societa, German
H andelsgesellschaften. In the documents of the Pan-American Union, sociedad is translated by company, a term recently
much employed in England and in bilateral treaties in the
same broad meaning. In this country, the term business association reflects the feeling, which appears universal at
present, that all these types are functionally and analytically
related.
3. Public Legal Persons
States. From Savigny's time, the generally accepted view
has been that recognition given to a state according to the
rules of public international law, implies recognition of its
13

See infra pp. too,

115, 116.
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capacity in private law matters. States thus enjoy full capacity without any special grant. 13 In particular, they may
bring suits to the extent allowed to all foreigners in general
and, in principle, may receive donations and legacies as well
as immovables on the same basis. Their activities, however,
like those of other foreign persons, may be restricted by the
locallaw. 16 International law does not guarantee states more
than a right to the usual buildings for diplomatic and consular representation. 17 All these propositions 18 were decided
in the careful consideration of two cases: that of Zappa, a
former Greek national, who appointed the Greek state heir
to his immovables in Rumania and South Germany; 19 and
that of the Countess de Plessis-Belliere, who left her estate
in France to the Holy See. 20
·
Public corporations. By further universal acceptance, recognition of a state extends ipso jure to all instruments of
government exercising political powers of the state and endowed by it with separate legal personality, such as provinces
or municipal corporations. The same is true with respect to
charitable, educational, and religious corporations, performing public but nongovernmental functions and established by
14
FooTE 87; r FIORE§ 303; WErss, 2 Traite 39o; MATOS§ rr9; on the
Code of Chile, see 3 VICO §§ 40-42. In application to the United States, Story,
]., in U.S. v. Tingey (r83r) 5 Pet. S.C. IIS; as to the states, Grier, J., in
Cotton v. U. S. (r8so) I I How. 229.
15
C6digo Bustamante, art. 32; Montevideo Treaty on Civil Law (r889)
art. 3 ; Argentina : C. C. art. 34; 3 Vi co § 7 I.
16
2 BAR 67r; 2 WHARTON§ 746 ~;WESTLAKE§ 192; Trib. Montdidier
(Feb. 4, 1892) legacy to the Pope, see RENAULT, Clunet I893, ur8; App.
Colmar (Dec. rz, I933) Revue 1935, q8.
17
See below, p. r65 on the applicability of the French C. C. art. 9IOj p.
r66 on the capacity to acquire immovables.
18
German RG. (19I3) 83 RGZ. 367; (I9I8) 92 RGZ. 76.
19
Case Zappa (I89z), see DESJARDINS, "Des droits en Roumanie d'un Etat
etranger appele par testament a recueillir la succession d'un de ses sujets,"
Clunet I 893, I009; opinions by RENAULT, WOESTE, and LEJEUNE, Clunet 1893,
nr8, and of the Faculty of Berlin, 3 Z.int.R. (1893) 275.
2
Case of Plessis-Belliere (I89o) App. Amiens (Feb. 2I, I893) Clunet
1893, 384; cf. DuBOIS, "La papaute devant le droit international public et
prive," Clunet 19 I o, 374·

°
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the state as legal entities in private law. 21 These latter
"juristic persons of public law," which do not correspond
with geographical segments of the country, are called in
France "etablissements publics,"22 and in Germany "offentlichrechtliche Stiftungen" or "Anstalten."23
It follows that the question whether legal personality is
bestowed upon a governmental unit, is determined by the
state to which it belongs, and by no means according to the
lex fori. 24 Accordingly and by way of example, a state university not exclusively maintained by the state is not deemed
to be a public corporation, if its own state denies it this
nature. 25
Exceptions to the ipso jure recognition of foreign public
establishments seem, however, to be made in some LatinAmerican countries/ 6 especially in the case of church institutions. Quite generally speaking, the C6digo Bustamante
does not assure recognition for foreign administrative organisms (corporaciones) according to the law "that has
created or recognized them,m 7 but leaves it to the pleasure
of the "territoriallaw.ms
21
PILLET, Personnes Morales § 49· This does refer to chambers of commerce but not to the so-called foreign chambers of commerce, the first of which
was in Yokohama in I866, and the second the Belgo-American chamber in
New York. The French Supreme Court, Cass. (req.) (Nov. 7, I933) Revue
Crit. I935, I09 held a "foreign chamber" in Paris to be a private association.
Argentina: C. C. art. 34·
22
See 7 Repert. 6so No. z.
23
NEUMEYER, I Int. Verwaltungs R. I40.
24
7 Repert. 6soff. No. z.
25
This is the doctrine of internal law developed in this country according to
BALLANTINE, Corporations 46, 8 I o.
26
Infra p. I66 n. I98. Rules are missing in e.g., Venezuela, GOLDSTONE, I7
Tul. L. Rev. (I943) at 587. The C6digo Bustamante, arts. 3I-33 grants unconditional recognition only to the states; Treaty of Montevideo on Civil Law
(I889) art 3; Brazil, C.C. art. 20 refers to private juristic persons only;
Savigny's antiquated theory of "persons of necessary existence" has complicated
rather than facilitated the Latin-American doctrines.
27
This obscure language may induce one to think that State X has to recognize a legal person invalidly created in State Y because its personality has
been recognized in State Z which is participant in the convention. This, in my
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4· Foundations and Trusts29
In the civil law countries, a foundation is a juristic person
of private law, consisting of assets perpetually bound to
serve a certain purpose and existing independently of any
individuals. The administrators of the assets are not owners
at law as is an Anglo-American trustee or as in the case of a
gift subject to a charge (donatio sub modo).
The problem of conflicts law has been thoroughly reviewed
in the litigation respecting the foundation of Niederfiillbach.
King Leopold II of Belgium created a private foundation
with large funds in the city of Coburg, Germany, with the
governmental authorization of the Duchy of Coburg, but for
purposes which were to be performed in Belgium. The
experts were of the unanimous opinion that the validity of
the foundation depended upon the law of the place where
the "seat" or central office of administration was to be. The
country where its activities had to be exercised (Belgium)
was considered quite as immaterial as were the national law
of the founder and the place where the deed was executed.
There was controversy only upon the question whether the
stipulation of the deed fixing the seat of the foundation in
Coburg, corresponded with reality or was fictitious. 80
Accordingly, the rule has been generally sustained that the
creation, organization, capacity, and supervision of foundaopinion, is not the meaning, nor do these words express adherence to the principle of incorporation. The same words were used by the Spanish Civil Code, art.
37, cf. art. z8, and did not prevent the Spanish doctrine from following the
ordinary theory of central control. Probably the expression refers to the two
methods in municipal law of giving birth to legal persons, namely, by special
charter, the state creating the person, or by autonomy of the parties, on the
grounds of statutes authorizing the creation. The expression recurs, for instance,
in Guatemala, c.c. (I933) art. I7, and Honduras, c.c. art. s8.
28
C6digo Bustamante, art. 33, cf. 32., on which see infra p. 33 n. 1 I.
29
For comparative municipal law, see Les fondations, Part III of Travaux
de la Semaine internationale de droit (Paris I937 ).
30
The seat was assumed to be in Coburg by App. Bruxelles (April z, I9I3)
S.t9I3·4·9; NEUMEYER, zz Z.int.R. 484 and Revue I9I3, IS; VON LrszT, 2.7
Z.int.R. us, 12.8; contrarily, CHARLES DE VISSCHER, Revue I9I3, I83, 188.
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tions are to be governed by the law of the real central office
of administration. 5 1 This is a conflicts rule substantially similar in all respects to that concerning corporations in most
civil law countries.
The nearest analogue in common law to the civil law
foundation is a trust created for charitable uses. If the assets
of a trust are liable, apart from any liability either of the
trustees or of the beneficiaries, as, e.g., under an Oklahoma
statute, the analogy is very close. Since the American conflicts
rules on trusts differ in regard to immovable and movable
objects and according as they are created by settlement or
other transaction inter vivos or by will, this topic is correctly
treated in connection with property rather than the law of
persons. 32 However, it may be remarked in passing that the
tendency, indicated in the leading case of Hutchison v.
Ross33 and in the New York legislation,S4 of referring trusts
settled with New York trust companies to the law of New
York coincides with the continental conception. In fact, this
result would be more correctly reached by localizing a trust
at the place of its management rather than at the accidental
situs of the assets or, still worse, by ascribing a wholly fictitious localization to choses in action held in trust.

5· Associations for Nonprofit Purposes
Associations incorporated for purposes other than gain
have, I believe, been included in the Restatement's treatment
of corporations. They are governed by a personal law, determined practically in the same manner as that of business
31
German BGB. § So; NEUMEYER, I Int. Verwaltungs R. 143, 146;
MICHOUD, 2. Personnalite Morale §§ 32.0, 32.1; ARMINJON, Revue I9o2., 434;
CREMIEU, 8 Repert. 430 No. 19. On the scope see PILLET, Personnes Morales
§ 300; 2. ARMINJON (ed. 2.) § 178.
32
C/. Restatement § 2.94·
3
" (1933) 2.62. N.Y. 381, 187 N.E. 65, see also supra Vol. 1, 369.
34
Personal Property Law, art. 2. § ua.
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corporations. Differences exist, however, in the manner of
recognition. (Infra Chapter 22.)
Conclusion. In summary, we see that the recognition of
public establishments raises certain problems, while foundations and nonprofit associations clearly live under a personal
law analogous to that of business corporations.

6. Legal Persons with International Purposes35
Supranational legal bodies. The Holy See, before regaining temporal power by the Lateran Treaties, the International
and the European Danube Commissions, and later the League
of Nations were examples of autonomous organizations with
undoubted capacity in private law, although not derived
from one particular state. The United Nations and the PanAmerican Union are now outstanding examples. Capacity is
based either on multilateral conventions or on general
recognition.
Plurinational centralized legal bodies. Such public organizations as the International Postal Union, the World Red
Cross, the Union for the Protection of Literary and Artistic
Works in Bern, the International Health Office in Paris, and
the International Institute for Agriculture in Rome38 seem
to be explained as legal persons simultaneously constituted
in several states. Their private law capacity, however, as a
rule, flows from the one state charged with the enforcement
of the underlying multilateral agreement.
Plurinational decentralized legal bodies. There are many
hundreds 37 of business organizations and nonprofit associations for humanitarian or scientific purposes-among the
35
See NoRMANDIN, Du statut juridique des associations internationales (Paris
192.6). GuTZWILLER, u Mitteilungen dt. Ges. Volker R. (1933) II6; FERRARA, Le persone juridiche, in Tratatto di diritto civile (ed. Vassalli 1938)
Vol. II 2., 172..
88
Cass. Ita!., Sezioni Unite (Plenary) (Feb. z6, 1931) Rivista 1931, 386.
37
According to the lists annexed to the circulars of the International Chamber
of Commerce.
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oldest are the World Evangelical Alliance (I846) and the
Young Men's Christian Association (I 8 55 )-which carry on
activities throughout the world or over large territories, but:
under the present rules have to do without an adequate legal
unity. They have either to seek separate incorporation in the
several states or to be content with acquiring personality in
one state only. Both methods have grave drawbacks. Plurinationality except under special treaties lacks sound rules thus
far. An organization intended to work internationally is split:
into national branches, tied to a central office by free will and
convenience rather than by law. Three great associations of
this kind, the Institute for International Law, the International Law Association, and the International Chamber of
Commerce, encouraged by a Belgian statute of October 25,
I 9 I 9, allowing activity in the country to "scientific" international associations, 88 have inspired treaty proposals, but
their efforts failed. 39
Cartels. International cartels and business trusts, too, have
felt compelled to adjust their structure to the law of one
state. Where antitrust legislation, as in the United States,
is not affected, the parties have been able to organize under
a certain chosen law. 40
But also within the United States, multiple incorporation
has had a difficult development. 41 According to the theory
38
Foreign corporations of this type are, thereby, legally recognized (art. 8);
they must fulfill, however, certain conditions (arts. z and 3) in order to exercise
their activities in Belgium. See POULLET 2.50.
89
See Institute of Int. Law, Drafts of 1910, see Revue 191o, 559; of 19:13,
see 30 Annuaire ( 19:13) 97, 348, 385; Int. Chamber of Commerce, Discussions
in 192.3 and 191.8, cf. GUTZWILLER, supra n. 35, 153 n. 85; Report Politis,
Clunet 191.3, 465. All these propositions were inadvisable in fact and were
disapproved in opinions by the Institute of Foreign and International Private
Law in Berlin and the Institute for the Unification of Private Law in Rome.
40 See REINHOLD WOLFF in 4 Rechtsvergl. Handworterbuch 6:u; GEILER,
u Mitteilungen dt. Ges Volker R. (1933) 196; and in particular GuNTER
HOFHEINZ, Die Kartellbindung bei internationalen Kartellen (Heidelberg
1939) 63ff.
41
See FoLEY, "Incorporation, Multiple Incorporation, and the Conflict of
Laws," 4z Harv. L. Rev. ( 1929) 516.
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that a legal person is an artificial creature of the state, as
many corporations were believed to exist as there were incorporating states. 42 This obstacle is being gradually overcome by the courts, but also in this case an entirely satisfactory
solution frankly recognizing the corporate unity has not yet
been reached.
International public corporations for economic purposes.43
The most recent and important problem in this connection
concerns governmental institutions functioning like private
economic enterprises. The idea of clothing an undertaking
with the power of government but adjusting its daily life to
the pattern of businesss corporations was resorted to in this
country when the Tennessee Valley Authority was formed
and, in the international sphere, by conferring large autonomy
upon the Bank for International Settlements and, to a certain
extent, the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. Recently the creation of the International Air Transport Board, the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, with
many other organizations proposed, predicts the rise of an
international corporate life never before imagined.

II.
I.

THE NATIONALITY oF CoRPORATIONSu

Difference of Purpose from Conflicts Law

As a matter of strict classification, only conflicts problems
relative to corporations should be included in the subject of
42
This theory has been urged by Beale as late as in his treatise, 2. BEALE 902.;
cf. FUSINATO and ANZILO'l'TI, Rivista 1914, ISI, IS8.
43
A useful summary is given by W. FRIEDMANN, "International Public
Corporations," in 6 Modern L. Rev. (December 1943) tSs. On the Bank for
International Settlements, see Sir JoHN FISCHER WILLIAMS, Am. J. Int. Law
• 93 o, 66s.
44 The best qualified guides to the literature are the following works:
YoUNG, "The Nationality of a Juristic Person," :zz Harv. L. Rev. (1908) 1,
particularly describing the antiquated theories; SCHUSTER, "The Nationality and
Domicil of Trading Corporations," 2. Grotius Soc. ( 191 7) s7; ARMINJON, "La
nationalite des personnes morales," 34 Revue Dr. Int. (Bruxelles) ( 1902.) 3 81 ;
NEUMEYER, 1 Int. Verwaltungs R. ( 19 I o) I o6, and 12. Z. f. Volkerrecht
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conflict of laws. However, the Restatemene' 5 and many
treatises on conflicts law include a considerable part of the
rules of municipal law relating to foreign corporations. The
inclusion of this subject matter has some advantages; the
two aspects of corporate activities, national and international,
are interconne-cted, and the effort to separate them completely
results in giving a misleading picture. However, there is a
serious danger of confusion in the usual intermingling of
conflicts rules with local rules. Once Pillet attempted to
integrate both sets of rules in a broadly conceived law of
aliens (condition des hrangers).46 This effort could not be
more successful than the opposite tendency to extend conflicts law. While all aspects of corporate activity do need to
be seen in relation to one another, the conflicts rules applicable
to corporate action ought to be distinguished from legal and
administrative restrictions on the action of foreign corporations.
Failure to discern precisely the various purposes of the
rules regarding foreign corporations has largely contributed
to another unfortunate controversy, with a literature of fantastic proportions, on the question whether legal persons are
able to have a nationality, as though there were to be found
an answer necessarily covering international private law and
all branches of public law. Although the simple truth of
the matter has been known for de-cades to a number of
writers,47 the literature is too voluminous not to weigh
261; and, to be particularly recommended, NEUMEYER and GuTZWILLER,
Reports, in z Mitteilungen dt. Ges. Volker R. (1918) 149; 12 id. (1933)
129; PILLET, Personnes Morales; MAZEAUD, "De la nationalite des societes,"
Clunet 1928, 30-66; CAUVY, 10 Repert. (1931) 465.
45 In the long Chapter 6 of the Restatement, choice of law is treated in topic
1 (with exceptions);§§ x6s, x66, topics 4 and 6.
46
PILLET, Principes x68ff.; id., Traite 53 7ff., 334-ff.
47
See, for instance, BALLANTINE, Corporations § 8; almost all German
authors; 1 PoNTES DE MIRANDA 458 § 8; C6digo Bustamante separating "nationality" from "capacity"; and the study originally by Gil Borges, submitted by the Delegation of Peru to the Eighth Pan-American Conference
(Diario de Sesiones, Lima 1938, 6x8-8).
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heavily on many minds. Numerous authors and courts persist in using a language which suggests that they still believe
that a legal person, like an individual, has a nationality for
all purposes. Others deny that legal persons can have any
nationality at all. Both sides are right and wrong. A better
view is the following.
2.

Where Unity of Criterion Desirable

The conflicts problems of what law governs the existence
and activities of a corporation, are soluble without any regard
to the concept of nationality and must be solved separately
from all municipal rules. Under this aspect, a corporation is
called foreign when it is considered governed by the law
of a foreign state. In the United States, corporations created
in another state and, in Canada, those created in another
province, are foreign in contrast to corporations ~reated by
Congress or by the Dominion of Canada through its Secretary
of State, respectively.
But when recognition of foreign corporations and, in the
more frequent cases, when carrying on of business is made
dependent on reciprocity or on some kind of authorization,
it may be relevant to state to which particular country a corporation is considered to belong.
In all these three respects-personal law, recognition, and
permission to do business-the first two of which pertain to
conflicts law and the third to administrative law, the criterion
for ascribing a corporation to a determinate state should
evidently be identical. This important postulate of convenience seems to have been widely neglected.
A fourth application of the same test, once a test is chosen,
ought to be made in the fortunately rare cases in which conflicts rules themselves contain a discrimination between
nationals and foreigners. For instance, the German rule on
torts (EG. BGB. art. r 2) declares that a German national

20
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cannot be held liable for tort under foreign law to a larger
extent than under German municipal law. This rule applies
also to German corporations, and what is a German corporation is to be inferred from the German conflicts rule providing that a corporation centered in Germany lives under
German law. Under the conflicts rules of many countries,
nationals are entitled to avail themselves of the inheritance
law of the forum for claiming assets found in the territory,
despite divergent distributary statutes of the law governing
the succession upon death. 48 Here the term "national" again
may include legal persons.
3. Separate Fields
Outside of this circle of problems,. there exist innumerable
rules granting or denying the legal powers of domestic corporations to all foreign-created corporations or other legal
persons, or to those of certain favored countries. Merely as
examples, consider the multitudinous and heterogeneous provisions of taxation; the rules of jurisdiction regarding litigation of foreigners and attachment against them; the rules
relating to the choice between federal and state courts; procedural burdens such as the obligation to furnish security
for costs; 49 the prohibitions on owning or managing objects
such as immovables, ships, banks, radio stations; on receipt
of gifts and legacies; the principles of diplomatic protection
and international arbitration.
These rules of international, administrative, fiscal, juris48
France: Law of July I4, I8I9, art. 2, droit de prilevement.
Belgium: Law of April 27, I 865.
The Netherlands: Law No. s6 of April 7. I 869.
Germany: EG. BGB. art. 25 sent. z.
Brazil: C. C. of I9I6, lntrod. Law, art. I4, and numerous other LatinAmerican codes.
4 9 The clause of libre acces in the treaties is not considered as exempting from
the caution iudicatum solvi, see Swiss BG. (July 12, I934) 6o BGE. I 220
{construing the Treaty of Commerce of United States-Switzerland, of Nov. zs,
I8so, Nov. 8, I855).
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dictional, procedural, and private law, to which those of penal
law and criminal procedure may be added, are so different in
purpose that they cannot be construed on the same footing,
whether they refer expressly to domestic or to foreign juristic
persons, or to foreigners, citizens, or nationals in general.
In the correct method, each rule should be interpreted separately.
At present, the word "nationality" is intentionally avoided
in connection with corporations by some British and United
States official documents, consistently so by the Institute of
International Law and several Latin-American statutes. 50 On
the other hand, corporations have had nationality distinctly
ascribed to them by many statutes, treaties, 51 and recent
drafts, such as that of the Experts of the League of Nations112
and the C6digo Bustamante.53
The American umpire in the Mixed Claims Commission
between the United States and Germany had no doubt in
describing the Standard Oil Company of New York and two
other corporations as "American nationals," notwithstanding
the definition of an American national, which he underlined,
as "a person wheresoever domiciled owing permanent allegiance to the United States of America."54
That allegiance can properly be owed only by individuals,
is the main argument used against the nationality of juristic
50
Annuaire 19z9 II 301, cf. 141, 143ff.
For a survey on the language of the Latin-American statutes, see BoRGEs,
Informe 130-133·
.
51
E.g., Peace Treaty of Versailles, art. 54 par. 3 {status of Alsace-Lorraine
people); Convention on Air Navigation of Paris, Oct. 13 1 1919, art. 7 par. z.
Also British Peace Order. On the varying language of the treaties, see TRAVERs,
33 Recueil (1930) III z8; CAVAGLIERI, Dir. Int. Com. 186.
52
Am. J. Int. Law 19z8, Supp. 171, zo4 arts. 1, z, 4·
53
Art. I 6.
5
~ Mixed Claims Commission, U. S. and Germany, Administrative Decisions
and Opinions 66I, compared with the definition in Administrative Decision
No. I, id. I and I 89, I 93· United States on behalf of Lehigh Valley R. Co. v.
Germany (Oct. JI, 1939) Mixed Claims Commission, United States and Germany, Opinions and Decisions in the Sabotage Claims JZ 11 3Z4.
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persons. But, as usual, inexact terminology is innocuous when
its defects are known. If "nationality" is limited to the purposes of public law and if it is defined as the connection of a
corporation with another country, there can be no harm in
the use of the term. Only, it should be clear which purposes
are involved and which are not. Dangerous generalizations,
arising in fact from a careless use of the term nationality,
conspicuously appeared when the so-called theory of control,
grown up in matters of war seizure and liquidation, invaded
for a time the field of conflicts law. 55
However, the traditional doctrine confusing all these purposes has caused Anglo-American lawyers to look usually
to the state of incorporation 56 and civil law lawyers to the
state of central o:ffice/7 as being the home state of a legal
person in all respects. This view is incorrect without doubt.
Nevertheless, it is a fact in itself, and the reasons or predilections that engendered the two opposite tests of personal
law may well have presided also over their extension to
other fields.
We may take it that incorporation here, and central office
there, are widely applied criteria with a claim to subsidiary,
though not normal, application.
A few illustrations must suffice. Swiss authorities constantly declare companies to be citizens and nationals of the
country where they are incorporated and have their center. 58
55

InfrQ p. 58.

BORCHARD, ~iplomatic Protection § '1.77; SCHUSTER in '1. Grotius Soc.
( 1917) 64.
57
Cf. z STREIT-VALLINDAS 82.; KosTERS 659 n. 6; Italian Council of State
(May z7, 1918) Oiur. Ital. 1918 III ISo, Rivista 1919-2.0, 391-406 and
Note, SALVIOLI.
58 See Federal Council, BBl. 1876 III '1.46; 189z II 811 {diplomatic protection); RUEGGER in Schweizerische Vereinigung fiir Internationales Recht No. 10
(1918) (neutrality); BG. {July z2, 1889) 15 BGE. 570, S79; (Feb. 28,
189s) 20 BGE. 61 and other decisions on the application of treaties on jurisdiction and establishment. For decisions of other federal agencies see SCHNITZER
(Ed. :z.) z8o n. too, and cf. SAUSER-HALL, so Bull. Soc. Legis!. Comp. (1921)
236, 248.
56
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Similarly elsewhere, the test usual in conflicts law has been
applied to foreign corporations in defining their constitutional
rights 59 or their liability to provide security for costs/0 or
used as a criterion for jurisdiction61 or as sufficient to establish
federal jurisdiction because of diversity of "citizenship."62
Yet, in contrast with the choice of law rule of the forum,
the center of a corporation may be deemed to be the nominal
place designated in the charter,63 or the main place of business,
or despite adoption of the seat principle, the place of incorporation as such. Residence-"or some degree of residence"
-is a test in England for income tax, liability to be sued, and
to give security for costs, 6 ' and in the United States for the
purpose of venue65 or for qualifying a corporation as not
liable to foreign attachment. 66
59
United States: Muller v. Dows (1876) 94 U. S. 444 (on diversity of
citizenship); St. Louis & San Francisco R. Co. v. James (1895) 161 U.S. 545·
France: Cass. (req.) (May u, 1931) and Report Bricout, S. I9JZ.I.57·
England: Limerick and Waterford R. Co. v. Fraser (1827) 4 Bing. 394;
Edinburgh & Leith R. Co. v. Dawson (1839) 7 Dowl. P. C. 573; Kilkenny &
Great S. and W. R. Co. v. Feilden ( 1851) 6 Exch. 79, 8 3, Pollock, C. B.
60
Austria: OGH., Opinion on § 57 ZPO., see POLLACK, System des osterr.
Zivilprozessrechts (ed. 2) 177; WALKER 149 n. 29.
France: Trib. civ. Seine (April 13, 1877) Clunet 1878, 16o; Clunet 1899,
113; App. Colmar (Oct. 29, 1925) S. 1927.2.33; NIBOYET § 304; id., Revue
1927, 402.
Germany (formerly): RG. (Nov. 25, 1895) 36 RGZ. 393·
The Netherlands: Arnheim (June 28, 19:1.7) W. 117:1.3> N.J. (1928) 438
(Scottish principal establishment determinative).
61
Austria: Law of Aug. 1, 1895 (Jurisdictionsnorm) § 75·
France: (Competence under C.C. arts. 14 and 15) Trib. civ. Nevers (Dec.
15, 1891) Clunet 1892, 1023, Clunet 1899, 899, Clunet 1913, 1236.
Germany: ZPO. § 17.
62
United States: See D. 0. McGovNEY, "A Supreme Court Fiction," 56
Harv. L. Rev. (1943) 853.
Argentina: See 3 Vrco 79 § 82.
63
E.g., Germany: ZPO. § 17 (jurisdiction of courts); BGB. §§ u, 23
(jurisdiction of administrative authorities).
Switzerland: BG (Jan. 21, 1927) 53 BGE. I 124, 131, 134 (jurisdiction over
a corporation at its domicil).
64
See VAUGHAN WILLIAMS and CHRUSSACHI, 49 Law. Q. Rev. (1933) 337·
65
Cf. 2 BEALE§ 153·5·
66
Farnsworth v. Terre Haute R. Co. ( 1859) 29 Mo. 75; HENDERSON 189.
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Taxation87 may refer to any one of these places or to that
of doing business. That taxation is reasonably distributed
according to the various local contacts of an enterprise is, to
put it mildly, not characteristic of many systems.
The writers who have advocated one theory for everything are right in deploring the present chaotic experimentation. Obviously, however, no single theory is adequate for
the task.

III.

THE LATIN-AMERICAN VIEW

In South and Central America, a peculiar current of opinion
obtains, which we ought to notice and try to analyze. This
trend evidently started in 1876.68 When the British Government protested against measures taken in the Argentine
province of Santa Fe against the Banco de Londres y Rio de
la Plata en el Rosario, the Argentine Foreign Minister
Irrigoyen rejected diplomatic intervention on June 23, 1876,
by answering that the bank was an anonymous company
(stock corporation by shares), which could not have any
nationality. In a further note of August 21, he added that
the entity, distinct from the members, had nothing to do
with their nationality, while the entity itself was merely a
capital stock. Obviously, the fiction theory was used, perhaps
in the form advocated by Brinz that makes the purpose of
a corporation the subject of right (theory of Zweckvermogen). This denial of nationality to corporations, supported
in several quarters in South America,'69 was adopted in Rio de
Janeiro in 1927 by the Committee of American Jurists repre67 Taxation at the domicil has been regarded as the "general principle" in
Europe, see ALLIX, Recueil I937 III 572. The real domicil, not that indicated
in the Articles of Association is decisive in France (see infra p. 43 f.) and the
Netherlands, Rb. Amsterdam (Dec. II, I924) W. II334·
68
See ZEBALLOS, Clunet I 906, 695; ALCORTA, 2 Der. Int. Priv. 38-40.
69
The doctrine is a part of the general complaints advanced, for instance, by
SEUAS (Venezuela), II Annuaire (I889-92) 442. See also TRAVERS, Recueil
I93o III 37·
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senting seventeen republics, and was repeatedly expressed on
the occasion of the signatures to the C6digo Bustamante in
Habata, 1928. The Argentine Delegation signed the treaty
(which later was not ratified by Argentina) with the reservation that:
"It does not approve provisions affecting directly or indirectly the principle upheld by the civil and commercial
legislation of the Argentine Republic to the effect that 'juristic persons owe their existence exclusively to the law of the
State which authorizes them and are therefore neither national nor foreign; their functions are determined by said law,
in accordance with the precepts derived from the "domicile"
which that law acknowledges to such persons.' mo
And the Delegations of Colombia and Costa Rica observed:
"Juristic persons cannot have any nationality either under
scientific principles or in the view of the highest and most
permanent interests of America. It would have been preferable that in this Code, which we are going to enact, there
should have been omitted everything which might serve to
assert that juristic persons, particularly those with capital
stock, have nationality."
To satisfy this so-called Argentine doctrine, the Constitution of Colombia of 1936, for instance, which repealed the
article of the Constitution of 18 86 requiring reciprocity for
the recognition of foreign corporations, limited itself to the
statement in Article I 2:11
The capacity, the recognition, and generally the regime of
companies and other juristic persons are determined by
Colombian law.
This does not mean that Colombian internal law should
always be applied; conflicts rules may be established, but
70

Reservation 4; practically similar, the reservations of the Paraguayan (3)
and the Dominican Delegations(:~., cf. 3).
71 Cf. TULlO ENRIQUE TAsc6N, Derecho Constitucional Colombiano (ed. 2.,
1939) comment on art. u.
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the intention is clear not to recognize as corporations belonging to a foreign country those operating within Co,_
lombia.
Thus, an erroneous legal theory was developed as a justification for political action. The aim was to defend against
diplomatic intervention, on the background of unpleasant remembrances of foreign complaints, naval demonstrations, and
claims to arbitrate expropriations and riot damages, before the
era of the good neighbor policy.
As a positive support for the rule, it has often been adduced
that foreigners, whether individuals or legal persons, have
equal civil rights with nationals, a general Latin-American
progressive rule, emphasized in nearly all constitutions. The
argument, of course, tends to imply that a company enjoying
all privileges of domestic fellow-companies,. has no claim to
anything more. But, even if equality were not riddled with
exceptions72 and the conclusion were true, logic would lead to
the conversion of all corporations into domestic legal persons rather than into persons not belonging to any state.
As a matter of fact, the stand taken by the Mexican Government in 1938 in the case of the Eagle Oil Company, was
that British intervention was excluded because the legal person was Mexican, whereas the British Government complained of the forced local incorporation of the company. 13
Also, the very frequent legislative acts of Central and
South American governments barring foreign corporations
72 See the impressive discussion of the legal reality of the Latin-American
countries "as to the civil inequality of foreigners" by ZoRRAQUiN BEcu, El
Problema del Extranjero en la reciente legislaci6n latino-americana (Buenos
Aires I 943) 93, 95 and ff.
73
Note of April u, 1938. The British government replied (note of April :u,
I 9 3 8) that "if a government first can make the operation of foreign interests
in its territories dependent upon their incorporation under local law and then
plead such incorporation as the justification for rejecting foreign diplomatic
intervention," .•• (39 Bull. Inst. Int. (1938) 67). Se@ also JosEF L. KUNZ,
The Mexican Expropriations (New York I 940) at 49; and documents cited by
2 HYDE 908.

TYPES OF ORGANIZATIONS
from business without special authorization, have a tendency
toward requiring domestication. 74
These remarks have had the exclusive purpose of conceptual clarification. While a book like the present does not
deal with political aspects, the universal need of international
collaboration will have to be stated at the end of this part.
But the conclusion should be drawn at once that an equitable
compromise between the interests of invested capital or
skilled techniques and those of the territorial population,
cannot be obtained either by artificial theories or by denying
the existing international connections. Indeed, international
law, apart from all possibly doubtful problems, permits a
government to extend diplomatic protection to a corporation
constituted in its territory, and at least under some circumstances, to espouse the cause of nationals who are holders
of a considerable part of the capital stock or bonds. 75
Both the Treaties of Montevideo and of Habana have
distinctly perceived the necessity of connecting public and
private legal persons with determinate states, and the latter
has simply called this connection nationality. 78 The same is
true of many Latin-American statutes and constitutions.

IV.

DoMICIL OF CoRPORATIONS

Another futile controversy based on traditional concepts
for a long time h~ existed concerning whether and where
corporations have a domicil. 77 These questions originated in
74

See infra p. 185.
BORCHARD, Diplomatic Protection ( 1915) 6::.2.; CHARLES DE VISSCHER,
"La technique de la personnalite juridique en droit international public et prive,"
63 Revue Dr. Int. (Bruxelles) (1936) 475 1 484; CHARLES DE VISSCHER,
"Le deni de justice en droit international," 5:1. Recueil (1933) II 387; z HYDE
§ 7.79·
7'11 C6digo Bustamante, art. 16.
77
For American law, see the brilliant article by J. F. FRANCIS, "The Domicil
of a Corporation," 38 Yale L. ]. (1918-z9) 335· For a recent comprehensive,
though objectionable, treatise, see A. FARNSWORTH, The Residence and Domicil
of Corporations (1939), reviewed by KAHN-FREUND, Annual Survey of English Law (1939) 374; F. A. MANN, 3 Modern L. Rev. (1940) 174.
75
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the same practical grounds as the question regarding nationality. In large part, tax laws, commerce regulations, and
jurisdictional rules were drafted originally with only individuals in view. Lawyers had to construe the legislative references to domicil with respect to corporations and partnerships. Unfortunately, many solutions are unsatisfactory, as
when corporations are said to have no domicil but only "residence" or, at common law, are said to have several domicils
in contrast to physical persons.
As an outgrowth of the fiction theory, in the United States
every corporation is declared to be "domiciled" at its principal office in the state of incorporation78 and, in the absence
of an actual office, at a substituted fictitious business place in
such state. In the words of the Supreme Court:
"This statement has been often reaffirmed by this court,
with some change of phrase, but always retaining the idea
that the legal existence, the home, the domicil, the habitat,
the residence, the citizenship of the corporation, can only be
in the state by which it was created, although it may do business in other states whose laws permit it.m9
Hence, a corporation has a necessary domicil by force of
law in the state where it was incorporated and cannot acquire
a domicil outside that state. 80 This rule is also settled in
Canada apart from Quebec. 81 In other words, a corporation
is localized by its creation in a certain state and by this fact
is domiciled there.
Obviously, this doctrine would be quite as well expressed
by omitting any reference to the concept of domicil and by
78

Restatement § 41 comment a.
Bank of Augusta v. Earle (1839) 13 Pet. S. C. 519; Shaw v. Quincy
Mining Company (1892.) 145 U. S. 444, 450 citing the case of Bank of
Augusta with approval.
80
Restatement § 41 and comment b. Mr. Justice Holmes in Bergner & Engel
Brewing Co. v. Dreyfus (1898) 172. Mass. 154, 51 N.E. 531; 1 BEALE§ 41.1.
81
Bank of Nova Scotia v. McKinnon (1892.) 12. C. L. T. (Occasional Notes)
1 7 8 N. B.; Victoria Machinery Depot Co. v. The Canada ( 191 3 B. C.) 17
D. L. R. 2.7; 1 JoHNSON 175 n. 2..
79
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simply referring to the state of charter. 82 Moreover, the
purposes for which this fiction of a domicil has been invented, are mainly taxation and jurisdiction, and, although
in these matters the state of first incorporation has retained
some significance, it has not such a prominent role at present
as to justify an exclusive qualification as center. 83 In the
very last years, first the entire intangible personality, wherever located, and then the entire revenue from securities have
been deemed susceptible of taxation in the state in which a
corporation has its principal place of business. The state of
charter, however, does not seem to be correspondingly
eliminated. 84 •
In most civil law countries a corporation is localized for
conflicts purposes as well as for many others, at its "seat,"85
i.e., in the place where central control and management is
exercised. The same definition is unanimously given by
English writers88 for such matters as taxation and trading
with the enemy. 87
The English and American opposition to the general attitude of the civil law reverses in curious fashion the contrast
existing in determining the status of individuals. On the
Continent, the status of a corporation is subject to the domiciliary test, applied to individuals at common law, which, in
82

See HENDERSON 190; FosTER, Recueil 1938 III 455·
See FRANCIS, supra n. 77, 352, 353·
8
~Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Fox (1936) 298 U.S. 193; 35 Mich. L. Rev.
( 1936) 1032; Chestnut Securities Co. v. Oklahoma Tax Commission (C.C.A.
10th 1942) 125 F. (2d) 571, (1942) 316 U. S. 668; Note, HOFFEINS, 41
Mich. L. Rev. (1942) 559·
85
See below.
86
DICEY, Rule 19, 136; FooTE 119; WESTLAKE 368; ScHUSTER, "The Nationality and Domicil of Trading Corporations," 2 Grotius Soc. (1917) 59,
69; CHESHIRE 197•
87
By an inadequate argumentation, FARNSWORTH, supra n. 77, first contends
a priori that domicil must determine the "status" of a corporation (pp. uo,
2 31) and then impeacbes the dominant opinion of the English writers because
the usual definition of the domicil (as a central place of control) would give
the corporation a status impossible in English law {p. 274). The author denaturalizes the conception of domicil to no useful purpose at all.
83
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reference to corporations, repudiates its own familiar criterion and adopts that of the legal connection; this inversion
seems to have struck some English lawyers so much that they
have thought that a "domicil of origin" should be construed
as in the country of incorporation.88 The C6digo Bustamante
(art. I 6) mentions a "nationality of origin." These conceptions seem to correspond to the doctrine of this country assuming a necessary domicil in the state of incorporation.
•• See recently,

FARNSWORTH,

supra n. 77, zo9.
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The Personal Law of Business
Corporations
N LOCALIZING the personal law of legal persons, the
two chief rival systems may be termed the incorporation
principle, pointing to the law of the state of incorporation
as such, and the central office principle, which needs explanation.

I

I.

LAW OF THE STATE OF INCORPORATION

Anglo-American law. In all common law countries, a corporation lives under the law under which it has been created1
or "incorporated," the law from which, in Westlake's expression, it "derives its existence.m The English cases, the oldest
of which dates from 1 724, have always followed this theory. 3
The particular historic or rational causes for this rule are
not known, although it originated upon the current background of pedantic axioms now antiquated. In any event,
the rule appears to have been accepted as self-evident. It
is not astonishing that common law lawyers should think so,
since even some Continental writers, educated under the opposite system, have advocated the Anglo-American principle
as the logical outgrowth of the act of constituting a corporation."
In fact, the proposition that the legal entity of an association as a body separate from the members must be based
1

DICEY 544; I WHARTON 238 § 105a.
WESTLAKE 367.
3
Dutch West India Co. v. Henriques Van Moses (I724), I Strange 612;
FOOTE I62 and in Clunet I882, 465 at 473, n. 2.
4
See infra p. 66 n. 129.
2
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upon the law of a particular state, is obvious under any possible theory. But this is not the point. The problem is
whether the conflicts rule should be satisfied with the formal
creation of a corporation in some state. The Anglo-American
rule is satisfied; the fact of incorporation alone suffices. Thus,
the English Companies Acts are held inapplicable to companies registered abroad,5 and the personal law of a company "depends not upon the place at which its center of administrative business is situated, but upon the place at which
it is registered.')'6 And very distinctly the firmly settled
American rule refuses to take account of the place where the
activities of an association occur. As the Restatement puts
it:

"§ 152. Without regard to the place of the activities of an
association or to the domicil of its members, incorporation
may take place in any state . . .
"§ 154. The fact of incorporation by one state will be
recognized in every other state."
This conception ought to be examined in terms of considerations of convenience rather than of logic.
Other countries. The law of the state of incorporation is
said to be applied in the Soviet Union. 7 It is apparently contemplated also in the language of the recent legislation of
Peru (1936) and Brazil (1942), referring to the law of the
state where the corporation has been "constituted,''8 and in
a few other Latin-American legislations. 9 The corresponding
5

See YouNG 18::1, 2.05.
YoUNG 2.05 comment on Attorney General v. The Jewish Colonization
Ass'n (19oo) 2. Q. B. 556, C.A.; [19ol] K. B. 12.3.
7 Thus, in absence of a proper source, with feeble support in a former instruction, MAKARov, 35 Recueil (1931) I 473 at 524ff. and Precis 2.2.5; RABBINOWITSCH, 1 Bl.IPR. 212.; but see also STOUPNITZKY, Revue 1927, 418 at
442·
8 Peru:C.C. (I936) Tit.Prel.,art.IXpar. I.
Brazil: Introd. Law (I942) art. I I par. I; cf. IRIGOYEN, Consultas de la
Comisi6n de Reforma 14 (but see infra p. 35).
9
Cuba: C. Com. art. 15; C. C. art. 37·
Guatemala: C. C. (I933) art. 20.
6
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text of the Montevideo Treaty on Civil Law actually was
changed in I 940 so as to refer to the law of the domicil of
the association.
The C6digo Bustamante (art. 17) refers to this "nationality of origin" of associations, but not to determine the law
applicable to them (art. 33), including a set of rules inexplicable to all commentators.11
II.
1.

LAw OF THE PLACE oF CENTRAL CoNTROL

Countries

In most civil law countries, the personal law of a private
law corporation is that of the state in which it has its center
or "domicil," French "siege social," German "Geschaftssitz"
(seat).
This system has been followed by:
Austria: Ges.m.b.H. Ges. (Act on Limited Partnerships)
of March 6, 1906, § 107 and common opinion, see
Walker 147; Ehrenzweig-Krainz § 82 n. 4·
Belgium: Lois coordonm!es sur les societes commerciales
(Consolidated Companies Act, 1873) art. 172; revised
(1935) art. 196; Belgo-German Mixed Arb. Trib., 3
Recueil des decisions 573·
Bulgaria: Act of Limited Partnerships, of May 8, 1924,
art. 127.
Denmark: S. Ct. (Nov. 8, 1917); (March 8, 1922) see
6 Repert. 217 No. 29.
Uruguay perhaps likewise: C. C. (I9I4) Tit. Fin., art. 2394: "where a
legal person has been recognized as such," as amended November zs, I94I.
10
Art. 4 par. 1. The official report in Republica Argentina, Congreso Sudamericano I46 shows some disagreement with this change.
11
C6digo Bustamante, art. 34 refers the civil capacity of civil, commercial, or
industrial companies to the respective stipulations of the contract of association.
Cf. art. I 8 and see the criticism by Gil Borges, reproduced in the motion made
by the Delegation of Peru, Diario de Sesiones, Octava Conferencia lnternacional
Americana, Lima, I 9 3 8, 11 8. See, moreover, art. 32, which was not contained
in the draft of De Bustamante, and has been sharply censured in 2 PoNTES DE
MIRANDA 448.
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France: Cass. (civ.) (June 20, I87o) S. I870.1.373; Cass.
(req.) (March 29, I898) S. I90I.I.70· Associations are
specially discussed by 2 Arminjon § I99·
Germany: RGZ. Vol. 7, 70; Vol. 83, 367 (a business corporation of Wisconsin); Vol. 88, 54; Vol. 92, 73; Vol.
I I 7, 2 I 7; Vol. I 59, 46; Aktiengesetz of Jan. 30, I 93 7,

§ 5·12
Greece: Decisions up to I934: 2 Streit-Vallindas 79 n. 9;
for I935-I937, Note in Clunet I938, 6I3.
Hungary: C. Com. arts. 210, 2 I I; Act on Limited Partnership, § I06 (implicit).
Italy: Consiglio di Stato (May 27, I9I8) Giur. Ital. I9I8
III I 53, Note, Salvioli, Rivista I9I9-20, 39I; Cass.
(July I3, I936) Rivista I938, 225; Diena, 2 Prine.
290; D'Amelio, Clunet I9I7, I235·
Liechtenstein: P.G.R. art. 232 par. I.
Montenegro: C.C. art. 787.
The Netherlands: General opinion based on Rv. art. 4 (2)
(3); Rb. Rotterdam (Oct. 25, I9I6) N.J. (I9I7) 270;
and others; Medan (Dec. 4, I925) I24, Indisch
Tijdsch. 242. See also Kosters 659; Mulder I98.
Contra for lex fori, only one decision, Rb. Amsterdam
(Dec. I9, I924) W.II346, N.J. (1925) 1065.
Poland: Int. Priv. Law, art. 1 No. 3; Interlocal Priv.
Law, art. 3 No. 3·
Rumania: C. Com. (1938) art. 353·
Spain: C. C. art. 28, cf. Trfas de Bes 379·
Switzerland: C. C. art. 56; BG. (Dec. 8-14, 1904) 31
BGE. I 418, 466, 473; (April I, 1924) 50 BGE. II
511, Clunet 1924, 785; (May 23, 1928) 54 BGE. II
257, 27I; Federal Council, Message of August 20,
12
Decision in the special case of "Gothaer Gewerkschaften" does not justify
the objections raised by some writers to the general rule, see MELCHIOR 466;

RAAPE IH.
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I 9 I 9 introducing the revised draft of the Code of Obligations, BBl. I 9 I 9 V 720.
Turkey: Law of Nov. 30, I330/I9I4, art. I, cf. 7 Repert,
250 No. I27.
Yugoslavia: C. Com. (I937) § SOI par. I.
China: Int. Priv. Law, art. 3·
Egypt: App. Alexandria (Feb. I9, I927) S. I927·4·9·
Japan: C. C. art. so; C. Com. arts. 44 and 258, on which
see Chapter I9 at n. 63 (better opinion).
Argentina: C. C. arts. 6 and 7, cf. art. 34; see 3 Vico § 8I;
Zeballos, Clunet I906, 604; C. Com. art. 286.
Brazil: Thus far prevailing opinion, see Carvalho de Mendonc;a, 4 Trat. Dir. Com. § I5I3, cf. Espinola, 8-C Tratado I 777 § IOO.
Colombia: C6digo Judicial, art. 272; see Caicedo§ 71.
Honduras: Foreigners' Law, Decree No. 3I of Feb. 4,
I 926, art. 4·
Mexico: "Almost unanimous doctrine," see Caso § I93·
Venezuela: C. Com. (I9I9) art. 359 (new 334), at least
with respect to Venezuelan corporations, see Crawford,
12 Tul. L. Rev. (1938) 219.
Treaty of Montevideo on Commercial Law (r889) art. 5;
on Com. Terr. Law (1940) art. 8 par. r; on Civil Law
(I 940) art. 4 par. I.
Also, numerous bilateral treaties assuring the establishment
of nationals of one contracting state in the territory of the
other party have adopted the same principle. It is natural that
civil law countries should do so among each other/3 but rather
13
For instance: France with Japan (Aug. 19, 1911) art. 4, 105 British
and Foreign State Papers (1912) 101 at 6o3; with Greece (March 11, 1929)
art. 2o, par. 1, 95 L. of N. Treaty Series (1929) 401 at 415, 134 British and
Foreign State Papers (1931) 773 at 781; with Germany (Aug. 17, 1927)
art. z6, 76 L. of N. Treaty Series (1928) 7 at 24, 12.6 British and Foreign
State Papers (1927) Part I, 689 at 7oo; with Czechoslovakia (July 2, 1928)
art. 2.2., 99 L. of N. Treaty Series (1930) 107 at 12.1, 129 British and Foreign
State Papers (1928) Part II, 305 at 314; with Cuba (Nov. 6, 1929) art. 7,

36 CORPORATIONS, KINDRED ORGANIZATIONS

strange that they do not do it in every treaty. 14 On the other
hand, it is remarkable that even the United States, Great
Britain, and the Soviet Union in some15 of their treaties,
especially in recent times, 16 have employed the usual European formula, running for instance in the treaty of the United
States with Germany as follows:
"Limited liability and other corporations and associations,
whether or not for pecuniary profit, which have been or may
hereafter be organized in accordance with and under the laws,
par. I 1 II4 L. of N. Treaty Series (I93I) 360 at 363, IJI British and Foreign
State Papers (I929) Part II, I94 at I97; Germany: see the list of treaties in
MELCHIOR 476 n. 2.
14 E.g., Germany with Italy (Oct. JI, 1925) art. 8, par. 1 52 L. of N.
1
Treaty Series (1926) 179 at 185 and 311 at 315, 124 British and Foreign
State Papers (1926) Part II, 629 at 631; Germany with Sweden (May 14,
1926) art. s, par. 11 51 L. of N. Treaty Series (1926) 99 at 103 and 145 at
147 1 124 British and Foreign State Papers (1926) Part II, 741 at 743·
Similarly, Swiss treaties up to I 8 92, see SCHNITZER, Handelsr. 81 who thinks
it was done under the influence of the fiction theory.
15 Incorporation ("Constitution") alone is mentioned, e.g., in the treaty of
U.S.S.R. with Iran (Aug. 27, I935) art. 8, par. I, 176 L. of N. Treaty Series
(1937) 299 at 305; U.S.S.R. with Turkey (March 16, 1931) art. 71 134
British and Foreign State Papers (1931) 1128 at IIJO. In the treaty United
States with Greece (Nov. 2I, 1936) art. 1, U.S. Treaty Series No. 930, 183
L. of N. Treaty Series ( 193 7) 169 at 170, corporations and associations "of the
United States and of Greece" are mentioned.
16 United States with Germany (Dec. 8, 1923) art. 12, par. 1, U. S. Treaty
Series No. 725, 52 L. of N. Treaty Series (1926) 133 at 141; with Hungary
(June 24, 1925) art. 9, U.S. Treaty Series No. 748, 58 L. of N. Treaty Series
(I926) III at 117; with Honduras (Dec. 7, 1927) art. 13, par. 1, U. S.
Treaty Series No. 764, 87 L. of N. Treaty Series (1929) 42I at 430; with
Austria (June 19, 1928) art. 10, par. 1, U.S. Treaty Series No. 838, II8 L. of
N. Treaty Series (1931) 241 at zso; with Poland (June 15, 1931) art. u,
par. 1, U.S. Treaty Series No. 862, 139 L. of N. Treaty Series (1933) 397 at
4071 Great Britain with Germany (Dec. z, 1924) art. I6, par. I, 43 L. of N.
Treaty Series (1926) 89 at 98, II9 British and Foreign State Papers (1924)
369 at 374; South African Union with Germany (Sept. 1, 1928) art. 15, par. 1,
95 L. of N. Treaty Series (1929) 289 at 297, 128 British and Foreign State
Papers (1928) Part I, 473 at 478. The German text of both treaties translates
"established" and "gevestigd" (Dutch) by "errichtet." Thus, the British side
would accept the continental principle and the German side the British principle;
but the German translation is incorrect, as 1 FRANKENSTEIN 484 n. 183 shows.
U.S.S.R. with Italy (Feb. 7, 1924) art. 9, 120 British and Foreign State Papers
(1924) 659 at 662; with Germany (Oct. 12, I92S) art. 16, par. 1, 53 L. of N.
Treaty Series (1926) 85 at 97, I22 British and Foreign State Papers (I925)
707 at 714; with Norway (Dec. 15, 1925) art. s, 47 L. of N. Treaty Series
(1926) 9 at 15, 122 British and Foreign State Papers (1925) 992 at 994·
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National, State, or Provincial, of either High Contracting
Party and maintain a central office within the territories
thereof ..."
To the same effect, international arbitrations involving the
United States,17 proposals of the Institute of International
Law (1891, 1929, 1933)/8 of the subcommittee of experts
for the League of Nations19 ( 1927 ), and treaties for avoiding
double taxation20 can be cited. Only in the draft of the committee, reporting to the Diplomatic Conference on the Treatment of Foreigners, in Paris, 1929, has the Anglo-American
view been maintained by adding to the usual formula that, in
the case of countries to the laws of which the concept of a seat
of a company is unknown, the condition established on this
point will not be applicable.
Certain subtle divergences among these texts are negligible. They clarify the subject on one point which will be
examined immediately. None of them has taken the cases of
renvoi into consideration. (See infra p. so.)
Significance of the Principle

2.

In fact, corporations usually have their central office in the
country where they obtain incorporation, but not necessarily
so, and in the United States often not. A corporation consti17

United States with Peru (I869) Affaire Ruden et Cie. (partnership consisting of Mr. Ruden, an American citizen, and Mr. J. P. Escobar, citizen of
New Granada) see LAPRADELLE-POLITIS, z Recueil des arbitrages internationaux (I856-I87z) 589.
United States with Chile ( 19oi), case of Henry Chauncey, societe en commandite in Valparaiso, see MooRE, 3 Digest 8oz.
18
Annuaire I929 II I47• Meeting in New York, I9Z9, proposed regulation,
art.

1.

19 Art. I (Am. J. Int. Law I9z8, Supp. zo4) concerning the "nationality of
commercial corporations," including the personal law.
20
The British-Swiss Treaty against double taxation, of October I 7, I 9 3 I,
art. 3, I3I L. of N. Treaty Series (I933) Z45 considers a company as having
domicil in the forum, if the management and control of the business is in the
forum. "Control" has been explained in an exchange of notes (id. z64) to mean
effective management and the real center.
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tuted in Delaware with headquarters in Amsterdam will be
considered subject to Dutch law on the whole European Continent, and therefore on principle as nonexistent. The true
point of difference between the two systems is not that under
the one incorporation is sufficient, and in the other the situation of the main office would suffice to determine the personal
law. The statutes do not define the Continental system so
correctly as do the treaties providing that a corporation must
be organized or constituted in one of the two countries and
have its central office (seat, domicil) in the country where it
is constituted. The requirement of domicil is additional to that
of incorporation and does not by any means replace it. Hence,
the Continental rule is no more than a variant of the common
law rule and could well be adopted in the treaties of any state.
While this essence of the rule has often been misunderstood, especially in the English literature and by German
writers too, the policy behind the rule also has not always
been appreciated. The most important viewpoint from which
to consider the rule is that of a state that does not want an
organization to establish its principal office in its territory and
yet derive its existence and legal character21 from a foreign
state. Thus, in the oldest decision of the German Supreme
Court on this matter, a company incorporated in the state of
Washington, United States, for the purpose of exploiting
Mexican mines, but which was controlled by a board of directors in Hamburg, Germany, was denied recognition as an
American legal entity; having failed to fulfill the German
requirements for incorporation, it was treated as a German
noncorporate association. 22 When a domestic company transfers
21

Not only capacity, in contrast to formation and dissolution, as

BENTWICH (ed. 6) 368 believe.
22 RG. (March 31, 1904) DJZ, 1904,
ZBJV. (1931) 307 reports the case of a

WESTLAKE-

sss, cf. infra p. 100. VON STEIGER, 67

joint stock company, incorporated in
Kenya, East Africa, under British law, but administered in Paris, Fnnce. In
Kenya, there was only a representation and the technical management. This
corporation would be recognized neither under the French nor any other
Continental conflicts rule.
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its domicil to a foreign country, it loses its personality. 23
Whatever the policy of the country may be in regard to capital interests, cartels, minority and small stockholders, plural
votes, and the like, organizations established with headquarters in the country have to comply. French lawyers
particularly insist on the necessity of preventing evasion of
imperative requisites and prescriptions. In contrast to the recognition of the law of the incorporating state "without regard
to the place of the activities of an association" (Restatement
§ 152), the state of the central office is considered the most
vitally interested.
Then again, the state where incorporation is obtained, may
not want its law to be used for organizations intending to
maintain their real existence abroad. Switzerland once cancelled the registration of numerous French-controlled companies, incorporated but only nominally established in Geneva.24 Belgian courts proceed likewise. 25
3. Concept of Central Office
For a time, eminent French authors conceived the most significant place for localizing a business corporation to be the
place at which it discharges its functions, viz., carries on its
manufacturing, trading, or other activities indicated in the
charter. Where the main part of such technical work is done
-the siCge d' exploitatiotr-there they regarded the corporation as centered. 26
23

RG. (June 5, 1882.) 7 RGZ. 68.
24 Advices
by the Swiss Federal Department of Justice and Police to

the canton of Geneva, see BURCKHARDT, 3 Bundesrecht 1 ou III.
25
See Trib. civ. Bruxelles (Feb. 2.6, 192.3) Novelles Belges, 3 D. Com. 676

§

52.02..

26
Notably 2. LYON-CAEN et RENAULT §§ u67H·I THALLER, Annalea de
Droit Commercial, 1890 II 2.57; WEiss, 2. Traite 481.
To the same effect see the English case Keynsham Blue Lias Lime Co. v.
Baker (1863) 33 L. J. Exch. 41.
Contra: See as to France, ARMINJON, 2. Precis§ 188, as to England, YouNG
1 94·

40 CORPORATIONS, KINDRED ORGANIZATIONS

This concept, in fact, is of some relevance for taxation and
certain other phases of the legal position of corporations. 27
With respect to conflicts law, however, this theory has been
generally rejected. Even though the Belgian Companies Law
has made the "principal establishment" the test, a literal
interpretation has been long since abandoned. 28 Also, in the
systems under which the center of exploitation suffices to
subject a company to the domestic law (infra pp. 46ff.), the
seat of an organization is identified with its chief executive
office.
The office where the central management and control are
exercised is regarded as the brain of an enterprise. "It is there
that its personality manifests itself, for it is there that its
organs operate, directing its operations and controlling
its policy," thus Young reproduces the Continental conception.29 The legally important decision on commercial contracts
is commonly concentrated there. In addition, factories or
premises may be dispersed in several countries and no main
working place discernible, whereas every corporation is supposed to have its headquarters at a single place. The law of
this place, therefore, is unanimously held decisive. so
However, the place must be ascertained. Normally, stockholders and directors hold their regular meetings in the same
town, where also the head executives have their offices, books
and archives are kept, transactions with customers are negoti27 However, in France jurisdiction for bankruptcy proceedingsis taken at the
central office of the management, not at that of exploitation (advocated by
THALLER, Traite elementaire de droit commercial (ed. 7, 1925) § 1738 and
others, cf. VALENSI, 8 Repert. 328). See on the question Cass. (req.) (July 31,
1905) 8.1906.1.270; id. (Nov. 26, 19o6) 8.1909.1.393·
28 Belgium: Consolidated Companies Laws, of 1873, art. 129; of 1935, art.
197; POULLET §us; Novelles Belges, 3D. Com. 682 § 5248.
29 YouNG 149.
30 Belgium: Trib. civ. Bruxelles (Nov. 14, 19u) Revue 1913, 178; Trib.
com. Gent (May 4, 1914) Clunet 1917, 1087; and (Feb. 26, 1923) cited
by PouLLET § 264.
Denmark: BoRUM and MEYER., 6 Repert. 217 No. 30.
France: Cass. (civ.) (June 20, 1870) 8.1870.1.373; (March 29, 1898)
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ated, and the principal business is managed. But these activities may fail to be assembled. Where the management is
centered is then considered a question of fact-finding by an
evaluation of many circumstances. 31 As a last resort in the
prevailing opinion, the place where the directors usually meet
is the most important, as their decisions are of direct effect, 32
while others hold that the general meetings of stockholders
are more significant, since they instruct the board. 33 Preferably individual solutions should not be prejudiced by any
such rigid criteria. They need an examination of symptoms,
similar to that used in America and England for determining
the "domicil" or "residence" of a corporation for purposes
of jurisdiction or taxation. 5 4 For example, the Cesena Sulphur
Co. was incorporated in England to exploit sulphur mines in
Sicily. The managing directors, the main books, the accounting and two-thirds of the stockholders were in Italy, but since
the meetings of the board of directors and the general stockD.x899·1.5951 S.x9oi.t.7o, Clunet 1898, 756; (July 6, 1914) Clunet 1916,
1:z96; (Dec. :z4, 19:z8) Gaz. Pal. 19:Z9.1.IZ4; see also HouPJN et BosVIEUX,
3 Traite des societes (ed. 6, 1929) § :zu4.
Germany: BGB. §:z4: "Unless it is otherwise provided, the place where the
administration of a corporation is carried on is deemed to be its seat." Same for
foundations BGB. § 8o and for jurisdiction ZPO. § I 7·
Italy: Cass. (July 31, 1925) Foro Ital. Rep. I9:z5, 313, "Competenza"
Nos. 377, 378; Cass. (April I7, 1931) Foro Ital. I9JI.x.6o:z.
Japan: See DE BECKER, Int. Priv. Law 59; but cf. infra p. 48.
Switzerland: BG. (Dec. 14, 1904) 31 BGE. I 418,471.
31
In opposition to this method, :z ARMINJON § I 90 objects to conferring
upon the courts the power of discretionally determining the center of a company. However, Arminjon's own theory ("Nationalite des personnes morales,"
Revue 19o:z, 381; :z Precis§ 191) is obscure and seems not very different (see
:z Precis, ed. :z, 483 n. :z). The French doctrine is generally unstable because
of the endless fear of fraude.
32
See PERCERou, Note, D.19Io.:z.4I; CuQ, Nationalite des societes ( 19:z1)
63; LEVEN, De la nationalite des societes (these Paris 1899) s8; HOUPIN et
BosVIEUX, 3 Traite des societes § :z:zos.
33
Codigo Bustamante, arts. 18, I 9; .PILLET, Personnes Morales § 94 ; for
Spain, see TRiAs DEBEs, Estudios 381. For location of a corporation within the
state, I BEALE 240.
34
FARNSWORTH, The Residence and Domicil of Corporations (1939) :z48,
l74·
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holder meetings took place in London-not because of the
English incorporation-residence within the meaning of the
Income Tax Acts was held to be in England. 85
Conscious of the possible divergencies in determining the
place of central control, the Geneva subcommittee proposals
of 1929leave the legal definition to the "municipal law under
which the company was formed and its seat established.m 6
4· Real Existence of the Central Office
It may happen that the central establishment of an organization is actually situated in a country other than that designated by the constitutional documents. The act of incorporation need not necessarily be void, for this reason alone, under
the law of either country. But it is common opinion that the
personal law is conferred upon the organization only by the
state of the actual chief office: the siege social must be real,
not fictitious. 37 The indication of a central place in the charter
or by-laws furnishes but prima facie evidence. 88
This is also the distinct doctrine of the German courts and
leading writers89 in conflicts law, as well as with respect to
tax liability,40 although in other matters such as jurisdiction
of courts41 and administrative agencies42 the "seat" nominally
35

Cesena Sulphur Co. v. Nicholson (1876) 1 Ex. D. 428.
Am. J. Int. Law 19z8, Supp. zo4 art. 3 par. I.
37
Recognized in all internationat resolutions cited supra sub (b). For the
prevailing Italian doctrine see V. TEDESCHI, Del domicilio (1936) 350.
38
Swiss BG. (July :u, I889) IS BGE. 570 No. 79; CosTE-FLoRET, I Revue
generale de droit commercial (1938) 577 at s86.
39
RG. (June z9, I9II) 77 RGZ. I9i RGR. Kom. n. 4 before§ ZI; § :u n.
4i STAUDINGER-RIEZLER, 1 Kommentar § 24; WIELAND, z Handelsr. 79·
Contra: a small minority of writers who claim 99 RGZ. z I 7 as authority.
40
Tax Procedure (Reichsabgabenordnung) § sz, see the commentary by
BECKER, Die Reichsabgabenordnung (ed. 7, I93o) I88 § z.
The Fiscal Convention between France and Germany, of Nov. 9, 1934, art.
I 3 adopted the French definition of the "siege" as the place where the legal,
financial, administrative, and technical management is centered in a permanent
manner, see MICHEL, Revue Crit. I937, 630.
41
Germany: ZPO. § I7·
42
BGB. §§ zz, ZJ, zs.
36
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indicated in the articles of incorporation may be determinative.48
The French courts have strangely extended the scope of
this idea. They, too, naturally disregard a fictitious domicil
and look to the actual siege social. 44 For example, the "Boston
Blacking and Co.," constituted and established in East Cambridge, Massachusetts, operated from 1912 a branch in Montmagny, France, but in 1923 converted the branch into a
French societe anonyme, "Boston Blacking et Cie.," whereupon the mother corporation ceased to pay taxes imposed on
foreign business. The courts found nothing factually changed
in the carrying on of the business and declared the conversion
to be simulated, i.e., fictitious, the American corporation having remained the owner of the business as before. 45 But the
courts include the case where central office has been "fraudulently" pretended to exist abroad in order to "evade" the
French law of corporation/6 or in order to create "privileges
for certain shareholders."41 In such instances, it is immaterial
whether the organization seriously means to have its seat
abroad. The "Moulin Rouge Attraction Inc., Ltd." was incorporated in London for the purpose of carrying on a famous
amusement place in Paris. It was established that there was
nothing in London except rented premises, while the entire
administration was in Paris and all negotiations for the promotion had been contracted and the capital raised in France.
The promoters and the first manager were punished for not
having complied with the formalities required for French
incorporation. 48 In other cases, associations have even been
43
For particulars, see the commentaries to § 24 of the BGB., and WIELAND,
1 Handelsr. 172; 2 id. 78 n. ?·
H Cass. (req.) (Nov. 21, 1889) .Clunet 1889, 8so; for other decisions, see 2
AR.MINJON § 188; recently Cass. {req.) (July 17, 1935) S.19J6.t.41.
45
Cass. (civ.) (June 29, 1937) Clunet 1938, 67, 7 Giur. Comp. DIP.§ 105.
46
Cass. (req.) (Dec. 22, 1896) S.t897.I.84, D. 1897.1.159, Clunet 1897,
364; Cour Paris (March 27, 1907) Clunet 1907, 768; for other decisions see
SURVILLE 722 n. 2; LIGEROPOULOS and AULAGNON, 8 Repert. No. 97·
47
See LEREBOURS-PICEONNIERE 195 § 163.
48
Trib. corr. Seine (July z, 1912) D.19IJ.2.165, Clunet 1913, 12?3·
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treated as nonexistent. The courts conducting such investigations inquire into the reasonableness of foreign incorporation. In the case of a company organized to exploit mines in
Canada, having its administrative center in France, it was
held innocuous that the enterprise was incorporated abroad,
after a certain merger of companies, because this facilitated
its business. Also the fact that, instead of a company organized under the laws of a Canadian province, an English type
was chosen, was approved on account of the interest in preferring the more common British legislation!9
In one form or another, the statement that the real, not
some nominal or artificial, domicil determines the applicable
law, occurs in many statutes and court decisions. 50 To unify
the formulation of the Continental principle, the subcommittee draft of the League of Nations for an international treaty
on commercial companies (1929) provides, in article 3, that
the contracting parties are free "to regard a seat as fictitious
and artificial if its connection with the territory ... is fraudulent and intended to evade imperative provisions of the
applicable law or if the real and effective seat is not situated
in the country where the company has been formed." Yet the
concession made thereby to the French doctrine of fraude is
questionable. While a "simulated" domicil is no domicil at
49 Trib. com. Lille (May 2.I, I9o8) D.I 9I o.2..4 r. In a similar way, central
control of a corporation as ground for the imposition of taxes must be "real";
a transfer of the "siege social" to a colony is held genuine: Trib. Seine (July 6,
I935) Revue Crit. I936, 77I, or fictitious: Cass. (req.) (July I7, I93S) Revue
Crit. I936, 767; Trib. Seine (Dec. 2.2., I938) Revue Crit. I939, 2.69.
50 E.g., Denmark: see 6 Repert. 2.I7.
Egypt: Trib. Mixtes, see ARMINJON, Revue I9o8, 772., 865; KEBEDGY, id.
I9I4, 396; App. Mixte d'Alexandrie, Clunet I930, 767.
Japan: C. Com. art. 2.58; see comment in I C. Com. of Japan Ann. 4I2..
Switzerland: Fed. Council (Jan. zo, I875) BBl. I876 II 2.; Eidgen. Amt
fiir das Handelsregister (Nov. 4, I92.8) 2.8 SJZ. 32.8, 5 Z.ausl.PR. (I93I) 7u.
But Liechtenstein, P.G.R. art. 2.33 allows holding companies with a purely
nominal office in the country to receive juristic personality; this is just one of
the tricks of this code to attract rich foreign holding companies.
Apparently dissenting, Yugoslavian C. Com. of I937, art. soi par. I, see
EISNER, I Symmikta Streit (I939) 2.90.
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all, a "fraudulent seat" that is not simulated is real and
serious. Whether an association incorporated in a country in
which its real headquarters but no other activity is located, is
valid, ought to be decided according to the law of this very
country, if the principle of central establishment obtains. All
that the "evaded" country may reasonably do, is to treat the
corporation as foreign and react appropriately against its
carrying on business. The French doctrine of fraud, therefore,
has deserved criticism in theory as well as in practice, because
it introduces a high degree of insecurity into conflicts law.G 1
In the great majority of countries, the American view is
shared that "it is no fraud or evasion of the laws of a state
for its citizens, intending to act only in their own state to
form themselves into a corporation under the laws of another
state."G 2

III.

ExcEPTIONs

r. To the Law of Incorporation
While as a rule, for the purpose of the incorporation principle, the place where a corporation is intended to operate
lacks importance, there are exceptions well deserving notice.
One is the case. where a state makes it possible for a corporation to be created with the power to do business exclusively outside the state. Such corporations have been held
devoid of legal existence, because a state cannot "spawn corporations and send them forth into other states to be nurtured
and do business there," when it will not allow them to operate
within its own boundaries. 53
51 ARMINJON, Revue Dr. Int. (Bruxelles) (r9o2) 408 and iJ. 1927, 393;
BEI1"'ZKE, Jur. Personen 69; and especially TRAVERS, Recueil 1930 III 67, 7o,
78. VAUGHN WILLIAMS and CHRUSSACHI, 49 Law Q, Rev. (1933) 348 observe
moreover: "It is surely paradoxical that a country should impose its nationality
by way of punishment for fraud." Quite so! But this is not a necessary incident
of the law of the central office, and the repudiation of the French theory of
fraud does not "drive" us "back" to the law of incorporation.
2
G 2 BEALE 775 § 167-4~8 Land Grant R. & T. Co. v. Coffey County (r87o) 6 Kan. 149, 153; see
BALLANTINE, Corporations 854 n. t6; 2 BEALE§ 167-4-
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By analogous reasoning, the privileges of interstate commerce have been safeguarded against misuse. A corporation
chartered in West Virginia but conducting all its contracting
and manufacturing operations in Illinois where also all its
property 'was located, was regarded as doing exclusively intrastate business. 54
The California courts have occasionally argued that, if a
corporation does all its business and has all its property in that
state, domestic law should be applied rather than that of the
state of creation, and they have assumed the situs of the stock
of a company to be in the forum for the purposes of an action
for issue of shares. 55
In this connection, we may mention also the usury cases in
which courts have refused to recognize an agreement that the
law of the corporation's domicil--of the state of incorporation
--should govern a contract, if its principal place of business
is in another state. 56
2.

To the Law of the Central Office

An Italian commercial provision/7 followed by some other
codes/8 provided that a foreign-created business corporation
54

Hump Hairpin Co. v. Emmerson (I92.2.) 2.58 U.S. 2.90.
Wait v. Kern River Mining, Milling & Dev. Co. (I909) I 57 Cal. I6,
Io6 Pac. 98. That in analogous cases some courts are more inclined to take
jurisdiction on internal affairs of a corporation, contrary to the rule infro
Chapter 2.0 n. 53, is another fact.
The American Department of State may refrain from intervening for American-incorporated .companies, if all shareholders and the entire business are in
the country a~tainst which steps should be taken, see 2. HYDE 903.
56 Stoddard v. Thomas (I9I5) 6o Pa. Super. Ct. 177 (loan by a corporation
actually doing business in the District of Columbia, the customer being a resident of Pennsylvania, and the law of Virginia being referred to); Brierley v.
Commercial Credit Co. (I92.9) 43 F. (zd) 72.4 (promise of credit in Maryland
to a firm in Pennsylvania, by a firm doing actual business in Baltimore (Md.),
the law of Delaware being agreed upon); U. S. Building and Loan Ass'n v.
Lanzarotti (I92.9) 47 Ida. 2.87, 2.74 Pac. 630.
57 Italy: C. Com. of I88z, art. 2.30 par. 4; VIVANTE, 2. Trattato di diritto
commerciale § 82.o; DIENA, I Dir. Com. Int. 34I; FED02ZI 7I; CAVAGLIER.I,
Dir. Int. Com. 158.
58 Portugal : C. Com. ( I8 8 5) art. I I o.
55
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was subject to Italian law, if both its "seat" and its "principal
object" were in Italy. This restricted the significance of the
central office. Italian law seemed not to apply to a foreign
incorporated business enterprise even though the central administration was in Italy, unless the technical activity was
centered there. On the other hand, a corporation created in
Italy and having its control center there, was always regarded
as governed by Italian law, irrespective of the place of manufacturing or trading.
The Argentine Commercial Coqe/9 followed by Honduras,60 probably the Mexican61 laws, and finally the Rumanian and Italian amended texts 62 declare the internal law
always applicable, if either the head office (and the general
Rumania: C. Com. (1887) art. 239.
On Argentina's provisions framed on the basis of the Portuguese code, see
next note.
59
Argentina: C. Com. art. 286; ALCORTA, 3 Der. Int. Priv. ISH Cam. 2a
App. Cordoba (Nov. II, 1938) 22 La Ley 126. The restrictive interpretation
byZEBALLOS, Clunet 1906,613 is overruled.
For example, the "Societe du Port de Rosario," subject matter of the decision
of the French Cass. (civ.) (July 9, 1930) D.I93I.I.I4, S.I931.124, would
certainly be held in Argentina to be a national company. It was created in
France but deployed all its activity as to works, exploitation, and revenues in
the Argentine port Rosario, according to a governmental concession. From the
French point of view, the Court of Cassation stated that the gold clause stipulated in the bonds of the corporation was to be considered as an international
contract, not subject to the French currency laws, but did not declare the company to be Argentine, as VOELKEL, 14 Tul. L. Rev. (1940) at 4S n. 13 assumes.
60
Honduras: C. Com. (1940) art. 286.
Nicaragua: C. Com. art. 339·
Paraguay: C. Com. art. z86, all these textually following Argentina.
Panama: C. C. art. 82.: "associations" having their principal object in Panama
are subject to the local law as to the form, validity, and registration of their
acts of association; C. Com. ( 1916) art. II.
Venezuela: C. Com. (1919) art. 359 (new 334); PERES, "Sociedades extranjeras", zs Revista Der. Jur. y Ciencias Soc. (1936) so, thinks that the corresponding article 359 of the former code refers to partnerships only and that
foreign corporations with their principal establishment in Venezuela are only
"domiciled" there.
61 See ScHUSTER, 7 Tul. L. Rev. (1933) at 376, quoting JoRGE VERA
EsTANOE, 382.
62
Italy: C. C. (1942) art. 25os. What, furthermore, does the new art. 2509
C. C. mean? It says: companies constituted in the territory of the state, even
though the object of their activity is abroad, are subject to Italian law. Are
they recognized without having their seat in the state, thus adding the principle
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meetings of the shareholders, adds Argentina), or the principal establishment, or chief object, is situated in the state.
Thus, the principle is no longer restrictive when it operates
in favor of the law of the forum, but it remains so in reference
to foreign law.
A similar provision of the Japanese Commercial Code
(article 258) runs as follows:
"A company which establishes its principal office in Japan
or the chief object of which is to engage in commercial business in Japan shall, even though formed in a foreign country,
comply with the same provisions as a company formed in
Japan." 63
This rule has been explained as intending "to forestall
any attempt to establish a fictitious permanent establishment
in a foreign country in order to evade the application of
Japanese laws."6 '
Also the Treaty of Commerce between Great Britain and
Turkey of 1930 in which the seat principle was adopted has
been corrected in the final protocol to the effect that foreign
companies concentrating their principal operations on Turkish
territory, must obtain "Turkish nationality" in order to do
so.65
For minor political reasons, finally, the German Civil Code
declares an exception to its principles, viz., it permits special
charters for associations domiciled abroad. 68 This has been
of incorporation to the other grounds for claiming domestic character? Art.
zp8, No. z, in fact, requires a stock corporation only to indicate its seat without mentioning that it should be in the state.
Rumania: C. Com. (1938) art. 354·
63 Cf. YAMADA, 6 Repert. 540 No. 6r.
Similarly, Liechtenstein: P. G. R. art. '-33·
64 I C. Com, of Japan Ann. 4u n. I, see Tokyo District Court (Sept. 10,
19I8) itl. n. z.
65
Am.]. Int. Law 1933, Supp. 109 art. 13.
66 BGB. § '-3: see NEUMEYER, I Int. Verwaltungs R. u9 and in z Mitteilungen dt. Ges. Volker R. (I 9 I 8) 159; RUNDSTEIN, Report, zz Am. J. Int.
Law 19z8, Supp. 186.
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applied to German school, church, and relief organizations.
It is fully admitted in Germany that this provision pertains
to the municipal law rather than to conflicts law and that no
extraterritorial effect is expected. 61
The same should be assumed in regard to provisions of the
more recent Italian type which subject foreign-created corporations to all domestic rules for the only reason that their
center of exploitation is in the country. Such a rule, perhaps
justifiable in itself, lacks reciprocity. A state that regards a
corporation as domestic because it has its seat there, should
not characterize likewise as domestic one whose seat is abroad.
These pretensions recall the artful combinations of principles
that are used to extend the domain of territorial law to individuals.
While these unprincipled provisions are frequently confused with the imposition of domestic law upon foreign corporations carrying on business in the country, they seem to
have a deeper and more involved bearing. What consequences the Italian courts68 attach to the modified text of their
law are not yet known.
An exception would have to be stated also if the statement
of a few French writers were actually law, that a corporation
by its charter may fix its "seat" in a country in which it does
not have its central administration whenever serious interests
warrant this choice69 This, however, seems to refer, at most,
to some phases of administrative law.
61

RAAPE 129, 132 VI.
Failure to comply with the provisions of the old Commercial Code was
not considered prejudicing recognition. See Cass. (July IJ, 1936) Giur.
Ita!. Rep. 1936, 889 Nos. 267-270; Foro Ita!. Rep. 1936, 1751 No. 556; App.
Milano (May 7, 1937) Giur. ltal. 1938, 870 No. 352; App. Torino (Jan. 7>
1936) Foro Ital. 1936 I 397·
60
DEMOGUE, Note in 8.1908.2.177; PERCEROU, Note in D.1910.2.41 and in
Annales de Droit .Commercial 1926, 5 n. r; 8URVILLE 724; 8oLus, Note,
8.1933.2.49; LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIERE 195. Cf. KESSLER, 3 Z.ausl.PR. (1929)
766; GUTZWILLER, 12 Mitteilungen dt. Ges. Volker R. (1933) 182; BEITZKE,
Jur. Personen 89.
68

so
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IV.

RENVOI

Important modifications, not so much of principle as of its
results, follow from renvoi. The "Eskimo Pie Co." was incorporated in Delaware and, by American standards, recognized in Kentucky where the main establishment was
located. For this reason the German Reichsgericht, too,
recognized the incorporation. 70 We should assume that whenever incorporation and main office are situated in different
states both of which follow the principle of incorporation, the
legal personality is to be recognized in any country of the
opposite system, provided that renvoi is not rejected.
But the converse is true, too. If an anonymous company
is formed in France with control actually centered in Brazil,
French and Brazilian courts agree in applying Brazilian law
to the problems of the existence and capacity of the organization. Failure to create a company in Brazil causes nullity
or nonexistence in both countries. There is no reason why an
American court should insist on qualifying such company as
a valid French entity. The principle of incorporation furnishes
the convenient answer, if it is considered that the incorporation has been ineffective in France and missing in Brazil.

v.

TRANSFER OF CENTRAL ADMINISTRATION
TO ANOTHER CouNTRY

1.

Law of Central Control

The most critical aspect of the system based upon the
central management rather than upon the mere fact of incorporation, develops when it is desired to transfer the main
office from the state of incorporation to another state. 11 Such
70

RG. (June 3, 192.7) 117 RGZ. 2.15; cf. RAAPE 131 § 6.
For literature see WIELAND, 43 Z. Schweiz. R. (N. F.) 2.68; PERROUD,
Clunet 192.6, 561; HAMEL, 2. Z.ausl.PR. (192.8) 1002; BEITZKE, Jur. Personen
§ 19; 2 STREIT-VALLINDAS 88. On the controversy respecting the effects on nationality, see CAVAGLIERI, Dir. Int. Com. 233 and authors cited; C6digo Bustamante, art. 20 par. 1.
11

THE PERSONAL LAW

5I

happening logically should destroy the legal entity; at the
new place a new one would have to be built up. This, however,
makes necessary winding up of the corporation, difficult legal
operations and huge losses, taxes, and charges in both countries, so as to render the undertaking an arduous affair. For
the purpose of saving all that, may the charter be modified?
And may an incorporated association do so, without losing its
capacity or even being automatically dissolved?
These and kindred questions have been the topic of abundant controversy from the viewpoint of the country from
which the corporation emigrates. Prevailing French doctrine
allows the stockholders to decide in an extraordinary general
meeting by unanimous resolution to transfer the siege social
abroad, without dissolving the juristic person. 72 It is doubtful
whether a clause in the by-laws, which has become regular
in France, permitting the board of directors to change the
seat, is a valid delegation of power, 73 particularly if the seat
should be transferred to a foreign country. To the opposite
effect, in the dominant German opinion a decision of the
corporate organs to transfer the seat to a foreign country,
automatically causes the dissolution and liquidation of the
corporation. 74 In Switzerland75 and elsewhere78 the problem
is unsolved.
72
Cass. (civ.) (Nov. 26, I894) S.I895.I.I33, Clunet I895, II71 Cass. (req.)
(March 29, 1898) D.1899·I·595, S. 190I.1.69, Clunet 1898, 756; Trib. com.
Seine (May IS, 1925) Revue I926, 271 PERROUD, id. 5671 cf. LEREBOURSPIGEONNIERE § I65. CosTE-FLORET, ''Le transfer du siege social," I Revue
generale de droit commercial (I938) 577, 590, asserts that a two-thirds
majority suffices.
73
For nullity, Cour Paris {Nov. 27, I931) Gaz. Pal. 1932..I.I89 and CosTEFLORET, id. 59I.
74
German RG. (Junes, I882) 7 RGZ. 68, 701 RG. (June 29, I92.3) I07
RGZ. 941 STAUB-PINNER in 2. Staub 787 § 292 n. 201 FLECHTHEIM in 3 Diiringer-Hachenburg I 283 § I82 n. 45· Mining corporations by transfer enter into
liquidation, 88 RGZ. 53·
Austria: OGH. (Jan. q, I92o) 4 Bull. lnst. Int. (I92.I) 89 n. 743·
Italy: ANZILOTri 1241 CAVAGLIERI, Dir. Int. Com.§ :u.
75
See STAUFFER, 7 Gmiir art. I4 No. Io61 SIEGWART, in 5 Zurcher Kommentar zum Schweiz. ZGB. Einleitung No. 365.
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Some countries, on the other hand, into which an existing
foreign-constituted company wants to move have shown
readiness to receive it without change of personality. Some
decrees of Brazil have provided that an anonymous stock
company which transfers its seat to Brazil and obtains governmental authorization to carry on business is considered a
national. 77 In recent times, this method has been used by
states seeking to attract large holding companies. Normal
principles are set aside. Even Swiss legislation, generally a
model of correctness in international relations, has allowed
foreign stock corporations to register as Swiss anonymous
stock companies with central offices there, on special authorization by the Federal Council under greatly facilitated conditions of incorporation. 78 The entity petitioning has to prove
that it is a legally constituted stock company under the law
of its foreign headquarters. 79 This means that it must have
existed and not have been dissolved at the time of its reincorporation and transfer of its domicil, notwithstanding the
fact that this may cause dissolution in the home state.
A number of small states went much further, making great
concessions as respects incorporation fees and current taxation.80
It would appear that if the personal law of the corporation
prohibits exportation of the management without dissolution
and winding up, or requires a unanimous decision or a governmental authorization (as Liechtenstein does for its own
76 E.g., Belgium: Novelles Belges, 3 D. Com. No. sz 14 denies the possibility
of transfer without destroying personality; but most lawyers follow the French
literature.
11
Brazil: Cf. BEVILAQUA zz3; CARVALHO DE MENDON~A, 3 Trat. Dir.
Com. § 6z4 (c). Companies authorized to do business in Brazil may transfer
their seat to Brazil according to Decree-Law No. z6z7 of Sept. z6, 1940, art. 71.
78
Swiss Rev. Code of Obligations (final provisions) art. 14 par. 1. Cf.
SAUSER-HALL, Le transfert des societes anonymes de l'etranger en Suisse

(1938).
79

Same code, art. 14 par. z.
Liechtenstein, P.G.R. art. z34: the seat may be transferred to Liechtenstein, on authorization by the court, without dissolution abroad and without
bringing business or administration into the country.

80 E.g.,
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corporations), consistency demands that these provisions
should be respected in other countries. Yet, it seems that nobody cares for such application of the personal law. A company, thus, may be dead in its former state and continue to
live in another state, although the same principle of the place
of central control governs in both states.
Finally, the occupation of various countries by the enemy
during the second World War has brought new necessities.
Noteworthy are the emergency decrees of the governments
in exile of the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxemburg. 81 In
particular the Belgian decree-laws allowed a business company
to transfer its siege social to a foreign country without losing
its nationality; they further provided that such transfers may
be effected by a simple decision of the administrative organ
of the company, i.e., by a majority vote of a general meeting
of the stockholders or of the board of administration. 82 By
virtue of the first provision, the personal law of the company
is upheld and the company is treated by the Belgian courts
and authorities as a national. This obviates the requirement
that the central control should be exercised in Belgium. It is
not demanded that a new place of control be established at
any place of business abroad. Since, on the other hand, the
existence of an actual central office is of no importance in the
United States, a Belgian corporation or partnership having
taken refuge in this country, without being reincorporated,
is to be considered a foreign organization, subject to Belgian
law. Of course, a Belgian corporation whose domicil had been
moved to New York, by resolution of the board of directors
in June 1940, was considered entitled to sue in court as a
resident. 83
81
The dates are recorded by DoMKE, Trading with the Enemy in World
War II (1943) 172, cf. id. 345; HANNA, "Nationality and War Claims," 45
Col. L. Rev. ( 1945) 301, 34'o.
82 Belgian Decree-Law of February 2 1940 with the other decree-laws re1
1
pealed by art. 8 of the Decree-Law of February 191 1942 1 Moniteur Beige
(London, March 31, 1942) 174, 182.
83 Chemacid S. A. v. Ferrotar Corporation (D.C. S.D. N.Y. 1943) 51 F.
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Contrary provisions of the charter or by-laws concerning
the domicil of the company were repealed, as provided also
in a Swiss emergency decree allowing juristic persons to
change domicil within the country. ~ The Dutch decree made
the transfer of domicil from the mother country to another
country a matter of governmental decision. 85
8

Law of Incorporation
Continental writers usually believe that at common law, in
a system based merely upon incorporation, no difficulty can
arise if the central office is removed from the country of
incorporation to another country. 86 English authors have
confirmed this view and seem to rejoice over this proof of
superiority.87
Now, it is quite true that, since the place of the headquarters is immaterial, it may be transferred at will. The
Egyptian Delta Land & Investment Company, Limited, incorporated in London in I 904, could be from I 907 on "controlled, managed, directed, and carried on entirely in Cairo,"
released from its English liability for income tax88 without
losing its personality. This cannot be done under the principle
connecting a juristic person with a state by its place of control,
and the case certainly contrasts with that of the Tramways
d'Alexandrie, a stock company incorporated and .domiciled
2.

Supp. 756; see also Rem hours en Industriebank N. V. v. First Nat'l Bank of
Boston (D. C. D. Mass.) C. C. H. War Law Service, Statutes, par. 9155, cited
by HANNA, supra n. 81, at 34Z n. 79·
84
Swiss Federal Council (Oct. 30, 1939) 55 Eidgeniissische Gesetzsammlung
(1939) 1301.
85 Decree of March 4, 1942, Staatblad van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden,
No. Cx6.
86 See e.g., GEILER, u Mitteilungen dt. Ges. ViilkerR. (1933) x8o.
87
VAUGHAN WILLIAMS and CHRUSSACHI, 49 Law Q. Rev. (1933) at 346.
88
[192.9] A.C.x. Attorney General v. The Jewish Colonization Ass'n (x9oo)
z Q. B. ss6; [1901] I K. B. IZ3, c. A. per Smith, M. R., at 130! "The fact
that there was a council of administration which carried on the business of the
company outside of England does not render the company any less an English
company and subject to English law." Gasque v. Inland Revenue Commissioners [1940] z K. B. So.
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in Brussels whose annulment was sought in the Belgian courts
because more of its management was carried on in Egypt than
the by-laws justified; the existence of the company was only
saved by the argument in the lower tribunal that the stockholders had not unanimously decided to transfer the siege
social, and in the court of appeal by the reasoning that the
facts did not establish such transfer. 89
Where, however, it is desired to change the personal law,
for instance, in order to escape a feared revolutionary legislation, or to change "nationality," in order to establish the
right to diplomatic protection or to alter the basis for taxation
(otherwise than for English income tax in the opinion of
the House of Lords), Anglo-American conceptions do not
open any way for maintaining the entity and avoiding winding up. Since, by the old orthodox idea, a corporation can have
no legal existence outside the incorporating state, it "has no
domicil in the jurisdiction which created it, and as a consequence it has not a domicil anywhere else"; 90 "it cannot migrate to another sovereignty." 91 In theory, there does not
even seem to exist any doubt that a corporation is unable to
change its personal law, or "quasi nationality," without winding up and new creation, although in practice ingenious ways
may be found to transfer an undertaking to a newly created
foreign company. 92 The question is entirely different from
that of change of nationality by a continued corporation in the
89
Trib. com. Bruxelles (Dec. 8, 1925) and App. Bruxelles (January 13,
1928) Jur. Com. Brux. 1928, 28 and 38.
90
Mr. Justice Holmes in Bergner & Engel Brewing Co. v. Dreyfus (1898)
172 Mass. 154, 158, 51 N. E. 531, 532; 1 BEALE 228 § 41.1: "It can never
acquire any other domicil."
91
2o C. J. S. 12, Corporations§ 1788 n. 24.
92
In In re Aramayo Francke Mines, Ltd. [1917] 1 Ch. 451-C. A.,
Clunet 1919, 1 12 6, a mihing company incorporated in England but carrying
on business in Bolivia, with a majority of Bolivian stockholders, attempted
to avoid the English war income taxes by a scheme described as follows: a new
company was created in Geneva, Switzerland, to which the assets and the undertaking were to be transferred "upon the basis of an exchange of shares of equal
values and the assumption by the Swiss company of the liabilities and engage-

56 CORPORATIONS, KINDRED ORGANIZATIONS

case where the territory of its domicil is ceded to or annexed
by another power. 9 a

VI.

THEORY oF CoNTROL

The two dominant theories determining the status of
corporations agree in disregarding any qualification of the
directors or members of the association as well as the places
where the capital funds are sought or supplied. 94 For example, where all members of a company founded in Chile
are United States citizens, the company is not regarded a
citizen for the purposes of federal jurisdiction on the ground
of diverse citizenship. 95 In the words of Mr. Justice Stone:
"For almost a century, in ascertaining whether there is the
requisite diversity of citizenship to confer jurisdiction on the
federal courts, we have looked to the domicile of the corporation, not that of its individual stockholders, as controlling."96
Also in England before the first World War, it was a
commonplace that nationality of a company, whatever it may
signify, is independent of the nationality of the participants. 97
ments of this company" (i.e., Aramayo), see Cozens-Hardy, M. R., at 473,
Warrington, L. J., at 475· The opinions were not concerned with any other
problem than the political danger of the company's coming under Swiss control during the war.
FARNSWORTH, The Residence and Domicil of Corporations (1939) 217-222.,
231, 234 contends that a corporation under Anglo-American law can acquire
a domicil of choice in theory but not in law,-words which do not convey what
they should.
93 See MooRE, 3 Digest 804 § 485; TRAVERS, Recueil 1930 III 106; see also
KAHN-F'REUND in Annual Survey of English Law (I939) 374·
94 ARMINJON, 2 Precis§§ I 85ff. and most European writers.
95 See cases in 35 C. J. S. 8I 8 § 2I n. I I.
96 Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co. (1933) 288 U.S. 476. And see as to claims
of American corporations in claims agreements "for an unbroken history of
one hundred and forty years," the opinion of Professor Edwin M. Borchard
of March 11, I925, in Mixed Claims Commission, United States and Germany,
Final Report of H. H. MARTIN ( 1941) 41.
97
Usually based on Driefontein Cons. Gold Mines v. Janson, Ltd. (I9oo)
2 Q. B. 339, [I9oi] 2 K. B. 4I9, [I902] A. C. 484; Central India Mining
Co. v. Societe Coloniale Anversoise [I92o] I K. B 753, 762.
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The same attitude was emphasized by neutral nations during
the war of I9I4-I9I8, for instance by the government of
Brazil when declaring neutrality in 1915.98
War seizures and restrictions. During the first World War,
9
however, English courts, headed by the House of Lords/'
defined enemy corporations by a new concept which soon was
emulated in the war legislation of many belligerent countries,
and finally was sanctioned in the provisions of the Peace
Treaties of I 9 I 9 dealing with liquidation of enemy property.100 The essential element of the innovation was that a
corporation was considered to have enemy character, if it was
"controlled" by enemies, that is, was under the dominating
or prevailing influence of physical or juristic persons who
themselves were qualified as enemy aliens. The United
States stayed distinctly aloof from this encroachment upon
the traditioi}al theory. 101
Mixed arbitral tribunals. The courts instituted in conformity with the Peace Treaties had to apply the aforementioned
provisions based on the new control theory. They had, moreover, to deal judicially with prewar debts submitted to
98
Brazil: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Circular No. 1 of Feb. zz, 1915;
cf. CARVALHo DE MENDON~A, 4 Trat. Dir. Com.§§ 1513-I4.
99
Continental Tyre Co. v. Daimler [19I6] z A. C. 307, in matters of
trading with the enemy. The notions established in the decision were in reality
new. The Hamborn [1919] z A. C. 993 (extending the rule to a Dutch company and liability to condemnation in prize). See PARRY, "The Trading with
the Enemy Act and the Definition of an Enemy," 4 Modern L. Rev. ( 1941)
I 6I, I 67; MENDELSSOHN BARTHOLD¥, "Der Kriegsbegriff des Englischen
Rechts," 8 Rheinische Z. f. Zivil- und Prozessrecht 35 7; cf. GARNER, 1 International Law and the World War (1920) 217. It was much noticed, moreover,
that the Lords spoke of the concept of enemy, and not of that of nationality,
see VAUGHAN WILLIAMS and CHRUSSACHI, 49 Law Q. Rev. (1933) 338.
100
Treaties of Versailles (with Germany) art. 2 9 7 (b) ; of St. Germain
(with Austria) art. 249 (b); of Neuilly (with Bulgaria) art. I 77; of Trianon
(with Hungary) art. 232 (b). Cf. R. FucHs, "Die Grundsiitze des Versailler
Vertrages iiber die Liquidation und Beschlagnahme deutschen Privatvermogens
im Auslande (I 92 7) in 6 LESKE-LOEWENFELD II 90.
101
The Trading with the Enemy Act, 40 Stat. I 411, § 2; in introducing the
Bill to Congress, the Attorney General of the United States said, "We have
specifically abstained in the bill from attempting to go behind the corporate
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clearing proceedings, of which each allied or associated power
could avail itself. Since England, France, and Italy each
elected this procedure in relation to Germany, prewar debts
and claims between English, French, and Italian nationals,
on the one hand, and German nationals, on the other, had to
be entered into the clearing (Versailles Treaty, article 296).
Moreover, prewar contracts between nationals of countries
which had been enemies formed the object of a special jurisdiction of the mixed arbitral tribunals (Versailles Treaty,
article 304).
With the usual confusion of problems, the attempt was
made to transfer the criterion of control to the application of
these two articles. It was a point of great practical importance.
Incidentally to the procedure of clearing, Germany was liable
as guarantor for prewar debts of a German company on a
fixed high exchange rate. It was contended that the guaranty
extended to an English incorporated company controlled by
Germans and liquidated by England. After an initial period
of divided opinions,102 the various mixed arbitral tribunals
commonly acknowledged that, under the peace provisions
not expressly resorting to the device of control, nationality was
to be construed in accordance with the familiar devices of incharacter." Behn, Meyer & Co. v. Miller (I925) 266 U.S. 457; HamburgAmerican Line Terminal and Navigation Co. v. United States (I928) 277 U.S.
I 3 8. Mr. Justice Reynolds stated that Congress definitely adopted the policy of
disregarding stock ownership as a test of enemy character and permitted property of domestic corporations to be dealt with as non-enemy (at I4o); Fritz
Schulz Jr. Co. v. Raimes & Co. (I9I7) Ioo N. Y. Misc. 697, I66 N. Y.
Supp. 567.
On the sharp rejection of the control theory in Switzerland see SAUSER HALL,
so Bull. Soc. Legisl. Comp. (I92I) 237 n. 4·
102 The Franco-German Mixed Arb. Trib. went to the most advanced applications of the "control" theory in the much discussed decisions, Societe du
Chemin de Fer de Damas-Hamah v. Cie. du Chemin de Fer de Bagdad (Aug.
3I, I92I) I Recueil trib. arb. mixtes 4oi, Clunet 1923, 595; Soc. An. du
Charbonnage Frederic-Henri v. Etat Allemand (Sept. 3o, I 92 I) 1 Recueil
trib. arb. mixtes 422, Clunet I 92 3, 6oo; and other cases. See VAUGHAN WILLIAMS and CHRUSSACHI, 49 Law Q. Rev. (I933) 340.
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corporation or head office, without regard to the nationality
of the shareholders or directors. 103
Postwar controversy in France. The excitement stirred up
by this dispute and the memory of the war emergency law in
France, resulted in a tendency to adopt control as the general
criterion of "nationality," including for the purposes of choice
of law. A corporation should, in every respect, be ascribed to
the country whose nationals exercise preponderant influence
on the business administration. 104 Niboyet, the leader of this
movement, proposed an appropriate system. 105 When a committee of bondholders of a Rumanian corporation, in order
tC? sue the corporation in France, formed an association in
Paris in accordance with the French law of 1901 on associations, the Tribunal de la Seine held that the association could
not sue, because the members were not Frenchmen. This decision is recognized as absurd. 106
103
Anglo-German Mixed Arb. Trib., Chamberlain & Hookham v. Solar
Zahlerwerke G. m. b. H. (Dec. u, 1921) x Recueil trib. arb. rnixtes 722;
Gebr. Adt. A. G. v. Scottish Co-op. Wholesale Soc. Ltd. (Nov. 30, 1927) 7
Recueil trib. arb. rnixtes 473· Anglo-Bulgarian Mixed Arb. Trib., Dawson &
Son v. Balkanische Handels- & Industrie-A. G. (October xo, 1923) 3 Recueil
trib. arb. mixtes 534; Anglo-Hungarian Mixed Arb. Trib., Investment Registry, Ltd. v. United Ternes and Sornogy County Local Railways, Ltd. (Feb. 24 1
1925) 5 Recueil trib. arb. mixtes 48-all adopting the double criterion of
constitution plus seat; the British agent in the second case even urged the German seat, while the German agent stressed the center of economic activities.
Similarly, Germano-Belge Mixed Arb. Trib., Soc. de Transports Fluviaux en
Orient v. Soc. Imperiale Ottornane du Chernin de Fer de Bagdad (Dec. xo,
1929) 9 Recueil trib. arb. rnixtes 664, Annual Digest 1929-30 1 2.48 case I5J.
Belgo-German Mixed Arb. Trib., La Suedoise Grammont v. Roller (October x6,
I 92 3)
3 Recueil trib. arb. rnixtes 5 70. Italo-Gerrnan Mixed Arb. Trib.,
Fratelli Giulini v. Etat Allemand (April 29, 1924) 4 Recueil trib arb. rnixtes
506: for other cases see VAUGHAN WILLIAMS and CHRUSSACHI, supra n. 99,
341, FELLER, 2 Z.ausl.off.R. (1931) II 55·
104
App. Colmar (Oct. 29 1 1925) S.1927.2.33 (on cautio iudicatum so/vi)
and (Feb. 28, 1923) Revue juridique d'Alsace et de Lorraine 1923, 438 (on
valorization) concerned matters of foreigners' condition, but were styled and
cited i.n a general way.
105
NIBOYET in many utterances, see especially Manuel No. 304 and Revue
Crit. 1934, I 14.
106
Trib. Seine (April 30, 1932) S.I9J2.2.I74 (as of April 2o, 1932) Gaz.
Pal. 1932.2.217; see criticism by STEFANI and ANDRIOLI, z (Jiur. Cornp.
DIP. (1933) 22 No. xo.
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Once more, the administrative authorities and the courts
returned to the previous views. 107 As early as 1926, the
French Minister of Justice stated that it was "now generally
assumed that the nationality of a company is determined by
the place of its true and effective center, viz., the place where
its administration is actually managed and centralized.mos
The bilateral international treaties of establishment were
reassumed on the old footing.
These discussions, nevertheless, were not forgotten. With
the new war approaching, French measures of precaution
against foreign-domiciled corporations extended to a wide
range of foreign-controlled organizations domiciled in France.
Conflicts law was directly affected by a French decree of
April 12, 1939, declaring that foreign associations with nonprofit purposes required recognition by decree, and that the
term, foreign, includes "groups presenting the characteristics
of an association that have their siege social abroad, or groups
having their center in France, are in fact directed by foreigners, or have either foreign managers or at least twentyfive per cent foreign members.m 09
With this exception, it can be stated that in the field of
conflicts law the control theory was completely rejected by
all countries. As a matter of fact, the theory has proved time
and again impracticable and unjust in reference to subsidiary
corporations and otherwise. 110 Even its discriminatory application against enemy property has inspired many crude solu107
Cass. (req.) {May 12, 1931) 8.1932.1.57, D.1936.r.121; cf. Revue Crit.
1934, 109; 1938, 340. Cass. (req.) {Jan. 9, 1940) Nouv. Revue 1940, 202:
given under public law, a partnership (being a legal person in France) constituted and having its seat in France is of "French nationality," irrespective of
the nationality of its members.
108
Answer by the Garde du Sceaux, Journal Official of February 5, 1926, see
Clunet 1926, 534·
109
See 'SAVATIER, "Sur la condition des personnes morales en DIP. dans les
divers decrets-lois fran~ais de 1939", Revue Crit. 1939,418.
110 See SAUSER-HALL, Les Traites de Paix et les droits des neutres ( 1924)
11 7; R. FucHs, op. cit. supra, n. 1oo and cited authors. See also VAUGHAN
WILLIAMS and CHRUSSACHI, 49 Law Q. Rev. (1933) 347: "It is inconceivable
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tions, as for instance in the case of companies incorporated and
administered in neutral countries, which were forcibly liquidated in an Allied country to the detriment of the neutral
members. 111 The virtual agreement reached between the wars
in all formerly belligerent countries, is remarkable. During
the present conflagration, of course, practically all belligerent
countries have enlarged the concept of enemy for the purpose
of trading with the enemy prohibitions, freezing and sequestration of enemy assets, and in this connection have combined
all three theories of incorporation, seat, and control so that
each one of these criteria stigmatizes a corporation as enemy. ~
In economic warfare, the economic connections cannot be disregarded.
Likewise, although not fitted for determining the personal
law, the theory of control could reasonably be employed so
as to entitle only French-dominated companies to enjoy
compensation for war damages in France. 113 It was a sign of
continued confusion that this decision was hailed by the advocates of the control theory as a "turning point" in the development of the concept of foreign incorporation. 114
Questionable, however, were decisions of the French Court
of Cassation denying protection to so-called "commercial
property," i.e., the rights arising out of a long-time lease of
business premises under the Law of June 30, 1926, to French
firms controlled by the American corporations, Remington
and Singer. 115
11

that one country should have the right to create a person which is to be a
national of another country."
111 See against this encroachment the decision of the Swiss Federal Court
(April I, I 924) so BGE. II 51; Note, SAUSER-HALL, Clunet I 924, 785; Note,,
NJBOYET, S.I925.I.ZZ5.
112 For the various methods used, see DoMKE, Trading with the Enemy in
World War II (I943) I20-I44.
113 Cass. (civ.) (July 25, I933) D.I936.I.128; and again Cass. (civ.) (May
29, 1937) Clunet 1938, 89.
114
DE GALLAIX, Nouv. Revue 1936, 485, 498; and in International Law
Association, Report 39th Conference I 9 3 6 (I 9 3 7) 65.
115 App. Rennes (June I6, 1930) D.I931.2.9, Annual Digest I9Jo, 25I
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Finally, although diplomatic protection, with discretionary
consideration of all elements, may be granted to nationals
interested in a corporation, 116 intervention on behalf of a corporation as being controlled by nationals is opposed by a strong
opinion.111
In conclusion, the criterion of control is entirely inconvenient for determining the personal law, although it may
be suitable for discriminating in exceptional administrative
measures against certain groups of companies. But to advocate
this test generally for all purposes excepting conflicts law, as
the Peruvian Delegation has proposed to the Pan-American
Union, 118 is a very doubtful generalization.

VII. RATIONALE
The characteristic of the Anglo-American principle has
appeared to consist in the recognition of the law of any state
of incorporation, whereas the opposing principle recognizes
the law only of that state where a corporation has been created
and is domiciled in fact. The conceptual difference between
the two systems would be somewhat lessened if the dogma
that the domicil is necessarily in the state of incorporation,
were to be taken seriously in Anglo-American law. Although
this idea has never been employed in selecting the personal
law, it does concern private international law that, by another
traditional rule, meetings of the members of a corporation
can be held only in the state of incorporation, a rule adopted
No. I 53 (half concealing the name of the mother company which is, however,
the Singer Manufacturing Co. of Elizabeth Port, N. J.); Cass. (req.) (May 12,
I93I) S.I9J2.I.57, D.I9J6.I.I2.I. NIBOYET, 2 Traite 377 § 837 approves
the latter decision.
116
See BoRCHARD, Annuaire I 9 3 I, I 297-3 I 3; DE VISSCHER in Revue Dr.
Int. (Bruxelles) (I936) 481.
117
Cf. as to Latin America, supra pp. 24-27.
118
Octava Conferencia, Lima I9J8, Diario de Sesiones, Projecto at p. 6I8
arts. 3-5. The motion was developed upon the Commission of Jurists, see id.
I039•
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in the Restatement (§ 163), "unless otherwise provided by
the law of the state of incorporation." The New York Annotations to the Restatement recall the former rigid Ormsby
Rule, 119 whereby neither shareholders nor directors were
allowed to make binding acts outside of the jurisdiction. It
would be no great step from this to a rule prescribing that
unless the "seat" is situated within the state, incorporation is refused. This is a natural feature of the continental
system, 120 but would easily be reconciled with the AngloAmerican principles.
However, the contrast of principles is felt in three practical
differences:
(a) In the first instance, the common law principle leaves
the promotors of a corporation free to choose any country
for creating the legal person, and any other country for controlling the administration. The opinions evidently are radically divided on the desirability of this freedom, which is
refused in the Continental system. Before the first World
War, English business used the corporation law of the Isle
of Guernsey, which use was regarded so improper that it was
abolished by a clause of the Companies Act of 1929/21 In
this country Delaware for a time became a Mecca for corporations, more recently sharing its popularity with New York,
New Jersey, and certain other states. Delaware is still famous
for the elaborate care with which the law is currently kept in
line with newly occurring needs, and for the special experience of the judiciary. Boards of directors in Delaware companies find their interest in efficient management better safe119
Ormsby v. Vt. Copper Min. Co. (I 874) 56 N. Y. 62.J. See also Stabler
v. ElDora Oil Co. (1915) 2.7 Cal. App. 516, 150 Pac•. 643; HENDERSON 189.
120
E.g., Germany: Aktiengesetz, Jan. 3o, 193 71 § 5·
Switzerland: See SCHNITZER, Handelsr. So.
Venezuela: C. Com. arts. 2.09 1 2.19-22.01 as interpreted by CRAWFORD, 12. Tul.
L. Rev. (1938) 2.12..
121
Companies Act, 192.9 1 s. 353 subjects those companies to English law.
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guarded from interference by small groups of outsiders,
which does not necessarily mean undue disregard of various
minority interests. The opinions of the experts, however, are
strongly divided. There are a good many lawyers in this
country who think that a corporation should be created at the
place of its principal activity and not be entitled to seek out a
law thought more favorable with regard to powers, liabilities,
audits, or publicity. Also, in states having modern corporation
laws, such as Michigan, the opinion prevails that foreign
incorporation for domestic enterprises should be sought only
if special reasons make it advisable, such as exceptional needs
not satisfied by certain provisions on preferred stock. Considerations of taxation seem no longer to exercise a controlling
influence on the choice of the charter state. As mentioned
above, the tendency is even stronger to recognize a rival
claim of the state of the actual management to control all
intangibles and revenues. 122 The traditional principle, thus,
is weakened, and its competition with other ideas promotes
confusion.
.
No such doubts exist with regard to the competition of
Liechtenstein, Luxemburg, Monaco, and Panama in offering
lowest bids for holding companies. They, indeed, provoke
the thought of "corporation Renos."
(b) Second, the Continental principle makes it very difficult to transfer a corporation as an existing legal person to
another country. Since this weakness can easily be remedied
by legislation, the point is insufficient for a decisive criticism.
It is entirely impossible, on the other hand, to change the
personal law of a company incorporated in England or in the
United States.
(c) Third, the principle of incorporation causes puzzling
problems in the case where an association is incorporating in
several states. The original doctrine concerning the effect of
1 22

Supra Chapter

18

p.

29.
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multiple incorporation was loaded with inconveniences,123
((defying the common understanding of the business
world."124 Some improvement was effected by recognizing
that the legal person created and re-created is the same; the
corresponding conclusions were reached, for instance, that the
creation of shares is governed by the law of the first incorporation.125 But a more radical reform would be desirable, and
in fact Henderson has urged that the law of the state of incorporation where the headquarters are situated be adopted
for all manifestations of an identical corporation.126
This suggestion, fostering a link between the two principles, would seem highl¥ significant. But thus far, the international situation is quite similar to that in regard to the
two great principles respecting status. Such eminent experts
as Young in England and Henderson in the United States
have regretted the common law principle as it stands; 127 more
recently the following words were exchanged in a meeting
of the International Law Association:

ccMr. Wyndham A. Bewes: The nationality of a company
registered in England is a fiction invented by English law,
the nationality itself to start with being a related fiction. If
you want to go to the realities of things, the existence of a
living company, you have to go to where that company is administered. I think our law is wrong and I should like to see
it changed.
ccMr. President: I thank Mr. Wyndham Bewes. It is one
of the very rare occasions upon which I have heard an eminent
English lawyer say that the law of England is wrong.m28
Nevertheless, a minority of Continental writers advocate
123

FOLEY, "Incorporation, Multiple Incorporation and the Conflict of Laws,"
4Z Harv. L. Rev. (19z9) 516.
124 HENDERSON I 9 3> cf. 69.
125
Restatement §§ zo3, zos.
126
HENDERSON 191 ff.
127 YOUNG 161 1 167, zo7; HENDERSON ibid.
128
International Law Association, Report of the 39th Conference 1936
(1937) ss.
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just the Anglo-American principle! 129 The majority of lawyers on both sides seem perfectly satisfied with the wisdom
of their respective principles. 130
Again, international attempts at unification131 have failed. 132
This was also the fate of the notable draft of a uniform state
law concerning foreign corporations (I 934) .133
The simple measure suggested above of prescribing in the
local requirements for incorporation, that the central office
should be in the state, would leave the conflicts law intact and
could be followed by those states which have no ambition to
create corporations for foreign consumption. There should be
no doubt in theory that this is the soundest solution. Likewise
in theory, it would seem obvious that the Continental conflicts principle is the true equivalent to the common law
principle with respect to individuals, and that this domiciliary
rule has as much to recommend it for corporations as it has
for individuals. In a federation, the nation-wide activities of
a private legal person should be supervised and guaranteed
by a federal organ. This is true for intrastate as well as
for interstate activity, but, as things stand, the states are
thoroughly disinclined to cede one of their last important
powers, and the corporations cannot afford to have their
129
France: PILLET, Personnes Morales§ 137; WEISS, 2 Traite 392.
Germany: 1 FRANKENSTEIN 459; GEILER in I 2 Mitteilungen dt. Ges.
Volker R. (1933) 179 and in Diiringer-Hachenburg 51; NussBAUM, D. IPR.
185; ScHWANDT in Landesreferate, Sonderheft, 6 Z.ausl.PR. (1932) 206.
Italy: ANZILOTTI, 6 Rivista (1912) 109, 113.
Switzerland: VON STEIGER, ZBJV. 1931, 306 (but without such criticism
in his address, Schweizerische Vereinigung fiir internationales Recht No. 27,
p. 28).
130
See the characteristic opposition of views, on the one hand, of D'AMELIO,
Clunet 1917, 1227, and on the other, of VAUGHAN WILLIAMS and CHRUSSACHI,
49 Law Q. Rev. (1933) 343, 347, 348 who accuse the "seat" principle of
"inconceivable" pretension and "glaring inconsistencies."
131
See Report, RuNDSTEIN, Am. J. Int. Law 1928, Supp. 187; LEPAULLE,
De la condition des societes etrangeres aux Etats-Unis d'Amerique (1923) 74·
132
The Sixth Hague Conference (1928) found no time for the problem.
133
Uniform Foreign Corporation Act, in Handbook of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws ( 1934) 286.
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vast bureaucratic duties increased by additional federal impositions. Thus, in this country, the main problem lies in
other considerations, the most important of which is concerned with the right of doing business, which will be discussed at a later place in this book.

CHAPTER

20

The Scope of the Personal Law
of Corporations

T

HE personal law governs all matters relating to a
corporation's existence, its functions as defined by its
constitution, its organization, liabilities, and termination, as well as connected matters. 1 It accompanies the legal
entity from birth to death.
1.

Existence and Legal Character

The personal law determines whether there is a corporation. The forum will rely on this law for affirmation or
negation of its existence. 2 A perfected incorporation-in any
state, or in the state of central control-is recognized irrespective of facts that would be considered omissions or defects
in the process of incorporation and causes for dissolution
under the domestic law of the forum. 3 Conversely, an association not enjoying legal personality in the place of attempted
1
Formulations to the same effect: RG. (May 27, 1910) 73 RGZ. 366, 367
(capacity of having and exercising rights, constitution, administration, contract
of association and its modifications); Codigo Bustamante, art. 248 (constitution, function, and responsibility of the organs) .
2
Restatement§ 155 (1) and (z) implicitly.
England: Henriques v. General Privileged Dutch Co. (1728) Ld. Raym.
1532, 1535; The National Bank of St. Charles v. De Bernales (1825) 1 C. & P.
569.
United States: First Title and Securities Co. v. U. S. Gypsum Co. (1931)
zx1 Iowa 1019,233 N. W. 137.
Examples:
Belgium: App. Bruxelles (Feb. z9, 1896) Pasicrisie 1896.2.365.
France:Trib. civ. Seine (July z, 1896) Clunet 1899 1 575·
The Netherlands: Hof Amsterdam (May 7, 19oo) W. 7488; Rb. Rotterdam
(June 51 1913) W. 9549; Rb. Amsterdam (May 29, 1914) W. 9683, and 6ee
KosTERS 67 5·
3 Restatement § 155 comment b.
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creation, is not considered anywhere an incorporated body!

Illustration. The Committee of Underwriters of Hamburg
brought an action in Paris. The French Supreme Court held
that the plaintiff, a legal person under the law of Hamburg,
and not a stock corporation/ was able to sue. 6
The requirements for validity of corporations established
in the state where a corporation is alleged to have been
created, must be fulfilled. It may be that an act of the
legislative or executive branch of the government is necessary
(Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Poland), as was universally
required in former times. 7 Ordinarily, however, general
statutes establish the conditions under which an association
may gain personality by creation through private persons
for private purposes. The provisions vary with respect to
every particular of the formalities, such as the documents
embodying the declaration of the promoters (articles, certificate or memorandum of association or incorporation, or
charter and by-laws, in Europe ordinarily one document,
the "statute") and the records and advertisements necessary
for public association. There is also diversity on the minimum
number of members needed, the subscriptions or payments
to be made, the verification of noncash contributions, and
similar matters. The law of incorporation controls which
provisions are conditions precedent and which mandatory,
and which kind of invalidity follows an omission or mistake. 8
This law must be wholly satisfied. 9
4
Restatement § 155 comment b; Dickey v. Southwestern Surety Ins. Co.
(1915) 119 Ark. u, 173 S. W. 398; Sinnott v. Hanan (1915) z14 N.Y. 454,
108 N. E. 8 5 8.
5
Otherwise the court would have denied recognition on the ground discussed
infra, Chapter u, pp. 130-I40.
6
Cass. (civ.) (July u, I 893) Clunet I 893, uo4.
7
App. Colmar (March 31, 19o8) Clunet I91o, 613 (authorization required
in Luxemburg).
8
England: In re The Imperial Anglo-German Bank (I87z) z6 L. T. N. S.
229; cf. YOUNG 178 n. 4·
Belgium: App. Bruxelles (April 3, I933) Belg. Jud. I9Z4 c. I46o.
9
Restatement § 155 ( z).
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Whether agreements by which the promoters engage
themselves to bring a corporation into existence form an
integral part of the proceedings needed for incorporation, is
determined by the personal law. If they are not so considered,
the law of contract governs.10 Assuredly contracts concluded
between the promoters and the members of a finance or
guarantee syndicate or agreements between these persons and
the bankers are not covered by the personal law .11
While the validity of the creating act is thus subjected to
the law of the incorporating state, it has been objected that,
unless it is validly constituted, a legal person cannot have
a personal law; to determine under this personal law whether
the constitution is valid, would mean a vicious circle. 12 But
it is simply reasonable that the same law should govern the
acts by which an association assumes personality, acquires
capacity and an organization, as well as the discharge of its
functions. The overworked argument of a circulus inextricabilis is once more deceptive. ·
Objections on the ground of public policy to technical
particulars of the foreign requirements for incorporation
are very seldom raised. Examples may be found in jurisdictions where one-man companies are abhorred. 13
In connection with this conception, it is an important and
universally settled rule that the subscribers (in the broadest
meaning) to the stock of a company are liable according to
the personal law of the corporation. 14 To support this rule,
10 RG. (March 4, 1930) IPRspr. I9JI No. II (Vorgrundungsvertrag),
Swiss BG., 35 BGE. II 2JI, 36 id. II 387.
11 2 ARMINJON (ed. 2) 464 n. I§ I8I.
12
2 ARMINJON (ed. 2) § I8J.
13
Belgium: Cass. (Jan. 5, I9II) Revue pratique des societes (I9ll) I85;
Revue pratique du notariat ( I9II) 2 79 (a company cannot exist with only one
member).
The Netherlands: Kg. Amsterdam (May 5 and u, I9I6) W. 9978 and
IOOOJ.
14 United States: Crofoot v. Thatcher (I899) I9 Utah 212, 57 Pac. I7I;
Trent Import Co. v. Wheelwright (I9I2) u8 Md. 249, 84 Atl. 543
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it is usually argued in Europe that the subscribers tacitly
submit themselves to the law governing the future corporation.15 This argument, in fact, covers also those subscriptions which are not an essential prerequisite of the constitution.
In the United States, the same result, i.e., that the action
against the subscribers is determined by the law of the state
of incorporation, is reached by the construction that the subscriber's offer is deemed to have been accepted by the corporation as soon as formed. 16
For the formalities of the contract of association, if the
contract is executed in a state other than where its commercial
domicil is to be, i.e., where incorporation is to be sought, the
revised text of the Treaty of Montevideo refers to the law
of the place of contracting.17 But this is true only to the extent
to which the law of the state of incorporation refers to the
local law by the rule locus regit actum.
Capacity (Powers)
The main idea involved m this topic
to be recorded at this juncture:
2.

IS

simple enough

(illegal stock subscription); May v. Roberts (1930) 133 Ore. 643, 286 Pac.
546, 549; Collins v. Morgan Grain Co. (1926) 16 F. (2d) 253, 255·
Austria: OGH. (Dec. 29, 1930) 12 SZ. 956 No. 315, 6 Z.ausl.PR. (1932)
972 (Swiss law determines principal, interest, and time limitation).
France: Trib. com. Seine (May II, 1887) Clunet 1889,670 (Belgian law);
Trib. com. Seine (June 25, 1891) Clunet 1893, 893 (Luxemburg law); Cour
Paris (Aug. 4, 1893) Clunet 1893, 1226 (the buyer of a foreign share cannot
invoke the French provision that shares must amount at least to 500 francs);
Trib. com. Seine (March 17, 1896) Clunet 1897, 1043 (Belgian law determining prescription for the subscriber).
Germany: OLG. Miinchen (July 17, 1928) IPRspr. 1929 No. 23 (Eng-lish
law).
The Netherlands: Kg. Amsterdam (Dec. II, 1916) N. ]. (1917) 8.
Switzerland: BG. (Oct. 15, 1915) 41 BGE. II 588 (Swiss law on rescission.
based, however, on a special argument).
15 Bclgium: Trib. com. Bruxelles (Dec. 31, 1907) .Clunet 1908, 1231.
France: Trib. com. Seine (June 17, 1907) Clunet 1908, 170.
Germany: Common opinion, see KESSLER, 3 Z.ausl.PR. (1929) 768 No. 1.
16 Athol Music Hall Co. v. Carey (1876) II6 Mass. 47I; for other cases
see WARREN, Cases on Corporations (I 928) I 75·
17 Draft of Treaty on Commercial Terrestial Law (I94o) art. 26 § 2, cf.
art. 7·
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A corporation, if recognized, enjoys the powers conferred
upon it by its charter or by the legislation of the incorporating
state. This latter, the "general law" of the corporation, cannot be disregarded, unless it intends to amplify or diminish
the powers of corporations or a class of them only within the
territory of the state. Exceptions may be raised to the powers
of a foreign corporation on the grounds of public policy, but
this should not be done without the strongest reasons.
The principle includes the ability of a corporation to have
rights and liabilities and to be heir or legatee/ 8 as well as
the capacity to exercise rights (capacity of enjoyment).
If consistency be observed, the personal law of the state
of incorporation governs the name or firm of the entity. 19
Thus the German Reichsgericht protected an abbreviated
name "Kwatta" under Dutch law (according to the Paris
Treaty for the Protection of Commercial Property of 18 83), 20
and the name "Eskimo Pie Co.," following the law of
Delaware. 21
In the European opinion, there is no doubt that the scope
of this personal law embraces the right to sue and to be a
party to a law suit. 22 This is also one of the oldest rules of
18 See, for instance, Cour Paris (June :u, 1935) Clunet 1936, 884; Trib.
com. Seine (Nov. 14, 1936) Clunet 1938, 307; Revue Crit. 1938, 57: Austrian
law for existence and capacity to be a legatee of the Society for Assistance to
Frenchmen in Austria.
19 France: App. Douai (Nov. 18, 1904) D.1905.:i.I75; Cass. (req.) (Dec.
26, 1905) D.19o6.1.252.
Argentina: Cam. Fed. de la Cap. (June 16, 1944) 34 La Ley 1024.
20 RG. (Sept. 26, 1924) 109 RGZ. 213.
21 RG. (June 2, 1911) 117 RGZ. 217.
22 France: Cour Paris (July 2o, 1936) Clunet 1937, p6 with the instructive distinction that the foreign corporation may sue by virtue of its capacity
under article 15 of the Civil Code, but that jurisdiction is given only within the
limits defined by French Code of Civ. Proc., art. 59·
Germany: STEIN-JONAS, ZPO. §50 (ed. 1934) VI.
Italy: Former C. Com. (1882) arts. 230-232 have been considered to cover
the whole field of capacity to be a party and, by the prevailing opinion, even
where a foreign business corporation has failed to comply with the conditions
for doing business in the Kingdom. See below pp. 142, 143, 147·
The Netherlands: Doctrine firmly settled by H.R. (March 23, 1866) W.
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England, going back to the cases of 1724 and 1825,23 and
certainly is the true rule in this country, despite Beale's
assertion that the whole problem of who may sue and be
sued is procedural. 24
In contrast to the capacity to be a party, the competence
of certain individuals to appear in court on behalf of a
corporation which is a party, may be influenced by the procedural law of the forum. This problem cannot be expounded
here. American courts seem accustomed to follow consistently
the lex fori.
What law determines the status of a corporation as a
merchant, important under most civil law legislations? Opinions are divided. The personal law is applied by logical
consequence in Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Switzerland, 25 and has been prescribed in an elaborate manner in
2781; see also Hof den Bosch (May 26, I89I) W. 6I29 (corporation in
liquidation); KosTERS 689; Rb. Dordrecht, (Jan. u, I927) W. 11625,
37 Z.int.R. ( 1927) 447, I VAN HASSELT 327 (expressly declaring that reciprocity is not required for recognition); Rb. Haag (March 27, I936) W. I937> 665
(company constituted in Bern, Switzerland); Hof den Bosch (Feb. 9, I937)
W. 19 3 7, 9 9 2. There is, however, a great controversy a,bout foreign (French,
Belgian) provisions denying the right of a corporation to appear in its own
name; the majority of decisions regard these provisions procedural and therefore
not applicable in the Dutch forum, see VAN HASSELT 3·
Scotland: Edinburgh and Glasgow Bank v. Ewan (I8p) I4 Ct. Se$5. (2nd.
ser.) 547·
Sweden: MALMAR, 7 Repert. I4I No. I49·
Switzerland: BG. (Sept. I6, I9o9) 35 BGE. II 458, App. Ziirich (May 2,
1938) 3 8 Bl.f.Ziirch.Rspr. ( I9 39) I 90 n. 85: "capacity of being sued for
attachment is a branch of the capacity of being a party, and this is a branch
of the capacity of having rights," concerning a "curatorium of administration
for the estate of the late princes, H-0, etc."
23
Right to sue: Dutch West India Co. v. Henriques (I724) I Strange 6I2,
aff'd (1728) 2 Ld. Raym. I5J2, (I73o) id. I5J5; The National Bank of St.
Charles v. De Bernales (I825) I C. & P. 569, Ry. & M. I90·
Liability to be sued: Newby v. Van Oppen and The Colt's Patent Firearms
Mfg. Co. (1872) 7 Q. B. 293.
24
3 BEALE § 588.I and 2. See infra pp. I42, I43. I47·
25
Germany: ZPO. § I7.
Italy: App. Roma (March 3, 1932) Foro Ita!. I932 I II73; Cass. (April29,
1933) Foro Ita!. I933 I 116o; Cass. Roma (March 24, I938) Giur. Ita!.
I938 I, I, 65I (an Italian company for dealing with rural land in Argentina
is commercial and therefore subject to bankruptcy, though its activity is not
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the C6digo Bustamante.u French courts and writers, however,
advocate the law of the forum. 27
By an exception universally adopted, the capacity of a
corporation to commit tort is governed by the law of the
place of the alleged tortious act, if the forum does not insist
on its own policy. 28
More detailed attention will be given below (Chapter 22)
to the problems arising when contracts exceeding the powers
either of the corporation or its representatives, are concluded
on behalf of a foreign corporation.
3· Internal Organization
The problems regarding the organization of the internal
life of the corporate body 29 include in the first place acquisition and termination of membership. 30 In a fraternal benefit
considered commercial under Argentine C. Com. art. 8. This decision is correct
without regard to "qualification according to lex fori," as claimed by a note
in Clunet 1939, 185.
The Netherlands: Rb. Almelo (Oct. 30 1 1901) W. 7736.
Poland: Int. Priv. Law, art. 2; Inter local Priv. Law, art. 4 (center of
enterprise) .
Switzerland: VON STEIGER, 67 ZBJV. (1931) 313; cf. CAVAGLIERI, Dir. Int.
Com. (1936) 16o-173·
26 C6digo Bustamante, art. 248. See also 2 LYON-CAEN et RENAULT II 950
§ 1127.
27 ARMINJON, 2 Precis (ed. 1) 384 § 179.
Similarly, NussBAUM, D. IPR. 190, 194.
Mexico: Ley General de Sociedades Mercantiles ( 19 34) art. 4·
Institute of International Law, 35 Annuaire ( 1929) II 1 64-167 seems to combine.both principles in a singular way.
28 Restatement § 166 comment b.
France: Cass. (crim.) (Aug. 8, 1873) Clunet 1875, 22; Trib. corr. Seine
(March 13, 1903) Clunet 1903, 831; id. (July 27, 1910) Clunet 1911, 234.
Germany: OLG. Niirnberg (Jan. 4, 1934) IPRspr. 1934 No. 26; RAAPE 137;
NussBAUM, D. IPR. 191 (n. 6) § 42; in other opinions: 2 ZITELMANN 129;
SCHNITZER, Handelsr. 115; but Liechtenstein, P.G.R. art. 235 (3) requires
the minimum liability established by the law of the forum.
29 Canada Southern R. Co. v. Gebhard (1883) 109 U.S. 527.
30 Restatement § 1 8 2.
England: Baker v. Baker, Eccles & Co. (1917) 242 U.S. 394 as construed
by CHEATHAM, Cases 81 5.
France: Cour Paris (May u, 1881) Clunet 1882, 317; Trib. com. Seine
(May 28, 1896) Clunet 1896 1 874.

THE SCOPE OF THE PERSONAL LAW

75

organization, the charter and by-laws determine also who
is eligible to be a beneficiary. 31
Certificates. Membership may depend on the holding of
a certificate. Whether it does, and to what extent-whether
for instance actual or potential membership rights are conferred upon any holder of a share certificate-is determined
by the law of the state of incorporation. If this state is one
in which the conception of the common law prevails, shares
are not transferable except by registration on the company's
books, and any certificates of stock issued have merely evidentiary value. This system has been maintained in many
existing American and Canadian statutes on stock transfer,
although these allow the companies incorporated in the state
to issue certificates that are indorsable in blank and transfer-:
able by delivery. Acquisition of the certificate as a tangible
thing (under the law applicable thereto) confers ownership
in the corporeal certificate and in addition conveys title to the
share of stock as between assignor and assignee, 32 but membership is acquired only by subsequent registration. Under
English law, however, and according to the Uniform Stock
Transfer Act (adopted or substantially equalled in forty
states), registered certificates, indorsed in blank or accompanied by separate instrument of transfer or assignment;
bill of sale, et cetera, embody the rights of the certificate
owner to demand registration as the owner of membership
upon the books of the corporation. "Title to a certificate and
to the share represented thereby can be transferred only by
delivery of the instrument.ms The share, hence, may be said
Germany: RG. (May 25, I928) JW. I928, 20I3; RG. (March 10, I934)
88 Seuff. Arch. (I 934) I 93, IPRspr. I 934 No. 11.
Switzerland: BG. (July 9, I9I3) 39 BGE. II 426.
31
See 2 BEALE I 2 r 2 n. r.
32
Williams v. Colonial Bank (r888) 38 Ch. D. 388; GooDRICH§§ rs6-I59
n. 173.
33
Uniform Stock Transfer Act, § 1, 6 U. L. A. (I 922).
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to be materially, although not formally, merged with the
certificate. Finally, the prevailing Continental type reaches
the same goal by the complete merger of share and certificate
in bearer shares. 34
It follows that the certificate in all cases is transferred
according to the law governing tangible things, viz., as is
often asserted, by the law of the situs, but more precisely,
by the law of tne place where the certificate is delivered. 35
In contrast thereto, the personal law of the corporation determines, whether consent of other members, or that of the
corporation, or whether recording in the books, is required
to entitle the transferee to the rights of a shareholder as
against the corporation, its other members, the state, and
other third independent parties, to relieve the transferor
from liability to the corporation, and related questions. For
example, if the ownership of the certificate, embodying a
share of an English private limited company, according to
Swiss law is validly transferred to a Swiss bank, the rights
of the acquirer are nevertheless subject to the transfer restrictions of English law. 36
In an analogous way, in case of inheritance, the last personal law of the deceased will decide to whom the assets
devolve, but whether one who thus acquires shares holds
an effective title in relation to the corporation, is exclusively
determined by the law of charter. 37
Seizures. The application of the law of the corporation
to the transfer of shares includes seizures of all kinds. 38 In
34
I BEALE§ I04.I; German RG. (March 10 1 1934) IPRspr. 1934 No. II.
Another opinion seems to be expressed by M. WOLFF, IPR. 71 IV 2..
85
United States: Direction der Disconto-Gesellschaft v. United States Steel
Corp. (192.5) 2.67 U.S. 2.2.; See Note, 15 Cal. L. Rev. (192.7) 145, 149, 150.
36
See VON STEIGER, 67 ZBJV. (1931) 32.0.
37 The comment b to Restatement § I 82. is probably in accord.
38
RABEL, "Situs Problems in Enemy Property Measures," I I Law and Cont.
Prob. ( 1945) II 8, I 33· As an illustration, see:
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the main, this has been recognized in all those cases where
shares or certificates have been confiscated. In particular, the
Alien Property Custodians in this country, 39 in Canada/0
and in South Africa 41 have been upheld when they vested
in themselves enemy registered shares by mere notification
to the central office of the company, despite circulation of
the respective certificates in neutral countries, because the
company law involved was based on the common law principle. On the other hand, the perceptive analysis of the
principles underlying the Uniform Stock Transfer Act as
adopted in New Jersey, by Judge Learned Hand, and in the
Supreme Court of the United States, by Mr. Justice Holmes,
recognized seizure by the English Public Trustee, of stock
of the United States Steel Corporation, indorsed in blank
and deposited in a bank in London for the account of German
banks. 42 The holding of such a certificate rather than the
registration upon the books of the corporation procures membership. This, the Disconto-Gesellschaft case, should have
authority for courts everywhere. By its recognition of the
mobilization of the membership embodied in the certificate,
the decision relates the problem to the use of financial markets
and the importance of commercial reliance, the very considerations that originated the institution of certificates to
bearer. One question only has been intentionally left open
by this and other cases: whether the public policy of the
The Netherlands: Rb. Rotterdam (Sept. u, 1922.) W. 10960: certificates
representing German shares in an English corporation were in England and on
seizure by the English trustee of enemy property transferred on the books. The
Dutch court recognized the seizure according to the applicable English law.
39
Miller v. Kaliwerke Aschersleben Aktiengesellschaft (C. C. A. zd 1922)
283 Fed. 746; United Cigarette Machine Co. v. Canadian Pacific R. Co.
(C. C. A. 2d 1926) 12 F. (zd) 634.
40
Spitz v. Secretary of State of Canada [1939] 2 D. L. R. 546, Exch. C.
41
Randfontein Estates Gold Mining Co. v. Custodian of Enemy Property
(1923) S. A. L. R. App. D. 576.
42
Disconto-Gesellschaft v. U. S. Steel Corp (1925) 267 U. S. 22.
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state of incorporation overriding its own stock transfer law,
may abridge the rights of bona fide holders of true bearer
shares. Such an extension of war measures has not been
excluded. However, thus far, no unequivocal case in which
bona fide neutral acquirers of bearer shares have been divested, has occurred here or in England.
A similar classification is due to the rights and liabilities
pertaining to the members. 43 The Restatement enumerates
as subject to the law of incorporation:
The right of a shareholder to participate in the administration of the affairs of the corporation, in the division of
profits and in the distribution of assets on dissolution and his
rights on the issuance of new shares ( § I 83); the right to
vote, to receive dividends, etc. (comment a, ibid.) ; the right
to object to corporate activities (comment b, ibid.).
The question whether the trustee (for the purpose of voting) will be allowed to vote the shares ( § I 84).
The existence and extent of the liability of a shareholder
for assessments or contribution to the corporation for the payment of debts of the corporation ( § I 8 5).
For illustration, a certificate issued by the National City
Bank of New York on "our American share" giving title
to shares of a European corporation, is governed, as regards
validity and content, by New York law, and with respect
43
United States: Hudson River Pulp Co. v. Warner (r9oo) 99 Fed. 187,
39 U.S. C. C. A. 452; O'Brien v. Chicago R. Co. (r868) 53 Barb. (N.Y.) 568,
36 How. Pr. 24 (spurious stock); Ernst v. Elmira Municipal Improvement Co.
(1898) 24 N.Y. Misc. 583, 54 N.Y. Supp. 116 (right against unlawful issue
of preferred stock); Nashua Savings Bank v. Anglo-American etc. Co. (1903)
189 u.s. 221.
England: Spiller v. Turner ( 1897) r Ch. D. 911, cf. YouNG 186.
Canada: Pickles v. China Mutual Ins. Co.; China Mutual Ins. Co. v. Smith
(1913) 47 S. C. R. 429, 10 D. L. R. (1913) 323, conf'ng, 46 N. S. R. 7,
3D. L. R. 766 (Supreme Court of Nova Scotia 1912.).
Belgium: App. Bruxelles (Jan. IJ, 1928) Jur. Com. Brux. 1928, 42 (preferred stock of a Belgian company is not valorized, according to Belgian
law).
Switzerland: BG. (April r, 1924) so BGE. II 57, 58.
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to the deposit of the original European shares by the proper
law applicable thereto; but in all other respects the law of
the incorporating state controls. 44
Members are subject to assessments made in conformity
to the charter, by-laws, and statutory provisions of the law
of incorporation, "although they are not made parties to
the proceeding for levying it." 45
The same law of incorporation determines how directors
are nominated and what position they hold; how and at what
place the directors or committees shall meet; 46 all questions
of internal management; 47 the method of distribution of
profits and appropriation of earned surplus to reserves;
accounting; whether a corporation is permitted to acquire
its own stock, 48 et cetera.
Matters of internal organization, however, are not only
reserved to the law of the charter, but regularly also to the
jurisdiction of the courts of the state of incorporation.
Jurisdiction. "The English court will not interfere in the
internal disputes of foreign corporations with domestic issues
as between the members" 49-a maxim not consistently respected. 50 In the United States, it has been declared that,
in the absence of an office for the transfer of shares, a foreign
corporation may not be sued for the issuance, transfer, or
44 See FLECHTHEIM, 3 Z.ausl.PR. (1929) 118.
45 Mr. Chief Justice Stone in Pink v. A. A. A. Highway Express Inc. (1941)
314 U.S. 201, 207; Warner v. Delbridge & Cameron (1896) 110 Mich. 590,

68 N. W. 2 83 : "Every person who deals with it (the foreign corporation)
everywhere and particularly one who becomes a member of the corporation,
is bound to take notice of the provisions which had been made in its charter,
and subjects himself to such laws of the government of its situs as affect the
powers and obligations of the corporation."
46 Restatement § 164.
41 San Remo Copper Min. Co. v. Moneuse (1912) 149 App. Div. (N.Y.)
26, 133 N.Y. Supp. 509, reversed (1911) 132 N.Y. Supp. 570.
48 Tolman v. New Mexico & Dakota Mica Co. (1885) 4 Dak. 4, 22 N. W.
505.
49

Sudlow v. Dutch Rhenish R. Co. (1855) 21 Beav. 43, per Romilly.
DICEY, Rule 139, n. d seems to indicate less consistency than in the
American courts.
50
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cancellation of shares; 51 generally, courts exercise discretion
in assuming jurisdiction; it is a question of policy and
convenience, not of right. 52 It is thought, however, that
considerations of convenience, efficiency, and justice point
to the court of the domicil of the corporation for settlement
of the issues presented. 53 Analogous rules existing elsewhere
are in part even stricter and more comprehensive. 54
4· External Relations
The personal law of the corporation controls the rights
and liabilities of the corporation and of the members toward
third persons, such as creditors and debtors. 55 In particular,
it covers the powers of the corporation56 and the liability of
promoters, directors, advisory board, 57 and shareholders. 58
51 Restatement§§ I92, I93; cf. Hopkins v. Great Western Fuse Co. (I94I)
343 Pa. 438, 22 Atl. (2d) 7I7; Sternfeld v. Toxaway Tanning Co. (I942)
290 N.Y. 294.49 N. E. (2d) I4S.
52 Restatement, Scope Note to Topic 5, 279; Notes, I8 A. L. R. I376, 1383;
32 A. L. R. 1353, I355; 29 Col. L. Rev. (I929) 968; 27 Mich. L. Rev.
(I929) 336.
53
See Notes, 33 Col. L. Rev. (I933) 492; 89 A. L. R. 736; I7 Bost. U. L.
Rev. (I937) 878. An exception has been mentioned supra Chapter I9 n. 53·
54
E.g., Belgium: Law on Competence, of March 25, I876, art. 44 gives exclusive jurisdiction to the court at the place of the principal establishment, over
disputes between the administrators and members. The constitutional documents
may change this rule however. See Novelles Belges, 3 D. Com. 349 § 22I7.
France: C. Civ. Proc., art. 59, see comment by GLASSON, TISSIER et MoREL,
2 Traite theorique et pratique de procedure civile (ed. 3, I926) § 36o.
Germany: ZPO. § 22, HGB. §§ 272 par. 2, 309, 325; Genossenschaftsgesetz
§ 5 I, Gesellschaft mit beschrankter Haftung Gesetz § 75.
55
Canada Southern R. Co. v. Gebhard (I883) Io9 U. S. 527; a person
dealing with a foreign corporation submits himself to the regulation of the
foreign state discharging the corporation from liability.
56
See discussion infra pp. I5 7ff.
57 Restatement § I 8 7.
58 Restatement §§ I87, I9o, cf. Leyner Engineering Works v. Kempner
(C. C. S.D. Tex. I9o8) I63 Fed. 6os. On the special subject of limitation of
the liability of stockholders, see the notes in II3 A. L. R. po and I43 A. L. R.
I442.
England: General Steam Navigation Co. v. Guillou ( I843) II M. & W 877;
Bateman v. Service (P. C. I88I) 6 App. Cas. 386, per Sir R. Couch, 388.
Canada: Allen v. Standard Trust Co. (I92o) 57 D. L. R. I05 (Man. App.);
for other cases see 3 JoHNSON 453·
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For instance, where a British incorporated limited company
carried on business in California, in which state the constitution and the civil code of the time declared the shareholders
of a corporation liable for the debts of the corporation, the
59
English Court of Appeals correctly denied the action.
Liability of stockholders in the United States. In this
country, however, the problem has been singularly confused.
The provisions of California just mentioned established
proportionate liability of stockholders to be applied also to
stockholders of foreign corporations,S0 a unique and ex61
travagant rule that fortunately was repealed in 1931. But
the not so infrequent provisions imposing some subsidiary
liability upon shareholders, such as in particular on those of
banking, guaranty, investment, insurance, or similar corporations62 have been extended to the members of organizations
of other states under qualified circumstances interesting to
note.
(i) While the Supreme Court of the United States in
several cases has compelled state courts to give effect to the
statutory liability of members under the law of organization/ 3
it once approved a judgment declaring a stockholder subject
to the liability statute of the state whose resident he is. 64
Against this emphasis on the power of the domiciliary state,
it should be noted with all due respect that the accidental
59

Risdon I. & L. Works v. Furness [I9o6] I K. B. 49·

° Cal. Constitution, former § 3, art. XII; C. C., former § 322.
61
6

Cal. Stat. (I9JI) p. 444; C. C.§§ 322-325a; cf. BALLANTINE, Cal. Corp.
Law, 4 § 3: "This form of liability was unique and operated as a deterrent to
the investment of capital here."
62
E.g., see Kentucky: Rev. Stat. (I946) § 271.I8o (2) (insurance); Maine:
Rev. Stat. (I 944) c. 49 § I I 7; Ill. Constitution, art. I I § 6.
63
Converse v. Hamilton (I9I2) 224 U. S. 243; Supreme Council of the
Royal Arcanum v. Green (I9I5) 237 U. S. S3I; New York Life Ins. Co. v ..
Dodge (I9I8) 246 U.S. 357· Accordingly, Groesbeck v. Beaupre (I94o) 307
Ill. App. 215, 30 N. E. (2d) 53 I·
64
Pinney v. Nelson (I 9 o I ) I 8 3 U. S. I 44 ; followed by Restatement § I 9 I
comment a.
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domicil of an individual should not interfere with the structure of a capital organization recognized under our basic
principles for common interest. Otherwise, local liability
rules ought to be applied also when they are more favorable
to the stockholder than the rules governing the corporation.
In fact, when a citizen of New Jersey was sued on his
individual additional liability as a stockholder of a banking
corporation of Florida, the New Jersey court dismissed the
action with reference to a local statute. 65 A na!ve annotation
tried to justify this decision constitutionally by the argument
that the claim was not based on a judgment but on a statutory
liability. 66 These seem to be isolated aberrations.
(ii) Although the stockholder was not a resident and
the corporation was f~reign, he was held subject to the
liability statute of the state where the corporation concluded
a contract. The courts assumed an agreement of the stockholder with the third party whereby he was deemed to have
submitted to the statute of the place of contracting, either
when the charter of the corporation expressly authorized
doing business in that state or even when the charter failed
to specify the states in which business may be conducted. 67
These fictitious constructions were aptly refuted in the case
of Thomas v. Matthiessen68 by the Federal Courts of New
York, Judge Ward of the Circuit Court of Appeals declaring
that under the theories rejected "corporate stock is liable to
become in this country an uncertain and even dangerous
65

Cochrane v. Morris (I93I) ION.]. Misc. 82, I57 Atl. 6p.
57 N.J. L. J. (I934) 26I.
67
See the California cases cited in Restatement California Annotations § I 9 I.
Other cases and argumentations on the same lines in Notes, 23 Harv. L. Rev.
(I9Io) 37, I2 Col. L. Rev. (I9I2) 450, 27 Harv. L. Rev. (I9I4) 575· This
strange argument has been shared by YouNG and by STEVENS 729 n. I 82.
The Restatement § I9I, trying to reduce the scope of the local law, still
applies it when "(h) the shareholder has personally taken part in doing the
act or causing it to be done, or (c) has notice that the corporation was formed
to do business there."
68
(C. C. D. N.Y. I9o9) I7o Fed. 362; (I9II) I92 Fed. 495·
66
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asset." The Supreme Court, however, although approving
of this reasoning, found factually that the New York stockholders of a New York corporation had agreed to liability
under the law of Arizona, because by the charter the corporation was specially organized to do business in Arizona
and California. 69
We may in fact, as explained before, set aside the case
where a business organization is intended to operate exclusively, or at least principally, in a state other than that
of incorporation; this, however, should be done, if at all,
only under some theory of evasion that is to be based, not on
the behavior or domicil of any particular stockholder, but
on the contrast between the corporate purposes and the selection of the state in which to incorporate. In Peck v. N oee, the
corporation was organized to do business in California only,
and its organizers and officers were California residentS. 10
In this case, probably with stronger facts than in that of
Thomas v. Matthiessen, the local law might have had a
claim. 71 All other arguments against the exclusive application
of the law of the charter are evidently induced by mistaken
application of the conflicts rule that a principal is bound to
the construction given to his authority by the law of the
state where the agent acts upon it. In our case, no such
construction can alter the fact that the stockholders have
agreed only to a charter limiting their liability to their share
in the stock, and hence have given approval to business carried
on in whatever place, only at the risk of the corporation and
not otherwise. To reason as though individual stockholders or
all stockholders by allowing business abroad have waived the
limitation of their liability, is gratuitous.
On the other hand, the exclusive application of the law
69
70

71

(1913) 2J2 u.s. 221.
Peck v. Noee (r9o8) 154 Cal. 351,97 Pac. 865.

Cf.

STUMBERG 340.
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of the charter is entirely desirable in the interest of certainty
and equity, even if more reliable expressions for exception
could be found than in the helpless formulation of the Restatement (supra note 67).
Borderline problems. Special attention will be given later
to the authority of the principal representatives of a corporation contracting with third persons. There is no doubt,
however, on principle that the personal law of the entity
controls. 72 Only the border line between this and other conflicts rules causes some difficulties. In particular, the territorial
law of the country where a foreign corporation does business
is likely to claim consideration of its own rules. Application
of the law governing the contract may further complicate
the problem. Young in his excellent monograph, trying to
find a just delimitation, proposed that only those rules and
enactments which relate to the permanent character and constitution of a juristic person, or to the relations of its members inter se and toward the juristic person itself, should
be regarded as part of its personal law having extraterritorial
effect; no enactment made to protect the interests of third
parties should be included. 73 This is not a suitable proposition,
because the law of the incorporating state, too, generally has
rules protecting third parties which ought to be applied and
because the local law is also entitled to regulate business
72
United States: 2 BEALE 758 § I65.1.
England: Banco de Bilbao v. Antonio Rey y Zardoya, K. B. ( 19 3 7), "not
published" in England, Clunet 1938, 6o2; aff'd, 2 All E. R. [I938] 253-C. A.:
revocation of powers of employees under Spanish Constitution and C. Com.
art. 21.
Brazil: Sup. Trib. Fed. (Sept. 2, I9o8) I07 0 Direito 2I5.
France: App. Douai (April 28, I 897) D.1899.2.I 95·
Germany: KG. (March 8, I929) IPRspr. I929 No. 21.
The Netherlands: H. R. (Jan. 12, I933) W. 12626; charter of Belgian
comptoir determines agent's power to conclude a cartel with Dutch and German
companies.
73
YouNG I 8 5. If he says: "A state cannot exercise its legislative powers over
the subjects of other states, even to protect them," he adds a new "cannot" to
those well criticized by himself.
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conducted in its territory in respects not concerning the interest of third parties but the public interest.
5. Modification and End
The law of the state of incorporation determines:
Alteration of the charter or by-laws, e.g., increase or decrease of the capital stock; 74 annulment of the charter; 75
its expiration by lapse of time; 76 dissolutiont whether voluntary or forced, 78 its method and cause; 79 in states recognizing
the extraterritorial effect of foreign adjudications in bankruptcy,So the effect of such adjudication on the existence and
representation of the corporation; 81 and its continuation after
a certificate of dissolution for purposes of winding up or
actions of debt. 82
74
Austria: OGH. (Dec. 29, 1930) 12 Amtl. S. No. 315·
France: Trib. com. Seine (Junes, 1875) Clunet 1876, 363.
Germany: RG. (May 27, 1910) 76 RGZ. 366, 20 Z.int.R. 408 (Dutch law
applied, art. 289 par. 3 of the German HGB. declared inapplicable).
75
See supra ns. 2ff.
76
Sturges v. Vanderbilt (1878) 73 N.Y. 384.
77
United States: Relfe v. Rundle (r88o) 103 U.S. 222: right of appointed
state official against shareholder; approved for England by Dicey.
England: Ban que Internationale de Commerce de Petrograd v. Goukassow
[1923] 2 K. B. 682 at 69r.
France: App. Chambery (Dec. I, 1866) S.I867.2.I82; App. Paris (June IS,
I937) Clunet 1937, 812 (jurisdiction denied).
Germany: RG. (May 20, 1930) 129 RGZ. 98; OLG. Frankfurt (Nov. I,
1907) r6 ROLG. 10o; OLG. Kiiln (June 2o, 1913) Rhein. Arch. II9.
The Netherlands: Rb. Amsterdam (April 22, 19Io) W. 9IS9; (Jan. 26,
1923) W. I 1054; Rb. Maastricht (June 25, I93I) W. 12366 (powers of
liquidators).
Switzerland: 51 BGE. II 264, 14 Praxis 371; Bern, ZBJV. (1907) 555·
78
Belgo-German Mixed Arb. Trib., Bender Eregli v. Stinnes, 5 Recueil trib.
arb. mixtes 75 r.
79
Sinnott v. Hanan (I913) 156 App. Div. (N.Y.) 323, I4I N.Y. Supp.

sos.

80
See NADELMANN, "The Recognition of American Arrangements Abroad,"
90 U. of Pa. L. Rev. (1942) 78o, 789.
81
England: (As to movables) principle of Solomon v. Ross ( r 764) I H.
Bl. IJ I (n); see CHESHIRE 478.
82
Restatement § IS8 comment c; O'Reilly, Skelly & Fogarty Co. v. Greene
(1896) 40 N. Y. Supp. 36o, aff'd, 4I N. Y. Supp. 1056; Sinnott v. Hanan
(19I5) 2I4 N.Y. 454, Io8 N. E. 8 5 8.
Germany: OLG. Frankfurt (Feb. 2I, I933) IPRspr. I933 No. 4, applying
§ ros n. 8 of the New York Stock Corporation Law.
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If the state of incorporation does not provide for a suit
in the corporate name after dissolution, an American rule
provides that where the corporation was doing business or
had property in another state, it may be kept alive by the
statutes of this latter state for the purpose of suing or being
sued, and that the effect on the winding up of the business
or on the property existing in that state will be recognized
in third states. 83 This rule deserves universal application,
although on the Continent statutes on dissolution generally
do prescribe continuation for the purpose and duration of
winding up, if the formal dissolution is not deferred until
this moment. Thus, where an English company had been
dissolved without satisfying the claim of a certain creditor
who sued for payment out of German immovables recorded in
the land register in the name of the company, the German
court found it impossible directly to apply the English rules;
it considered the company as continuing for the purpose of
the suit. 84 The fiction, of course, does not refer to any business
done after the dissolution. 85 No such statute was available
in the case of Soviet nationalization, which will be mentioned
below; hence, the House of Lords had to decide whether a
dissolved Russian company could sue for debt in England,
which was granted by the narrow margin of three votes
against two. 86
As a jurisdictional effect, it is generally held that the court
of the corporation's domicil has exclusive power to dissolve
83 Restatement § Is 8 comment d; Rodgers v. The Adriatic Fire Ins. Co.
(I89s) I48 N.Y. 34, 42 N. E. SIS, SI6; People v. Mercantile Credit Co.
(I9oi) 6s App. Div. (N.Y.) 3o6, 309, 72 N.Y. Supp. 8s8.
84 Cour Paris (July 6, I93S) Clunet I936, 9I6. This was disregarded in
Gibbs and Sons v. La Societe Industrielle et Commerciale des Metaux (I89o)
2S Q. B. D. 399, criticized by YouNG I 8 I.
85 OLG. Frankfurt (Nov. I, I 907) I 6 ROLG. I oo. The Reichsgericht declared that no such proceeding would be granted in the mere interest of the
shareholders, RG. (May zo, I930) 129 RGZ. 98, 107, See German HGB.
§ 302.
86 Russian & English Bank v. Baring Bros. & Co., Ltd. [I936] A. C. 40s.
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as well as to annul the legal person. Perfectly distinguishable is the jurisdiction exercised in any state where business
is carried on to wind up dissolved foreign corporations or
partnerships. 88 In England, a technical doubt whether winding up may follow dissolution in an order contrary to common law, was resolved by an express provision of the Companies Law. 89
When in 1901 France dissolved all religious congregations
that had not obtained authorization, the Fathers of Chartreux
were correctly recognized in Switzerland as an association
because they had transferred their domicil and recreated
their legal form in other countries. 90 The Freres des ecoles
chrhiennes should have been recognized also in France,
insofar as they had mother houses in other countries. 91 The
dissolved French congregations themselves could not be
recognized in any country except on the ground of public
policy; this seems not to have occurred. Also, the dissolution
of the Bank of Ethiopia by the Italian Government has been
recognized elsewhere. 92
Soviet nationalization. On a large scale, the problems of
87
United States: Restatement New York Annotations§ 157 n. 2; 2 BEALE
74-2 § I 5 7.z; Barclay v. Talman (I 842) 4 Edw. Ch. 128.
France: Trib. civ. Seine (Jan. 8, I912) Revue I9I2, 402, cf. 2 ARMINJON
(ed. I) § I 8 3· Contra: PILLET, Personnes Morales§ I 72·
Belgium: Trib. Liege (July 23, r89I) Clunet I893, u43; cf. 3 RoLIN
§§ 1264, 1284.
88
England: In re Comm. Bank of South Australia (I886) 33 Ch. D. 173,
1 74·
United States: Lowe v. Pressed Metal Co. (I9I6) 9I Conn. 9I, 99 Atl. I.
89
WESTLAKE § 132; DICEY 326; In re Comm. Bank of India (I 8 68) 6 Eq.
517; In re Matheson Bros. Ltd. (1884) 27 Ch. D. 225; In re Mercantile
Bank of Australia ( 1892) 2 Ch. D. :z.o4. See Companies Act, I929, § 338
( r) : this rule requires only a "place of business," not an "established place
of business" in England, Cohen, J., In re Tovarishestvo Manufactur LiudvigRabenek [I944] I Ch. 404,408.
90
Switzerland: 32 BGE. I 157; 39 BGE. II 65I.
91
See PILLET, Personnes Morales § 293 against a decision of Trib. corr.
Seine.
92
Bank of Ethiopia v. National Bank of Egypt and Liguori [I937] Ch.
D. 513, 3 All E. R. 8, Clunet 1938, Io5.
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dissolution and winding up have been discussed in the many
cases arising out of the Soviet Decree of December 14, 1917,
pronouncing the nationalization of Russian companies. 93 The
first impulse everywhere was to deny the Soviet Decree
recognition. This was done by some courts on the ground
that the Soviet Union had not received recognition by the
government of the forum. 94 But in this country, Cardozo,
J., in the New York Court of Appeals refuted this specious
argument at a time when the American Government had not
yet recognized the Soviet Government de jure. 95 This accords
with the decisions of the Federal Tribunal of Switzerland,
which had not recognized the Soviets until I 946. 96 Recognition
of a government has nothing to do with the existence of a
private person. Other courts held that the Soviet provisions
were not really meant to dissolve the corporation97 or to extend beyond Russian frontiers 98-both inexact assumptions. 99
93
CONNICK, 34 Yale L. J. (192.5) 499, NEBOLSINE, "The Recovery of
the Foreign Assets of Nationalized Russian Corporations," 39 Yale L. J. (1930)
I I 30.
94
United States: Fred S. Tames & Co. v. Second Russian Ins. Co. (App. Div.
N. Y. I92.4) 2.03 N. Y. Supp. zJz, I46 N. E. 369; Joint Stock Co. of
Volgakama etc. v. National City Bank (App. Div. N. Y. I924) 2o6 N. Y.
Supp. 476.
England: Russian Bank of Foreign Trade v. Excess Ins. Co. [I9I9] K. B.
39, 35 T. L. R. 42. The Eastern Carrying Ins. Co. v. Nat'l Benefits Life &
Prop. Ins. Co., Ltd. (I9I9) 35 T. L. R. 2.92..
95
Sokoloff v. Nat'l City Bank of New York (I924) 239 N. Y. I 58, I65,
I45 N. E. 9I7, 9I8; Note, CONNICK, 34 Yale L. J. (I925) 499; cf. Lehman,
J., opinion in Dougherty v. Equitable Life Assurance Society (I934) 266 N.Y.
7I, I09.
96
Switzerland: so BGE. II Sit; 51 id. II 263; 55 id. I 289, Clunet I93o,
1164.
97
England: House of Lords in Russian Commercial and Industrial Bank v.
Comptoir d'Escompte de Mulhouse [192.5] A. C. II2; 40 T. L. R. 837, the
first case after the British recognition of the Soviet Government; followed by
numerous others, see WoRTLEY, I4 Brit. Year Book Int. Law (I933) 4, 5·
Germany: KG. (March 3I, I925) JW. I92.5, IJoo, Clunet I925, I057·
98
England: Employers' Liability Assurance Corp. v. Sedgwick, Collins & Co.
[I927] A. C. 95; The Jupiter [I92.7] P. zso, 253; Woronin, Luetscheg &
Cheshire v. Frederick Huth & Co. (K. B. I92.8) Clunet I92.8, 756, 758.
99
MAKAROV, Precis 2.I9; opinion of Schoendorf stated by the KG. (Oct. 2.5,
I927) JW. I92.8, 1232., IPRspr. I928 No. I4.
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Most appealing was the frank statement that the confiscatory
character of the decrees offended the public policy of the
forum. 100 Numerous French judgments up to 1928 declared
more precisely that, while the title validly passed within Russia, it was contrary to French public policy, that by socialization the legal existence of the enterprises should be destroyed
within France. 101 This opinion was shared by the New York
courts and expressed as late as 1 934. 102 On this basis, the
capacity of the nationalized corporation to appear in court
was affirmed, 103 provided that directors suing in the name
of the corporation showed authorization from its stockholders:104
The matter has become obsolete, however, in this country,
inasmuch as the Soviet Government on the occasion of its
recognition de jure by the so-called Litvinoff agreement, has
assigned to the United States Government any claims it may
have had to property within the territory of the United
States. 105 The Court of Appeals of New York nevertheless
10° France: Trib. com. Marseilles (April 23, I925) Clunet I925, 39I; App.

Bordeaux (Jan. 2, I928) and Cour Paris (June I3, I928) S.I928.2.I6I; cf.
NIBOYET, Clunet 1929, II5; App. Aix (Dec. 23, I925) Clunet I926, 667.
The Netherlands: Rb. Haag (March 9> 1933) W. u589, VAN HASSELT 335·
The former director was considered representative in view of the impossibility
of holding a general meeting of shareholders.
In Germany, this opinion could not be maintained, in view of the Treaty
of Rapallo of April I 6, I 9zz, art. 2, whereby Germany recognized the Soviet
legislation, see RG. (May 2o, I930) IZ9 RGZ. 98.
101 Trib. com. Seine (Jan. 16, 1922) Clunet 1923, 539; (April 26, I9zz)
Clunet 1923, 933; (March 23, I925) Clunet 1927, 3SZ; (April n, 1926)
Clunet I 927, 35 7; Trib. com. Seine (Oct. I, I 926) Clunet I927, 359·
102 Salimoff & Co. v. Standard Oil Co. of New York (I933) 262 N.Y. zzo,
186 N. E. 679, Note, 33 Col. L. Rev. (I933) 75o; Vladikavkazsky R. Co. v.
New York Trust Co. (I934) 263 N. Y. 369, I89 N. E. 456, Note, 34 Col.
L. Rev. (1934) 962. See the survey by Lehman,]., opinion in Dougherty v.
Equitable Life Assurance Society (I934) 266 N.Y. 7I at 106.
103 James & Co. v. Second Russian Ins. Co. (I925) 239 N.Y. 248, I46 N. E.
369; Russian Reinsurance Co. v. Stoddard (1925) 2II App. Div. 132, 207
N.Y. Supp. 574·
104 Banque Internationale v. Nat'l City Bank of New York (I929) I33 N.Y.
Misc. sz7, 233 N.Y. Supp. 255·
105 See 28 Am. J. Int. Law (I934) Supp. Io; State of Russia v. Nat'l City
Bank of New York (I934) 69 F. (:zd) 44·
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held a local branch of a Czarist Russian insurance company
existent, the strong state control over insurance business
warranting a distinct personality of the branch despite the
disappearance of the mother company. 106 But the Supreme
Court of the United States has overruled this construction
and all other objections to the extraterritorial effect of the
Soviet confiscatory decrees. 107 The theory of the Court, which
identifies governmental recognition of the Soviet Government with binding recognition of the nationalization decrees,
is a regrettable deviation from well-settled principles of
international law. 108
In Europe, where litigation was more frequent, all objections finally vanished; the personal law has won full victory.
The power of a state to establish a legal person susceptible
of being recognized everywhere implies a power to terminate
it with extraterritorial effect. Hence, the courts accepted
the proposition that the Russian corporations had ended. 109

106 Moscow Fire Ins. Co. v. Bank of New York & Trust Co. (1939) 28o
N.Y. 286,20 N. E. (zd) 758, aff'd (1940) 309 U.S. 62.4.
107
U.S. v. Pink (1942) 315 U.S. 2.03.
108 BoRCHARD, "Extra-territorial Confiscations," 36 Am. J. Int. Law ( r 942.)
275. JESSUP, "The Litvinov Assignment and the Pink Case," id. z8z, 2.85; Note,
51 Yale L. J. (1942) 848; LAUTERPACHT, Annual Digest 1938-1942. (1942)
141, rso.
109 England: Lazard Bros. & Co. v. Midland Bank, Ltd. [1932] r K. B. 6r7,
aff'd, House of Lords [1933] A. C. 2.89, Clunet 1934, 159; In re Russian
Bank for Foreign Trade [1933] r Ch. 745, Clunet 1934, 445·
Belgium: App. Bruxelles (July I r, r 936) Revue Crit. I 937, r 2. r.
France: Cour Paris (June 13, I92.8) Revue 192.9, 93; and (July 2.2., 1929)
Clunet I929, I095 expressly reversing its stand of May 17, I92.7, Clunet 192.8,
131. Cass. (req.) {July 2.9, 1929) D. H. 192.9, 457, Clunet 1930, 68o Revue
1931, 342.; Trib. com. Seine {Jan. 20, 1936) Revue Crit. 1937, 117; Trib.
com. Seine {Jan. r5, I934) Revue Crit. I935, 468 and Cour Paris {July r5,
1935) Revue Crit. 1936, 158 (bank accounts necessarily stopped at the date
of nationalization).
Germany: KG. (Oct. 25, 1927) JW. 1928, 12.32., IPRspr. 1928 No. 14,
and especially RG. (May 20, 1930) 129 RGZ. 98, JW. I93r, 141, IPRspr.
I93o No. 9; RG. {July n, I934) JW. 1934, 2845, IPRspr. 1934 No. n,
Clunet I935, r64; 6 Giur. Comp. DIP.§ 245·
Poland: S. Ct. (Dec. 4, I929) Clunet 1931, 770.
Switzerland: Despite nonrecognition of the Soviet Government, see supra
n. 96.
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What then happens to the assets left by a former Russian
corporation in another country? Unanimously, the courts
hold that the confiscatory effect of the Soviet legislation
cannot reach assets situated abroad. One reason adduced is
that such confiscation violates a stringent policy of the
forum. 110 A more convincing argument regards the character
of the fiscal privilege claimed by the Soviet Government
as necessarily limited to the territory under its sovereignty.111
While there is some old divergence of opinion about the legal
character of a right of inheritance that a state ascribes to itself,
the Soviet State had evidently exercised the right of a state
to occupy ownerless property (bona 'Vacantia), a right internationally confined to assets within the territory of the state.
Whatever the intention of the Soviet Government may have
been, another state is entitled, on its own soil, to deal with
the assets according to its own conceptions.
Generally, on the request of a national creditor or stockholder, an administrator was appointed by a competent
court. 112 Business managed by local agents of the defunct
corporations was liquidated. 113 In New York, branches of
Russian insurance companies have been liquidated under the
Insurance Law. 114
Are shareholders, however, able to join in a suit to continue
110
Swiss BG. (July 13, 1925) 51 BGE. II 259, 264; App. Paris (June 13,
1928) Clunet 1929, 119. See also MAKAROV, Precis 220.
111
Hamilton v. Accessory Transit Co. (N. Y. I 857) 26 Barb. 46; The
Jupiter [I927] P. In, 250.
112
France: Cour Paris (Oct. 3 I, I 9 35) Clunet I 9 3 6, 3 37.
Germany: BGB. § I9I3.
Switzerland: BG. (Oct. 26, I929) 55 BGE. I 289, Clunet I93o, II64.
For England, recommended by WoRTLEY, 14 Brit. Year Book Int. Law
(I933) 8; Latvia, Laws of April I7, I925 and Sept. I6, I927, and Poland, Decree-Law of March 22, I928, cf. Polish S. Ct. (Dec. 4, I929) Clunet I93I, 770
expressly prescribed liquidation, while Esthonia, Decree of Oct. 27, I92o provided for compulsory domestication of branches of Russian stock corporations.
113
Great Britain: Companies Act, I929, § 338 (2).
114
Matter of People (Russian Reinsurance Co.) (I93I) 255 N. Y. 4I5
I75 N. E. II4.
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the former corporation? While this was held impossible in
Germany, 115 the device of a de facto company has been used
in France and Belgium,116 if there were common assets to be
administered in the country. 117 Officers of the former company
may be considered administrators. 118 The nationalized corporation is liable to be sued for the debts of the old firm at
least those to creditors who are nationals of the forum. 119
Again, when uncertain situations are apt to arise, winding up
or bankruptcy (liquidation judiciare) may be ordered at any
moment at the request of shareholders or creditors, respectively.120 In this case, any theory of universality being excluded by the disappearance of the Russian legal entity,
every country conducts separate proceedings, although a
receiver may be appointed at a place where refugee directors
and shareholders control the business de facto. 121
RG. (May 2o, 193o), 129 RGZ. 98.
App. Bruxelles (July II, 1938) 41 Bull. Inst. Int. (1939) 273 No. 10934.
117 In absence of such property, jurisdiction has been denied; see Cour Paris
(June 15, 1937) Clunet 1937, 812..
118
Trib. com. Seine (June 17, 1934) Clunet 1935, 117.
119 Cour Paris (March 29, 1938) Deutsche Bank v. Ass'n des Porteurs etc.,
Clunet 1938, 1017; id. (April n, 1938) Deutsche Bank v. Banque Internationale de Petrograd, Nouv. Revue 1938,617.
12°France: See the decisions of Trib. com. Seine of 1934 to x936, reported in
Clunet 1935, 125; RevueCrit. 1935,491; 1937,117.
Belgium: Trib. com. Liege (March 25, 1938) 41 Bull. Inst. Int. (1939)
273 No. 10933: the company continues to function in Belgium but must be
dissolved at the request of any stockholder to satisfy first the non-Russian
creditors, and after them the non-Russian shareholders. Difficulties arising from
the territorial limits of liquidators appointed in France are illustrated in
App. Bruxelles (July II, 1938) summarized in 41 Bull. lnst. Int. (1939)
273121No. 10934.
App. Bruxelles (July 11, 1936) Revue Crit. 1937, :21.
115
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Unincorporated Business Organizations
I.
I.

METHOD oF LEGAL CoNsTRUCTION

The Old Antithesis

C

LINGING to the inherited simple contrast between
corporation and partnership, the literature for too
long a time was lost in speculation over the nature
of unincorporated organizations. The most significant dispute
concerned the ordinary mercantile partnership which very
clearly does not fit into the categories either of juristic persons
or of mere contracts of societas. A deep cleavage among the
European scholars was reflected in the split between the
French doctrine, followed widely in Latin countries and
influential in Louisiana/ which acknowledges mercantile2
collective societies as juristic persons, and the German theory
accepted in many other countries, which denies that an
1
Louisiana courts, more definitely than any others, have pronounced that
a partnership is a civil person: Smith v. McMicken (I848) 3 La. Ann. 3I9,
322; Succession of Pilcher (I887) 39 La. Ann. 362, I So. 929; Newman v.
Eldridge (I9o2) I07 La. 3I5, 3I So. 688; Stothart v. William T. Hardie
& Co. (I903) IIO La. 696,34 So. 740. Particularly informative with respect
to the liability of commercial partnerships domiciled in Louisiana is Liverpool,
Brazil & River Platte Navigation Co. v. Agar & Lelong (C. C. E. D. La. I882)
I4 Fed. 6I5. Of course there were limitations to this theory, see Drews v.
Williams (I898) so La. Ann. 579, 23 So. 897. Although Louisiana did not
adopt the Uniform Partnership Act, the old sweeping definitions appear to have
vanished.
2
The French doctrine distinguishes commercial (which are deemed to be
recognized as juristic persons by C. C. art. 529) and civil societies (whose nature
was in controversy) but the distinction has become of minor importance, since
the courts have gradually recognized the legal personality also of the "civil"
societies, and the Law of August I, I893, art. 68 has subjected civil societies
clothed in the form of commercial companies to the commercial laws. See
PLANIOL et RIPERT (et LEPARGNEUR), II Traite Pratique 248 § 989. These
enlargements have not been followed in all countries adhering to the French
type.
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offene Handelsgesellschaft is a legal unit. An analogous
debate divided American authors when the Uniform Partnership Act was drafted. On the one hand, the draft was attacked
on the ground that it made concessions to the legal unit
theory but did not acknowledge it completely,3 and, on the
other hand, it was claimed that the draft, while purporting
to adopt the aggregate theory, had in reality diluted it. 4 As
late as 1929, Warren even resented the language of the
Uniform Act which spoke of the partnership as "it" and as
having assets! 5
The Uniform Act, however, embodying the best practical
solution conforming to universal business conceptions/ has
victoriously demonstrated that the dilemma was futile. The
result of the act coincides with the conclusion reached in
Germany, Switzerland, Scandinavia, Argentina, and other
countries. The aggregate theory is the basis and certain
features of a corporation are avoided, but there is a name
or firm; assets, creditors, and debtors of the partnership
exist in a marked sense; enforcement of claims and bankruptcy are assured; and in an increasing number of jurisdictions the partnership may be sued and even may sue, although
methods and effects may slightly vary. 7
3
CRANE, "The Uniform Partnership Act, a Criticism," 28 Harv. L. Rev.
(I9I5) 762. See contra WM. DRAPER LEWIS, "The Uniform Partnership Act,
a Reply to Mr. Crane's Criticism," 29 Harv. L. Rev. (I9r6) I58, I59i again
CRANE, "The Uniform Partnership Act and Legal Persons," id. 838.
4
WARREN, Corporate Advantages 29, 293. In my opinion, this unfortunate
work of an eminent author has been properly censured by MAGILL, 30 Col. L.
Rev. (I929) I44 and WHIPPLE, 39 Yale L. J. (I930) I44, but it seems still
to exercise some influence.
5
WARREN, Corporate Advantages 295·
6 See 7 Uniform Laws Annotated, and WRIGHTINGTON, The Law of Unincorporated Associations (I 9 I 6) 144. The Act, in I 944, was in force in twentyfour states including the most industrial regions.
7 Austria: Allg. HGB. art. I I r.
Germany: HGB. § 124 par. I .
Liechtenstein: P. G. R. § 697.
Poland: C. Com. (I934) §Sr.
Switzerland: C. Obi. art. 55 9·
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In theoretical formulation of the common result, the
partnership is regarded not as an independent person, but
as a unit at every moment identical with the partners for the
time being; the partners in their specific conjunction and not
the general partners separately are the owners of the assets
and, potentially, parties to lawsuits. 8
Similar controversies have involved joint stock corporations, limited partnerships, and business trusts, despite their
high content of corporate elements.
2.

Gradation of Corporate Character

The European literature at long last has perceived the
multifarious gradations established by modern inventiveness
between the extremes of a mere contract of associates and a
complete legal person. 9 Indeed, it is a statement of sober
truth that a partnership is not a corporation. That the French
societe en nom collectif is generally termed a legal person,
has been criticized by the author of the French standard work
on juristic personality, because this type, too, is far from
embodying all features of a regular corporation.10 But nothing
is gained on the other hand by ignoring in juristic construction
all those indicia of corporateness that make even ordinary
partnerships appear legal bodies to businessmen. The dispute
should find an end in Judge Learned Hand's suggestion
that the entity of the firm should be constantly recognized
and enforced in accordance with business usages and under8 See LEWIS, 29 Harv. L. Rev. (I9I5) I 58, and the "constant view of the
Reichsgericht," as expressed in 46 RGZ. 4I; 65 id. 2I, 229; 86 id. 70; WIELAND, I Handelsr. 4:w n. 61, 621-628; STAUB-PINNER in I Staub§ I05 n. 8.
MUGEL, Offene Handelsgesellschaft, in 5 Rechtsvergl. Handwiirterbuch at 466
has correctly argued that there is no reason why the capacity of partnerships of
being a party to a lawsuit should not be construed analogously to its other
capacities.
9
Final clarification was due in the first place to CARL WIELAND, I Handelsr.
(1921) 396-434·
10
MICHOUD, I Personnalite Morale §§ 68 and 72, 2 id. 328 n. r; see also
LEHMANN, 74 Z. Handelsr. (r913) 465.
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standing; "like the concept of a corporation, it is for many
purposes a device of the utmost value in claritring ideas
and in making easy the solution of legal relations." 11 ·
In this country, as a matter of fact, judges and draftsmen
perceived the truth earlier than in Europe. More than anything else the doctrine of de facto corporations demonstrated
that corporate functions can be exercised without a formally
independent personality. The doctrine of "disregarding
corporate nature" to obviate abuses was a complement thereto.
The continuous necessity of comparing the different institutions of the states was educational in preventing overestimation of the corporation label. "It is difficult to find what
peculiar powers or privileges can only be possessed by corporations or associations which must be regarded as incorporated
or personified.m 2 Indeed, entirely separate capacity is the
only essential attribute of a corporation. A common name,
common funds or ownership of property, continuity of existence unaffected by changes in the membership, transferable
shares, concentration of power in the management, limited
liability of members, capacity to sue and be sued, capacity
to be declared bankrupt-these and other features of an
ordinary stock company may be more or less broadly combined in the structure of unincorporated bodies.
3. Purposes of Construction
It is a familiar and good method to analyze the corporate
elements in a foreign type of association for the purpose
of applying the corresponding domestic rules on corporations.
Such associations may be assimilated to domestic business
corporations from certain points of view and differentiated
11
In re Samuels & Lesser (D. C. S.D. New York 1913) 207 Fed. 195, 198.
An excellent comparison between corporation and partnership with respect
to their changeable attributes is given in FLETCHER, 1 7 Cyc. Corp. § 20.
12
BALLANTINE, Corporations I I § 4; to exactly the same effect, STEVENS,
Corporations § 5.
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13

from others. American courts are particularly well prepared
to inquire into the composition of an organization without
being influenced either by dogmatic preconceptions or mere
names of institutions. For instance, in a famous American
leading case, the Liverpool Insurance Company, an English
joint stock corporation, was subjected to taxation in Massachusetts as a foreign corporation. The Supreme Court of the
United States approved the constitutionality of this discrimination.14 It is a confusion, unfortunately still significant of a
part of the literature, that the Liverpool case has been contrasted with such cases as Great Southern Fire Proof Hotel
Co. v. Jones, 16 in which a Pennsylvania limited partnership
was declared not to be a corporation, although it is a wellknown type of a near-corporation, definitely nearer to the
full-fledged type than an English joint stock corporation. 116
The explanation is very simple and by no means a secret.
The case dealt with access to the federal courts on the
ground of diverse citizenship, and there is a strong tendency
to limit this privilege as much as can be done consistently
with the earlier admission of corporations.
How the courts employ this approach, may be exemplified
by the treatment of common law trusts created under unequivocal laws and with ample corporate advantages in
Massachusetts, New York, Oklahoma, and Wisconsin. Such
trust "is neither in fact nor in law a corporation.m 7 Nevertheless, because of the many attributes of a corporation
possessed by this organization, it has been broughes under
13
WIELAND, I Handelsr. 430: "Only concepts of relations enable us to understand a total thing composed of parts."
14
(187o) 10 Wall. 566.
15
( 1900) I 7 7 U. S. 449, cf. ( 1904) 19 3 U. S. 5 32.
16
This mistake of WARREN, Corporate Advantages 519, 520, seems to be not
yet eradicated.
17
Burgoyne v. James (S. Ct. N. Y. 1935) xs6 Misc. 859, 282 N. Y.
Supp. r8.
18
See Note, 34 Col. L. Rev. (I934) 1555.
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such statutes as Blue Sky laws/9 corporation tax laws/0 and
bankruptcy statutes. 21 It is quite consistent with the method
of evaluating the 'impact of corporate features on a given
problem, that the courts may doubt whether a statute requiring foreign corporations to obtain permission to do business,
apply to such foreign business trusts as are validly constituted
under their home laws. Filing has been declared unnecessary
in Missouri, Montana, and New York/ 2 but is required in
Kansas, Michigan, and Washington. 28 The more liberal solution seems to be influenced by the idea that a common law
trust is created by the mere volition of the organizers in the
declaration of trust rather than as a creature of a statute. Of
more persuasive force than this approach which stems from
the time of the fiction theory, is the argument that, in the
provisions on licensing, the New York legislature intentionally seems to have assimilated business trusts to partnerships
rather than to corporations. 24 The contrary solution, not
merely intended for fiscal interests, may well be justified
by the consideration that persons dealing in the state with
the trustees of a foreign business enterprise are at least as
19 Reilly v. Clyne (I925) 27 Ariz. 432, 234 Pac. 35; cf. DUXBURY, "Business Trusts and Blue Sky Laws," 8 Minn. L. Rev. (I924) 465.
20
Tide Water Pipe Co. v. State Board of Assessors (I895) 57 N.J.
Law 516, 3 I Atl. 220 (partnership association of Pennsylvania).
21
In reAssociated Trust (D. C. D. Mass. I9I4) 222 Fed. IOI2.
22
Missouri: Manufacturers' Finance Trust v. Collins (I933) 227 Mo. App.
I 120, 58 S. W. (2d) I004.
Montana: Hodgkiss v. Northland Petroleum Consolidated (I 93 7) I 04
Mont. p8, 67 Pac. (2d) 8Ir.
New York: Burgoyne v. James (S. Ct. I935) I56 Misc. 859, 282 N.Y.
Supp. I 8.
23
Kansas: Home Lumber Co. v. Hopkins (1920) I07 Kan. 153, I90 Pac.
6or; Harris v. U.S. Mexico Oil Co. (1922) rro Kan. 532, 204 Pac. 754·
Michigan: Mich. Trust Co. v. Herpolsheimer (I932) 256 Mich. 589;
cf. next note.
Washington: State v. Paine (r926) I37 Wash. 566, 243 Pac. 2, aff'd, 137
Wash. 572, 247 Pac. 476.
24
Both arguments have been used by Shientag, J., in Burgoyne v. James,
supra n. 22, at I 3, I 8.
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much endangered as when dealing with foreign corporations.
It fits this situation well that the United States Supreme
Court does not interfere with the freedom of states to treat
a foreign trust either way. With its approval, a business trust
of Massachusetts, whose trustees and shareholders were exempted from personal liability, after investigation of its
structure, was declared clothed with the ordinary functions
and attributes of a corporation and in Michigan subject to
the laws relating to foreign corporations doing business in
the state. 25
We shall meet more examples hereafter. Although conclusions reached may not always have been satisfactory, yet
the method is clear and unimpeachable. Occasions for the
courts to apply their method of putting the problem continue,
since statutes and judge-made rules for the most part are still
conceived as if corporations and partnerships were in contradictory opposition. The treatment of mixed types still
depends on a delicate balancing in accordance with the intentions underlying every one of the different statutory or
other rules. Also, the sparse texts directly referring to unincorporated organizations have presented some problems
of construction. At any rate, the courts recognize that their
task is to construe and adjust unspecified statutes that do
not squarely regulate the foreign hybrid organizations.
In this connection, attention may be drawn to the Uniform
Foreign Corporations Act, § r, which has proposed a broad
assimilation for the purpose of filing for doing business:
" 'Corporations' includes a corporation and all associations,
organizations, trusts, and joint stock companies having substantially the powers or privileges of corporations not possessed by individuals or partnerships, under whatever term
or designation they may be elsewhere defined and known."
25

Hemphill v. Orloff (19z8) :t77 U.S. 537>

sso.
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II.

PERSONAL LAW

If, then, the courts have developed an assured method
of analyzing the mixed nature of business trusts, joint stock
corporations, partnerships of diverse kinds, labor unions, and
clubs, for the purpose of Blue Sky laws, federal revenue,
state taxation, and licensing statutes, is the same approach
not proper for the purpose of ascertaining the applicable
law?
It seems only logical to assume that all organizations enjoy
a personal law at least to the extent that corporate attributes
attach to them.
r. Civil Law Doctrine

Need for a personal law. This problem has not been
exhaustively discussed in any country and not at all in this
country. European writers have, however, perceived that a
personal, ubiquitous law is as necessary to foreign unincorporated organizations, including partnerships, as to veritable
corporations. The status of any association ought to be determined consistently and permanently. 26 A careful Italian
decision declares that "the need of a unitary regulation of
commercial associations (societa) in their international relations requires respect for their original constitution.m 7
An alternative solution would be to allow each court to
determine under its domestic law the legal effects of a foreign
association. Sometimes writers and courts have been inclined
to apply the famous "characterization according to the lex
fori," to determine whether a foreign association should be
regarded as a legal person. But this is not a tenable proposition. As the Restatement well states in its conflicts rule
26

BAR in I EHRENBERG'S Handb. 345; CARL WIELAND, 43 Z. Schweiz.

R. (N. F.) (I924) 279; HAYMANN in 75 Jherings Jahrb. 412.
27

App. Roma (March 8, I9J2) Giur. Ital. I932 I 2, 225, 227, Foro Ital.
I9J2 I I I73> af/'d, Cass. (April 29, 1933) Foro Ital. Mass. I933, JI9·
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on corporations :28 "Whether an association has been incorporated is determined by the law of the state in which an attempt
to incorporate has been made.'' This implies that an association, considered a corporation in the state of charter, is considered just that everywhere. Furthermore: "The effects
of an unsuccessful attempt to incorporate are governed by
the law of the state in which the attempt was made." This 29
implies that a de facto corporation resulting from a defect
in the process of incorporation in the state of the charter, is
so recognized. 30 Is it possible in consistency to treat other
unincorporated associations by a conflicting criterion? If it
is understood, after all discussions, that the difference separating corporations, joint stock companies, and partnerships is
only gradual, how can the recognition of foreign-created
associations stop with corporations? A third solution has been
advocated by a few writers who persist in the error of not
distinguishing the problems of personal law and nationality,
especially enemy nationality; 31 they would determine the
personal law of an association according to the citizenship
of its members, a senseless and often impractical approach.
Laws and treaties. The general European doctrine attributes to associations and partnerships, irrespective of legal personality, a personal law, determined by the same criterion
as in the case of corporations, i.e., in England, the place of
creation, and on the Continent, the "seat" or central office.32
This rule is expressed in recent enactments such as the Polish
28

29

Restatement § ISS·
Or subsec. 3 of§ ISS and special note to§ ISS drawing the same conclu-

sion.
80

United States: See annotation, 73 A. L. R. uoz; 23 Am. Jur. 67 § 56.
Belgium: App. Gent (April 2I, I876) Clunet I876, 305.
France: ARMINJON, Revue I9o8, 772, 82.5.
Italy: App. Roma (March 8, I932) supra n. 2.7.
31
FEDOZZI, Gli enti collettivi nel diritto internazionale privato (I 897)
2.43; CAVAGLIERI, Dir. Int. Com. 2.70. A similar old decision of the Swiss Fed.
Trib. (Nov. II, I 892.) Clunet I 893, 640 is obsolete.
32
England: General Steam Navigation Co. v. Gui!lou (1843) II M. & W.
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statute on international private law, which extends its scope
to "juristic persons as well as all societies and associations,ma
the Code of Liechtenstein/ 4 the C6digo Bustamante35 and
the new draft of the Montevideo Treaties. 36 Of particular
significance are the provisions of international draft proposals37 and bilateral treaties, such as the following:
"The expression 'companies of the High Contracting
Parties' shall, for the purposes of this Treaty, be interpreted in
877; Bank of Australasia v. Harding (I8so) 9 C. B. 66I, cf. z BEALE 894
n. 3·
Austria: WALKER I49·
Belgium: PoULLET § Z09, 3eme regie: foreign associations put by their
national law in an intermediate status between the total absence of any juristic
individuality and the civil personification in proper sense will enjoy in Belgium
the particular status assigned them by their national legislation.
Germany: ROHG. (February I7, I87I) z ROHGE. 36; LEWALD §§ 53,
65; and see the commentaries to Handelsgesetzbuch § I o6.
Italy: Bosco I73 (though not very clear).
The Netherlands: See I VAN HASSELT 3I5ff. including in "handelsvereeniging" the "non-juristic persons."
Switzerland: VON STEIGER, Die Handelsgesellschaften im internationalen
Privatrecht, 67 ZBJV. (I93I) at 3u.
33 Poland: Int. Priv. Law, art. I No. 3·
34 Liechtenstein: P. G. R. arts. 676, 677.
35 Codigo Bustamante, art. Z49·
36 Treaty on Civil Law, art. 4 par. 4 (sociedades civiles); on Commercial
Law, art. 8 (sociedades mercantiles). The actual text of I 8 8 9 limits itself to
juristic persons which concept in Argentina and Paraguay excludes partnerships, cf. ARGANA, Report on the Commercial Draft of I 940, in Republica
Argentina, Segundo Congreso Sudamericano zzs.
37 Institute of International Law, Draft I 929, art. 5, Annuaire I 929 II I 39,
I6z. Draft of Experts, League of Nations, art. 8, cf. Report RUNDSTEIN, Am.
J. Int. Law I928, Supp. I89, I9I.
Ambiguous: Draft of the Geneva Sub-committee on the treatment of foreigners, Revue I930, 236, z4z, art. I6 § I: "Les societes par actions et autres
societes commerciales, y compris les societes industrielles, les societes financieres,
les compagnies assurant les communications et les compagnies de transport,
ayant leur siege . . . " The draftsmen may have believed a partnership or a
joint stock company necessarily to be a juristic person.
On the other hand, the treaties of the United States, e.g., with Poland (June
IS, I93I) art. II, U. S. Treaty Series No. 86z, I39 L. of N. Treaty Series
(I933) 397 at 407, mentioning "limited liability and other corporations
and associations," seem to refer exclusively to juristic persons, as also the original
German version of art. u, Treaty U. S.-Germany (Dec. 8, I923) U.S. Treaty
Series No. 7z5, 52 L. of N. Treaty Series (I9z6) I33 at I4I understands
the analogous passage.
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the case of either High Contracting Party as relating to the
limited liability and other companies and associations (partnerships) formed for the purpose of commerce, finance, industry, transport or any other busine~s, and carrying on business in the territories of that Party, provided that they have
been truly constituted in accordance with the laws in force
therein, etc." Treaty between Great Britain and Turkey, of
March I, I9J0/ 8 article 2.
"Limited liability and other companies, partnerships and
associations formed for the purpose of commerce, insurance,
finance, industry, transport or any other business and established in the territories of either Party shall, provided that
they have been duly constituted in accordance with the laws
in force in such territories, be entitled, in the territories of the
other, to exercise their rights and appear in the courts either as
plaintiffs or defendants, subject to the laws of such other
Party." Treaty between Great Britain and Germany, of Dec.
2, I 924/ 9 article I 6, paragraph I.
Evidently to the same effect the formula included in article
paragraph I, of the Treaty between Egypt and Turkey,
of April 7, I937/0 enumerates: joint stock companies, including industrial, insurance, and transport companies which
have their headquarters (siege) in the territory, et cetera.
Conflict with domestic classification. The principle is obvious in the case where a partnership is considered an entity
short of legal personality in the countries both of creation
IO,

38
Great Britain-Turkey (March 11 1930) 108 L. of N. Treaty Series (1930)
407 at 4Io, I32 British and Foreign State Papers (1930) 342..
39
Great Britain-Hungary (July 23, 1926) art. 10 par. I; 67 L. of N.
Treaty Series (I927) 183 at 189, 12.3 British and Foreign State Papers (1926)
Part I 5 I 7 at 5 20 (partnerships and associations).
Great Britain-Germany (Dec. 21 1924) art. 16 par. 11 43 L. of N. Treaty
Series (I926) 89 at 98, II9 British and Foreign State Papers (1924) 369
at 374, RGBI. 1925 II 777· Similarly, the German treaty with South Africa
(Sept. 1, 1928) art. 15, 95 L. of N. Treaty Series (192.9) 289 at 297, 128
British and Foreign State Papers (1928) Part I, 473 at 478; Finland, RGBI.
I926 II 557; Italy, RGBI. 1929 II 15; etc.
40
191 L. of N. Treaty Series (1938) 95·
Germany: OLG. Kassel (July 30, 1909) Leipz.Z. 1909, 954 (Swiss partnership); OLG. Augsburg (Nov. 6, 1917) 30 ROLG. 105 (Swiss limited partnership).
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and of recognition. An American partnership is in fact recognized in Germany with exactly the same degree of personality
and the same extent of personal liability of the partners as
in the state of creatioD. 41
The personal law applies likewise to a foreign partnership
that is not a legal person under its original law, also when
a similar domestic partnership is construed as a corporation.
For example, a partnership of the United States is to be
treated in Mexico as of the same nature it has in the United
States, different from Mexican partnerships which are corporations. A German partnership or association without legal
personality, an American partnership, or a de facto corporation should enjoy abroad its personal law, neither more nor
less than at home, particularly with respect to standing in
court. In the French courts, this thesis has been accepted42
against opposition erroneously characterizing as procedural
the French rule that only legal persons may appear in
court!3 Exactly the same problem exists in this country and
will be discussed shortly.
The converse case of a partnership with the status of a
corporation in the state of its creation is covered by the
conflicts rule on corporations. The personal law prevails
over a different local characterization, although eager followers of the lex fori theory have opposed this result. 44 Thus,
41 Germany: RG. (Nov. 25, I895) 36 RGZ. 393 (English partnership);
OLG. Kiel (March 2I, I902) 12. Z.int.R. 469 (Swedish cooperative); OLG.
Hamburg (June 6, I9o4) I4 Z.int.R. I63 (American partnership), I66, aff'd,
RG. (Oct. 7, I904) I5 id. 293.
42 App. Douai (Dec. I, I88o) Clunet I882, 3I7; Cour Paris (June 6, I9IZ)
Clunet I9I4, I278 (English partnership).
43 See MICHOUD, 2 Personnalite Morale 328 n. I, 345 n. I; 2 ARMINJON
(ed. 2) 538; as against 2 LYON-CAEN et RENAULT§ I 12.6.
44 RIGAuo, Io Repert. 229 Nos. I9, !U, 22 and in some respects MELCHIOR
138; SAUSER-HALL, so Bull. Soc. Legisl. Comp. (I92I) 2.47. NusSBAuM, D.
IPR. I 90, deciding according to the usual theory of characterization under the
lex fori. Also BEITZKE, Jur. Personen 62, I I 7 advocates the law of the forum,
with wrong reference to the decision of the German Supreme Finance Court,
IPRspr. 1931, Nos. I 5 and 16, actually confirming the conflicts rule.

UNINCORPORATED BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS

105

if a French "societe en nom collectif" claims in a German
court the rights of a legal person as enjoyed in France, it
is immaterial that common German opinion denies legal
personality to an "offene Handelsgesellschaft"; the legal
5
entity is recognized in conformity with French law/ A
partnership constituted by two British subjects in Czarist
Russia was a legal person under the local law; therefore
the liability of the partners to a German creditor was declared
dependent on the Russian law by the Anglo-German Mixed
Arbitral Tribunal. 46 Likewise, the Belgian law of October 25,
I 9 I 9 (article 8) allows foreign scientific associations to "exercise in Belgium ... the rights resulting from their national
law." The Swiss authorities recognized German private limited companies (Gesellschaften mit beschrankter Haftung) at
a time when Switzerland had not yet introduced this type/ 7
and now grant full acknowledgement to English stock companies, corporations sole and business trusts, all unknown
to Swiss internal law. 48
The following case of the Italian Supreme Court gives
another confirmation:

Illustration: Nizard v. Finanza. 49 Two brothers Nizard,
intending to form a partnership, established a firm in France
but omitted the prescribed publications. The resulting irregular or de facto partnership is considered a merely contractual relationship in France/0 while it would be an effective
corporation in ltaly. 51 After the death of one of the brothers,
taxes were levied on certain assets situated in Italy and
45
Germany: LEWALD 48; GEILER, u Mitteilungen dt. Ges. Volker R.
(1833) 186; M. WoLFF, IPR. 69 n. 1 and Priv. Int. Law 306.
46
Anglo-German Mixed Arb. Trib., Voith Maschinenfabrik und Giesserei v.
Thornton & Geiler, 8 Recueil trib. arb. mixtes 300.
47
Swiss Dept. of Justice (Nov. zs, 1898); Decision of the Federal Council
(June 16, 19oz) BBl. 190z IV 4-z.
48
SAUSER-HALL, so Bull. Soc. Legisl. Comp. (19Z1) z46.
49
Italy: Cass. (April z9, 1933) Foro Ital. 1933 I n6o.
5
France: Cass. (req.) (Feb. 8, 193z) Clunet 193z, 961.
51
Italy: Cass. (Dec. zz, 1931) Foro Ital. 193Z I 7161 936.
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brought into the societe. The legality of such taxation was
dependent, in the opinion of the courts, on the question
whether the assets were owned by the brothers in joint
tenancy or by the firm. The courts correctly resorted to the
personal law of the association and found it to be that of the
central office and principal place of business in France rather
than the law of the situs or the national law of the partners.
A learned French commentator on this case reveals his
perplexity, that the association has not been characterized
according to the lex fori as required in conflicts problems, but
consoles himself with thinking that the decision of the court
could be supported by reference to the law of aliens rather
than conflicts law. 52 Yet, the ascertainment of the personal
law of foreign organizations is by no means a problem of
((condition des hrangers" but a part of regular conflicts law.
In a case where in the name of an intended stock corporation, during the period of preparation for its incorporation,
contracts were concluded with third parties, the German
Reichsgericht has applied the personal law of the future
corporation, since the main office was to be established in
Germany. Under this law, namely, the German law, the
promoters were considered to be an unincorporated association, and the agents were personally liable. 53 It would have
been more correct to ascribe to the promoting syndicate its
own personal law, with probably the same result. The principle ought to be the same as where a limited company was
intended, with the central office being established in Bombay,
India, but because not registered there, considered a partnership according to Anglo-Indian law. 54
An exception made by the Belgian Supreme Court was
not a happy one. The court really did not doubt that the
52 MAURY, Note in 3 Giur. Comp. DIP. 23.
53
RG. (October 29, 1938) JW. 1939, IIO.
54
OLG. Hamburg (Jan. 21, 1932) Hans.GZ. 1932, B 266 No. 73, IPRspr.
1932 No. 14.
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capacity of the Societe des Droits d'Auteurs et Compositeurs
de Musique (sACEM) of Paris was subject to French law
but thought that article 1832 of the Civil Code, common to
France and Belgium, should receive the Belgian interpretation rather than the French so as to deny legal personality to
a sooiete civile. 5 5 A strange view. The law presiding over the
creation of an association should be exactly applied without
interference of the municipal law, whether it grants more or
less autonomy. The mistake is instructive. Also common law
courts have not hesitated at times to apply their own special
construction to an association organized in another state under
common law; we shall encounter immediately such a deCisiOn.

2.

American Law

(a) Quasi corporations. Apart from general partnerships,
it seems to me that, although no unequivocal commitment
to a formulated rule can be ascertained, practically the law
under which a limited partnership, a business trust, or a joint
stock corporation has been organized, clearly forms the law
determining the extent of its corporate advantages. The
above-mentioned examinations .of business trust relations
have led to the clear conclusion that New Y ark courts have
"fully recognized the status of a business trust" as reflected
in the decisions of the Massachusetts courts. 56 A Michigan
limited partnership association was thoroughly analyzed by
the Supreme Court of California, which found that under
the Michigan statute, the association had so many corporate
powers that it should be deemed a foreign corporation at
least for the purpose of the power to hold and convey real
55

Cass. Beige (November 12, 1935) 3 Giur. Comp. DIP. No. 131. Contra:
ibid.
56
Burgoyne v. James (1935) 156 Misc. 859,282 N. Y.Supp. 18; Textile
Properties v. Whittall Ass. (r934) 157 Misc. 108, 282 N.Y. Supp. 17.
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property in the firm name, 57 a power which was denied to
partnerships by California law. Where a limited partnership
was organized in Cuba under Spanish law to the effect that
a special partner was not personally liable with his separate
assets for firm debts, the New York Court of Appeals applied
Spanish law, although the contract sued upon was made in
New Yark on behalf of the firm. 58 This decision has been
incidentally approved in the Restatement59 and has several
parallels.<so It was not even mentioned that the Cuban organization, which must have been a comandita simple, would
be construed as a legal person in Cuba itself. The case, therefore, has a broad scope. In a later case, a New York unincorporated stock company was found to be a legal entity
"for most, if not all practical purposes, capable in law of
acting and assuming legal obligations quite independent of
the shareholders," a "quasi-corporate entity," very unlike an
ordinary copartnership. 61 As a result, capacity for issuing
negotiable bonds was recognized. In Kansas, it has been held
that a common law trust domiciled in Oklahoma has legal
capacity to acquire a royalty interest in lands located in the
state, in assimilation to corporations endowed with this
power under the state constitution.062 The status of an organization called "The Farmers Association of North Mississippi"
was analyzed according to the law of the state of Mississippi
where the members resided, and held not to constitute a
partnership.63
57

Hill-Davis Co., Ltd. v. Atwell (I9J2.) 2I5 Cal. 444, IO Pac. (2d) 463.
King v. Sarria (I877) 69 N.Y. 24,25 Am. Rep. 128.
59 Restatement § 343 comment c.
60 Barrows v. Downs (I87o) 9 R.I. 446, II Am. Rep. 283: in a contract
"considered as made in New York" by the general partner of a Havana partnership, his authority to bind special partners is "regulated by the law of Cuba";
Lawrence v. Batcheller (I88I) IJI Mass. 504, 509: "all persons doing business with limited partnerships are presumed to take notice of the laws of the
State in which they are formed." See moreover cases infra ns. 82-86.
61
Hibbs v. Brown (I9o7) I9o N.Y. I67, 82 N. E. 1108.
62 Fitch v. United Royalty Co. (1936) I43 Kan. 486, 55 Pac. (2d) 409.
63 Price v. Independent Oil Co. (I933) I68 Miss. 292, ISO So. 52 I,
58
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It is true that some decisions seem to indicate opposite
tendencies. But they belong to two classes of special considerations.
One class seems to be represented by only one case. An
attempt had been made to form a business trust in Texas, the
members contracting that no stockholder should be personally
liable. By the law of Texas, the stipulation was invalid, and
a partnership resulted with personal liability of the members. The plaintiff brought an action in Iowa on a note issued
by the "trustees" of the association, against an Iowa resident
who had bought stock in the organization. The Iowa Supreme
Court surprisingly dismissed the action on the ground that
public policy required the application of Iowa law under
which the organization is considered an unincorporated joint
stock association.lfl 4 The decision has been criticized on several
grounds. 65 It commits inversely the mistake made in the
California provisions which held a shareholder personally
liable under California law, contrary to the law of the charter. 66 These applications of the lex fori vary the personal law
without any possible justification.
As this case seems to suggest, the controversies about the
nature of a common law trust have somewhat confused the
issue. In contrast to the courts of Massachusetts, other jurisdictions such as Kansas and Texas have considered that corporate advantages such as limited liability of stockholders or
the concentration of the power of management should not be
attributed to an organization otherwise than by statute or by
a distinct agreement in the individual contracts made by the
trustees with third persons. Writers once correctly relied on
the conflicting considerations for the support of their own
respective opinions, so long as the law was fluid. But when a
64

Farmers' & Merchants' Nat'l Bank v. Anderson (1933) :u6 Iowa 988,

250 N.
65
66

w. ZI4.

Note, 47 Harv. L. Rev. (1934) sz6.
Supra p. 81.
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doctrine has become stabilized by the court practice or statute,
it is a part of the general law of the state. 67 Massachusetts
law on the one hand, Texas law on the other, ought to be
recognized exactly as they are. There is no occasion for Iowa
or California to supply its own theory. That the established
judge-made law of Massachusetts, for instance, should not
have been able to work out a trust susceptible of being recognized in Kansas, whereas its subsequently enacted statute
should be given effect, is one of those apparently immortal
dogmas loved by some writers and too unreasonable to be
really adopted by any court.
Of another character, however, are cases in which it was
stressed that the association had acted under the color of a
corporation. A limited partnership of Pennsylvania filed an
application for doing business in New York, referring to
its "corporate seal" and indicating an agent for service of
process. The New York court, without entering into an examination as to what was the true status of the party under
the law of creation, upheld the service upon the New York
agent authorized by the application mentioned. The plaintiff
otherwise "would have been misled." This is an interesting
exception to be connected with territorial protection of third
persons. 68
A similar idea has been expressed in a California case. 69 An
organization, having vainly attempted to incorporate elsewhere, conducted business in the state "in garb of a corporation inducing the transaction involved in the instant litigation." It was considered estopped to deny the legality of its
organization, and treated as a de facto corporation under the
67 Also in the field of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, primarily not in question here, the traditional doctrine that judicial decisions are not a part of the
public acts protected by the clause seems to vanish; see MoRGAN, "Choice of
Law Governing Proof," 58 Harv. L. Rev. (1944) 153, 167 and n. 31.
68
Wolski v. Booth & Flinn, Ltd. (1916) 93 Misc. 651, 157 N.Y. Supp. Z94·
69 Charles Ehrlich & Co. v. J. Ellis Slater Co. (1920) 183 Cal. 709, 192
Pac. 526.
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laws of California. On the other hand, the Iowa Supreme
Court permitted an Illinois de facto corporation to sue on the
ground that a domestic de facto corporation could do so, 70
instead of inquiring into the law of Illinois, 71 the state of
creation, as is normally/ 2 although not always, done. 73
Such cases remind us of the reverse side of recognition.
Reciprocal application of the personal law may cause some
concern where misrepresentation is to be feared. But this is
a general consideration needing separate and comprehensive
discussion in the future.
(b) Partnerships. The question is considerably more difficult with respect to partnerships, because the approach
implicitly accepted in the Restatement seems generally to be
in the mind of lawyers. It is this: partnership means the partners; whenever a contract is made on their behalf, the ordinary rules of agency apply and, since the power of an agent
to make his principal liable is said to depend on the law of
the place where the contract with the third party is made, it
is this law which governs the external situation of a partnership. In a few old decisions, the law of the place where a
partner contracts with a third party, clearly has been extended
to the problem of liability of other partners. 74 Some authors,
in fact, take it for granted that a partnership is devoid of a
personallaw. 75 Can it be, however, that one partner A, contracting in some jurisdiction on behalf of the partnership or

°

7
First Title & Securities Co. v. U.S. Gypsum Co. (1931) 211 Iowa 1019,
233 N. W. 137.
71 Note, 79 U. of Pa. L. Rev. (1931) 634, 635.
72 Thus in Illinois: Hudson v. Green Hill Seminary (1885) 113 Ill. 618
(Indiana de facto corporation) ; Concord Apartment House Co. v. Alaska
Refrigerator Co. (1898) 78 Ill. App. 682.
73
See Restatement New York Annotations §155.
74
Restatement § 1 34 No. 1; Baldwin v. Gray (La. 1826) 4 Mart. N. S. 192,
16 Am. Dec. 169; Ferguson v. Flower (La. 1826) 4 Mart. N. S. 312; Bank
of Topeka v. Eaton (1899) 95 Fed. 355; Alexandria A. & Ft. S. R. Co. v.
Johnson (1900) 61 Kan. 417, 59 Pac. 1063.
75
See, for instance, CRANE, "Conflict of Laws under Partnership Acts," 66
U. of Pa. L. Rev. (1918) 310, 314; also DICEY, Rule 140.
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even of partners A, B, C, may make partner C liable beyond
the rules under which the partnership has been organized,
without any cause other than the local law regulating domestic
organizations? The confusion wrought is evident. The extent
of a power of attorney, under certain conditions (to be discussed in the next volume), is governed by the law of the
place where the agent acts. This rule may affect an obligation of the partnership. But what effect such an obligation has
on the liability of the various persons, inherent in the partnership, with their own assets is determinable by another law,
governing in reality the structure of the organization.
Indeed, it has been said that the liability of partners is
determined by the state of the domicil or origin of the partnership. 711 The cases speak of the place of origin, 77 the place
where the partners are domiciled, 78 or where they carry on
their business. 79 None of these cases, it is true, clearly recognizes a constitutive law of the partnership. They rather argue,
more or less distinctly, on the basis of the conflicts rules concerning contracts. Likewise, the Restatement calls for the
law of the place where the partnership agreement is made to
determine the liability of a special limited partner. 80
Yet we have mentioned before a case involving Cuban
special partners, decided in New York under Cuban limited
partnership law. Also, this choice of law allegedly rested on
the fact that the partnership agreement was made and performable in Cuba. Nevertheless, the court compared the prob76
Thus BURDICK, Law of Partnership (ed. 3, I9I7) I4 on the ground of
Easton v. George Wostenholm & Son (C. C. A. 9th I905) I37 Fed. 524·
77
Cameron v. Orleans & Jefferson R. Co., Ltd. (I902) Io8 La. 83, Ioi,
32 So. 208, 215.
78
Wilson v. Todhunter ( 19 I 8) I 3 7 Ark. So, 207 S. W. 2 2I; Barker v.
U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. ( I9I 7) 228 Mass. 42I, 426, II7 N. E. 894, 896.
79
Barker v. U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. (I9I7) 228 Mass. 42I, 426, I I 7
N. E. 894 at 896; First National Bank of Waverley v. Hall (I892) I50 Pa.
466, 24 Atl. 665.
80
§ 343 comment c; 2 BEALE II94 § 345· 1.
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lem with the formation of a marriage relation and the acquisition of property in a foreign country. The difference from an
ordinary obligatory contract was obviously felt.
All the analogies above discussed make the conclusion
inevitable that partnerships also may have a personal law.

3· Contacts
(a) Law of the seat. In civil law countries referring to the
law of the state of the "seat" as applicable to corporations,
it is the dominant opinion that the seat principle governs also
all other private associations. 81 Commercial partnerships are
included, since they have necessarily a head office, at which
they have to register. Noncommercial societies are included
if they have a seat. 82
The nationality and domicil of the partners, therefore,
are immaterial. A partnership domiciled abroad is foreign,
even though all partners be subjects of the forum, and is
domestic, even though all be foreigners.
(b) American quasi corporations. In American cases,
equally, it is not rare to find applied the law of the state
where an associated body has been organized. The cases
'speak of "a common law trust domiciled in Oklahoma," 83 or
"determined by the law of Massachusetts where it is located,"84 "created in Massachusetts,"85 "a limited partnership
organized under the Act of Pennsylvania,"86 et cetera. It
81
WIELAND, I Handelsr. § 5 I n. I 8, and 43 Z. Schweiz. R. (N. F.) (I 92.4)
2.78, 2.79 n. I39; E. HEYMANN, 75 }herings Jahrb. (I92.5) 4I3; LEWALD,
7 Repert. 3 r 9; NussBAUM, D. IPR. 2.06; RuNDSTEIN, "Report on Draft of
Experts," art. 8, Am. J. Int. Law 192.8, Supp. 189, 191; FRAGISTAS (Greece),
IO Z.ausl.PR. (1936) 638. Contra: for the state of constitution, Inst. Dr. Int.,
Proposals, art. 5, see Annuaire 192.911 302..
82 GEILER in r Diiringer-Hachenburg 49 contends that, even if they have no
seat, the law under which the organization is made would apply.
83 Fitch v. United Royalty Co. (1936) 143 Kan. 486, 55 Pac. (zd) 409.
84 In reAssociated Trust (D. C. D. Mass. 1914) 2.2.2. Fed. rou, ror3.
85 Bartley v. Andrews (192.3) 2.02. N.Y. Supp. 2.2.7, zo8 App. Div. 702..
86 Great Southern Fire Proof Hotel Co. v. Jones (r9oo) I77 U.S. 449·
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seems that the places of organizing and of domicil are not
distinguished in determining the applicable law; this would
be analogous to the treatment of incorporated bodies, where
the domicil is legally deemed to be in the state of incorporation.
(c) American general partnerships. The question is of
more serious significance with respect to partnerships. Since
these have not yet been recognized in the United States as
bearers of personal law, the courts have been uneasy in defining the law governing their structure.87 Almost never has
the problem been squarely posited. The cases generally suppose a partnership carried on in the same state as that in
which it was constituted. 5 8 One case only is known in which a
partnership was formed in one state, Pennsylvania, and carried on in another, New York; the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania regarded the partnership as governed by the law
of New York. 89 And this was on the ground that New York
was the place of performance. 90
This situation calls for clarification. Partnerships may
have to be construed under foreign laws. Within the United
States, many states have adopted the Uniform Partnership
Act and many have not. What organizations are those made
"under the Act?m 1 In this case, any pretension that only
statutory law can bestow corporate attributes would be beside
the point; there is a statute.
81

See supra p. I I 2.
King v. Sarria (I877) 69 N. Y. 24, 25 Am. Rep. 128; In re Hoyne
(I922) 277 Fed. 668; Cutler v. Thomas (I852) 25 Vt. 73; Wilson v. Todhunter (I9I8) 137 Ark. 8o, 207 S. W. 2.2I, cf. 47 C. ]. 7I7, Partnership
§ I I 7•
89
First National Bank of Waverly v. Hall (1892) 150 Pa. 466, 24 Atl.
665, cf. supra n. 79·
90 2 BEALE 1192 observes that the result would have been the same under
the lex loci contractus.
91 C/. In re Hoyne (1922) 277 Fed. 668: whether a partnership was validly
made was determined under the Illinois Act, since the contract was executed
and the business conducted in Chicago.
88
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What is in issue is the question, which contact should
prevail in case of divided local attachments: the place where
the contract of partnership is "consummated" or "launched,"
or the place where the carrying on of business is centered,
the domiciliary seat. The Continental doctrine leans on the
latter contact, and it may be said in its favor in the absence
of registration that third persons have a much better opportunity to know the location of the actual headquarters than
the place where a contract was once made. Common law
habits, contented with mere incorporation and not ascribing
importance to the principal management, are not concerned
with unincorporated organizations. On the other hand, difficulties in ascertaining the main business place may occur in
some rare cases or irregular companies/ 2 but not frequently
in any group of organizations. That a partnership cannot
have a domicil, 93 is an empty assertion. Of course, ordinary
partnerships in this country, as contrasted with limited partnerships, need not necessarily have any fixed business place
and have no duty of registration, which was one of the chief
reasons for excluding their construction as legal persons. 94 But
in practice there will be found few partnerships showing no
central office in their letterheads, and a great many of considerable, if not gigantic, proportions whose business is comparable to that of big corporations.

III.

ScoPE OF PERSONAL LAw

r. General Aspects

It is not difficult to define the domain of the personal law
of quasi-corporations, whose distinctive elements are so prevalent in most de facto corporations, in the limited partner92

NAVARRINI, Note, Foro ltal. 1927 I 585.
This assertion of the Restatement § 41 comment d has been challenged by
Restatement New York Annotations 23.
94
LEWIS, 29 Harv. L. Rev. (1915) rs8 at 167.
93
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ships of Pennsylvania or Michigan, and in the common law
trusts of Massachusetts or New York. The border line runs
exactly where the contractual features replace the corporate.
The question, for instance, whether a special partner in a
limited partnership, as an ordinary creditor, may request
satisfaction out of the partnership funds for loans or goods
sold, in competition with strangers, is closely connected with
the structure of the organization, 95 and hence, it ought to be
covered by the law governing such organization. But if an
unincorporated joint stock company is constituted in such a
way that it discontinues in case an associate dies or is adjudged
a bankrupt, and company debts are incurred after the death
of an associate, the legal problems arising should be referred
to the ordinary law of contracts; whether an associate paying
the debt has recourse for reimbursement from the executor,
may be determined by the law governing the preliminary
agreement or the contract of association, not by that of the
place of the company domicil.
The subject seems not to have found any attention thus
far and would deserve a special study.
2.

Partnership

The Continental doctrine extends its principle to all incidents of organization of mercantile partnerships. The law
of the place where a partnership has its head office, therefore
determines in particular the constitution of the partnership,
so as to render defects in its creation under the personal law
open to attack everywhere; 96 the distinction between property
97
of the partnership and separate property of the partners;
powers of the partnership 98 including its capacity for being
Cf. WARREN, Corporate Advantages 319, 323.
DIENA, 1 Dir. Com. Int. z87.
App. Roma (March 8, 1932) supra p. 100 n. 27.
98 36 RGZ. 354; OLG. Kassel, Leipz. Z. 1911, 616 n.
Handelsr. 459·
95

96
97

z;

KoHLER, 74 Z.
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99

a party to a law suit; transfer and seizure of the rights of
partners/00 the authority of partners to obligate the partnership; 101 the liability of partners to third parties102 and whether
such liability is limited, joint, or joint and several.
The last application, concerning the conditions of the
partners' liability, is consistently followed by the courts of
France, Germany, the Netherlands, and other countries and
has been clearly adopted also in the English leading case of
General Steam Navigation Co. v. Guillou/ 03 The court in
this case, however, distinguished two questions: ( 1) one
substantive, whether French law governing the partnership
imposed upon the defendant joint liability or no liability,
to which question the court was ready to apply the French
answer; and ( 2) one procedural, whether in the French
courts the defendant would have to be sued jointly with the
other shareholders of the company, which mode of procedure
was declared to be inapplicable in an English court. This
distinction was applied to objectionable use in this and particularly in a later case. 104 In the latter, the court declared bad
99

See infra p. 119.
100 On the French sequestration of the trade mark "Chartreuse" after dissolution of the Congregation of Chartreux, see citations by NussBAUM, D. IPR.
2o8 n. r.
101 ROHG. (Feb. 17, 1871) 26 Seuff. Arch. No. 101 (speaking indiscriminately of foreign-constituted general partnerships).
102 Germany: AG. Celie (May 31, 1876) 31 Seuff. Arch. No. 303 (debt
of a partnership in Lima, Peruvian law applied to the liability of a partner
domiciled in Germany); RG. (Jan. :z, 192.0) Hans. RZ. 192.0, ~14 No. 35,
affirming OLG. Hamburg (May 2.7, 1919) id. 192.o, 87 No. 9: partners
domiciled in Bremen, of a partnership domiciled in Texas, are liable to third
parties, having contracted with the firm, only in accordance with the law
of Texas. This was distinguished from the German law governing the contract
itself. For other decisions see LEWALD 54§ 65.
French-Hungarian Mixed Arb. Trib. (Feb. 2.7, 192.9) Rothstein et Cie. v.
Appel, 9 Recueil trib. arb. mixtes 105 (Austrian creditor of a French partnership). French-Bulgarian Mixed Arb. Trib. (July 8, 192.9) Melian v. Diloff
Freres, 9 Recueil trib. arb. mixtes 2.87 (French creditor of a Rumanian partnership). In both cases it was emphasized that in addition to the firm, each partner
was liable jointly and severally.
103 (1843) 11M. & W. 877; cf. CHESHIRE 649; and see supra n. 8.
104 Bullock v. Caird (r875) ro Q. B. 2.76 apparently approved by LINDLEY,
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the plea of the defendant partner of a firm domiciled in Scotland that the firm was distinct from the members and that a
judgment against the firm was a condition precedent to individual liability. But the character of a Scotch partnership as a
distinct person was notorious and since has been confirmed by
the Partnership Act of 1 8 90. 105 This should have been recognized in England with all its attendant effects on marshalling
the liabilities of company and members. The privilege of
being sued only after the principal debtor has been sued and
his assets exhausted (beneficium excussionis) is an incident
to liability of partners, as German courts confirm/06 notwithstanding the opposed English view. 107
The law of the seat has been said also to include the reciprocal rights of the partners, with the proviso that this may
be changed by the intention of the parties. 108 But the Reichsgericht in a case of two German-domiciled partners carrying
on business in Portugal, had no hesitation in assuming that
application of German law was intended by the parties.109 On
the other hand, by a distinct mistake in a draft of the Institute
of International Law, all incidents, including conditions of
constitution, relations among associates and toward third
parties, dissolution and liquidation, have been lumped together and subjected to the law of the seat by presumptive
intention of the parties. 110 It should be contended, instead,
Partnership ( ed. I o, I 9 35) 2. 55 ( o), 7 r 8 (I) ; 3 BEALE § 58 8, 2, but see the
criticism by YouNG 179; M. WoLFF, Priv. Int. Law 243 § 224.
105
106

§ 4 ( 2 ).

0LG. Dresden (Feb. z, 19I6) 38 Sachs. Arch. 94; LEWALD 54; STEINJONAS, ZPO. § so VI.
107
In re Doetsch, Matheson v. Ludwig ( r896) 2 Ch. D. 83 6; cf. Partnership
Act, r89o, § 91 LINDLEY, Partnership (ed. ro, I935) 255 (o), 7I8 (r).
108
Germany: RG. (January 30, I889) 2.3 RGZ. 31; Bay. ObLG. (May 26,
I902) 3 Bay. ObLGZ. 446; LG. Karlsruhe (March II, I909) I9 Z.int.R.
525 1 Clunet I9I0 1 12.56; RG. (May 22, 19II) Leipz.Z. I9II, 6r6; FICKER,
4 Rechtsvergl. Handworterbuch 470; GEILER in I Diiringer-Hachenburg 49·
109
RG. (February 27, I931) Hans.RGZ. I93I B 2.95 No. ros. Perfectly
in accord, Bay. ObLG. (November 5, 1921) 27 Bay. ObLGZ. r87 No. 71
(partnership in Russia).
110
New York Meeting, Annuaire 1929 II 302, art. 5· As the discussion at
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that the personal law is independent of intentions of the
parties but does not cover the internal relations of associates
in any kind of partnership, because they are not characterized
by corporate features. They are entirely subjected to contractual conflicts rules, and it is only casually that the applicable law often coincides with that of the center of the business,m or, for that matter, the place where the business
started.
The American partnership cases, due to their general attitude, cannot offer a direct contribution to this problem.
3· The Right to Be a Party
Following the principle of the personal law and at the
same time conceiving the right to be a plaintiff or defendant
as substantive, the Continental doctrine states that the law
of the principal business place determines this right. The prevailing theoretical approach is the same as in construing
rights and duties of partnerships in general; the members
in their particular joint relationship are the parties. 112 Accordingly, the members of an Engli~h partnership may sue
under the name of their firm on the Continent, 118 because they
may do so according to English procedure, although in the
English conception the proceeding is more closely connected
with the individuals than on the Continent. By the same
t63ff. shows, there was no real agreement; in addition, the enlarged role of
party autonomy clashed in the proposal itself with the prejudice against party
autonomy.
111 To this effect, probably Anglo-German Mixed Arb. Trib., Samson v.
Heilbrun (June 27, I 929) 9 Recueil trib. arb. mixtes 36: a partnership consisting of an English and a German national, dissolved by art. 299 (a) of the
Treaty of Versailles, is subjected to Scottish Law with respect to the relations
between the partners resulting from a dissolution not followed by agreement
or winding up procedure.
112 See WIELAND, I Handelsr. 420 and n. 61.
113
France: App. Douai (Dec. I, I88o) Clunet I882, 3I7.
Germany: RG. (November 25, I895) 36 RGZ. 393·
The Netherlands: Rb. Roermond (May 3, I934) N. J. (I935) 253. See
II Z.ausl.PR. (I937) 2IS No. 93 (contra: No. 92 ibid.)
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token, a New York partnership has been held in Germany
incapable of being a party. 114
In the United States, however, the problem presents
peculiar difficulties. The reasons are various, including the
doctrines that, at common law as contrasted with statute,
only legal entities may sue and be sued; that statutory authorizations to associations lacking personality are of procedural
character; and that common law courts refuse representative
actions in such situations. 1'15
These arguments imply that the state of creation has not
elevated these types to the rank of corporations in the meaning of the forum, although they are perfectly capable of suing
at home. The courts embark on a thorough analysis of the
status of the unincorporated associations according to the law
of the state where they have been organized, but the decision
finally depends on whether the specific mixture of corporate
and noncorporate elements justifies classifying the association
as a corporation in the sense of the forum.
Such reasoning evidently is grounded in traditional conceptions. It should be noticed, however, that the application
of these conceptions to foreign associations obscures their
legal structure and causes a great deal of unnecessary delay
and di:fficulty, ~ even though in some cases careful lawyers
may avoid these problems by adjusting matters to special
devices of the local procedure. The entire argument amounts
to a requirement that other states should not equip organizations in a manner different from the forum. The very investigation into attributes other than the right to sue, in order
to ascertain the right to sue, shows how inadequately the
problem is handled. Joint stock companies established under
11

114

OLG. Hamburg (June 14, 1904) 9 ROLG. 25.
STURGES, "Unincorporated Associations as Parties to Actions," 33 Yale
L. J. (1924) 383-405.
116
See STURGES (supra n. 115) at 404.
115
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the statutes of New York, Pennsylvania, or Michigan are
"difficult to distinguish" from corporations. 111 Why must
they be distinguished at any cost, for the purpose of denying
them the very right to sue that they have in their home
stater
Of course, the real theoretical trouble lies in the dogma
that the right to be a party is procedural. As in many other
respects, the development of American law requires a definite
departure from the overextended scope of procedural law.
In the meantime, we may draw some comfort from a recent
concurring vote of Mr. Justice Frankfurter. The Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure have expressly dealt with unincorporated associations, but they did it under a congressional
authority confi.ned to procedural matters. Therefore, it is the
official view of the United States Supreme Court that, as
Mr. Justice Frankfurter declares, suability of trade unions is
"in essence and principle a procedural matter." The federal
rule allows a trade union to be sued in its common name if
the local law allows this, a question possibly resolved by the
local procedural law. "But if such a procedural matter may
be cast in the form of a substantive issue for the determination
of status, it would at least in this case, be a question of the
substantive law of the District [the local law of the case at
bar] and not raise any substantive issue of federallaw." 118 In
other words, the law of a state may treat the problem as substantive, an incident of the personal law; this will be enough
for the federal court to recognize suability on its allegedly
procedural level.
It seems to follow that American courts, irrespective of
their own characterization, ought to apply the personal law
of foreign countries, including suability as an incident, and
consistency requires that this liberalism should extend to the
117

BALLANTINE 15.

118 Bushy v. Electric Utilities Employees Union (1944) 65 S. Ct. 143.

U2

CORPORATIONS, KINb:REb ORGANIZATIONS

laws of sister states, endowing associations or partnerships
with the substantive right to sue or be sued.
Occasionally, it has been noted that New York courts may
be liberal in entertaining suits against unincorporated associations, because they have a special procedure provided by their
statutes. 119 It should be replied that any procedure good for
citing a corporation is good to use against any nonincorporated group which has articles of organization implying
its suability under the applicable law.
Finally, if an action at law can be instituted against a
corporation, there is no reason other than the mere weight
of a tradition cancelled by economic necessity, to prevent a
similar action against any organization endowed with the
capacity of being sued by its personal law.

IV. QuAsi NATIONALITY oF PARTNERSHIPs
How to apply the various rules affecting foreigners to unincorporated associations, particularly partnerships, again
depends on the infinitely differentiated purposes of these
rules. 120 Neither can partnerships be simply assimilated in all
respects to corporations, although they enjoy many benefits
of the latter and are now often included in the treaties protecting business organizations, nor are they entirely incapable
of being treated as entities.
There is no fixed rule including all matters such as security
for costs, jurisdiction, taxation, and the like, valid for all
countries. 121
On the other hand, nationality of partnerships in the
119

Note, 34 Col. L. Rev. (1934) 1555, 1556.
Cass. (civ.) (July zs, 1933) Gaz. Pal. 1933·2.502 states that
although a partnership is invested with the attributes of a legal unit in France,
such concept cannot be transferred without qualification to the domain of public
law, and in particular a partnership composed of foreigners may not claim
compensation for war damage according to the principles of private law. Other
decisions had decided the particular issue to the contrary, especially Cass. (req.)
(July 17, 1930) Revue 1931, 128.
121
For instance, Austria: Law on Jurisdiction (Jurisdictionmorm) § 75 (administrative seat), cf. WALKER 149.
12
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meaning of the peace treaties of I 9 I 9 dealing with the clearing of prewar debts should not have been denied. The AngloGerman Mixed Arbitral Tribunal held for dogmatic reasons
that an English or German partnership was not an English
or German national in the meaning of the Treaty provisions
concerning prewar debts. Hence, the nationality of the single
partners was decisive for their participation in claims and
debts, upon the application of the clearing and valorization
rules. 122 This theory was wrongly deduced from the overestimated fact that partnerships are not legal persons in
every and all respects, in disregard of the essential corporate
attributes they undoubtedly have and of the various purposes
for which they have always been considered connected with
the several countries. In fact, the view of the Tribunal was
entirely impractical. 123
Belgium: Cass. (Nov. 5, I9o6) Clunet I907, 8o8 (center of operation, for
tax purposes).
France: 2 ARMINJON ( ed. 2) 49I § I94·
Germany: Nationality has been ascribed to partnerships for the purposes of
restricting the provisions of the HGB. to domestic partnerships, RG. (Feb. II,
I896) 36 RGZ. I72, I77; RG. in Leipz.Z. I9II, 6r6; the duty of advancing
security for the costs of a lawsuit, OLG. Hamburg, DJZ. 1900, 444; STEINJoNAS, r ZPO. (ed. 5, I934) § rro I II c. (36 RGZ. 393, 396 is obsolete),
cf. STAUB-PINNER in I Staub 647 § ro5 n. 45, for general jurisdiction (13
OLG. 73). Cf. WIELAND, r Handelsr. 419 n. 57, 6r7-I9 § r8. On the other
hand, a Venezuelan partnership is recognized as a juristic person, but the
German partners are treated for tax purposes as the members of a German
partnership. Reichsfinanzhof (Feb. u, I93o) 27 Entsch. (of this court) 73,
and JW. 193I, r6o with critical note by RHEINSTROM.
Italy: Cass. (April 29, 1933) Foro ltal. Mass. 1933 IV 3I9: a French
"irregular company" treated for taxation as not being a unity according to
French law.
Switzerland: ScHNITZER, Handelsr. I59·
The Netherlands: Rb. Rotterdam {June 24, 1914) W. 19I5, 9719, 3 (a
unit for jurisdiction); Rb. Amsterdam (Dec. I9, 1924) W. II346 (a French
partnership of an English and a French national has to give security for costs
in respect to the English partner only, although it is held to be a legal unit in
the French doctrine).
122
Fisher & Co. v. Biehn and Max (March 22, 1922) 3 Recueil trib. arb.
mixtes u, JW. 1922, ll6I; Hardt Co. v. Stern (March 23, I923) 3 Recueil
trib. arb. mixtes u, 2 Friedensrecht 72.
123
RABEL, JW. I922, rr62; HERM. lsAY, 3 Abhandlungen zum Friedensrecht (1923) 25; id., Private Rechte und Interessen im Friedensvertrag (ed. 3,
1923) 57; R. FucHs, 3 Mitteilungen dt. Ges. Volker R. (I922) 24 and in 6
LESKE-LOEWENFELD II roo; STAUB-PINNER in I Staub § Io5 n. 9a.
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Recognition
I.

THEORIES OF RECOGNITION

1

I

N the nineteenth century two rival schools of thought
dominated the treatment of foreign corporations in private law. Young, in his admirable study of 1912, called
them the restrictive and the liberal theories. Perhaps they
may be better described as the theories of the territorial and
the extraterritorial or international effect of incorporation.
Scarcely noticed in the literature, before the present war a
third current gained influence, having nationalism as its distinctive impulse.
I.

The Territorial Theory

At one time, the idea generally prevailed that every state
had to decide arbitrarily what foreign corporations should
have legal personality within its own territory. This doctrine
limited the functions of legal persons by geographical boundanes.
In the famous words of Judge Taney:
"A company can have no legal existence out of the boundaries of the sovereignty by which it is created. It exists only
in the contemplation of the law, and by force of the law, and
where that law ceases to operate and is no longer obligatory
the company can have no existence. It must dwell in the place
of its creation and cannot migrate to another sovereignty." 2
And Field, J., declared:
"The Company being the mere creature of local law, can
1 For a survey in this country, see MACHEN, "Corporate Personality," 2.4
Harv. L. Rev. (19II) 2.53, 347·
2 Bank of Augusta v. Earle ( 1839) I 3 Pet. s. c. 519 at 588.
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have no existence beyond the limits of the sovereignty which
created it."3
This doctrine has taken root in American thought, Professor James reminds me, as a result of the colonial English
companies. Nevertheless the doctrine sounds strange, when
constantly repeated 4 in the courts of the United States, the
country of the Bill of Rights, for it comes directly from
governmental absolutism and has been engendered by three
factors:
First, the tradition of police states required that legal
personality be conferred upon an association only by grant of
the sovereign. The prince, the state, created the legal entity.
This system of concession, authorization, charter (in the
original meaning), goes back to Julius Caesar and Augustus
who made the essential functions of corporations ( coire, con'l)OCI!lri, cogi) dependent on permission by the Emperor or the
Senate. 5 The purpose was political precaution against subversive factions, and the system has remained a weapon of
suspicious and jealous rulers.
Second, discrimination against foreign corporations was
nourished by the fear not only of political disturbance but
also of foreign economic forces menacing domestic organizations by competition. Laurent, the principal European protagonist of this doctrine, was hostile to certain types of associations.
Third, Savigny and his followers constructed on this
background the doctrine of the artificial nature of corporations: Any personality not produced by nature had to be conferred by the lawmaking power and hence was imaginary,
fictitious, a mere creature of the law.
3

Paul v. Virginia (I868) 8 Wall. I68.
Even BALLANTINE, Corporations 843 makes no exception.
5
MITTEIS, Romisches Privatrecht (I9o8) 399; RABEL, "Grundziige des
romischen Privatrechts" in HOLTZENDORFF-KOHLER, I Enzyklopadie der
Rechtswissenschaft 428; ScHNORR VON CAROLSFELD, Geschichte der juristischen
Person en (I 9 33).
4
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In a final conclusion from this apparently solid complex
of ideas, a corporation was thought necessarily to be restricted to the boundaries of the state and inexistent outside
of it.
Such territorialism was defended in Europe by Mancini,
Laurent and his contemporaries, and in a late isolated stand,
r9o8, by Andre Weiss. 6 In this country, Taney's and Field's
dicta were made the basis of the Restatement in I934/ although each part of the doctrine has been thoroughly refuted8 and entirely discarded by common opinion throughout
the world. To maintain the doomed theory in the face of
modern conditions, diverse auxiliary theories were invented,
such as the "theory of comity" whereby the state permits
foreign corporations to function in its territory, although not
bound to do so, and the agents' theory which pretends that a
foreign corporation despite inexistence in the state nevertheless acts and contracts through agents, that the legal person
dwells outside but its agents reside inside. These makeshift
constructions also were long since destroyed by the criticism
of scholars. 9 The real American law has nothing to do with
them. 10
6
LAURENT, 4 Principes 232, 285 § 119; 4 LAURENT 256, 293 §§ 130, 154;
RoLIN, I Principes § 27, 2 id. § 8o6. For decisions in various countries, see
KoSTERS 67I n. 1.
1
2 BEALE § I66.I: "The association can exist as a corporation only where
that law prevails which makes it such, that is, within the territorial limits of
the state of its charter; for the law of a country has no extra-territorial operation." DUDLEY FIELD § 545·
8
YouNG 4I and in 23 Law Q. Rev. (I9o7) I5I, 29o; HENDERSON I63.
Fortunately, these truths have been remembered more recently: Note in 79 U. of
Pa. L. Rev. (I93I) I119, IIJ5-II38; LATTY, "International Standing in
Court of Foreign Corporations," 29 Mich. L. Rev. (I93o) 28.
European leaders: I BAR § I 04; LAINE, Clunet I893, 273; PILLET, Personnes Morales I7-57; id., Principes §§ 73, 74; id., I Traite 336; MICHOUD,
2 Personnalite Morale§§ 232ff.; 2LYON-CAEN et RENAULT§ I093; I FIORE
§ 319; FEDOZZI, Gli enti collettivi nel diritto internazionale privata ( I897)
I97-2I6 and II diritto processuale civile internazionale (I9o5) I85-2I2; Lo
MoNAco, Filangieri I885, I, 379·
For more literature see KosTERS 672; GUTZWILLER I627; CHARLES DE
VISSCHER, Revue I9I3 at I93·
9 YOUNG 48; HENDERSON 36-49; see I BAR 302; PILLET in Melanges,
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Nevertheless, these ghosts from metaphysical spheres reappear in the Restatement and survive in the language of
the courts. More dangerous, a few derivatives are popular
such as the following: "A corporation cannot perform outside of the state by which it was created, acts which are strictly
corporate acts." 11 In particular, meetings of stockholders in
matters of formal organization can be held only in the state
of incorporation. 12 Authority to an agent must be given in
this same state. 13 A state has the right to "exclude" foreign
corporations from doing business, or to impose conditions on
them for doing business, at its pleasure. 14 Foreign corporations cannot have more rights than domestic corporations. 15
What life or value there is left in these sayings, we shall
have to discover.
2.

The International Theory

The system developed in the epoch of liberalism brings
corporations into a position analogous to that of individuals.
Created by the competent state, they need no particular recognition at all in other states. This theory has the background
of an even older history than that of the territorial theory.
Research in medieval law has discovered that before the time
of the princes who claimed sovereignty like Roman Caesars,
corporations were freely formed by the association of members. Also the collegia and sodalitates of the Roman Republic were autonomous creations. Moreover, Germanic as
well as Roman legal history has taught that the conception
of a corporation as a merely artificial being is utterly wrong.
Antoine Pillet (I929) 500; RIGAUD, IO Repert. :zz6 No. II.
10
See Note, 79 V. of Pa. L. Rev. (I93I) II19, II38.
11
Reichwald v. Com. Hotel Co. (I883) Io6 Ill. 439·
12
Restatement § I 6 3; BEALE, 5 Col. L. Rev. ( 190 5) 2 55. Outmoded, see
STEVENS, Corporations 482.
13
2 BEALE 768 par. 2.
14
Restatement§§ I67, 168. On the reality of things, see HOLT, 89 U. of Pa.
L. Rev. (1941) 453·
15
See infra pp. I49ff.
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For a time, the scholars of old Germanic law18 even popularized the idea that in complete antagonism to the allegedly
"Roman" fictitious legal person, the medieval associations
were living bodies, vigorously working in all public spheres
and of more economic, social, and political significance than
their individual members. This Germanistic approach left
lasting improvements in domestic laws, as for instance in
giving the principal representatives of corporations the role
of "organs" that embody the will of the corporate "body"
and are able to obligate the entity by contract and in tort. 17
But this theory also has been abandoned by better advised
scholars. From the historical point of view, the concept of the
"universitas," designed by the Roman jurists after the pattern
of the autonomous city (polis), has formed the eternal
model of an entity distinct from its members in its relations
to the outside world. The internal relation between a private
corporation and its members with respect to their participation in the common assets and debts varied even in the
ancient world. Thus, the antithesis of a "Roman" soulless
fictitious person and a Germanic living organism was highly
distorted. From the theoretical angle, present writers like to
say that individuals also take their legal status from the law,
hence there is no innate ground why organizations should
be discriminated against. In addition, the normal method of
bestowing personality upon associations is no longer granted
by special act but statutory determination of conditions precedent-in Europe called "normative conditions"-by complying with which private persons may create legal bodies.
While trade and industry have multiplied their associations and gained for them wide international admission, the
mightiest impulse, of course, has come from the immense
16 In the first place, Orro GIERKE, Die Genossenschaftstheorie und die
Deutsche Rechtsprechung (I 8 87) 5, 604.
17 See German BGB. § 3 I; Swiss C. C. art. 55: the will of a juristic person
is expressed through its organs (not "organisms" as ScHICK translates).
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growth of capitalism. Industrialization favored and needed
concentration of means. Exchange of raw materials, industrial products, and skilled enterprise opened countries
to corporate ventures. In the height of the capitalistic era,
few nations wanted to hide behind Judge Taney's doctrine,
certainly not the United States.
It is of extraordinary interest that the liberal system was
declared in England as early as I 724 by leading cases which
still have authority. 18 Foreign companies have ever since
been accorded recognition as respects their personality, as
well as full freedom to do business in Great Britain. The
Canadian courts are well aware, despite their many contrary
statutes, that "at common law, a foreign corporation may
carry on business in a jurisdiction other than its own without
·
having special authority to do so.m 9
Elsewhere, this system was adopted in the course of the
nineteenth century. The commission of German states, which
drafted the General Commercial Code of I 862, found it
so obvious that the civil existence of foreign companies must
be recognized that no provision to this effect was considered
necessary. 20 But the right to do business was distinguished.
Unconditional recognition, at least in this meaning, has remained the nearly unchallenged principle for commercial
associations in most of Europe, and has been defended with
respect to all juristic persons by most of the literature. 21 Only
the French Republic has insisted in principle, despite the
French writers, on certain restrictions established under
Napoleon III, against foreign stock corporations.
18
Dutch West India Co. v. Henriques Van Moses (172.4) I Strange 612.;
Henriques v. General Privileged Dutch Co. (172.8) z Ld. Raym. 1532., 92. Eng.
Re. 494•
19
C. P. R. v. Western Union Telegraph Co. (189o) 17 S. C. R. 151;
Ontario Wind Engine & Pump Co. v. Eldred (Sask. 1912.) z W. W. R. 6o,
z D. L. R. 2.70.
20
Protokolle 371, 42.. Sitzung (quoted by WALKER zoz).
21
See also ARCANA, Report in Republica Argentina, Segundo Congreso
Sudamericano 2.2.3.
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3· Reactionary Trends
Developments between the two world wars have demonstrated once more that the problem of recognition of foreign
corporations is more intimately connected with economic
and political considerations than with abstract speculation.
From the beginning, the Soviet Union has been slow to recognize foreign legal persons. The National Socialist Law on
Stock Corporations of 1937 abolished free admittance of
foreign business associations to the carrying on of business/ 2
and the comment by a national socialist author revives Laurent's theory. 23 French and Latin-American laws and literature have shown much of the same spirit, perhaps not so
much aiming at restoring the territorial nature of incorporation, as endeavoring to strengthen the examination, supervision, and governmental domination of foreign enterprises.
Regulations to enforce control over the activities of immigrant
business go hand in hand with measures to close certain
branches to all foreigners and to enforce the practice of certain quotas of nationals on boards of directors and membership lists.
Nevertheless, except for Russia, the principle of unconditional recognition has not lost its prevailing role. Notwithstanding conscious and unconscious exceptions, it may be
asserted that this principle prevails at this moment throughout the world. Language in both Americas sounding as if
recognition depended on authorization, often is not to be
taken literally. Even so, the picture is complicated, and the
practical effect of recognition is reduced or menaced by restrictions of many kinds.
It is convenient, therefore, to define first the concept of
recognition according to actual laws.
22 See infra p. I 8 3·
23 BEITZKE, Jur. Personen

(1938) 715·

7, 49, criticized by

RAAPE,

5 Z. AK. Deutsches R.
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4· Concept of Recognition

If the liberal theory were carried through without exception, there would be no need for a notion other than that of
the personal law, since under this theory any foreign corporation created by the personal law exists within the forum.
The need arises only because in certain countries or for certain types of legal persons the personal law acquired abroad
is not held sufficient to support the existence of a corporation
within the forum. There is no evidence that any jurisdiction
would disregard the existence of a juristic person in the state
where it has been validly constituted according to the law
regarded as competent at the forum.
Recognition, consequently, signifies that the authorities
of a state affirm a foreign-created legal person as existent
for all purposes, applying the law considered to be the personal law.
Recognition does not mean the creation of a new person,
as would be the logical implication of the theory whereby a
corporation "can exist only in the country which makes it
such" and "the consent of another state cannot alter the
matter.m 4 Under the influence of such imaginations, ( r) recognition of an existing legal entity, ( 2) reincorporation, i.e.,
the constitution of a new personality, and finally, (3) "domestication," which lies in between, were easily confused. 25
By an effect felt up to our days, we still hear the contention
that recognition is dependent on a sort of naturalization. But
a sharp distinction is important. A compulsory requirement
of the latter character has correctly been called an unjustifiable trespass on the foreign competent law. 26
24

2 BEALE § I66.I.
I FIORE § po. On the distinction of "domestication" from the mere pursuit of business, see 2 BEALE § I5 3·7· The German Reichsgericht (July II,
1934-) JW. I934, 2845, Clunet 1935, 164, IPRspr. I934- No. I2 observed this
distinction with respect to an English certificate of registration.
26
CHARLES DE VISSCHER, Revue 1913 at 194,195 and n. l.
25
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Of course, there is no rule of present international law obligating a state to recognize foreign-created juristic persons. 27
There exists, however, theoretical agreement on the desirability of mutual liberality, expressed in numerous drafts to
multipartite treaties. 28
On the other hand, recognition does not necessarily include,
and in the great majority of countries does not include,
permission to have a place of business or an agent, or to do
business in the country. Moreover, various restrictions are
imposed. This, of course, deprives recognition of much of its
practical value. Yet recognition involves legal personality
only, not permission to engage in commercial or other activities. 29 These two categories, although correctly contrasted,
have been inadequately termed by some Anglo-American
writers "civil capacity" and "functional capacity.mo With
more clarity, commentators on the recently repealed Italian
Commercial Code state that the poorly drafted sections therein, regulating the business of foreign mercantile organizations,
do not really "create the prerequisites of their legal constitution" but instead "presuppose their legal constitution under
the foreign law.m 1
What prerogatives usually flow from recognition as such
will have to be discussed more closely after a survey of the
systems adopted in the present legislations.

II.
I.

CoNDITIONs FOR RECOGNITION

Unconditional Recognition
Under the system attaching international effect to the
27 1

40 n.

BAR 302; NIEMEYER, "Les societes de commerce,'' Recueil I 924 III
I.

28 See art. 6 of the Draft on the Treatment of Foreigners, 1929, Revue I9Jo,
238; VERDROss, 37 Recueil (I93I) III 405.
29 PILLET, Personnes Morales § I 3·
30 YouNG, 23 Law Q. Rev. (1907) 162; LATTY, 29 Mich. L. Rev. (I931)
34; ScHUSTER, 7 Tul. L. Rev. (I933) 345, 362 n. 86; 8 id. 570.
31
Note, Rivista I912, 509.
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creation of a corporation, recognition in the practically restricted meaning, just defined, is obtained ipso jure, without
the need of any step, such as filing for registration, paying of
fees, or applying for a decree.
(a) For all organizations. This system, applied to all
corporations and other associations, is actually in force in
England/ 2 and the United States/ 3 as well as Brazil/4
Greece,35 the Netherlands/ 6 Spain/ 7 Switzerland/ 8 and
certain other countries. 39 It has also been adopted in the
Montevideo Treaties40 and in the C6digo Bustamante. 41
The statutory Argentine rule is in controversy but the best
authorities indicate a system exactly parallel to that of the
United States, requiring authorization only for the carrying
on of business.42 In Italy, the principle was for a long time
32
See supra n. I 8. A condition is that the government of the country of
creation is recognized by the British Government, see 5 HALSBURY's Laws of
England (I932) 86o.
33
Restatement §§ I pff. speaks of all incorporated associations, but as to unincorporated bodies see supra pp. I08 n. 59, I I2 n. 8o.
34
Brazil: This theory has been prevailing in the opinion of the leading writers, see CARVALHO DE MENDON<;A, 4 Trat. Dir. Com. § 1510, EsPINOLA, 6
Tratado 557, and clearly adopted in Introd. Law (I942) art. u, cf. EsPINOLA,
8-C Tratado 1 77 5.
35
Greece: App. Athens (I937) No. 209I, 49 Themis 406, Clunet 1938,
900; 2 STREIT-VALLINDAS § 23; C. C. (I940) art. 10 (the draft had required
royal authorization).
36
The Netherlands: H. R. (March 23, I866) W. 278I; KosTERS 672.
37
Spain: Arg. C. C. art. 28, cf. 27; C. Com. art. I5, cf. 21 last par.; see
TRiAs DE BEs 376 § 324. This includes associations, excepting certain classes
such as religious orders, since the Law of Associations of June 30, I887 does not
distinguish domestic from foreign associations.
38
Switzerland: BG. (July u, I934) 6o BGE. I 225; SCHNITZER, Handelsr.
8r.
39
Austria: The Imperial Decree of Nov. 29, I865 concerning "the admission
of foreign stock corporations and stock companies with limited partners to
carrying on business in Austria" has been explained in the prevailing opinion
as not referring to recognition, see WALKER 202. This construction was maintained in Czechoslovakia, see LAUFKE, 7 Repert. I86 Nos. 58, 59·
For the group of codes following the Spanish model, see Chapter 23 n. 3 r.
40 Supra P· 35·
41
C6digo Bustamante, art. 33·
42 Argentina: C. Com. arts. 285-287; ZEBALLos, Clunet I 906, 6o4-6I 8;
MAcHADo, I Cod. Civ. Arg. 74; I WEiss-ZEBALLos 4I4; RIVAROLA, I45
Revista Gen. Legis!. y Jur. (Madrid I924) 533, 539· More recently, opinions
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affirmed by the writers and rejected by the courts. 43 Finally,
the Supreme Court adhered to it in 1930 and 1931,44 and so
apparently does the new Civil Code. 45
In Belgium, unconditional recognition has been granted
by statute to foreign "commercial companies" only, but is
extended to all legal persons, public and private, by liberal
writers and by some courts/6 although other authorities continue to deny capacity, particularly to foreign nonprofit
associations when they bring actions. 47
on the interpretation of C. C. arts. 33, 34, as against art. 45 were sharply
divided between ALCORTA, 2 Der. Int. Priv. 34 and 3 VICO § 83. The old
liberal doctrine defended by Vico seems to remain victorious. See App. Buenos
Aires (April 2o, 1934) 46 Jur. Arg. 183, 187; ROMERO DEL PRADO, Der. Int.
Priv. 83; Note, Clunet 1938, 838. Art. 45 of C. C., thus, is understood to apply
to authorization for business only. Law No. 8867, of February 6, 1912 is
understood to mean that this authorization is not needed in case of reciprocity.
However, the practice is called "peu libirale" in Clunet, loc. cit.
Paraguay: The liberal theory is adopted by BAEZ 47·
43
FEDOZZI 71; CAVAGLIERI, Dir. Int. Com. 241; UDINA, Elementi § 79,
referring to C. C. (r865) arts. 2 and 3; C. Com. (r882) art. 230.
44
Cass. (March 11, 1930) Rivista Dir. Priv. 1931, II, 161. Note, SERENI
in 8 Annuario Dir. Comp. III II; summary, I Annual Digest (I931-I932) 278
No. 146. Cass. (July 27, 193r) Giur. Ital. 1932 I, r, r62, Rivista 1931, 183.
45
Disp. Prel. (1938) art. 6; id. (1942) art. r6 par. 2, states that the rule
of par. r, on principle granting foreign individuals the civil rights of nationals,
applies also to foreign legal persons. The final draft (art. 9) expressed the
principle that they enjoy the same capacity as national juristic persons but not
more than in the foreign country. The Minister of Justice held it more prudent
to say expressly that juristic persons are treated like foreign individuals in order
not to revive a former controversy. (Relazione SaLMI, 1938, § 7). Evidently,
in this line of thought, the law of aliens and recognition of the personal law
are identified. Soberly considered, however, the actual text limits itself to a
somewhat problematic provision regarding merely the law of aliens. Hence, it
is understandable that AZZARITI-MARTINEZ, r Diritto civile italiano secondo
i1 nuovo codice ( 1940) 3 71, raises the question whether foreign legal persons
may be considered existing and may exercise their civil rights in Italy without
being "recognized" by the Italian State. In his own opinion, recognition is
granted without a formal act.
46 Consolidated Companies Act 1935, art. 196, corresponding to art. 128 of
the original text of 1873 and art. 171 of 1913. See POULLET,§§ 2oo-2o3; Cass.
(April 12, I888) Pasicrisie r888.1.r86.
47
Belgium: Cour Bruxelles (May 4, 1932) Clunet 1933, r84 (a French
association of cheese manufacturers); Cass. (Nov. 12, 1935) 3 Giur. Comp.
DIP. No. r 3 I (action by the French association of authors and composers,
with strange arguments, see supra, Chapter 21, n. 5 I).
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(b) For trading associations. In a second system, the
principle applies only to trading corporations and other
commercial organizations, having a stable central place
abroad. Also some followers of the territorial theory, making
an exception, consent to this result for the sake of advanced
international commerce. 48 Nonprofit associations encounter
more distrust.
Thus, in Germany foreign business corporations and partnerships have been recognized ipso jure from an early time 49
in what may be qualified as customary law. The same rule
obtains, e.g., in the Netherlands/0 Rumania/ 1 Yugoslaviat
Japan/ 3 and in the influential Civil Code of Chile5 4 whose
example has been followed in numerous special Latin-American laws on stock corporations. 55
In France, an analogous customary ·rule has been strongly
curtailed by an exceptional legislation concerning capital
stock corporations, so as to limit unconditional recognition to
business organizations on a personal basis: copartnership and
partnership en commandite. 56
Whether the Soviet Russian law recognizes in any way
48
ROLIN, 1 Principes 167 § 28, conveniently recalled by LAITY, 29 Mich.
L. Rev. (1931) 33·
49
ROHG. (April 28, I87I) zz ROHGE. I47; and the constant decisions of
the Reichsgericht from 7 RGZ. 70. See 83 RGZ. 367.
50
The Netherlands: Rb. Rotterdam (Junes, I9I3) W. 9549·
51
Rumania: C. Com. (I887) art. 237.
52
Yugoslavia: C. Com. (I937) § 502 par. I.
53 Japan: C. Com. art. 255. Although the Japanese Civil Code, art. 36 (I)
speaks exclusively of commercial companies, art. 255 of the Commercial Code
has been interpreted by the Supreme Court (April I7, I905) I C. Com. of
Japan Ann. 406 case r65, as not distinguishing whether a foreign company is
a juristic person or not.
54
See 3 VICO 40.
55
See especially Honduras: C. C. art. 57, cf. BIJON, 6 Repert. 443 No. 35;
C. Com. (I 940) art. I o.
Mexico: C. C. (I928) art. 2736, see SCHUSTER, 7 Tul. L. Rev. (1933)
348; Ley General de Sociedades Mercantiles (I 934) art. 250.
Venezuela: C. Com. (I9I9) arts. 359 (new 334) ff.; see GOLDSTONE, 17
Tul. L. Rev. (I943) 587; and now C. C. (I942) arts. I9, 30, I65I.
56
See 2 WEISS, Traite 484; 2 LYON-CAEN et RENAULT 9I4 § I093·
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foreign business organizations, as has been asserted, cannot
be ascertained. 57
(c) For nonpro fit corporations. Prevailing though somewhat uncertain French doctrine58 traditionally has regarded
foreign associations with purposes other than profit as ipso
jure existent, irrespective of reciprocity. Nor were exceptions
of public policy raised even when a foreign domiciled religious congregation, whose French department had been dissolved in I90I, brought actions in France. 59 However, among
others, the question remained unsettled whether foreign associations could do more than the modest acts permitted to
French associations not enjoying a declaration of "public utility." At present, these doubts are ended; a decree prior to the
war of 1939, which may be of temporary character, required
governmental authorization as a condition of recognition. 60
A German statutory provision, too, declares that associations pursuing noneconomic purposes need a decree of
recognition, 61 but the Reichsgericht has recently confirmed the
doctrine that such a decree is unnecessary except to validate
a contract concluded in Germany and also governed by German private law. 62 Apart from this case, such an association
57
MAKARov, Precis 229 apparently thinks that the special authorization
required by the laws of the USSR regards only the doing of business, but that
unrecognized foreign corporations may sue in Russia, upon claims arising
abroad, only under reciprocity.
58 See the opinions (very divergent on many points) of PILLET, Personnes
Morales § 269; HEMARD, Theorie des ntillites §§ 335-351; LEREBOURSPIGEONNIERE § 169; NIBOYET § 319 and contra, 2 Traite 345 § 816.
59
Aix (Feb. 27, 1913) aff'd, Cass. (req.) (Nov. 24, 1914) D. I9I6.I.I93i
NEUMEYER, 1 Int. Verwaltungs R. 136 and authors cited; 2 ARMINJON §
199. Similarly, e.g., Italy: App. Milano (Jan. 17, 1928) Clunet 1928, 1287.
6
° France: Decree of April12, 1939, see supra Chapter 19 n. 109.
61 EG. BGB. art. 1o; a decree as envisaged in this section has very seldom
been requested. Only one case is known where an authorization was granted,
that of the German-Austrian Alpinist Association when it moved headquarters
temporarily to Innsbruck, Austria.
62
RG. (Oct. 29, 1938) 159 RGZ. 33 at 47, implicitly indorsing the opinion
of WIELAND, 43 Z. Schweiz. R. (N. F.) 225; Th. KIPP in BGB. Handausgabe
FisCHER-HENLE-TITZE (1932) note to EG. BGB. art. Io; RAAPE 1611
M. WoLFF, IPR. 71 n. 13.
·
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is treated like a German association without legal personality,
its agents acting in the country are personally liable,63 and the
entity may also be sued.64
There are, on the other hand, laws recognizing foreign
corporations of public interest more readily than commercial
companies. 65
(d) Foundations. With respect to foundations, whether
public or private, the contrast of theories has been solved by
a definite victory of the "liberal" doctrine. Even in France,
the rule has been adopted that no authorization is needed
for recognition of the legal existence and capacity of a private
foundation in accordance with the law of its foreign "seat." 66
Of course, activities in pursuance of the constitutional documents are subject to particularly anxious control under the
territoriallaw. 67
(3) Partnerships. While partnerships are recognized unconditionally in many countries along with corporate business
associations, they are also treated in the same manner in
countries where barriers against stock corporations or against
nonprofit associations have been established/8 with the possible exception of a few Latin-American countries. 69 Partnerships have never been subject to authorization, nor has
BGB. § 54 par. z; EG. BGB. art. I o sent. 2.
In analogy to ZPO. § so sent. z, § 735·
65
See for instance Chile: Corte Suprema (August Io, I936) 33 Rev. Dei'.
Jur. y Ciencias Soc. II, 1, 449, 452., 470 recognizing the Junta Provincial de
Beneficencia de Sevilla, Spain, according to Spanish law, as testamentary heir
of Chilean immovables; the court emphasizes that the Chilean legislature has
not established the requirements as for lucrative corporations.
66
NEUMEYER, I Int. Verwaltungs R. § IJ; PILLET, Personnes Morales
§ 306; CHARLES DE VISSCHER, Revue I913, at I9I; CRfMIEU, 8 Repert.
437 No. 52; LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIERE § I69.
67 CHARLES DE VISSCHER, id. at 2.06.
68 Hence even in France a Colombian partnership could obtain without formalities a judgment and, therefore, in Belgium an exequatur, Trib. Antwerp
(June 2.7, I936) Jur. Port Anvers 1937, 56.
69
For Brazil see infra Chapter 23, p. I84 n. 54·
Mexico: C. C. art. 2736 speaks of authorization necessary for "the foreign
associations and companies of civil character."
63

64
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territoriality been claimed to affect their creation. The
doctrine regarding partnerships has been helped by the usual
exaggerated emphasis on their personal basis, but substantially it must have been important that economic dangers
from partnerships were not so feared as from big corporations.
Only one question has disturbed the simplicity of this
matter. As the distinction between mercantile and nontrading
or civil associations may be decisive, which law determines the
mercantile character? Is it the law of the forum/ 0 the personal
law (of the "seat" or creation), 71 or either of them? 72 The
Belgian solution accepting the last answer/ 3 is the best; if an
association serves commercial, industrial or financial purposes,
as defined at the forum, it should be recognized even though
it may be considered nontrading at home.
2.

Special Conditions for Recognition

(a) Authorization in case of reciprocity-France. 14 When
in the I 8so's under the spell of Laurent's territorial theory
Belgian courts suddenly declared French stock companies
( socihes anonymes), which played a large part in Belgian
economics, to be "inexistent" in Belgium and denied them
the right to sue, the French government protested. Finally,
the two countries reciprocally recognized each other's governmental charters creating stock corporations. The French Law
of May 30, 1857, sanctioning this agreement, permitted the
French government to extend by decree the rights conferred
70 Lex fori: I LYON-CAEN et RENAULT§ 2 I I and 2 id. § I 12.7; ARMINJON,
Revue Dr. Int. (Bruxelles) (I927) 368; NussBAUM, D. IPR. I9o.
71 Personal law: AssER-RIVIER, Elements I90; STREIT, Z.int.R. (I 896) 32 I;
PILLET, Personnes Morales§§ I82, I92, 230; CAVAGLIERI, Dir. Int. Com. I72.
Undecided: Institute of Int. Law, Draft I929, art. 6, Annuaire I929 II 302.
72
See DIENA, I Dir. Com. Int. 293, 296.
73 PouLLET § 2 I 3, and cases cited. To the same effect, Yugoslavia, C. Com.
(I937) § soo par. 2.
74
2 LYON-CAEN et RENAULT §§ 909ff.
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upon the Belgian companies to those of other countries. In
I867, France, following the model of England, replaced the
method of special decrees creating individual corporations
by that of general statutes under which private persons
may create corporations, and Belgium (I 873), as well as
most other countries, followed suit. Nevertheless, France
maintained the system of stating by decree that a certain
foreign country observes reciprocity with France, and that
therefore stock corporations created in that country are to be
recognized. These decrees have reached a great number. 75 In
addition, many bipartite treaties grant mutual recognition
of corporations and are regarded as equivalent to decrees
stating reciprocity. Such treaties have been concluded among
others, with Great Britain, on April 30, I862, and Canada,
on December 15, 1922, while a decree was rendered with
respect to the United States on August 6, I 8 82. The list of
nations so involved is long but not exhaustive. 76
The French system has been imitated in some other countries, in Greece in particular. 77 In Belgium78 and Italy/ 9 it
was soon abandoned. A devastating criticism was expressed
by the greatest French writer on commercial law, Charles
Lyon-Caen,S 0 but has not been of any avail.
The position of an unauthorized foreign stock corporation
in France has been developed without consistency. A
corporation has no capacity to contract and may not sue
third parties but, if sued, is not allowed to defend on the
75
On controversies concerning the right of the most favored nation, see :z.
LYON-CAEN et RENAULT§ 1102.
76
See the list given by NIBOYET 37I n. 3·
77
See CARABIBER, 6 Repert. 4 I 4 Nos. 42-44; MARIDAKIS, I I Z.ausl.PR.
(I 93 7) I I 9· But the present Code is liberal, see supra n. 35.
78
Belgium: Consolidated Companies Act, of May I 8, I 873, art. 128.
79
Italy: C. Com. (I88:z.) art. 230.
80 Reports of I888 and I89I to the Institute of Int. Law, I I Annuaire
(x889-I89I) at x6o. Also NIBOYET, in this case, advocates the liberal principle
of recognizing foreign legal persons not doing business in the country, see
:z. Traite (I938) :z.8:z. § 77o, 34I § 813.
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ground of its own irregularity,S 1 because domestic creditors
should be protected. The incoherence of this system is increased by the consideration that the entity may function as a
de facto corporation under domestic law and in such quality
can engage in contracts and maintain branches, as well as be
subject to bankruptcy proceedings. 82
Other countries. Reciprocity has been required as the only
condition of recognition in Hungary83 and Czechoslovakia. 84
In Latin-American states, reciprocity has been a popular
requisite,85 but increasingly it has been found incompatible
with the principle that foreigners and foreign juristic persons
are assimilated to nationals. For this reason, Colombia cancelled the requisite of reciprocity in its Constitution of 1936. 86
(b) Special authorization. It follows from the restricted
domain of unconditional recognition already mentioned that
all foreign nonprofit corporations need special authorization
for being able to avail themselves of their existence in Belgium, France, Germany (with modifications), the Netherlands, Rumania, Soviet Russia, Yugoslavia, Chile and most
other Latin-American countries, and Japan.
Also, private and public foundations need authorization
in some countries, and business corporations which are not of
a certain type may possibly need it in some jurisdictions.
In a few Latin-American countries, finally, it is claimed
that the personality of a foreign corporation is recognized
only when it is authorized by the government, and some
authors take this pretension seriously. 87 In these jurisdictions
81 HEMARD, Theorie des nullites §§ 342-345; 2 LYON-CAEN et RENAULT
§ I I 04; THALLER, Traite § 7 7 I.
82
PILLET, I Traite § 740.
83
DE MAGYAR!, Clunet I92.4, 595; anonymous, 6 Repert. 456 Nos. IS
his, I 9·
84
On the basis of§ 33 of the Allg. BGB., see LAUFKE, 7 Repert. I87 No. 6:z..
85
Reciprocity is still required in other respects in Argentina, see infra p. 1 79·
86
See TULlO ENRIQUE TAsc6N, Derecho Constitucional Colombiano (ed. z,
I939) 6o; cf. with respect to individuals, CAICEDO 12.3 § 81.
87
See Chapter 2.3 ns. 48ff.; and see as an example of certain laws, Honduras,
Law of Foreigners of r 926, art. 4: foreign juristic persons enjoy the rights
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nonauthorized companies seem not to be allowed the minimum of rights which recognition usually confers. 88 Moreover,
there are countries where either authorization of the existence,
or the registration at an office, is said to be essential for the
recognition of any legal person. We shall encounter such
theories, mostly of a doubtful nature, with respect to several
Latin-American jurisdictions. Also, the Chinese authorities,
using their peculiar technique, have declared that "it is not
known" how a foreign juristic person having no business place
in China could be registered, and therefore that it is "difficult
to recognize its personality." 89
3· Treaties
The problem was much discussed for a time whether the
clause usual in bilateral treaties that the "subjects" of either
contracting power should enjoy treatment of the most favored
nation in matters of commerce, applied to the recognition of
the personality of corporations. 90 Therefore, treaties of amity
or commerce have included provisions expressly assuring the
reciprocal recognition of corporations and, sometimes, also
of associations. But the significance of these clauses is now
limited to countries denying recognition in the absence of a
treaty, factual reciprocity, or special authorization. 91
Among the other provisions, the clauses allowing isolated
acts of business or minor activities, and access to courts, concern our present subject but scarcely alter the existing situation.
granted them by the laws of the country of their domicil provided that they
have been recognized by the Executive Power.
88
See infra ns. IOI, I:u.
89
2 Interpretations du Yuan Judiciaire en matiere civile (Le Droit Chinois
Moderne, No. 35· I940) I6 § 387, Interpr. No. 1471 of April 3, 1925.
90
See for the affirmative view, WEISs, 2 Traite 505 (with many references).
Contra: 2 LYON-CAEN et RENAULT 924 § 1102; PILLET, Personnes Morales
I 8 3, I 84
91

§

12.4.

On C6digo Bustamante, art. p, see ScHUSTER, 8 Tul. L. Rev. (1934)

571 n. 14.
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III.
1.

EFFECTS OF RECOGNITION

Full Effect

In a few countries outstanding for their broad views and
cosmopolitan mentality, such as Great Britain, Switzerland,
the Netherlands, and Greece, recognition is traditionally
granted to any organization in the world legally created in the
state of its central office or, in the British case, in any state.
This recognition means in principle no less than the permission to exercise the purposes of the charter. It is fair to state
that, although France reserves its general authorization of
foreign stock companies, this authorization, if given to the
companies of a certain country, includes the right of doing
business within the country. The principle is not inconsistent
with regulations such as the prescription of registration.
But this standard is not reached in most countries.
2.

Minimal Effect

In view of the manifold impositions and restrictions to
which in the majority of the territorial laws the activities of
foreign associations are subject, it is convenient to ask, What
position results from the mere fact of authorization, independently of any other requisite?
There are two such rights guaranteed and generally accorded in the international treaties. One is the capacity to be
a party to a suit, and the other the capacity to engage in
"isolated acts." Not without justification the first category
sometimes appears absorbed by the second, but it has to be
considered here separately in accordance with the more
common usage.
(a) Capacity to be a party. 92 Capacity to sue and to be sued
as a party to litigation in court has been regarded as a "natural
92
Cf. LAITY, "International Standing in Court of Foreign Corporations,"
29 Mich. L. Rev. (1930) 28.
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right" of a corporation/3 or as a means of realizing its rights,
and as "indispensable to protect the personal status."95 The
Supreme Court of the United States has held that the power
of a foreign corporation to bring proper suit in a state tribunal
is guaranteed by the Due Process Clause. 96 We may take it
as the by far prevailing view that foreign corporations are
considered capable of being a party not only in jurisdictions
where they are entitled to carry on business of a permanent
character, but also in those where they would need to comply
with some impositions if they were to do "business" but in
fact do not carry on any such business. 97 The situation is different, when a foreign corporation should have complied with
statutory requirements and in violation thereof has done
93

2 KENT 2 84; STORY § 56 5; LINDLEY, On Companies I 22 I g; WALKER

158.
94

YOUNG 89.
THOMPSON § 7977·
96 Kentucky Finance Corp. v. Paramount Auto Exchange Corp. (192.2.)
2.62 U.S. 544; Note, 79 U. of Pa. L. Rev. (1931) at 1135-II38.
97
England: WESTLAKE§ 306; YOUNG 179·
United States: Society for the Propagation of the Gospel v. Wheeler (x814)
2 Gall. 105; Bank of U.S. v. Deveaux (x8o9) 5 Cranch 6x, 78; HENDERSON
39-42·
Canada: Creamette Co. v. Famous Foods, Ltd. (1933) Ex. C. R. zoo (action
for infringement of trade mark).
Argentina: C. C. arts. 35, 44, C. Com. art. 2.85.
Brazil: Sup. Trib. Fed. (Sept. z, 1932.) 2.4 Arch. Jud. 394 (action by
Delaware corporation to cancel defendant's commercial name). The cases
are digested by RoDRIGO OcrAVIO, Dicionario Nos. 12.59 to 1269 and reviewed
by KNIGHT, 7 Tul. L. Rev. (1933) 2.10. Cf. CARVALHO DE MENDON<;A, 4
Trat. Dir. Com. 2 77; ESPINOLA, 6 Tratado 56 7 No. 6 and 8-C id. 1 77 5.
Chile: In one opinion, see HERRERA REYES, Sociedades An6nimas (I 9 35)
2.71 § 2.99·
Denmark: BoRUM and MEYER, 6 Repert. 2.17 No. z8.
The Netherlands: C. Civ. Proc. arts. 12.7 1 768; Rb. Amsterdam (March I7 1
1899) W. 7351, and (May.7, 19oo) W. 74oo, Clunet 1903, 92.5.
Portugal: C. Com. art. 109.
Rumania: Cass. (June 8, 1937) No. 142.8, Clunet 1938 1 961.
Sweden: MALMAR, 7 Repert. 14I No. 149·
Switzerland: BG. (July u, I934) 6o BGE. I 2.2.0 1 2.2.6: corporation of New
York; recognition exists ipso jure and implies the faculty of standing in court.
Turkey: Law of Nov. 30, IJ30/x9I4 1 art. 12..
Venezuela: Corte Federal y de Casaci6n (Aug. 4 1 1934) Lahoud v. Colgate
Palmolive Peet Co. (1937) Gaceta Oficial II4.079, cf. CRAWFORD, 12. Tul.
L. Rev. (I938) 2.2.2..
95
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business in the state, but in many jurisdictions full capacity
is granted even in this case. 98
Capacity for suing and being sued is so much the most
important incident of recognition and so frequently causes
international preoccupation, that provisions for securing it
appear in all bipartite and multipartite treaties or drafts involving business associations.
Exceptions to this principle, however, discernible in numerous instances, deserve examination.
Sometimes an alleged exception is caused by confusion be98
United States: Cooke, J., in Alpena Portland Cement Co. v. Jenkins and
Reynolds Co. (I9Io) 244 Ill. 354, 9I N. E. 48o; McKee v. Stewart Land &
Live Stock Co. (I925) 28 Ariz. 5II, 238 Pac. p6; Mandel v. Swan Land&.
Cattle Co. (I895) I54 Ill. I77, 40 N. E. 462.
Canada: Alberta: Companies Act, s. I 49 (I) as construed in Lampson,
Fraser & Huth, Inc. v. Simpson [I942] 3 W. W. R. 238 (Alta.);
British Columbia: Charles H. Lilly Co. v. Johnston Fisheries Co. (I 909) I o
W. L. R. 2: "The ordinary common law right to sue was not taken away or
interfered with by the (Brit. Col. Companies) Act" ( s. I 4 3). Northwest
Trading Co. v. Northwest Trading Co. [C. A. I92o] I W. W. R. 353, af!'d
[I92o] 3 W. W. R. 729 (action to compel defendant to change its name);
Ontario: Howe Machine Co. v. Walker (I877) 35 U. C. Q. B. 37 (C. A.);
Quebec: Ontario Marble Works, Ltd. v. Lepage Marble Works, Ltd. (I 924)
3I Que. Pr. 2I7;
Saskatchewan: Bondholders Security Corp. v. Manville [I933] 3 W. W. R. 1,
[1933] 4 D. L. R. 699 (Sask. C. A.).
Austria: (Stock companies not having been permitted business): OGH (Oct.
10, 1888) 26 GIU. No. 12389; (June 22, 1932) I4 SZ. 425 No. tJZ; WALKER
204 n. I 1.
Belgium: Cass. Beige (Oct. 6, 1904) Pasicrisie I904.1.362: French mutual
insurance company in absence of the publications prescribed by art. 1 98 of
Consolidated Companies Act; App. Bruxelles (Feb. 8, I924) Revue Inst.
Beige I925, 232; see also Trib. Com. Liege (June 28, 1937) 5 Giur. Comp.
DIP. (I939) IO § 8. Formerly Cass. (March 7, 1895) Clunet I895, 876
had held the contrary opinion, but was criticized.
Brazil: The question seems not to have been decided, although the decisions
referred to in the preceding note (see in particular Sup. Trib. Fed. (May 6,
I925) 83 Revista Dir. 326, EsPINOLA, 1 Pandectas Brasileiras, pt. 2, 28o)
regularly held that foreign business corporations have personality "independently of governmental authorization."
Chile: In one opinion, see HERRERA REYES, Sociedades An6nimas (I 9 35)
271 § 299·
Italy: App. Torino (Jan. 7, 1936) Rivetta v. Rendley, Foro Ital. I936
I 397 citing ample precedents,
Rumania: See NEGULESCO, Clunet 1910, 55·
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tween recogmt10n and permission to do business, as only
recently in the Yugoslavian Commercial Code. 99
In other cases, a corporation has been declared nonexistent,
simply because it did not have a business place or do business
in the state and therefore omitted registration or filing for
license. Isolated language to this effect in the United States
has been noticed abroad100 but must be considered inexact.
However, such a deviation from the general behavior of
courts has been observed in a few Latin-American jurisdictions, particularly on the part of the Mexican Federal Tribunal.101 Such restriction has been the object of a declaration on
juridicial personality of foreign companies, opened for signature by the Pan-American Union on June 25, 1936, recently
ratified by the United States, Chile, Dominican Republic,
Ecuador, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Peru, and Venezuela. 102 It
declares:
"Companies103 constituted in accordance with the laws of
one of the Contracting States, and which have their seats in its
territory, shall be able to exercise in the territories of the
other Contracting States, notwithstanding that they do not
have a permanent establishment, branch or agency in such
99

293·

Yugoslavia: C. Com. § 503, criticized by EISNER, I Symmikta Streit at

100 LOEB, Clunet I 922, 3 I 9, and BE11"ZKE, Jur. Personen I 64 have cited
Texas Rev. Stat. I9I I, I3I8 (corresponding to art. I536 Rev. Stat. I925);
Chapman v. Hallwood Cash Register Co. (App. Texas I9o3) 73 S. W. 969,
but in this case the corporation had an office in Dallas, Texas, and carried on
business.
101 Mexico: See cases expertly commented by ScHuSTER, 7 Tul. L. Rev.
(1933) J4I, 374, 8 id. 563 and more recently the decision in Amparo Molina
(1935) 403 Seman. Jud. (1935) IJt2; VoELKEL, 14 Tul. L. Rev. (1940)
52, 66.
Furthermore, "personality" is denied in:
Bolivia: Law of Nov. 13, r886, art. 4·
Panama: Law No. 32, of Feb. 26, 1927, art. 91.
102 Proclamation of the President of the United States, 55 Statutes at Large
1201; the text of the Pan-American declaration has also been published in
Hudson, 7 Int. Legislation 355 No. 445·
103 Spanish sociedades, see supra p. r o. Chile, in its "understanding" in
signing, speaks of sociedades mercantiles.
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territories, any commercial activity which is not contrary
to the laws of such States and to enter all appearances in the
courts as planti:ffs or defendants, provided they comply with
the laws of the country in question."
The word "notwithstanding" directly refers to the mentioned
case, namely, where the corporation has no business ties with
the country, although its solution would seem a commonplace.
Finally, it occurs frequently within and without the United
States that a foreign corporation is not permitted to bring an
action, as one of the penalties for noncompliance with the
statutory requirements for doing intrastate business. 104 This
is comparable to the refusal by French courts of the right of
suit to foreign corporations not recognized through decree
or treaty, a refusal strongly disapproved in the French literature.1011
In connection with the Pan-American resolution mentioned
above, the United States has declared its "understanding"
that the companies "shall be permitted to sue or defend suits
of any kind without the requirement of registration or domestication." Certainly what was meant was "authorization"
rather than "domestication" in the proper sense. Does the
declaration mean that the resolution extends to the case of
unauthorized business? This, in fact, was the significance of
an analogous resolution by the Institute of International Law
as early as r 89 !. 106 But another "understanding" of the
Chilean Delegation points to the contrary conception, and
many states of this country deny the right to sue to noncomplying corporations.
Also the recommendations of the Council of the League
of Nations of I923 107 demanded the faculty to appear as
plaintiff or defendant only for such persons, firms and
104 See infra Chapter 2.3, pp. 2.o3ff.
105 See PILLET, 2. Traite §§ 745, 746.
106 II Annuaire (I889-I892.) I7I arts. I and III.
107 League of Nations Document, C. 3 6. M. 2. I; I 92.9 II No.

7·
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companies as are permitted to be established, but the International Chamber of Commerce, in its proposals to the Universal Economic Conference in Geneva, 1927, desired to
secure the right of standing in court for all companies.
None of these statements refers to the other half of the
so-called capacity to sue and to be sued, viz., the capacity to
perform procedural acts. The distinction is more important
than in the case of individuals, because even in countries
applying the personal law to the procedural competence of
physical persons, organizations usually are subject to the local
law of procedure. This is particularly remarkable in the case
of noncorporate associations.
Illustration: An English partnership is capable, under the
English court rules, of being a party and, therefore, has the
right to sue in a German court. The plaintiff partnership
failed to send in particulars for registration under the English
Registration of Business Names Act, 1916, and thus lost
enforcement of its rights arising out of any contract. 108 But
this regards only the procedural disability of the firm; "the
capacity of being a party according to English law engenders
procedural capacity in Germany even though it is missing
under English law." LG. Berlin (December 13, 1929),
IPRspr. 1930 No. 20.
.
(b) Single acts. Regulations requiring foreign corporations
to register or to obtain a license generally apply only if the
business to be carried on reaches some degree of permanence,
allowing "single" or "isolated" acts unconditionally. 109 The
boundaries of the permitted zone vary a little, but ordinarily
activities such as taking orders from customers by letter, or
by traveling agents/ 10 acquiring/ 11 holding,112 or administer108

LINDLEY, Partnership .(ed. 10) I 59·
Cf. Restatement § r 6 7 comment.
Argentina: C. Com. art. z85.
El Salvador: C. Com. art. Z99·
For other Latin-American countries, see VOELKEL, 14 Tul. L. Rev. (1940)
at 47 ns. zr, zz; 55 n. sz.
110
United States: This frequent assumption follows the English distinction
109
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ing113 property, and other simple exercises of the corporate
capacity, are included.
In the United States, no comprehensive definition of doing
business exists, but approximate agreement obtains on certain
definite rules or principles which are "suggestive and illustrative rather than definitive," as the draftsmen of the Uniform
Foreign Corporations Act have stated. Their tentative definition:
"The term 'doing business' means the transaction by a
foreign corporation of some part of its business substantial
and ,continuous in character and not merely casual or occasional,"
has been supplemented by an enumeration of permitted activities of a rather liberal extent. 114
On the other hand, there are certain outstanding cases in
made for purposes of jurisdiction and taxation in La Bourgogne [1899] P. 1;
[1899] A. C. 431; The Holstein (1936) 155 L. T. R. 466. See, for example,
West Pub. Co. v. Superior Court of San Francisco (Cal. 1942) 128 Pac.
(2d) 777: "mere solicitation of business, advertising or demonstrating products,
listing of names of the company in the telephone directory or the company
having its name on the door of an office or presence of a company official on
personal business ...."
Canada: Alberta: Foreign Companies Act, 3 Rev. Stat. 1922, 2019 s. 4
(3): "The taking orders by travellers for goods, wares or merchandise to be
subsequently imported into Alberta to fill such orders, or the buying or selling
of such goods, wares or merchandise by correspondence if the company has no
resident agent or representative and no warehouse office or place of business in
Alberta . . . shall not be deemed to be carrying on business under the
meaning of this Act." 'Similarly, British Columbia: Rev. Stat. 1936, c. 42, s.
178, and Nova Scotia: Rev. Stat. 1923, c. 173, s. 30. But the Alberta provision
was narrowed: Companies Act, Rev. Stat. I 942, c. 240, s. I 3 3 (b). Extremely narrow, Manitoba: Companies Act, Rev. Stat. 1940, c. 36, s. 452.
Austria: OGH. (May 3o, I899) Amtl. S. No. 88, Io Z.int.R. 76; (Feb. 5,
I929) Rspr. 1929, 49 No. 70, cited by WALKER 204 n. 12.
Brazil: Sup. Trib. (May 25, I927) 87 Revista Dir. 88 (sale of goods by
an American business corporation not authorized to do business).
Rumania: Cass. (June 8, 1937) No. 1428; Clunet 1938, 961.
111
E.g., taking valid title to property in stock; after resale the buyer has
a good title: Crockin v. Boston Store of Fort Myers (Fla. 1940) 188 So.
853·
112
Austria: High Administrative Court (June 30, 1936) 65 J. Bl. 505.
113
YoUNG 91, citing 4 LAURENT§ 137•
114
National Conference, Handbook 1934, 287, 304 with a valuable table
of cases.
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which neither the constitutional freedom of interstate and
foreign commerce nor the usual statutory faculty of doing
single acts may be relied on. Thus, intrastate business is
assumed to exist if a warehouse is maintained in the state,
115
from which goods are shipped to customers in the state; or
if a foreign corporation sells and, through its agent in the
state, installs machinery/"6 constructs highways,117 supplies
concrete pipe for a sewer job,118 or installs fixtures. 119 But a
transaction made by an agent in the state is likely not to be
regarded as doing business, if the authority of the agent is
limited to soliciting and transmitting applicationS. 120
In the Latin-American countries, the main criterion, as
will be seen, is the carrying on of a branch or agency in the
territory. 121 Bolivia, however, is said to deny even the minimum of tolerance to any nonregistered foreign company. 122

J. Is the Extent of Recognition Determined by Domestic
Law?
All particular solutions described above evince the simple
principle that the foreign personal law, if recognized, is
applied exactly as it is established by the state of creation. The
smooth operation of this principle is, however, jeopardized
by frequent broad references to the concepts and measures of
115
Where the goods are shipped from another state, the corporation is
recognized as engaged in interstate commerce, see Caldwell v. North Carolina
(1903) 187 U.S. 6u.
116
2 BEALE 843 § 179.15.
117
Amos D. Bridge's Sons, Inc. v. State of New York (1921) 188 App. Div.
soo, aff'd, 23I N.Y. 532.
118
Loomis v. People's Construction Co. (1914) 21 I Fed. 453·
119 George M. Muller Mfg. Co. v. First National Bank of Dothan (1912.)
q6 Ala. 22.9, 57 So. 762..
120
Union Trust Co. of Md. v. Rodeman (1936) 220 Wis. 453, 264 N. W.
so8 at 5 12..
121
See infra Chapter 2.3, I. Guatemala: C. Com. (1942) art. 416 shares
in this view. In addition, the C. C. (I933) art. zs, continuing former provisions, establishes a series of duties for foreign companies and associations
"habitually" carrying on business in the Republic.
122
Bolivia: Law of Nov. q, I886, art. 4; ARAOZ, I Nuevo Digesto de
Legislacion Boliviana (1929) 24; VOELKEL, 14 Tul. L. Rev. (1940) at 56.

150

CORPORATIONS, KINDRED ORGANIZATIONS

the law of the forum. Constitutions, statutes, and courts are
prone to declare that a foreign juristic person cannot have
more rights than domestic persons have.
In Europe this is an opinion of long standing, followed by
some eminent writers. 123 Michaud, the author of the French
standard work, regards it as a "principle generally ~ccepted
that foreign corporations ought not to enjoy treatment more
favorable than the French corporations," which principle, in
fact, "constitutes an exception to the personal law." 124 If
German courts, in recognizing the existence and capacity of a
foreign business association, describe its status as similar to
that of a German stock corporation or a limited partnership,125
they try only to make the personality of the enterprise clear.
In one case, however, a banking corporation of Tennessee was
refused recognition because it did not seem to conform to any
legal type of association at the forum-a decision without
authority. 126 Of English courts, it is only known that, not
accustomed to regard the monarchical state of England as a
person, they would not allow the King of Spain to sue as
personifying the Spanish fiscus, 121 but required that he should
act as a royal corporation sole, like the Crown of England 128
or as a trustee for his subjects, or on his own behal£. 129 But
this intolerance pertained to the overextended procedural
concepts of British judges. 130
123 MAMELOK 76; AssER-RIVIER, Elements 202; YouNG 92, 94; PouLLET
in Clunet I904, 828 and in Manuel 254 § 2I7. See also PILLET, Personnes
Morales 91 § 66.
124 MICHOUD, 2 Personnalite Morale 352 § 329.
125 See for instance, RG. (Dec. I6, I9I3) 83 RGZ. 367; RG. (June 3,
I927) II7 RGZ. 2I5 at 217; RG. (Oct. 29, I938) I59 RGZ. 33 at 46.
126 OLG. Hamburg (June 23, I 903) I4 Z.int.R. 64, criticized by BEITZKE,
J ur. Personen 6o n. I 6.
127 United States v. Wagner (1867) 2 L. R. Ch. 582 per Cairns, J.; cf.
YoUNG r8o.
128 King of Spain v. Hullett & Widder (r833) 7 Bli. N. S. 359, r Cl. & F.
333·
129 Hullett v. King of Spain (r828) 2 Bli. N. S. 31,28 R. R. 56.
130 YoUNG 299. Contrary to this spirit, C. M. SCHMITTHOFF, Textbook of
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Drafts of the Swiss Civil Code adopted the said doctrine
and granted corporations and establishments having foreign
headquarters civil personality only within the limits determined by Swiss law. 131 This idea was criticized and omitted
in the final text, but it has been incorporated in the Civil Code
of Liechtenstein 132 and the Commercial Code of Yugoslavia.
The latter recognizes the capacity of foreign companies to no
greater extent than is granted to domestic companies of a
similar or kindred type, serving similar or kindred purposes.
Foreign types unknown to the internal law are subjected to
the provisions involving the next related domestic type. 133 If
the foreign type cannot be fitted into any of the domestic
categories, it is treated like an ordinary stock corporation. 134
The recent Civil Code of Peru135 joins this group, stating
that "the capacity of foreign juristic persons cannot be contrary to the public policy nor more extensive than that granted
to nationals," and, while the Latin-American statutes following the Spanish model regularly set forth the principle that
(recognized) foreign corporations enjoy the same private
rights as national individuals, 136 certain ones, such as the
Constitution of Venezuela of 1936 (art. 37), add that they
have in no case greater rights than nationals. The tentative
drafts of the Restatement (Nos. r-3, § 171) declared that:
"No power given to a foreign corporation by the law of
the state of incorporation can give it a right to do any act
which a corporation as such is not permitted to do by the
law of the state in which the act is done."
the English Conflict of Laws (London I945) 33I tries to apply Dicey's
proposition that a foreign status unknown to the English law is not recognized.
131
Preliminary Draft (I9oo) art. 70; Draft of March 3, I905, art. I748.
See criticism by SAUSER-HALL, so Bull. Soc. Legisl. Comp. (I92I) 246.
132
Liechtenstein: P. G. R. art. 2 35 par. 3·
133 Yugoslavian C. Com. of I937, § 502 par. 2, cf. EISNER, I Symmikta
Streit (I939) 292. The Japanese C. Com. art. 255 is similar.
134
Yugoslavia: C. Com.§ soo pars. 3, 4·
135
Peru: C. C. (I936) Tit. Prel. art. IX par. 2.
136 Spain: C. Com. art. I 5, see TRiAs DEBEs 68.
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The final text has cancelled this statement, but comment b
of § 165 says that:
"A state usually restricts the activities of a foreign corporation to the same extent to which it restricts the activities
of a domestic corporation."
In fact, most American jurisdictions have a clause in their
constitutions or statutes enouncing one of the following versions of the same idea: 137
(a) Any foreign corporation shall have the same rights
and privileges as are enjoyed by domestic corporations of the
same or similar character,138 or
No foreign corporation shall have any greater rights or
privileges than those enjoyed by domestic corporations of a
similar character. 139
(b) No foreign corporation shall be allowed to transact
business in the state on more favorable conditions than are
prescribed by local law for similar domestic corporations. 140
(c) No foreign corporation may carry on any business
which a domestic corporation is prohibited from doing, 141 or
The exercise of which is either prohibited to domestic
corporations or against the public policy of the state,142 or
137 A survey as of the year I92.3 was made by the French writer LEPAULLE,
Condition des societes etrangeres I6I, I64.
138
Arizona: Code (I939) § s3-8o4.
Idaho: Code (I932.) § 2.9-so8.
Louisiana: General Statutes ( I9 3 9) § 12.46.
South Carolina: Code (I942.) § 7764.
Texas: Revised Civil Statutes (I92.S) art. I~32..
139 Montana: Constitution (I 8 8 9) art. XV li II.
Oregon: C. C. (Compiled Laws Ann.) (I940) § 77-3I8.
140 Arizona: Constitution (I912.) art. XIV§ S·
California: Constitution (I879) art. XII§ IS·
Kentucky: Constitution (I89I) § 2.02..
Utah: Constitution (I89S) art. XII§ 6.
Washington: Constitution (I889) art. 12. § 7·
141 Maine: Revised Statutes (I944) c. 49 §us.
Maryland: Annotated Code (I939) art. 2.3 § u8.
Ohio: Code (I938) § 86zs-I6.
Oklahoma: Constitution ( I907) art. IX § 44·
Virginia: Constitution (I9o2.) § I63.
142 Georgia: Code (I933) § 2.2.-IS03·
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Foreign corporations must be organized for a purpose
for which local corporations may be organized. 148
(d) Many states have some slight variations, such as
combining the "same rights and privileges" clause with the
clause that a foreign corporation cannot transact business forbidden to a domestic corporation,144 or
(e) Foreign corporations are subject to all liabilities,
restrictions, and duties imposed on like domestic corporations
and have no other or greater powers. 146
The emphasis in these statutes is on the penalties and
restrictions rather than the powers and privileges.
What do all these rules mean? Do they affect the recognition of the foreign-created personality?
It would seem so in a few instances. Among European
cases, there are some that have already been considered and
refuted, such as the Dutch decision rejecting the legal personality of a French partnership because the law of the forum
knew only partnerships without full personality; 146 the court
failed to see that as the party was not a Dutch partnership,
Dutch law could not apply. The Appellate Court of Brussels
recognized a Dutch association for nonprofit purposes only
since a Belgian law shortly before had introduced similar associations; 147 this was not a convincing reason, as was noted,
since the same court denied legal existence in Belgium to a
French trade union, 148 although the analogous "professional
syndicates" had been instituted in Belgium. 149
143

Kansas: Statutes (1935) § 17-503.
Illinois: Bus. Corp. Act (1933) § 157-103.
Michigan: General Corporation Act (1931) § 94·
Missouri: Revised Statutes (1939) §sop..
New Mexico: Statutes (1941) §§ 54-801, 54-804.
145
Arkansas: Pope's Digest (1937) c. 37 § 2249.
Colorado: Statutes (1935) c. 41 § 110.
Indiana: Annotated Statutes (1933) § 25-302.
Iowa: Code (1946) § 494.14.
Mississippi: Code (1942) tit. 21 § 5341.
146
Rh. Amsterdam (Dec. 19, 1924) 13 Bull. Inst. Int. (1925) 279 § 4225.
147
App. Bruxelles (June 9, 1925) Pasicrisie 1925.2.157.
148
App. Bruxelles (May 4, 1932) 1932.2.221.
149
DUBOIS-CLAVIER, Clunet 1933, 199.
144
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Because in Illinois domestic banks were forbidden to hold
stock in another bank corporation, the Supreme Court of
Illinois held that a foreign bank corporation licensed to do
business was not authorized to purchase bank stock, purchase
and transfer of the stock being "ultra vires and void.m 50 The
Court thus directly denied the corporate powers acquired in
another state. But, if ordinarily the theory of special powers
and the doctrine of illegality should be clearly separated/51
this is doubly needed where a legal prohibition is territorially
limited. The true solution was simply to extend the policy
of Illinois, viz., that no bank should hold stock in another
bank, to the branch of a foreign bank. On the same line, it was
declared public policy in Illinois that no corporation, whether
domestic or foreign, should engage in the business of buying
and selling real estate, although the statute seemed not to
envisage foreign corporations.152 Unincorporated associations,
whether domestic or foreign, have been held excluded from
writing insurance in Idaho. 153 A foreign corporation, authorized in Michigan to do telegraph business was not granted
a concession for other, viz., telephone, business "for which
a domestic corporation could be formed," but the court saw
clearly that what the statute intended was to prohibit one
corporation from engaging in both kinds of business, and this
policy was decisive. 154
The obvious conclusion may be verified by counterproof.
Although in Illinois a corporation cannot be organized to do
different classes of insurance business, there is no implied
prohibition for a New York corporation155 to do such multi150Golden v. Cervenka (1917) 278 Ill. 409 at 440, II6 N. E. 273 at 286.
151 CARPENTER, "Should the Doctrine of Ultra Vires be Discarded?" 33 Yale
L. J. (1924) 49, 68.
152 Evans v. McKinney (1923) 308 Ill. roo, 139 N. E. 99· See for real
estate brokerage, Warren v. Interstate Realty Co. (1914) 192 Ill. App. 438.
153 Intermountain Lloyds v. Diefendorf (193 I) 5 I Ida. 304, 5 Pac. (2d) 730.
154 Amer. Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. Secretary of State (1909) 159
Mich. r 9 5, r2 3 N. w. 5 6&.
155 People v. Fidelity and Casualty Co. (1894) 153 Ill. 25, 38 N. E. 752·
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form business in Illinois. Frequently, objections against the
purpose or the structure of a foreign corporation divergent
from domestic legislation, have been raised but rejected. A
corporation organized in another state solely for religious,
missionary, educational, and charitable purposes was held
capable of acquiring and holding land in California without
complying with certain provisions of the California Civil
Code. 156 A Kansas corporation having its capital stock divided
into shares of no fixed nominal par value, was recognized in
Missouri, 157 and a Delaware corporation, having a mixed
stock structure, was admitted in California/ 58 despite divergent domestic legislation. The New York courts have permitted an insolvent foreign corporation to make an assignment to creditors, prohibited to New York corporations/ 59
and so forth.
The reasonable intention of legislatures and courts is to
segregate within the territorial enacted law a portion embodying imperative public policy to be applied to all corporations,
whether foreign or domestic, doing business in the state. The
intention is not, however, to restrict recognition otherwise
than by the well-known provisions concerning the doing of
business. Only on this basis can the sanction of violations be
adequately determined.
Great help in avoiding harmful applications of the existent
incautious provisions has come from the popular statement
that the failure of a state to provide domestic corporations
with the same powers, or to authorize them to be formed for
156

General Conference etc. v. Berkey (1909) 156 Cal. 466, 105 Pac. 411.
State ex rel. Standard Tank Car Co. v. Sullivan (1920) 282 Mo. 261,
22 I s. W. 728, 732.
158
Commonwealth Acceptance Corp. v. Jordan (1926) 198 Cal. 618, 246
Pac. 796. The Constitution of Washington does not warrant exclusion of a
foreign corporation because it is permitted to issue common stock of different
classes not allow,ed domestic corporations, Fibreboard Products v. Hinkle
(1928) 147 Wash. 10.
159
Vanderpoel v. Gorman (1894) 140 N.Y. 563, 35 N. E. 9J2·
157
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the same purposes, is not presumed to exclude a foreign corporation from exercising activities according to its charter. 160
These observations suffice for the limited purpose of the
present inquiry, which is not concerned with the delicate
question how far public policy goes or should go. Evidently
all doctrines and provisions forcing all foreign organizations
into a domestic mould, are ill-framed and would be quite
dangerous but for the good sense of judges throughout the
world. To ban or degrade foreign types of associations would
entirely deform the principle that the law of the charter
governs. The progress of international intercourse which has
engineered the "liberal" theory of recognition, in turn, depends upon a liberal concept of recognition. Moreover, the
parties who organize an enterprise must choose its juristic
shape and adjust its structure in accordance with the types
offered by the local law and are unable to comply with every
idea of legislators in all parts of the globe. They should not,
in fairness, have to give thought to any law except that of
creation, except perhaps that designed to govern the principal
place of business.
The retrogression would be worse, if these clauses under
consideration should mean that domestic corporations would
be protected against competition161 by other means than
taxation and licensing for business. This would largely exceed the scope of the famous reciprocity or "retaliatory"
clauses.
If the problem, instead, is confined to its proper domain,
internal law will be held to affect the original nature of a
foreign organization only on the ground of a vital public
policy, important enough to overcome the needs of trade or
H 10 Stevens v. Pratt (1882) 101 Ill. 2o6, Stump v. Sturm (1918) 254 Fed.
535; 2 BEALE§ 167.33; FLETCHER, 17 Cyc. Corp.§ 8334 n. 45 and cases
supra ns. 151-153.
161 This is the interpretation by LEPAULLE, supra n. I 3 7, ·1 64 who is apprehensive of the sphere of discretion left to the administrative agencies.
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spiritual and cultural interchange. The theory of comity
should at last lose its grip.
There is, however, a reverse side of the thesis that "foreign
juristic persons enjoy the same private rights as those of the
same class" formed at the forum. De Becker believed it was·
"the awkward result" of the Japanese rule, formulated in
these terms, that foreign corporations may enjoy in Japan
rights which they cannot enjoy at home. 162 This is not the
meaning, of course. But it has likewise been observed in this
country that the domestic law of the state where activities are
exercised, increases the powers of a foreign corporation in
such matters as usury, taking land by devise, making preferential payments, and eminent domain. 163 Thus, the wellsettled rule that a state never concedes permission to a foreign
corporation to go beyond its charter164 would be overridden.
However, all such results may be explained, each one separately, in other ways. Regrettably, this matter exceeds the
scope of this treatise.
IV. THE PowERs OF THE CoRPORATION AND oF ITS AGENTS

There is no disagreement on the principle that the capacity
of a corporation and the authority of its principal representatives are primarily determined by its personal law.
I.

Powers of Corporation

Powers denied to a corporation by the law of incorporation
are denied it in any country. 165 American courts say, "Comity
does not add powers but only recognizes existing ones." Con162

DE BECKER, Int. Priv. Law 62.
Note, 40 Col. L. Rev. (1940) 1225.
164
See next note.
165
Relfe v. Rundle (t88o) 103 U.S. 222,2251 2 BEALE§ 165.1; PILLET,
Personnes Morales 105; RAAPE 136; TRiAs DE BEs 386. For instance, a foreign
company in liquidation has the limited capacity of the law of charter: App.
Athens (1929) Clunet 1931, 494·
163
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flicts, however, are immediately presented by the fundamentally different conceptions of common and civil law in
construing corporate powers.
In modern civil law, capacity to have rights and powers,
pertains to juristic persons in the same full extent as to individuals, excepting natural abilities such as capacity to marry
and to make a will, but including name, honor, and credit. 166
For the benefit of third persons dealing with corporations,
the laws usually freeze this full capacity into a "formal," i.e.,
an absolutely fixed sum of faculties, independent of the
purposes of incorporation and restrictions imposed through
charter or by-laws. Even though a juristic person ought not
to make certain transactions according to the constitutional
documents and resolutions of stockholder meetings, it can
yet do them with legal effect. Any transaction with third
persons, therefore, is valid, at least if there is no fraudulent
collusion between the agents and the third parties.
At common law, a juristic person has no more than the
special capacity conferred upon it by the act of creation in view
of its particular purposes. Whenever a corporation enters into
a transaction beyond the prescribed radius of its activity, it
acts "ultra vires," without power, and the act in principle is
legally inexistent as nobody's act. An English judge believed
this view self-evident and "not a mere canon of English
municipal law but a great and broad principle which must be
taken as part of any system of jurisprudence.m67 He allowed
a minority of stockholders in a Turkish railway corporation
to sue the directors with the demand to restrain them from
making payments ensuing from a majority vote in a general
meeting, the vote being "ultra vires of the majority." The
court thus not only interfered with the internal affairs of a
166 UDINA, Elementi No. So.
Quebec: C. C. art. 352, 358, 17; cf. 2 JOHNSON 177.
167
Pickering v. Stephenson (r872) 14 L. R. Eq. 32.2..
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foreign corporation but applied an imagined Turkish law
similar to the English.
The French Conseil d'Etat has developed a somewhat
comparable doctrine of "specialty" (principe de specialite)
limiting the powers of public administrative boards that have
legal personality, in accordance with their specific purposes.
But this doctrine is intended to foster good administration and
by no means to serve as a rule of private law or as a restriction
on capacity/ 68
This contrast must be realized in applying the conflicts rule.
It follows that American or English courts should recognize
the formal, general powers of Belgian, Brazilian, French, and
other civil law corporations, and that courts in civil law
countries should note the limited, special powers of American
and British corporations. The latter effect is actually well
known in Europe. 163
All theories of special powers, however, involve manifest
dangers to third persons who act in good faith, and the more
so in extraterritorial operation. The basic principle of the
personal law in itself rightly disregards whether third persons
do or do not know the extent of corporate capacity. The
Supreme Court of the United States once arrived at this
result by the presumption or fiction that "every person who
deals with a foreign corporation impliedly subjects himself
to such laws of the foreign government affecting the powers
and obligations of the corporation with which he voluntarily
contracts as that government authorizes."170 But the concealed
limitation to the avires'' inherent in the common law doctrine
of special powers, has caused inconveniences more acutely
felt in the United States than in England, because of the close
168 See RIGAUD, 1o Repert. 271 No. 151.
Trib. civ. Bruxelles (Dec. 6, 1893) Clunet 1894, 916 (English memorandum of association) ; approved in France by PILLET, Personnes Morales
§ 166; in Germany by M. WOLFF, IPR. 72 and others; in Switzerland by
STEIGER, 67 ZBJV. (1931) 317.
17
Canada Southern R. Co. v. Gebhard (1883) 109 U.S. 527.
169
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co-existence of so many states which are the common territory
of so many business corporations. Judicial inventiveness has
developed an abundance of remedies tempering the result and
particularly effective in case a corporation acts outside of its
charter state.171 Thus, the courts presume that a particular
contract entered into by a corporation is within its powers.
More important, many prohibitions are construed as applying
to corporate action only in the state of incorporation, e.g.,
statutory prohibitions against taking lands by will or general
assignment. 172 Such limitations present a hard task of interpretation, and no smooth formula has been found to designate
generally which parts of the charter, the by-laws, or the
general law "migrate with the corporation." 173 More adequate
relief is furnished by skillful drafting of charters and by-laws
covering every reasonably expected activity. Moreover, despite omission of required formalities or transgression of prescribed purposes, contracts are held valid on the ground of
assumed "general powers" of the corporation for the benefit
of other parties who act in good faith. In addition, fully
executed contracts are safe, and those executed by one party
are protected in most jurisdictions through the estoppel
doctrine. 174 What remains prevailingly unenforceable after
all, are only executory ultra vires contracts, and in some juris171
Restatement§ I 56 comment c; id. § I65 comment a; 2. BEALE 758 § I65.
The purpose of protecting third persons must be borne in mind. E.g., as the
Nevada Act of March 2.4, I909 (Statutes of Nevada, I9o8/I9o9, p. 2.5I),
gave priority to certain claims against an insolvent banking corporation, the
Ninth Circ. Ct. of Appeals in Washington-Alaska Bank v. Dexter etc. Bank
(I92.o) 2.63 Fed. 304 said that "depositors and others who dealt with the bank
were not required to search the statute of Nevada to ascertain what their rights
were. They were entitled to rely upon the laws of the territory where the bank
was engaged in business."
172
2. BEALE 757-762.; Restatement§ I65 comment a; Note in 40 Col. L.
Rev. ( 1940) I 2. I I- 12. I 5. Provisions against lending money in excess of a fixed
rate are likewise interpreted as territorial, but this regards illegal and not ultra
vires transactions.
173
Cf. Note, 40 Col. L. Rev. (I94o) l2.I8.
174
For a recent case of denial that defense by estoppel is barred by estoppel
see Pattison v. Illinois Bankers Life Ass'n (I935) 360 Ill. 616, 196 N. E. 882.
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dictions also those executed on one side, still with exceptions.
Where incorporation has been obtained in several states, the
corporation is not allowed to plead lack of power, if it possesses it in any one of these states. 115 Presumptions are in favor
of general and unlimited capacity, although it is not presumed
that a foreign corporation of a particular type or class has
power not necessarily or usually possessed by corporations of
the kind in question. 116 There are even other ways to evade
the ultra vires theory. 177
Well meaning and widely opportune though all these developments are, the "harsh and inflexible" doctrine of special
capacities has not been improved but broken; it survives in
incoherent fragments, involving differences in the various
courts as well as "confusion, uncertainty and injustice.m 78
Under these circumstances radical reforms have been
widely sought and in some states achieved in fact, partly on
the suggestion of the Uniform Business Corporation Act by
exempting most classes of cases from the doctrine; partly, as
in California, on the more adequate conception that corporations have general powers although the actual authority of
the directors may remain bound to the specified purposes. 179
For all these reasons, a conflicts rule is needed even within
this country. It has been held in a single case by the Missouri
175
Mackay v. New York etc. R. Co. (1909) 82 Conn. 73, 72 Atl. 583.
176 14a C. ]. § 3943·
177 See 2 BEALE 762; KESSLER, 5 Z.ausl.PR (1931) 538.
178
CARPENTER, "Should the Doctrine of Ultra Vires Be Discarded?" 33
Yale L. ]. (1923) 49-68; STEVENs, "Ultra Vires," 4 Cin. L. Rev. (1930)
419, 439·
179 California: C. C.§ 345, as amended by Stat. 1931, 18o2; see the important comment by BALLANTINE, "Drafting a Modern Corporation Law," 19
Cal. L. Rev. (1931) 465, 473·
Illinois: Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd 1934) c. 32 § 157.8, as amended June 30,
1945·
Michigan: 15 Stat. Ann. (1935) § 21.11, Gen. Corp. Act, Publ. Acts 1935,
No. 194 § 11 par. 1.
Ohio: Gen. C. (1938) § 8623-8.
Pennsylvania: Stat. (Purdon 1936) tit. 15 § 2852-302. On the powers of
banks see Note, 15 Cin. L. Rev. (1941) 105.
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Supreme Court that the law of the place of contracting rather
than that of the place of performance determines whether or
not a corporation, when sued on a contract, is precluded from
setting up the defense of ultra vires. 180 The law of the state
of incorporation was disregarded. 181 This solution has been
generalized in the Restatemene 82 in the highly enigmatic
rule that "the effect of an act directed to be done by a foreign
corporation is governed by the law of the state where it is
done." If we give the rule the most reasonable construction,
the compass of the powers of a corporation is determined by
the law of the incorporating state, but the effect of an act
beyond such powers is determined by the local law. The
Missouri Court, however, reached its result quite as the
former Italian Commercial Code did/ 83 by simply applying
the law of the place of contracting to the capacity of legal
persons, although the personal law governs their existence.
The systems generally subjecting capacity to the personal
law, necessarily have to use other methods. The case was not
foreseen in the older provisions under which individuals incompetent by their personal laws, nevertheless are bound by
contracts concluded with third persons in the forum. A few
German and Swiss authors, opposed by others, however, have
advocated analogous application of these provisions to corporations, so that an ultra vires contract made by an American
corporation in Germany would be as valid as one concluded
by a German corporation with full powers. 184 This analogy
180
Illinois Fuel Co. v. Mobile & Ohio R. Co. (1928) 3I9 Mo. 899, 8 S. W.
(2d) 834, cert. denied, 278 U.S. 640.
181
GOODRICH 268 § I05; cf. 2 BEALE 12I5 n. 9·
182
Restatement § I 66.
183
DIENA, I Dir. Com. Int. 3I3; id., 2 Prine. 287, 293; CAVAGLIERI, Dir.
Int. Com. 249.
184
WIELAND, 43 Z. Schweiz. R. 225; KESSLER, 3 Z.ausl.PR. (I929) 769;
NussBAUM, D. IPR. I9I n. 6; RuHLAND, 45 Recueil (I933) III 446; M.
WoLFF, IPR. 72 n. I 6; BEITZKE, J ur. Personen I I 8.
Contra: NEUMEYER, I Int. Verwaltungs R. I76; I FRANKENSTEIN 486;
VON STEIGER, 67 ZBJV. 253; SCHNITZER, Handelsr. rr5; RAAPE I37•
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has been embodied in the recent codifications of Poland,
Liechtenstein, Yugoslavia/ 85 and perhaps Italy. 186
This rule also refers capacity to the law of the place of
contracting, but only if this place is within the forum. In
addition, the outcome differs essentially from the American,
since the theory of ultra vires is abolished rather than mitigated for the purpose of recognition. It might be objected to
this radical result that foreign juristic persons are more easily
recognizable than foreign individuals and that persons dealing with any corporation may well be required to do their
best in inquiring into its nature and purposes. 187 However,
international commerce is interested in eliminating such costly
and delaying duties. Foreign courts may be excused when
they avoid both the unmitigated English and the entangled
American doctrines.
This has been strikingly confirmed by the Californian
reform of I 93 I. The defense of ultra vires has been abrogated
also in case of foreign corporations:
"This section shall extend to contracts and conveyances made
by foreign corporations in this state by foreign corporations."
(Cal. Code § 345, last paragraph)
Similarly, the General Corporations Act of Michigan of
I935, on the basis of the Uniform Business Act, excludes the
plea of ultra vires made by a foreign corporation against a
person not being a director, officer, or shareholder and not
having an actual knowledge of the ultra vires character of
the act. 188
185
Poland: Int. Priv. Law, art. 3·
Liechtenstein: P. G. R. art. 2 35 par. 6.
Yugoslavia: C. Com. § 502 par. 2, cf. criticism by EISNER, x Symmikta
Streit 292.
1 6
~ Disp. Prel. ( 1942) art. 17 par. 2, speaking of aliens, does not seem to refer
to both paragraphs of art. x6, but may be nevertheless so interpreted.
187
People v. Wiersema State Bank (1935) 361 Ill. 75, 197 N. E. 537 at
the end; RABEL, 3 Z.ausl.PR. (1929) Sto.
188
I5 Mich. Stat. Ann. (1935) § 21.1 I, Gen. Corp. Act, Publ. Acts I935>
No. I94 § I I par. 2.
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Consistently with the suggestions made in other parts of
this work, the plea of ultra vires ought to be governed by the
law that governs the contract.
2.

Legal Restrictions on the Capacity of Corporations

It is natural that the capacity of corporations may be restricted, on one hand, by general statutes of the state of incorporation and, on the other, by the law governing the particular case-which formula is more exact than to refer to the
"territorial" law or that where ''an act of the corporation is
done." A corporation may, for instance, take a legacy, only if it
has capacity under the laws both of the charter and of succession.189 Still other legislations may claim consideration, such
as that of the situs or that of the place of contracting, if different from the former two.
Two widespread examples of prohibitory provisions are
to be mentioned.
(a) Acquisitions by gift or will. The traditional mortmain
legislation of the I 8th and I 9th centuries was inspired by the
twofold consideration that a donor to church funds may deprive his family of their just inheritance, and that the continuous accumulation of wealth may dangerously increase the
secular might of the Church. In more recent times, reasons
of national economy have prevailed in fostering a policy to
prevent any long-lived juristic person from retaining possessions needed for the general welfare. Land in particular has
been regarded as an inestimable asset, limited in quantity,
which ought not to be monopolized by holders who usually
do not alienate their acquisitions.
In numerous countries, legal persons may not acquire
property by gift or other benevolence unless authorization
is obtained, if the value exceeds a certain amount or some189 2 BEALE 971, 1036. That this rule underlies also English and
BRESLAUER, Private International Law of Succession

is shown by

German law
(1937) 99·
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times irrespective of the value. 190 Since such a provision may
be a part of the law of charter, or of the law governing the
donation, bequest, or devise, or of the lex situs,191 the task
of a court in selecting the applicable law may be difficult.
In France, it has been held that a foreign corporation claiming
any acquisition in France by donation or legacy ought to show
authorization according to its personallaw192 and, in addition,
French authorization, if it is not profit-seeking and a French
family is affected, article 910 of the French Civil Code
not being intended to protect a foreign family. 193 In the
United States, it is generally held, in agreement with the
prevailing rule elsewhere, that acquisitions by devise or bequest require the consent of both the charter state and that
determining succession upon death, that is, the state of situs
for immovables, or that of the last domicil for movables. 194
Statutes protecting the family of the donor against inconsiderate disinheritance, may leave doubts respecting the
law determining the family's composition. In New York,
it has been convincingly argued195 that it is the family con190
England: Corporations Cons. Act, 19:1.91 § 14; Mortmain and Charitable
UsesAct, 1888.
Belgium and France: C. C. art. 910 concerning associations, not stock corporations, see Cass. (Nov. z9 1 1897) D.1898.1.108; (Oct. z9, 1894)
D.I896.I.I45·
Italy: C. C. (194:1.) art. 17.
Spain: C. C. arts. 746, 748.
Portugal: C. C. art. 1781.
Germany: EG. BGB. art. 86; cf. Prussia: Ausfiihrungsgesetz, art. 6; some
Swiss cantons, etc.
The Netherlands: Arts. 947 and 1717 of the Dutch BW., treated by KosTERS
682, have been repealed by Law of Nov. z9, 1935 1 par. z.
191
Cf. PILLET, Personnes Morales 90; LEWALD, Questions 68; 1 FRANKENSTEIN 486; WALKER 16o; POULLET :1.55 § :u8; RAAPE 638; BEITZKE1 Jur.
Personen 151 § 16.
192
Paris (June 2.1, 1935) D.1936.z.17.
193
Tri. civ. Seine (Nov. 14, 1936) Clunet 1938, 307; contra: Note, Clunet
1938, 309·
194
Christian Union v. Yount (1879) 101 U. S. 352.. FLETCHER, 17 Cyc.
Corp.§§ 8377, 8378.
195
Chamberlain v. Chamberlain (1871) 43 N.Y. 42.4, 433; BRESLAUER,
"Conflict of Laws in Restrictions on Freedom of Taxation," z7 Iowa L. Rev.
(1941) 42.5, 433 (adding distinctions).
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ceived according to the law of the testator's domicil, that
is envisaged by the statute forbidding "any person having
a husband, wife, child, or parent, to devise or bequeath to
any benevolent, charitable, literary, scientific, religious or
missionary society, association or corporation ... more than
one half of his or her share. . . .77196
(b) Taking of land. Acquisition of land by corporations197
and, particularly in many Latin-American countries, acquisition by foreign states or public corporations, 198 is not only
prohibited to corporations not licensed for doing business
in numerous states, but also is subject to special authorization,
without regard to consideration or value. Such restrictions
arise from mortmain policy, mistrust of foreigners in general,
or protection of certain districts for military reasons. Only
in the last two cases should the nationality of the members
be of importance.
With respect to the mortmain provisions commonly used
196

Then N.Y. Laws (r86o) c. 360 § r, now Decedent Estate Law,§ 17.
United States: Carroll v. East St. Louis {I873) 67 Ill. 568, r6 Am. Rep.
632; Nebraska, Rev. Stat. (I943) §§ 76-402, 76-404, 76-4o6, 76-407; Washington, Rem. Rev. Stat. (1932) § 3862-II. For some older statutes, see
FLETCHER, I7 Cyc. Corp.§ 8353 n. 38.
Belgium: POULLET § 218.
Germany: See EG. BGB. art. 88 and commentaries.
Spain: Law of June 3 o, r 8 8 7 against religious corporations.
For the Latin-American laws, see H. ZoRRAQUiN BEcu, El Problema del
Extranjero en la reciente legislaci6n latina-americana (Buenos Aires r 943)
ro I H.; for the official interpretation of the Mexican Constitution, art. 2 7, see
WHELEss, Compendium of the Laws of Mexico (I938) 564ff.
On the doubtful law regarding nonregistered foreign companies in Argentina, Chile and other countries, see VoELKEL, 14 Tul. L. Rev. (I940) at 62
n. 73·
1 98 Argentina: By analogy to Brazil, 2. Vrco § 85.
Brazil: In trod. C. C. art. 20; now Introd. Law ( 1942.) art. I I §§ z, 3
(on the history of this legislation see EsPINOLA, 6 Tratado No. IOI).
Guatemala: Decree No. 2369, of May 9, I940; Law on Foreigners of 1936,
arts. zo, 2. I.
Mexico: Constitution (I 9 r 7) art. 27 fr. II (restrictions on religious associations, charitable and educational institutions) ; cf. Note, SCHUSTER, 7 Tul. L.
Rev. (1933) 347·
Venezuela: Ley de Minas, of July 17, 192.5, art. 30.
See for Europe, FEDOZZI 4 7.
197
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in the United States, the Restatemene 99 asserts that ordinarily
statutes relating to usury, receiving land by devise, and
assigning and transferring property, are interpreted as purely
local in their application and do not restrict the acquisitions of
a corporation in other states. Thus, even a statute of the
charter state preventing corporations from taking land by
will, is not applied to taking land in another state. 200 There
. contrary authonty,
. however. 201
1s

3· Authority of Agents
One of the expedients for remedying the untenable theory
of territoriality was the fantastic idea that although a foreign
corporation cannot "exist" in the state, it can act therein
through agents. 202 This theory was taken seriously enough to
require that the authorization of an agent, being a corporate
act, must take place within the state of incorporation, and
that the corporation must be organized and the agent be
appointed prior to his acting. 203 These not even clever aberrations204 are unknown to other countries and alien to the
law practice of this country. Corporations are daily acting
through individuals without regard to geographical frontiers
and, where they act, they must exist.
Another distinction instead is essential. It is well known 205
199

Restatement § 165 comment a; 2 BEALE 762 § 165.3·
Howard (1871) 38 Conn. 342.
England: Great West Saddlery Co. v. The King (I92I) 37 T. L. R. 436 1

200 White v.

445·

Ontario: McDiarmid v. Hughes (I888) I6 0. R. 570 has held that
a Quebec corporation is subject exclusively to the local law as to taking land.
201
Kerr. v. Dougherty (188o) 79 N.Y. 327; Metropolitan Bank v. Godfrey
(I 86o) 2 3 Ill. 53 I; other instances are cited by 2 BEALE 762, and see LoRENZEN, 6 Repert. 369 No, 463; GOODRICH§ I62 n. 32; HARPER and TAINTOR1
Cases 927 n. 5·
202 Bank of Augusta v. Earle (I839) I3 Pet. S.C. 519, 588-589; Ex parte
Schollenberger (1877) 96 U.S. 369, at 377·
203 2 BEALE 768 § 166.3.
204 YOUNG 49·
205 FLETCHER, 2 Cyc. Corp. § 266. For the doctrine of OTTO GIERKE, see
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that there are two classes of individuals serving as representatives of corporations. One is formed by the principal
officers, called directors in the British companies laws and
termed "organs" of the corporate body in modern codes,
following a result of Gierke's theory of "real personality.mos
The other class is composed of ordinary employees. The
offices administered by the first group are created by the
fundamental documents and form an integral part of the
organization. These officers express the will and execute
the potential powers of the legal entity. All other individuals
acting in the name of a legal person do so by virtue of
contractual relationship only, as "mere agents" or "employees."
This classification is of significance also in conflicts law.
With respect to simple agents, either of a corporation or
of a partnership, no special conflicts rule is needed in addition
to the general rules concerning agents appointed by private
declarations. The most important of these latter rules predicates that the extent of an agent's authority is determined
by the law of the place where the agent acts upon his authority.207
If the principal establishes a permanent place of business
in a foreign state, the law of this place has an even more
decisive claim to define the authority of the agents negotiating
at these places.
The powers of a corporation's principal functionaries,
however, are rooted in its constitution and are comparable
his summary in 1 Deutsches Privatrecht (1895) 466, 469ff.; and in English,
R. HuEBNER, A History of Germanic Private Law (transl. Philbrick)
140ff. This theory has been adopted in France; see MICHOUD, 1 Personnalite
Morale§§ so-64 bis; z id. §§ 187,189.
206 "Organs" or "constitutionally authorized representatives" as a term has
been used in the German BGB. § 3 I, Swiss C. C. art. 55, etc.
207 See for first information, Restatement § 345; and as to English and comparative law, RABEL, 3 Z.ausl.PR. (1929) 8o9, 818; BRESLAUER, 50 Jurid.
Rev. (1938) z8z, 308.
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to the powers of the legal person itself. Such power is defined
for all individuals holding th~ same position and brought
to public knowledge through the articles of incorporation
or by-laws. Wherever a state of charter prescribes recording
of corporations in a register, it requires the individual
names of the officers to be included. Even in the absence
of such legal precaution, it has been firmly maintained that
a party dealing with the main officers of a foreign corporation
should inform himself about the extent of their allotted
powers. "Dealings with these companies are not like dealings
with other partnerships, and . . . the parties dealing with
them are bound to read the statute and the deed of settlement,." though they need not do more. 208 This has been
the true consideration underlying the common law doctrine
regarding acts of directors exceeding their authority. It was
the same as that embodied in the solid doctrine of Continental
conflicts law, that the personal law of a corporation determines whether a director's contract is binding on the entity.
In this opinion, a third party dealing with an "organ" of
a foreign corporation is charged with notice of the existence
and extent of this representative's constitutional power. 209
For example, in the interest of all third parties, German
law gives the board of directors of a German Aktiengesellschaft a legally defined all-inclusive authority of the broadest
scope, charter restrictions upon their authority being regarded
as mere instructions without external effect. 210 In a German
208

Royal British Bank v. Turquand (1856) 6 E. & B. 327; In re Hampshire
Land Co. (1896) 2 Ch. D. 743·
209
See in general, 2 ZITELMANN 207; RABEL, 3 Z.ausl.PR. (1929) 81o;
AssER and STREIT, Annuaire 1929 I 700.
Germany: ROHG. (Feb. 17, 1871) 2 ROHGE. 36; RAAPE, D. IPR. 119,
275·
The Netherlands: Rb. Haag (March 9, 1933) W. 12589; Rb. Maastricht
(June 25, 1931) W. 12366 (authority of liquidators).
210
HGB. § 235; Aktiengesetz § 74; Gesetz betreffend Gesellschaften mit
beschriinkter Haftung, of April 20, 1892, § 3 7, 2.
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nonprofit corporation,211 on the contrary, limitations on
the authority of directors, if publicly registered, restrict the
director's power to bind the entity. Under French law,
widely followed, administrators have exactly the authority
corresponding to the functions assigned to them by the
charter or, in the case of silence or insufficiency of the latter's
provisions, the normal scope of the enterprise. 212 Under the
conflicts rule referring to the personal law of the corporation,
all these domestic rules also govern abroad. Incidentally,
it may be noted that an increasing number of German writers
have borrowed from the theory of special powers the idea
that a corporation should not be bound by the act of a director, exceeding the purposes of the corporation and recognizable as such by a third party. 213 This corresponds with
the result envisaged in this country by those scholars who
propose to grant corporations simply general powers, whereas
agents would remain limited by the powers and purposes
of corporation214 and incapable of performing corporate acts
beyond this line. The formation of conflicts rules would
be strongly aided by such converging developments of the
actually contrasting municipal systems.
In the American discussions of conflicts law, the particular
position of the directors seems never to have been contemplated. The Restatement states that "the effect of an act
directed to be done by a foreign corporation" is governed
by the law of the state "where it is done" (§ 166), and
211

BGB. §§ 30,26 par. 2 (r).
2 LYON-CAEN et RENAULT § 819. In the Law of March 7, 1925, on
Private Companies with Limited Liability, art. 24, however, the German model,
supra n. 2 r o, has been followed.
213
ORTMANN, Allgemeiner Teil des BGB. 99; VON TuHR, I Allgemeiner
Teil des Deutschen Biirgerlichen Rechts 527; I EHRENZWEIG-KRAINZ § 82
sub I.
Objections or doubts: PLANCK-KNOKE, I Kommentar § 26 n. 4; Mii"LLERERZBACH, Wohin fiihrt die Interessenjurisprudenz 96; and others.
214
BALLANTINE, Corporations 249 § 70.
212
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the comment expressly applies this rule to the case where
"an agent of a corporation makes an agreement on behalf
of the corporation which he was directed to make"; "the
law of the state where the agreement is made determines
whether the corporation is bound thereby. . . ." While the
only added harmless example has no bearing on the question,
the provisions of the Restatement seem to result in the rule
that the authority of the board of directors, president, and
other officers is governed by the law of the state where the
contract with the third party is "made."
To understand the origin of this doctrine is easier than
to approve of it. So long as the constitutional documents
were the exclusively determinative expression of the authority of directors, fairly consonant interpretation of their
provisions could be expected in all common law courts. With
uniform substantive law, no conflicts rule is needed. The
situation, however, has changed somewhat, even among the
sister states of the Union, as a result of statutory modifications of the formerly uniform rule, as well as through variations in court practice. For example, the old rule that the
president of a corporation has no privileged power except one
conferred expressly by the charter or by-laws, has been substantially modified in many jurisdictions, but not in all, and
the alterations are different enough to create an "Alabama
rule," an "Arizona rule," an "Arkansas rule," and so forth.
Should a Chicago court in the case of a New York corporation
contracting in Illinois follow its own "Illinois rule"? While
in interstate cases this difficulty may often be evaded by
assuming the contract to have been made at the office of
the officer representing the corporation, the problem presents
itself unequivocally where a corporation of the German
type enters into transactions by means of one of its directors
at a place in the United States. Should the president of such
a corporation be regarded as unauthorized, for the only
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reason that a similar officer would be without authority under
the Arkansas or Illinois rule? Of course, he should not. An
American court would correctly argue that the general
statutes giving the director absolute powers are to be read
into the charter. But this means that the rules of the Restatement are sadly incomplete. The authority of a principal
officer is determined by the law of the charter. Exceptions
to the effect that authorization may also be derived from the
law of the place where the officer acts, have to be carefully
considered in connection with agency rules in general.

CHAPTER
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Doing Business
I.
1.

INTRODUCTION

Regulation of Foreign Corporations

W

HILE the state has no authority to impose a
burden upon interstate commerce by taxation or
otherwise, nevertheless it has authority to provide
by legislation the terms and conditions upon which a foreign
corporation may engage in intrastate business within its territorial limits, or avail itself of the benefits of its laws and the
aid and protection of its courts in the enforcement of contracts
relating to such business.m
This present American doctrine stands independently of
its derivation from the antiquated doctrine of "comity,"
whereby a state may arbitrarily admit or "exclude" the corporations of sister states, although this connection is still all
too vividly in the mind of many legislators and courts. In
principle, every state may impose conditions on the exercise
of activities in the state. 2 States are expected to hold these
conditions within reasonable limits but are not constitutionally
bound to do so in the case of intrastate commerce.
In this form, the principle is of universal significance. 3
However, the laws of the world display a variety of policies
ranging from the utmost liberalism to prohibitive exactions.
On the other hand, there is a common idea, more or less
instinctively felt, that the territorial state is entitled to
subject foreign organizations to visitation and regulation
1
Phillips Co. v. Everett (1919) z6z Fed. 341 at 343, citing Baltic Mining
Co. v. Massachusetts (1913) 231 U.S. 68, often quoted in cases.
2
See FLETCHER, I 7 Cyc. Corp. § 83oz.
3
Cf. NEUMEYER, z Int. Verwaltungs R. (19zz) 139·
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only when the latter have a definite contact with the territory, and that the state's interference may increase proportionately to the degree in which the foreign undertaking
merges in the life of the population.
Usually, the minimum contact required for controlling
a foreign corporation is either the fact of its reiterated "carrying on of business" in the country or its establishment of a
"place of business" or of an agency, terms distinguishable
as will be shown but overlapping to some extent. Thus,
filing for a license "to do business" in the United States
includes the indication of a principal place of business within
the state. 4 Further, in Latin-American countries when trading
within the national territory requires authorization,5 usually
a local representative must be appointed. 8 Agencies in most
cases are probably supposed to be fixed at some place.
The case of a company having its principal establishment
of manufacture or trade in the state, although it is incorporated and domiciled in another jurisdiction, is regarded in
several systems mentioned earlier as requiring an outright
exception to the principle of personal law. 7 Other cases in
which intensified control, possibly reaching complete compulsory "domestication," is justifiable, are presented by the
outstanding public interest involved in such purposes as
banking, financing, insurance, communication, transportation,
and other public utilities.
Normally, however, impositions on the business of foreign
corporations should never go all the way to veritable "domestication" or reincorporation.
4

Restatement§ 169 comment c No. 3, and illustrations to§ I67 Nos. 4 and

II,

E.g., Bolivia: Decree of March zs, I887, art. 5·
E.g., Bolivia: Law of Nov. 13, I886, art. 4; Decree of March 2.5, I887,
art. 2..
Guatemala: C. C. (I933) art. 2.5, cf. 23 in the case of "habitual business."
7
Italy, Colombia, Nicaragua, Japan and others, see supra pp. 46-48.
5
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Concept of Doing Business

The concept of carrying on business, as contrasted with
isolated acts, is discussed in the United States in regard to
three distinctive purposes: qualifying for license statuteswhich alone is in question here-jurisdiction, and taxation. 8
Definitions are at some variance but agree in the essential
point that a series of acts within the constitutional framework of the corporation must be performed or at least
initiated. 9 In the definition by the Uniform Foreign Corporations Act (§ 2, I), sanctioned by the American Bar Association in 1934 but not yet adopted in any state,
" ... the term 'doing business' means the transaction by a
foreign corporation of some part of its business substantial
and continuous in character and not merely casual or occasional."
"Doing business" may or may not be regulated in the
statutes of this country with the inclusion of charitable
corporations.
The English definition for the purposes of jurisdiction,
is simpler. In the words of Lord Herschell, "there is a
broad distinction between trading with a country and carrying
on a trade within a country.mo An English lawyer has observed that statutes in the United States do not so limit their
field, "because the courts of the various states have employed
every pretext to assume jurisdiction over foreign corpo8
See Restatement, New York Annotations § I 67 and CHEATHAM, Cases I I I 3,
urging with ISAACS, 2.5 Col. L. Rev. (I92.5) I02.4, that the courts should
watch better than they usually did the different significances of the phrase
"doing business."
9
This seems to be also the gist of the definition in comment a to Restatement § I 67: "Doing business is doing a series of similar acts for the purpose of
thereby realizing pecuniary benefit, or otherwise accomplishing an object, or
doing a single act for such purpose with the intention of thereby initiating
a series of such acts."
10
Grainger v. Gough [I 896] A. C. 32.5 at 335; La Bourgogne [I 899]
P. I; [I899] A. C. 43I; cf. Saccharin Corp. v. Chemische Fabrik etc. Akt.
[I 9 I I] 2. K. B. 5 I 6.
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rations.'' 11 However this may be as to jurisdiction, American
policy in regulating foreign corporate business is in fact
less broad-minded than the English, although much more
so than that of most other nations.
More closely approaching the English than the American
concepts are the expressions "carrying on business" or a
"trade" in Germany ( Geschaftsbetrieb, Gewerbebetrieb ),
"direct exploitation of the object of the charter" in France,
and "functioning" in Brazil, "trading (girar)" in Bolivia,
et cetera, terms likewise conceived for the purpose of required
governmental authorization. Business carried on with the
country in the absence of any establishment within it, in
theory, does not require a license in these countries.
3· Categories of Business Places
In Great Britain, registration is obligatory for foreign
companies having "established a place of business" in the
kingdom. This is a comprehensive term/ 2 but it requires the
company to have some "local habitation of its own." The
term "succursale" of French and many other laws, although
often used in the narrower meaning of "branch," is prevailingly understood to include all places of business where transactions occur, even though the business may be directed in all
respects by the principal establishment. A careful Belgian
definition declares a "succursale" to be "any dependent establishment (office, bureau, agency, etc.), any accessory center of
commercial life, set up in a stable and regular course at a fixed
place, where a manager resides and permanently represents
11 FARNSWORTH, 20 Journ. Comp. Leg. (I938) I83.
12 British Companies Act, I 929 ( 19 & 20 Geo. 5, c. 2 3) soo, Part XI, s. 344;

the above mentioned definition was given tentatively by the Lord President
in the Scotch case, Lord Advocate v. Huron and Erie Loan & Savings Co.
(Feb. 28, I911) (I911) S. C. 6u, 6I6; accord Cohen, J., in Tovarishestvo
Manufactur Liudvig-Rabenek [I944] I Ch. 404 1 408.
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the firm or legal person with authority to engage its liability
in contracts.m3
Another much narrower significance of "branch" (Zweigniederlassung) obtains in German, Austrian, and Swiss administrative rules. There, a branch office presupposes a
permanent establishment with separate organization and assets accountable, having the power to conclude transactions
independently, although subject to instructions by the central
management/~ Sometimes it is required that the business
carried on be of the same kind as that of the head establishment, but on a smaller scale.15 Hence impositions on branch
offices in these countries do not extend to "agencies" or
"representatives."
A ware of this proper sense of branch, the broad French
scope of succursale is reached in Spanish, Portuguese, and
Latin-American provisions by accumulating terms such as
"branches, agencies, and representatives of foreign corporations." The meaning is explained by the Colombian laws
that speak of "enterprise of a permanent character,m 6 and
the new Italian text, "secondary seat with permanent
agency.m 7 In fact, in Latin America, any permanent establishment regularly needs registration, if not authorization.
"Agents" in the language of commercial relations, as
distinguished from "representatives," have been described
as persons securing business and referring offers to the constituent company, and this meaning has been attributed to
18 App. Bruxelles (June 6, 1929) Revue pratique des sociches I929, No. 2972,
cited in Novelles Belges, 3 D. Com. No. s26I; Trib. com. Bruxelles (Feb. I,
1938) Jur. Com. Brux. I938, 6I.
14
Germany: I4 ROHGE. 40I, I7 id. 3I3; 38 RGZ. 263, so id. 429.
Austria: OGH. in Adl. Clem. I8oo, id. 2804.
Switzerland: s6 BGE. I 364; 6I BGE. I 303.
15 Switzerland: BG. (Dec. 10, I924) so BGE. II so7, Sio, cf. WIELAND,
43 Z. Schweiz. R. (N. F.) 242.
16 Colombia: Legislative Decree No.2 of I9o6, art. I; Law No. s8 of I9JI
1
art. 2.2.; Executive Decree No. 6s of I94I, art. I.
17 Italy: C. C. (I942) art. 2506.
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"agents" as used in the Latin-American laws. 18 The various
legislations may be divided on this point. However, the
multifarious duties connected with permanent establishments, seem to have no bearing on independent brokers or
distributors, intermediaries between an enterprise and its
customers. Nor do they apply to merchants dealing with a
foreign corporation on their own account and possibly working for several principals. Thus, these rules refer exclusively
to physical or juristic persons that enter into transactions,
or at least negotiate, on behalf of foreign corporations. This,
at least, is their natural construction and should be presumed,
if the contrary is not clearly intended. 19
Similarly, the personal law of the foreign corporation
has no application to subsidiaries or affiliates (French filiales,
German Tochtergesellschaften) i.e., autonomous corporations
or partnerships of any form, created under the territorial
law, though economically dependent and often politically
assimilated, to foreign, particularly enemy, organizations.
It follows incidentally that among the four main methods
open to business management for operating in a foreign
country, two do not enter into discussion in the following
survey, namely, carrying on foreign activities by an independent distributor and by a juridically independent foreign
subsidiary. We have to deal only with the two other procedures of submitting the entire corporation abroad to registration and other duties, or of having this done by a domesticcreated subsidiary, organized for the purpose of business
in the country. 20 Big American corporations most frequently
use the latter method.
18

See Regimen Jurldico 32., 98.
Cf. NEUMEYER, 2. Int. Verwaltungs R. 143, 139 n. 5·
2 For all four ways and their advantages and disadvantages, see the excellent
symposium, "Legal Problems Affecting American Corporations Doing Business Abroad" (i.e., in Latin America) in 8 Tul. L. Rev. (1934) sso.
19
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SURVEY OF SYSTEMS

Unconditional Admittance
Few countries accord freedom of trade to foreign-created
legal persons without authorization either for recognition
or for permitting the doing of business. England, however,
has upheld its old liberal principle/ 1 as have also Switzerland22 and the Netherlands/ 3 joined in 1873 by Belgium. 24
Also Yugoslavia 25 and, in this hemisphere, Argentina, Paraguay/6 the Dominican Republic/ 7 El Salvador/ 8 and Venezuela29 have based their rules on this system, although the
first two countries require reciprocity of treatment. Hence,
the Swiss and Argentine governments have been able to
I.

21
England: Companies Act, I929 (I9 & 20 Geo. 5., c. 23) 5oo, Part XI,
s. 343, "Companies incorporated outside of Great Britain carrying on business
within Great Britain."
22 Switzerland: No impositions have been provided either by the Federation,
BG. (July 22, I887) Clunet I893, 240, or by the Cantons, see WIELAND, 43
Z. Schweiz. R. (N. F.) zz 5; 'SAUSER-HALL, so Bull. Soc. Legisl. Camp. ( I921)
zz8 at 237; BG. (July u, I934) 6o BGE. I 225.
Hungary: Classified similarly by DE MAGYARY, Clunet I924, 596.
23 The Netherlands: MoLENGRAAFF, "De la condition des societes etrangeres
dans les pays bas," in Clunet I888, 6I9 at 623 (regretting this liberal attitude);
KosTERS 686-688.
24
Belgium: Consolidated Companies Act, of May I8, I87J, arts. 128-qo;
text of I935> arts. I96-I99·
25
Yugoslavia: C. Com. § 503 par. I; EISNER, I Symmikta Streit 293·
26 Argentina and Paraguay: C. Com. art. 287, as modified and interpreted in
Argentina by Argentinian Law No. 8867, of Feb. 6, I912, art. I, also applied
to a (Czechoslovakian) limited liability partnership, Cam. Com. de la Cap.
(Feb. u, I926) I9 Jur. Arg. 78. Provisions concerning the required documentation are contained in the Decree of April 27, I923, creating the "lnspeccfon
General de J usticia," art. 7. That no other conditions than these exist, has
been stated by Cam. Com. de la Cap. en plena (Sept. I 8, I 940) 22 La Ley 53 7;
C. Com. art. 287 is modified thereby, see Cam Com. de la Cap. 2a (May s,
I939) I4 La Ley 708. Hence, Argentina is not really devoted to the theory of
authorization, not to speak of the compulsion to nationalization. On the liberal
background see ZEBALLos, Clunet I9o6, 6o4, 6II.
21
Dominican Republic: Sup. Corte de J usticia (Nov. I4, I 9 3 6) 3 I 6 B. J.
(I936) 6oo.
28
El Salvador: C. Com. art. 299.
29 Venezuela: C. Com. (I9I9) art. 359 (new 334), 36I (new 336), nationalization being only optional; art. 36I, "pueden adquirir la nacionalidad
venezolana."
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declare, without concluding a treaty, that stock companies
of one country after due registration can reciprocally carry
on business by agents in the other country. 30 But, registration
and publication are additional requisites, and in such countries
as Yugoslavia and Venezuela, formalities may impose grave
restrictions on the freedom granted in principle.
2.

Business Without a Permanent Place

Italy, Portugal, and Rumania, as well as modern Turkey,
apparently allow not merely isolated acts, but all transactions
short of establishing an agency in the country to be concluded
by a foreign company. 31
3· Business Under Domestic Law
The Spanish Commercial Code of I 8 85 unconditionally
permits all business carried on either from outside or within
the country, but, if permanent centers, agencies, or branches
are established, all transactions made in the country are
subject to the provisions of the Code. This system was
initially followed in Colombia, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Peru. 32 It is, in reality, an inadequate way of
meeting the problem, revealing its dangerous elements when,
nevertheless, requirements for doing business have been
30

BURCKHARD, 3 Bundesrecht 10~3, V.
Italy: C. Com. (r882) art. 23o; C. C. (I942) art. :zso6; cf. CAVAGL!ERI,
Dir. Int. Com. 275.
Portugal: C. Com. arts I o9, cf. 11 x.
Rumania: C. Com. (I9J8) arts. 356, 357·
Turkey: Law of Nov. 30, I330/I9I4, art. u, see SALEM, 7 Repert. 250
No. I 35·
32 Spain: C. Com. (I 885) art. IS; cf. 2.1.
Colombia: C. Com. art. I9.
Cuba: c. Com. art. rs; Constitution (I940) arts. I9, 272.·
Honduras: C. Com. (1940) arts. ro, 2.86.
Mexico: Formerly C. Com. art. 15; now Ley General de Sociedades Mercantiles, of July :z8, 1934, art. 250; but see for the obstruction to this article
by the courts, supra p. 145 n. IOI, the literature cited.
Nicaragua: C. Com. arts. 8 and ro.
Peru: C. Com. art. 15 ; Constitution ( r 9 3 3) art. I 7.
31
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added, 33 or, on the other hand, the sweeping subjection to
domestic law has been extended still further. 34
4· Qualifying for Authorization
The continuously alleged power of the states of the
United States to "exclude" nondomestic corporations from
business is deemed to be restricted by certain provisions in
the Federal Constitution: the Commerce Clause, the doctrine
of unconstitutional conditions, the Equal Protection and the
Due Process Clauses/ 5 and also the Full Faith and Credit
Clause. 36 If a regulation does not violate the Constitution,
its wisdom and equity cannot be challenged. 37 But statutes
do not really exclude even alien corporations from business;
they only require "licensing," dependent on objective and
generally qualifying conditions. 38
A main characteristic of this system, too obvious even
to be noticed by American lawyers but a striking phenomenon
for Europeans/ 9 lies in the fact that the state statutes specify
the conditions for licensing closely enough to make supervision by the courts possible and decisive. That half of the
state statutes speak in imperative terms ("shall grant") while
the other provisions are permissive, practically makes no
difference. When the conditions provided by law are satisfied,
authorization is automatically granted. 40 Whether also non33 To illustrate, Colombia: Law No. 58 of I93I, art. :u speaks of request
for "permit" by the newly created Superintendencia de Sociedades An6nimas,
and Decree No. I984 of I939> art. 4 emphasizes this request for a permit
(called "special" in art. 3) .
Mexico: C. C. arts. 2736-2738 and Ley General de Sociedades Mercantiles,
art. 25I contain only prescriptions of formalities, but the restrictions on foreign
corporations carrying on business have been considerably increased.
34
Peru: Infra n. 130.
85
Restatement§§ I69-I78; FLETCHER, I7 Cyc. Corp. VI B, 227, §§ 8386 ff.
36
HoLT, 89 U. of Pa. L. Rev. (I94I) 452.
37
State ex rel. Tri-State Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. Holm (I 924) I 6o
Minn. 378, 200 N. W. 296.
38
HoLT, id. 478.
39
See LEPAULLE, Condition des societes etrangeres (I923) I74ff., 233ff.
40
Answer to a questionaire, sent out by Mr. Lepaulle, see id. I 79·
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profit-seeking corporations need authorization is not well
settled in all states; many states seem to "exempt such corporations from regulation altogether or else provide for some
special method of regulation." 41 An express exemption from
the duty of registration is provided in some provinces of
Canada. 42
Licensing is not believed to raise difficulties in any state,
with the only exception that Illinois and New York require
that the name be not susceptible of confusion with those of
domestic corporations, these amounting in New York to some
so,ooo. This is a problem f?r companies of other states with
an established firm name.
In most Latin-American countries, governmental authorization is required for establishing an "agency" or "representation." Only occasionally, as in Colombia and Nicaragua,
the text of the statutes makes it clear that the permit for
establishing a permanent place of business is certain to be
granted on the filing of a request and fulfillment of the legal
conditions. 43 But the writer is enabled by a statement of Dr.
Phanor Eder, based on his experience, to note that in at
least half of the Latin-American republics governmental
authorization is always granted, if the constitutional documents of the corporation do not contain stipulations contrary
to the basic principles of the domestic law.
41 Policy in this respect is presumed by the draftsmen of the Uniform Foreign
Corporations Act, National Conference, Handbook 1934, 306.
For duty to comply, State ex rel. Griffith v. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan
(I925) II7 Kan. 564, 232 Pac. 254; Knights of Ku Klux Klan v. Commonwealth (1924) 138 Va. soo, u2 S. E. 122; General Conference v. Berkey
(1909) 156 Cal. 466, 105. Pac. 411. Contra: Eaton v. Woman's Home Missionary Society (I9I4) 264 III. 88, 105 N. E. 746. See Note, 37 A. L. R. 1283.
42 Ontario: Extra Provincial Corporations Act, Rev. Stat. 1937, c. 252 s. 2,
class 6.
Saskatchewan: Companies Act, Rev. Stat. I 940, c. I I 3 s. 1 89·
Discretionary exemption in Alberta: Companies Act, Rev. Stat. I 942 1 c.

240 s. 134 (J).

British Columbia: Companies Act, 1929, c. 42 s. 179 (5).
43 Colombia: Acto Legislativo Constitucional No. I of 19 3 6, art. 6; C. Com.
art. 19 read with Law No. 58 of 1931, art. 22 and Executive Decree No. 65
of 1941.

Nicaragua: C. Com. (1916) art. 10.
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The text of the Hungarian Commercial Code follows the
same principle. 44

5. Discretionary Grant of Authorization
The liberality of the licensing system in this country is
perceived when contrasted with other legislations.
In various German states, foreign industrial and commercial enterprises have always required trade authorization by the state authorities supervtsmg industry
and trade, except where treaties accord reciprocity. 45
These disadvantages were inspired by suspicions of foreign
law more than foreign capital. The recent German Corporation Law of 1937 superimposes the necessity of governmental approbation/ 6 which may be refused without giving
reasons, and may be freely revoked. 47 This is a trend backward to the system prevailing in Austria and some Eastern
European legislations, which have simply provided that every
foreign business corporation shall be subject to discretionary
permission for doing business. 48
Most statutes of the Latin-American countries requiring
governmental authorization for the establishment of a permanent business place are drafted in terms that possibly reserve
to the governments full power of granting or refusing. What
44

Hungary: C. Com. arts. z1o-z17.
Reichsgewerbeordnung § rz in combination with Prussian Law of June z9,
1914 (carrying on a nonambulatory business).
Bavaria: Law of February 6, 1868, art. z (carrying on business).
Saxony: Ordinance of Nov. 1o, 1899, § 5·
Wiirtemberg: Executory Law to the BGB., art. z8z. Cf. NEUMEYER, z Int.
Verwaltungs R. 14zff.
46
Aktiengesetz (1937) § z9z (stock companies); Einfiihrungsgesetz to this
law, § z7 (limited partnerships, profit associations and co-operatives). On the
state agencies on which the authorization depends, see BEITZKE, Clunet 1937,
100Z,
47
BEITZKE, Jur. Personen 166.
48
Austria: Imperial Order of Nov. z9, 1865, and Law of March z9, 1873,
still valid in Czechoslovakia.
Poland: Law of March zz, 19z8, No. 383, on stock companies, art. 4 par.
6; Order of Dec. zo, 19z8, No. 919; on a more recent similar provision regarding limited private companies, see rz Z.ausl.PR. (1939) 867.
Rumania: C. Com. of 1887, arts. z38, Z44; C. Com. of Nov. 10, 1938,
branches and agencies may not be established unless reciprocity is guaranteed
45

184 CORPORATIONS, KINDRED ORGANIZATIONS

is the "public policy" to which corporate contracts and
documents ought not to be contrary in Mexico? 49 Precise
terms have been used for this purpose in the older Brazilian
prescription that foreign stock corporations and nonprofit
associations should file their charters and by-laws for "approbation," in order to enable them to function in Brazil
(funcionar no Brasil). 50 The actual provisions are that all
organizations pursuing purposes of collective interest, as
companies and foundations, follow the laws of the state
where they have been established but may not have branches,
agencies, or establishments before their constitutive acts have
been approved by the Brazilian Government. 51 In a decree
of I 89 I, it was prescribed that the government shall ascertain
"whether the company has a proper purpose and whether it
is to the advantage of the public; whether its creation is
opportune and its success probable; ... whether the capital
is adequate for the company purposes; . . . whether the
provisions relating to administration, accounting, dividends,
reserve funds, operations, and obligations, protect the interests of the shareholders and of the public."52 A recent
regulation more briefly provides that the Federal Government, in authorizing a stock corporation may establish "the
conditions that it shall deem convenient for the protection
of the national interests."53 It is controversial whether partnerships lacking corporative articles of association, as they
are based only on a contract, are free from this burden. 54
In Chile, the President of the Republic examines whether
(art. 355); in the case of joint stock companies and limited partnerships only
after authorization by the government (art. 356).
49
Mexico: Ley General de Sociedades Mercantiles (I934) art. 25I, fr. II.
50
Brazil: C. C. art. zo §I, as amended by Decree No. 3725, of Jan. IS,
I9I9; Decree No. 434, of July 4, I89I, art. 47·
51
Brazil: Introductory Law (I942) art. II § I; Decree-Law No. 2627
(sohre as sociedades por a~oes) of Sept. z6, 1940, art. 64.
52
Brazil: Decree No. 434, of July 4, I89I, art. 52.
53
Decree-Law No. 2627, of Sept. z6, I940, art. 65 § I.
54 BEVILAQUA, 6 Repert. I 6z-I 64; on the full controversy see EsPINOLA,
6 Tratado 547·
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the interests of the stockholders and of third persons are
protected, 55 and a granted authorization may be revoked if
the President "for any reason" estimates that a stock company
56
does not offer the guarantees required for authorization.
6. Domestication
Domestication is a procedure whereby a corporation loses
its foreign character and becomes a domestic corporation.
Although none of the above-described methods should be
characterized as requiring the conversion of a foreign corporation into a domestic one, certain additional requirements,
which are to be mentioned below, may greatly contribute
to efface the distinction between authorization and domestication. Is it true, however, that some, if not most, of the
Latin-American states demand a veritable "nationalization"
as a condition precedent to permitting the carrying on of
business? There is a theory to this effect advocated by a few
Latin-American authors 57 and apparently supported by the
language of some statutes. Thus, Bolivia prescribes that
the company should solicit "its legal constitution"58 at the
Ministry of Industry; Brazil that it should submit its own
constitutional document for "approbation"; 59 and the Mexican Supreme Court insists on the idea that inscription in the
register is indispensable for giving a foreign company "life
in Mexico," such existence including the right to sue; 60 so
55
Chile: C. Com. art. 468; Decree No. 1521, of May 3, 1938, arts. 47-49;
Decree-Law No. 251, of May zz, 193I, arts. uoff.; cf. on the requirements,
HERRERA REYEs, Sociedades an6nimas (Santiago 1935) 272 § 300.
56
Chile: Decree-Law No. 251, of May 22, I93I, art. u6, while the former
Regulation No. 3030, of December 22, I 92o, art. 48 required an "important"
reason.
57
Most outspoken, GIL BoRGES, Informe I, reproduced also by the Peruvian
motion to the Eighth Pan-American Conference, Diario 6 I 6.
58
Bolivia: Decree of March 25, 1887, art. 5·
59
Brazil: C. C. art. 20.
60
See cases of Ampara Zardain and Amparo Palmolive, as discussed by
SCHUSTER, "The Judicial Status of Non-Registered Foreign Corporations in
Latin America-Mexico," 7 Tul. L. Rev. (I933) HI at 356ff., ns. 8o, 83,
86; 8 id. 563 and supra Chapter 22 p. I45 n. I 01.
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also the Civil Code of Peru requires foreign juristic persons
to register "in order to enjoy personality." 61 Although these
expressions have an unfortunate connection with the problems both of standing in court by foreign corporations and
of their subjection to domestic laws,S 2 reasonably they cannot
mean the production of a new juristic personality by compliance with statutes prescribing authorization of doing business or registration. 63
64
The opposite theory would involve the queer proposition
that a foreign corporation is recognized as a person so long
as it has not established an agency in the country but loses
its existence by establishing an agency, whether without
authorization, or even after obtaining an authorization, since
that would be granting a new personality. It would, then,
seem more consistent to abandon formally the idea of recognition ipso jure and all the hopes that it once embodied.
Domestication, as facultative and optional rather than the
exclusive way to obtain permission for doing business, is
much less harmful and may sometimes be a perfectly convenient method. American concerns have been advised to
create subsidiaries in this country, specially designed for
reincorporation in determined foreign countries. 65
Within the United States domestication is almost obsolete
and seems to exist only in Georgia. 66
61 Peru: C. C. (1936) art. 1058. Similarly, Bolivia: Law of Nov. q, 1886,
art. 4· To the same effect, as it seems, Panama: C. Com. arts. 296, 378; cf.
EDER, IS Tul. L. Rev. (I94I) 528,532.
62
See supra p. 145; infra pp. 216-217 and 199-201.
63 See 2 RESTREPO-HERNANDEZ 92 § II9I; "La incorporacion no produce
una nueva persona jurldica."
64 There was an older Italian opinion of this kind, developed by FIORE, and
refuted by DIENA, I Dir. Com. Int. 245; CAVAGLIERI, Dir. Int. Com. 26I,
262.
65
See the instructive information by CRAWFORD, I t Tul. L. Rev. (I936) 59·
68 Georgia: Code (I936) § 22-I6oi; cf. C. C. H., State Tax Guide Service
1214 § 20.021. On the quite different domestication for the purpose of taxation, see WUNSCHEL, "Taxation-Business Situs of Credits-Domestication of
Foreign Corporations," 4I W.Va. L. Q. (I935) 412.
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7· Reciprocity
Reciprocity as a condition for license appears in a few
European countries,S 7 and underlies the "retaliatory" statutes
in the United States putting foreign corporations-especially
insurance companies-under the same restrictions and burdens as are imposed by the state of incorporation upon corporations of the enacting state, thus discriminating in favor
of domestic corporations. 68 Such provisions, recognized as
constitutional/ 9 are more frequently applied to taxation but
have also been used to deny the benefit of the rule that the
corporation may maintain a suit after belated licensing. 70

III.

THE PosiTION OF PERMANENT EsTABLISHMENTS IN
CoNFLICTs LAw

I.

Principle

It is a general doctrine that branch offices, whether in the
narrower or broader meaning of the word, have a double
nature influencing their treatment in conflicts law.
On the one hand, an establishment forms an organic part
of the entire enterprise and, therefore, participates in the
personal law of the main organization. To the extent that
nationality is ascribed to the legal body, the branch office
shares in this. 71
67
Austria: All g. BGB. § 3 3 (formal, not material, reciprocity, requiring that
Austrians be treated like the citizens, not like the foreigners in Austria); Law
on Limited Partnerships (Ges.m.b. H. Gesetz) § 108.
Bulgaria: C. Com. art. 227 No.7·
Denmark: Stock Corporation Law, of Sept. 29, 1917, § 42; Companies
Law No. 123, of April15, 1930, § 74·
France: Regulation concerning Insurance Companies, of Dec. 30, 1938, art.
143 par. I (according to NIBOYET, 3 Traite 237 n. I).
Poland: Decree of Feb. 7, 19I9, art. 7·
Rumania: C. Com. (I938) art. 355·
68
See FLETCHER, I 7 Cyc. Corp. 456 § 846I n. 35·
69
FLETCHER, I7 Cyc. Corp. 270 § 8399.
70
Wolf v. Lancaster (I9o3) 70 N.J. Law 2oi, 56 At!. I72; treated as a
general rule by 2 BEALE 856 n. 3·
71
Germany: RG. (May 2, I924) Io8 RGZ. 265.
Hungary: S. Ct. (April3o, I93o) Clunet 193I, 1243.
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On the other hand, a branch joins in the life of the country
where it is established and, for this reason, to a large extent
must obey the territoriallaw. 72 For the purpose of this law,
it is often considered "domiciled" in the country of its location.73 Transactions between the corporation and its branch
74
are of significance at least in tax and administrative law.
2.

Scope of the Personal Law

The personal law will regularly govern the internal organization of a branch office, as for instance the distribution
of powers and the administrative relations between the central
and the branch offices. 75
It determines traditionally the name or "firm" of the
branch, although convenient additions to the name may be
locally prescribed to show the kind of association or the
fact that the central management is foreign and where it
is situated. 76 Laws are divided on the question whether the
foreign-acquired name is to be protected when it is apt to
create confusion with a local corporation established before
the branch but after the foreign corporate name was made
known abroad. 77 In a few jurisdictions, however, these rules
12
Belgium-France, Convention concerning Conditions of Residence (Oct. 6,
I927) art. 7, 69 L. of N. Treaty Series (I927) 49 at 53, IZ7 British and
Foreign State Papers (I927) Part II 98 at 99·
73
See, for instance, Brazil, C. C. art. 3 5 pars. 3 and 4, as construed by
ESPINOLA, 8-C Tratado I4o6, I781.
Nicaragua: C. C. art. 34 par. 2.
Venezuela: C. Com. arts. 359 (new 334), 360 (new 335).
74 Recognized in Cuba, Trib. Supr., decisions cited in 3 Jurisprudencia del
Trib. Supr. (I944) No. 2165.
75
WIELAND, 43 Z. Schweiz. R. (N. F.) 27I; Swiss Fed. Trib. (April I,
I924) so BGE. II 5I, 57 (with a point against French war measures) see supra
Chapter I 9, p. 6I n. I I 1.
16
Switzerland: Rev. C. Obl., art. 952, last par.; Law of Dec. I8, I936,
Eidgenossische Gesetzammlung 1937, No. IJ.
Germany: HGB. § zo; Ges.m. b. H. Gesetz § 4; Genossenschaftgesetz § 3
par. I ; Aktiengesetz § 4·
Liechtenstein: P. G. R. § 1044 par. 1.
Poland: Stock Companies Order, of December zo, I928, § 6.
77
Cf. German HGB. § I8 par. 2; 42 Jahrb. KG. I6o; Liechtenstein: P. G. R.
§ 1044 par. 3·
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are set aside, the territorial rules claiming completely to
determine the branch name. 78
The personal law determines also the liability of the main
79
organization for obligations entered into by the branch,
as well as the termination of the branch through dissolution
of the main body. 80
That organization and internal government of the main
enterprise in deciding such incidents as the issue and purchase
by a corporation of shares of stock, modification of capital,
negotiability of share certificates issued out of the state,
are beyond the territorial legal domain, may be considered
as generally admitted. 81
Consistent Continental opinion holds in all these respects
the same principle to be applicable to branches of unincorporated organizations. 82 The importance of the individual
members for the structure of a partnership is appreciated.
Nevertheless the corporate attributes of a copartnership also
exercise their influence.
3· Territorial Law Governing According to General Conflicts
Rules
Natural circumstances justify conflicts rules referring to
the territorial laws in the following respects:
(a) In every case of a branch office or other permanent
representation of any foreign principal, it is universally agreed
that the authority enjoyed by the directors or agents, in
contracting with third persons in the country of the establish8
' Laws of Sweden, Denmark, and Norway on registration, § I 6, criticized by
NEUMEYER, 2 Int. Verwaltungs R. 189, 193, but recommended by WIELAND,
43 Z. Schweiz. R. (N. F.) 218,237, cf. 244.
79
PILLET, Personnes Morales § I 67.
80
See supra Chapter 2o, p. 90.
81
Yet, BALLANTINE, Corporations§ 293 and the same, Cal. Corp. Law 312
§ 323, defines the scope of the territorial law in a broader way.
82
See, for instance, Yugoslavia, C. Com. (1937) §§ 104, 165, 504, 507; and
in general the citations supra pp. xooff.
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ment, should be determined by the law of the place where
the authority is acted upon rather than where it- has been
granted. A slight difference exists in that in the United
States the decisive place is regarded to be that of contracting83-whatever this may mean practically-while in other
countries it is assumed to be the place of the establishment
itsel£. 84
(b) It is likewise consonant with general considerations
of conflicts law that the manager of a branch office should
be personally liable to third persons either by collateral or
subsidiary liability whenever the law of the country so
provides.
(c) As a matter of course foreign organizations are subject
to the general local administrative provisions concerning
bookkeeping and accounting, publication of balance sheets,
inspection and information,S 5 labor, taxation, and bankruptcy. 86 This explains easily the often discussed rules that
the issue of shares or bonds within the state by a foreign
corporation is subject to the territorial provisions, and that
stock exchange regulations include the quotation of foreign
stocks.87 In the United States, laws regulating the holding
or transfer of shares88 and even a local prohibition of partnersa American Fire Ins. Co. v. King Lumber Co. (1917) 74 Fla. 130, 77 So.

168.

84
Germany: RG. (Dec. s, 1896) 38 RGZ. 194; (April 3, 1902) 51 RGZ.
147; (Jan. 14, 1910) 66 Seuff. Arch. No. 73; cf. HUPKA, Die Vollmacht
(1900) 252.
Yugoslavia: C. Com. (1937) § 507.
85
Getridge v. State Capital Co. (1933) 129 Cal. App. 86, 18 Pac. (zd)
37 5; Winter v. Baldwin (x 889) 89 Ala. 48 3, 7 So. 734·
C6digo Bustamante, art. 2.50.
Belgium: Consolidated Companies Act (1935) art. 198.
Denmark: Law of April 15, 1930, §§ 75ff.
Germany: KoNIGE, Leipz. Z. 1914, 1417.
Italy: C. C. (1942.) art. 2506.
Portugal: C. Com. art. I I I.
86 E.g., France: Cass. (req.) (June 19, 19o8) Clunet 1909, I094·
Yugoslavia: c. Com. § so&, see EISNER, l Symmikta Streit 296.
87
2 LYON-CAEN et RENAULT§ I 141.
88 See 2 BEALE 782 n. 3·

DOING BUSINESS

191

89

ship with other corporations have been held applicable.
(d) Qualification as a merchant, for the purposes of local
rules on registration, firm name, and accounting, is determined by the locallaw. 90 But when the "commercial" nature
of contracts, executed at the main office, is examined for
purposes of jurisdiction or other matters, the personal law
should be applied.
IV. STATUTORY IMPOSITIONS

r. Service of Process and Jurisdiction
Statutes regularly require foreign corporations and firms
desiring to do business, to indicate a fixed place of business
and an agent or a principal manager upon whom service of
process may be made. This certainly is a fair provision insofar
as litigation involves contracts, tort, taxation, or other duties
connected with the business conducted by the agency. It is
a corresponding good rule that the local courts should refrain
from taking jurisdiction beyond the affairs of the establishmene1 "on a cause which arose wholly outside of the state.m 2
But there is a tendency to extend further the authority of
local agents to all matters inclusive of the causes of action
arising abroad.
89
9

2 BEALE 782 n. 4·

°France: 2 LYON-CAEN et RENAULT§

I 127.
Germany: 36 RGZ. 394; OLG. Kassel, Leipz. Z. I9o9, 954; WIELAND,
I Handelsr. 6I9 n. r8; STAUB-BoNDI, in I Staub§ 6 n. 3, § 33 n. 4; cf. § 22
n. 4 explaining that, if the personal law agrees, the local German HGB. §§ 22,
30 permits the transfer of a branch with its firm name to another person.
91
See, e.g., Italy: SERENI, Rivista I93I, 266.
Colombia: Legislative Decree No. 2 of I 9o6, art. 2.
Costa Rica: Law No. to, of Dec. 3, 1929, art. I (3) (amending Corporation
Law, art. I5t) "for the decision of the judicial questions to which the transactions of the branch give rise and in all matters concerning requisites of
publicity, ..."
Guatemala: C. C. (1933) art. 25 (2); Legislative Decree No. 137o, of
April I6, I925, art. I.
Treaty of Montevideo on Commercial Law ( r889) art. 6.
92
Canada: Pearson (or Pearlman 1) v. Great West Life Assurance Co.
(C. A. r 9 u) 2 W. W. R. 5 6 3 , 4 D. L. R. r 54 .
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In England, where no establishment of the foreign company exists but there is a representative, his authority to
receive a writ of summons without limitation extends to all
suits against the company, even though he may manage only
a share transfer office, 93 but it has been said that his authority
94
must be proved by the plaintiff, "which is difficult."
The American statutes prescribing the appointment of an
agent as a condition precedent to licensing, are divided. In
a distinct group, the authority of the required agent is
95
restricted to domestic matters either by an express clause
or by implication. 96 Of the remaining statutes uncertain in
language, many more possibly may be claimed for this latter
class. 97 In the great majority of licensing statutes, however,
in case a foreign corporation has not appointed an agent or
the agent has disappeared or lost his authority, an official
93

The Madrid [I937] P. 40.
GuTTERIDGE, "Le Conflit des lois de competence judiciaire dans les actions
personnelles," 44 Recueil (I933) II, III at u9; cf. DICEY 232.
95
Kansas: Gen. Stat. (I935) § 17.501.
Nebraska: Rev. Stat. (1943) §21-I2or.
New Hampshire: Rev. Laws (I942) c. 28o §I.
SouthDakota:Code (1939) § 11.2003.
Washington: Rem. Rev. Stat. (I932) Supp. § 3836-I8.
96 Alabama: Code Ann. (I 940) tit. 1 o § I 92; Jefferson Island Salt Co. v.
Longyear Co. (1923) 210 Ala. 352, 98 So. 1 I9·
Idaho: Code Ann. (I932) § 29-502.
Indiana: Burns' Stat. Ann. (I933) § 25-304; § 25-306, as amended by
L. 194I, c. 226 § 8.
Iowa: Code (I 946) § 494.2.
North Dakota: Rev. Code (I943) §§ IO-I7IO, IO-I733> IO-I734·
Rhode Island: Gen. Laws Ann., c. I I 6 § 65 as construed by cases.
South Carolina: Code (1942) § 7765.
Tennessee: Code Ann. (1943) § 4I2o.
Wisconsin: Stat. (I943) § 226.02.
97
Arkansas: Pope's Dig. Stat. (1937) § 2247; American Ry. Express Co. v.
Rouw Co. (I927) I73 Ark. 8Io, 294 S. W. 401.
Arizona: Code Ann. (I939) § 53-8or.
Georgia: Code Ann. (I933) § 22-I Ioi; Reeves v. Southern R. Co. (1905)
49 S. E. 674.
Maryland: Flack's Code Ann. (1939) art. 23 § I19 as amended by L. 1943,
c. 932, and§ I2o as amended by L. 194I, c. 687.
Minnesota: Stat. (1945) §§ 303.06, 303.13; Erving v. Chicago & Northwestern R. Co. (I927) 17I Minn. 87, 2I4 N. W. u.
94
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of the state-the secretary of state, the auditor, et cetera-is
designated as attorney for the corporation with authority
to receive service of process either under a declaration to be
made by the corporation or by a statutory provision. The
courts, under the guidance of the Supreme Court of the
United States/ 8 have developed a system varying in the
states and apparently still :fluid, which the draftsmen of
the Uniform Foreign Corporations Act refrained from reproducing in a section, because it would be enormously complicated.99 One of the particular doctrines is that service on
an appointed agent or the official designated as attorney,
may be effected in causes arising outside the state, where
the corporation has appointed him to this effect, or is deemed
to have consented to his authority, especially in the case
of a public officer, by having filed for doing business on the
ground of a statute unequivocally conferring on him constructive authority, while the corporation is actually doing business
at the time suit is. brought against it. 100
In a few jurisdictions, the right to sue a foreign corporation
doing business in the state for all causes of action is a privilege
of residents. Moreover, a practice has developed that carrying
on business in a state adds to the probability that the courts
of the state will take jurisdiction in cases involving the inMississippi: Code Ann. (I942) § 5345·
New York: Gen. Corp. Law, § 210; Karius v. All States Freight, Inc.
(I94I) I76 Misc. I55, 26 N.Y. Supp. (2d) 738.
Ohio: Gen. Code Ann. (I938) § 8625-5; Burke v. McClintic-Marshall Construction Co. (I9Io) 9 0. N. P. (N. S.) 577·
98
Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. v. Gold Issue Min. & Mill. Co. ( 1917) 243
U. S. 93; Robert Mitchell Furniture Co. v. Selden Breck Const. Co. (I 92 I)
257 U. S. 2 '3; Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. Clarendon Boat Oar Co. Inc. (I 9:zz)
257 U.S. 533; Davis v. Farmers Co-op. Equity Co. (I923) 262 U.S. JI2;
Mich. Central R. Co. v. Mix (I 929) 278 U. S. 492; Canadian P. R. Co. v.
Sullivan (C. C. A. ISt I942) u6 F. (2d) 433, cert. denied (I 942) 3 I 6 U.S. 696.
99
National Conference, Handbook I934> 325; cf. Restatement§§ 90, 9I.
10 Karius v. All States Freight, Inc. (I94I) I76 Misc. I55• 26 N.Y. Supp.
(2d) 738; Erving v. Chicago & Northwestern R. Co. (I927) I7I Minn. 87,
214 N. W. 12. Note on service of process upon designated state official, I45
A. L. R. (I943) 630·
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ternal affairs of the corporation where all parties to the
controversy are in the state. 101
In many other countries, as clearly laid down in the
Japanese Code102 and particularly in Latin America, 103 jurisdiction is taken on a broad scale against foreign corporations
domiciled in any sense in the state. The parent corporation
may thus be exposed to heavy commitments even at home
when judgments of the territorial courts are accorded enforcement in the state of charter. 104 A wholesome reaction
sometimes appears under French influence. For instance, an
Argentine decision making a branch office in Buenos Aires
of a Liverpool shipping line liable for faulty performance
of an affreightment by the branch office of the same firm
in New York, has been severely criticised on the basis of the
French principle that a suit must refer to acts done or
obligations created in the jurisdiction of the branch or agency,
in order to avoid abusive actions against foreign firms. 105
2.

Registration
In the great majority of countries, though not in the

101 See in particular Maryland, Flack's Code Ann. ( r 9 3 9) § I r 9> c and d;
Missouri Rev. Stat. Ann (1939) § 6oo5 as to insurance corporations; for a
Delaware corporation doing business in Missouri, State ex rel. Northwestern
Mutual Fire Association v. Cook (1942) 349 Mo. 225, 16o S. W. (2d) 687,
cf, Note, 145 A. L. R. (supra n. roo) at 652; 2 BEALE 891 § 192-7 and
cases cited.
102 Japan: C. Com. art. 255 par. 2, as construed by the Jap. S. Ct. (February
15, 1905), covers the whole of the company's business, and according to App.
Tokyo (July 23, 1920) extends to matters arising abroad. See r C. Com. of
Japan Ann. (1931) 405, 406.
103 Brazil: Decree-Law No. 2627, of Sept. 26, 1940, art. 67: foreign stock
corporations, licensed to do business, are required to have a permanent representative in Brazil, subject to be sued and to receive initial service for the
corporation, with full powers to treat and to determine definitely, any matters.
The meaning, however, may be restricted to acts and operations on behalf of
the company in the country; art. 68 subjects only such operations to the laws of
Brazil.
104 See CRAWFORD, "The Brazilian Business Corporation," 11 Tul. L. Rev.
(1936) at 63.
105 Argentina: Cam. Fed. de la Cap. (March 17, 1941) Praizos Hnos. v.
Lamport Holt Line, 75 Jur. Arg. 231 1 criticized by DE LA VEGA, id. 232.
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United States and the Netherlands (which have not instituted
any special index of foreign corporations), 106 business organizations are recorded in special public registers. Foreign enterprises have in most states to register any agency established
in the territory. Germany and Switzerland traditionally require only branch offices in the narrow sense to be registered,
a restriction that has been criticised in the interest of the
security of commerce. 197 Since 1908, England, which has no
general register of commerce, also has required foreign
companies having any place of business in the country to
register. 108 Canadian provinces have to some extent followed
this method. 109
While in England there is a special register for foreign
companies, in other countries a problem is presented with
respect to the registration of foreign associations, in view
of the different registers and regulations for recording
domestic associations, such as stock corporations, limited liability partnerships, and ordinary firms.
Generally, the provisions respecting domestic organizations
are applied by analogy; 110 the formalities of those in situations most similar to the foreign association are employed.m
If there is no parallel, the Italian Code prescribes compliance
with the most exacting formalities, viz., those imposed on
stock corporations. 112 In Germany, it is prescribed policy
to require only documentation and facts that can be furnished
106
This was criticized long ago by AssER because of the absence of provisions making foreign corporations known, see KosTERS 688 n. 5·
107 WIELAND, 43 Z.Schweiz.R. 243ff.
108
Companies Act, 1929 (19 & 20 Geo. 5, c. 23) soo, Part XI, s. 343·
109 Alberta: Companies Act, Rev. Stat. 1942, c. 240, s. 134·
British Columbia: Companies Act, Rev. Stat. 1936, c. 42, s. 179·
Manitoba: Companies Act, Rev. Stat. 1940, c. 36, s. 453·
'Saskatchewan: Companies Act, Rev. Stat. 1940, c. 113, s. 189.
110 Japan: C. Com. art. 255 par. 1.
111
Switzerland's Federal Council (June 16, 1902) discussed by STEIGER,
67 ZBJV. (1931) at 324·
11 2ftaly: C. Com. (1882) art. 230 par. Ji C. C. (1942) art. 2507.
Similarly, Rumania: C. Com. (1938) art. 358.
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on the basis of the foreign law; 118 to reconcile both laws,
it has also been held that where the general law of the
incorporating state limits the liability of directors in a manner
unknown to the law of the forum, these limitations must be
recorded to be available against a third party .114
Some legislations, however, have imposed special heavy
burdens of documentation upon foreign corporations, and
worse, registrars and courts sometimes exaggerate these requirements so as to render compliance extremely cumbersome.115
3. Publications
A number of statutes have prescribed the data to be given
in registration and in subsequent notifications regarding the
financial status of the association. 116 This is in line with the
recent strong increase of supervisory policy, tending to enlarge the control of the management by the state and the
public. But again, the impositions may go too far. Sometimes,
an inappropriate curiosity is displayed in inquiring into business done outside of the state. This is another reason for
big corporations with a worldwide radius of activity to form
subsidiaries with capital funds set apart for the purposes of
the branches. 117
113

German HGB. § I 3 par. 3; see also § 20I par. 5; Aktiengesetz § 3 7·
Denkschrift zum Entwurf eines HGB. (I888) 26; NEUMEYER, 2 Int.
Verwaltungs R. I 9I n. 5, 202.
114 KG. (March 8, I929) IPRspr. I929 No. 2I; RABEL, 3 Z.ausl.PR. 8Io.
115 For example, complaint has been made by GRANT, 8 Tul. L. Rev. (I934)
557 against the requirements connected with the obligatory filing of a general
power of attorney in Mexico and Cuba; by EDER, I 5 Tul. L. Rev. (I 94 I)
520 at 534 with respect to Panama.
An effort to remedy these difficulties has been initiated by a Pan-American
"Protocol on Uniformity of Powers of Attorney Which are to be Utilized
Abroad," Washington, February I 7, I 940 1 signed by Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia,
El Salvador, Nicaragua, Panama, United States and Venezuela, and ratified by
the United States, Brazil and several other states. See 36 Am. J. Int. Law
(I942) Supp. I93 and subsequent volumes. The Protocol includes powers executed in the name of a juridical person (art. I s. 3).
116
See FICKER, 4 Rechtsvergl. Handworterbuch 469.
111 See CRAWFORD, "The Brazilian Business Corporation," I I Tul. L. Rev.
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4· Guarantees
In some countries, the creditors of the branch are protected
by such measures as deposits to secure future debts, or a
certain part of the capital stock must be held in the country,
in Brazil at least two-thirds. 118 Again, establishment of a
legally independent affiliate is the usual answer.
5. Application of the Internal Law
As stated above, foreign business assoctattons are quite
normally governed by the domestic administrative law with
regard to establishments, and by the domestic law of agency
as respects the extent of the authority enjoyed by the managers of the establishment. It agrees with the general principles that article 287 of the Argentine Commercial Code
subjects the company to the provisions of the Code as regards
the registration and publication of the articles of organization
and of the authority conferred upon their representatives
or agents. 119 On the other hand, the legitimate sphere of
domestic law is also observed in the Treaty of Montevideo
(art. 5 ), which limits the territorial prescriptions to "the
exercise of the acts comprised in the objective of incorporation."
Only such restricted effect should be inferred when it is
required that a resident representative of the company must
possess a general power of attorney with full authority to
bind the company by his acts. 120 By an analogous reasoning,
(1936) 59 at 63, and "The I940 Corporation Law of Brazil," I6 Tul. L. Rev.
(I942.) 2.2.8 at 2.37.
118
Brazil: Decree No. 434, of July 4, I89I, art. 47 §I.
Rumania: C. Com. (I887) art. 2.45 is probably repealed; such measures
have been abolished in other countries, except for insurance and similar companies.
119
To similar effect, Brazil: Decree-Law No. z6z7, of Sept. z6, I 940, art. 68
(but see n. 12.8).
Guatemala: C. C. ( I933) art. zs (4).
Portugal: C. Com. art. I I I.
120
Expressly, Denmark: Law on Stock Corporations, of April I5, I93o, §
77 ("in all legal relations arising out of its activity in the country").
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if the Chilean law provides that not only must a foreign
stock company establish a special fund in Chile for the
fulfillment of its obligation in the country, but also that the
assets of the company are "affected by the Chilean laws,"
the latter provision reasonably is limited to the assets situated
in Chile.121
In the United States, the Supreme Court has twice had
opportunity to deal with the attempt of Missouri to protect
resident holders of insurance policies against certain subsequent contracts modifying their policies. The court summarized the arguments of the Missouri court as follows:
"As foreign insurance companies have no right to come into
the State and there do business except as the result of a
license from the State and as the State exacts as a condition
of a license that all foreign insurance companies shall be
subject to the laws of the State as if they were domestic
corporations, it follows that the limitations of the State law
resting upon domestic corporations also rest upon foreign
companies and therefore deprive them of any power which
a domestic company could not enjoy, thus rendering void
or inoperative any provision of their charter or condition in
policies issued by them or contracts made by them inconsistent
with the Missouri law." 122
This reasoning the Supreme Court rejected:
"And this argument we declared unsound since the 'proposition cannot be maintained without holding that because
a State has power to license a foreign insurance company to
do business within its borders and the authority to regulate
such business, therefore a State has power to regulate the
Costa Rica: Corporation Law, art. 151, amended by Law No. 10, of Dec. 3,
1929, art. 1 (r).
Rumania: C. Com. arts. 246(1), 247·
121
To this effect, HERRERA REYES, Sociedades Anonimas (Santiago 1935)
274, 275, commenting on Decree-Law No. 251, of May 2o, 1931, art. 123 (c)
and (d).
122
New York Life Ins. Co. v. Head (1913) 234 U.S. 149 at 163.
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business of such company outside its borders and which would
123
otherwise be beyond the State's authority ....' "
Some laws, however, extend their realm beyond any such
limits. They either establish imperative requirements respecting the structure of licensable organizations, or they seem
to subject transactions of licensed organizations to their law
of the forum without restriction.
In the first respect, some Latin-American laws employ
careless language in subjecting foreign corporations doing
business in the country to the internallaws. 124 The authorities
of many Latin-American republics, as an American writer
explains, show "great reluctance to allow qualification of a
foreign corporation which presents, in its charter or by-laws,
provisions in conflict with locallegislation."125 Thus, usually,
unlimited corporation life is forbidden. 126 Sometimes, some
higher proportions for subscription stock and paid-in stock
are prescribed, or a fixed percentage of the profits must be
allocated to a reserve fund, or the corporation may be dissolved if the capital structure is deteriorated over a fixed
percentage. 127
In the second respect, where a statute sweepingly declares
that the relations of the organization to third parties, or even
all commercial operations of the branch shall be subject
to the laws of the country, 128 the formula raises an issue. If
123

New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge (1918) 246 U.S. 357 at 376.
124 E.g., Colombia: Law No. 58 of 1931, art. 22 in fine.
125 GRANT, 8 Tul. L. Rev. (1934) 556 at 558.
126
GRANT, supra n. 12.5.
127
GRANT, supra n. 12.5.
128 Spain: C. Com. art. 15, and its followers, supra p. 18o.
Hungary: See GuNorscH, 4 Z. Osteurop R. (1937-38) 293, 295·
Brazil: Decree No. 434, of July 4, 1891, art. 47 applied the law of the
forum to all "relations, rights and duties between company, creditors, shareholders and every person interested." Art. 68 of Decree-Law No. 2627, of
Sept. 26, 1940 seems more modest, see supra n. 119 and CRAWFORD, 16 Tul. L.
Rev. (1942) 2.2.8 at 237 (last lines), subjecting the companies to the laws
and tribunals "as to the acts or operations practised in Brazil." But the Introductory Law of 1942, art. 11 § r. declares the companies having branches
etc. in Brazil obligated to have their constitutive acts approved by the gov-
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this includes the private law, 129 it may mean that the company
and a resident of the state in question are forbidden to conclude their contract in another state under the foreign law,
since some codes in fact seem to pretend that the parties may
not submit their contract made in the state to any other law.
Actually, extensive claims of lex fori are raised in several
Latin-American laws. Nevertheless, one would think, at
least, that the "laws" of the country imposed upon the
foreign corporation include this country's own conflicts rules.
Definitely objectionable are unqualified provisions such
as in the Turkish law/ 30 that the company must "submit to
all laws and regulations of the country," in Peru that foreign
companies are subject, "without any restrictions to the laws
of the Republic,m 31 or in Ecuador that this applies to all
questions arising in or outside of court. 132
On the usual requirements for licensing in this country
that the foreign corporation shall be subject to all the restrictions and duties imposed on similar domestic corporations
and shall have no other or greater rights, powers, or privileges, it would be repetitious to observe the exaggerations
contained in these clauses. 183
In quite a different connection, we have encountered the
provision introduced in the Codes of Liechtenstein and
ernment making themselves subject to the Brazilian laws (ficando sujeitas a lei
brasileira). This law and EsPINOLA, 8-C Tratado 1406, 178t, §§ too, tot,
emphasizing this text, fail to explain whether this subjection extends to matters
other than those of the Brazilian business places.
129 Probably it does not in Cuba, C. Com. art. 15 ("mercantile operations
within Cuban territory") and similar provisions in Honduras, Nicaragua, and
Mexico, supra n. 32..
130
Turkey: Law of Nov. 3o, 133o/t 914, art. 13; cf. SALEM, 7 Repert.
zso No. 132.
131
Peru: Constitution ( 19 3 3) art. 1 7.
132
Ecuador: Companies Law of Oct. 15, 1909, art. 7·
133
Supra pp. 149ff. Special rules for particular classes of corporations may be
excepted. For foreign building and loan associations, Colorado, Stat. Ann.
(Michie 19 35) c. 2 5 § 42 anomalously provides that "all contracts made
with citizens of this state shall be deemed as made under Colorado laws."
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Yugoslavia, declaring the permanent agency of a foreign
business association, inscribed in the register of commerce, to
be legally existent and capable of acting to the same extent
as a similar domestic corporation. 134 This provision grants
security to third parties, particularly in the case of dissolution
of the mother corporation.
6. Special Purposes
Territorial law will reasonably take on a broader scope
when particular purposes call for intensified control, as in the
case of insurance, credit, railroad or other public transportation, or communication or similar business of public significance. Thus, in this country, the regulations regarding domestic corporations have largely been applied to foreign
organizations, in such fields as savings and building loans, and
full domestication, involving transformation into a domestic
corporate entity, has often been required in the case of railroad or generally public services. 135

v.

SANCTIONS OF TERRITORIAL IMPOSITIONS

If the duties imposed by the local law are violated, the
effect is naturally governed by this law itself, and each provision needs its own construction. However, certain effects
on contractual obligations, following the two requirements
of licensing and of registration are of peculiar significance.
134
Liechtenstein: P. G. R. § 2.36 par. 4·
Yugoslavia: C. Com. § 503 par. 5; see EISNER, I Symmikta Streit 296. Supra
Chapter 2.2., p. I5J.
135
United States: See Restatement § I 69 comment d; FLETCHER, 17 Cyc.
Corp.§ 8386; I8 A. L. R. 12.4ff., 72. A. L. R. ro5; 2.3 Am. Jur. §§ ur, 387;
Regimen Juridico 6-2.5, 73-92.. For some comparative notes see E. R. SALEM,
Clunet I938, 68I.
For France: NIBOYET 374 No. 3I4, and for insurance companies, NIBOYET,
z Traite 361 §§ 8z8ff.
For Latin-American countries: C6digo Bustamante, art. 2.53; Cuba: CRAWFORD, "Cuban Corporations," I 0 Tul. L. Rev. ( I936) 568.
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Failure to Obtain Authorization to Do Business

United States. The extensive discussion of the first question
in the United States, nourished by an abundance of statutes
and cases, has been summarized in a comprehensive note in
the Restatement ( § I 79). Nevertheless, the matter is too
confused to allow more than a survey of the most significant
phases. 136 In Williston's judgment, the decisions of the
courts, "do not seem generally based on very secure or sound
distinctions.m 37 The texts of many statutes, particularly the
older ones, are of little avail, as they are fragmentary and
use such terms as "unlawful," "void," "voidable," "valid"
in an unreliable manner. Moreover, many statutes have been
changed in recent times, several repeatedly, so as to make
previous summaries and annotations antiquated.
The outstanding problem is that of the effect of a contract
concluded by a foreign corporation in the state without compliance with the statutory requirements for doing business.
Beale distinguishes only two classes of authorities, those holding the contract valid and those that hold it void. 138 This
is misleading, whereas, on the other hand, regard to all
particularities of the various regulations has had the opposite
defect of obscuring all leading ideas. That there are, in effect,
four classes of statutes, may be gathered from the construction
given them by the state courts or from their apparent meanmg.
It may be noted, at the outset, that there is a common
sanction of fine for noncompliance, appearing in the statutes
of most states.
136 Valuable suggestions are contained in the classification by LoRENZEN, 6
Repert. 370, and in such decisions as Perkins Mfg. Co. v. Clinton Construction
Co. (I93o) 2I I Cal. 228, 295 Pac. I, followed in 75 A. L. R. 439 by a
comprehensive annotation. It is regrettable that all surveys are satisfied with
indicating cases almost without any regard to the current statutes which have
very often been changed (c/. the characteristic warning to the reader in 136
A. L. R. II6I, I in fine; 23 Am. Jur. (I 933) 575 n. 2o) ·
137 WILLISTON, 6 Contracts 5028 § I77I.
138
2 BEALE §§ I 79.24-25.
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(i) In a small group of states, noncompliance does not in
any way prejudice the rights and duties arising from a contract concluded in the state. 139 The significance of this liberal
attitude will be illuminated by the description of the other
groups.
(ii) A larger class of statutes140 is exemplified by the New
York statute concerning other than "moneyed corporations,"
which has been construed by the highest court of New York
139 Delaware: Rev. Code (1935) c. 6s § 220 (only a fine imposed).
District of Columbia: Code (1940) § 13-103 (provides only for service
of process after repeated changes).
Georgia: Code Ann. (Park 1936) § 22-1501, in accord with Alston v. New
York C. P. Corp. (1927) 36 Ga. App. 777, 138 S. E. 27o.
Kansas: Gen. Stat. Ann. (Corrick 1935) § 17·501 and 1943 Supp.; Heart
of America Ins. Agency v. Wichita Cab and Transport Co. (1940) 151 Kan.
420, 423, 99 Pac. (2d) 765, 767.
Kentucky: Rev. Stat. (1946) §§ 271.055, 271.990; Williams v. Dearborn
T. Co. (1927) 2I8 Ky. 27t; 291 S. W. 388, overruling Fruin v. Chatterson
(I9I2) I46 Ky. 504, I43 S. W. 6.
Nebraska: Rev. Stat. (I943) § 2I•120I, 12o6, 1209, 1210 (misdemeanor to
act for noncomplying corporation, no denial of rights mentioned) superseding
the law avoiding the contract quoted in Henni v. Fidelity B. & L. Ass'n (1901)
61 Neb. 744, 86 N. W. 475·
North Carolina: Gen. Stat. Ann. (Michie I 943) § 55-II 8.
South Carolina: Code Ann. (I942) §§ 7769, 7789 (only fines _provided).
14
° California: C. C. § 408, as amended by L. I933, c. 533 ~ 92.
Colorado: Stat. Ann. (Michie I935) c. 4I §§III, II3 (changing previous
milder law).
Connecticut: Gen. Stat. (I93o) § 349I.
Florida: Stat. Ann. (I94I) § 613.04.
Idaho: Code Ann. (I932) §§ 29-504, 29-505, 29-506, cf. § 29-5o3a, introduced I 940.
Illinois: Business Corp. Act of I933, § 125, changing previous more rigid
law quoted in Automotive M. Co. v. American S. M. P. Corp. (I924) 232
Ill. App. 532.
Indiana: Burns' Stat. Ann. (I933) § 25-3I4 (most statutes declare contracts
not void, see Ind. Ann. to the Restatement,§ I79).
Iowa: Code (I 946) § 494·9·
Louisiana: Business Corp. Act, I928, as amended by Jfd. Extra Session
I935, Act No. 8 § I; previously contracts were enforceable under Act No. 267
of I9I4, § 23, as amended by Act No. I2a of I92o, § I. Federal Schools v.
Kuntz (I93I) I6 La. App. 289, I34 So. u8.
Maine: Rev. Stat. (I944) c. 49 § 124.
Maryland: Flack's Code Ann. (I 939) art. 2 3 § 12 I.
Massachusetts: Ann. Laws (I932) c. I8I § 5·
Minnesota: Stat. ( I945) §30J.2o.
Nevada: Comp. Laws (I929) §§ 1842, I848.
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as establishing inability of the corporation to sue upon the
contract, as the only penalty for noncompliance. 141 The contract, therefore, deserves the term of "valid," despite the
fact that it is unenforceable by the corporation in the state
courts. Two important consequences have been drawn. First,
the party dealing with the corporation is bound to the contract
in a perfectly normal manner. He is unable to avoid the contract on other grounds than those of the ordinary law of
contracts; there is no failure of consideration on the part of
142
the corporation, until the corporation refuses performance.
Second, the corporation itself is able to sue on the contract
in the courts of other states and in the federal courts, even
those sitting in the state of noncompliance itsel£. 143 The latter
restriction on the statutory sanction is the more significant, as
no state has the power to exclude by statute the right of a
party to remove a suit to the federal courts. 144
New Hampshire: Rev. Laws (1942) c. 28o § u.
New Mexico: Stat. Ann. (I94I) §§ 54-805, 8o7; Niblack v. Seaberg Hotel
(I938) 42 N. M. 28I, 76 Pac. (2d) II 56.
New York: Gen. Corp. Law,§ 218 (see infra n. I 66).
North Dakota: Rev. Code (I 943) §§ I o-1709, 1o-I 735, I o-1 7 3 7 (L. I 9 3 7,
c. II 6 § 2oa).
Ohio: Page's Gen. Code Ann., § 8625-25.
Pennsylvania: Business Corp. Law (I933) § IOI4, as amended by L. I945>
Act No. 373·
Rhode Island: Gen. Laws Ann. (I938) c. II6 § 67.
Virginia: Code Ann. (I942) § 3848.
Washington: Rem. Rev. Stat. (I932) Supp. § 3836-u.
West Virginia: Code Ann. (Michie I943) § 309I; Ober v. Stephens (I903)
54 W.Va. 354,46 S. E. I95·
141 See 2 BEALE 855 quoting Gray, J., in Neuchatel Asphalte Co. v. Mayor
of New York (I898) ISS N.Y. 373, 49 N. E. I043i cf. Fritts v. Palmer
(I889) I32 U. 'S. 282.
142
See Mahar v. Harrington Park Villa Sites (I9I2) 204 N.Y. 23I, 234,
97 N.E. 587; Alsing Co. v. New England Quartz & Spar Co. (I9oi) 66 App.
Div. 473, aff'd, 174 N.Y. 536.
143 David Lupton's Sons Co. v. Automobile Club of America (I 9 I 2) 22 5
U.S. 489; Republic Creosoting Co. v. Boldt C. Co. (C. C. A. 6th I930) 38 F.
(2d) 739; Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Kane (I 94I) II 7 F. (2d) 398;
133 A. L. R. II63, and Annotation, id. I17I; see 2 BEALE 859 n. 5 andRestatement § I 78.
144
Restatement § I7I; Terral v. Burke Construction Co. (I922) 257 U.S.
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Under this approach, it may be asked: What extraterritorial effect will result from a judgment of the state of noncompliance, dismissing the action of a foreign corporation on
the ground of the failure to qualify? Although the problem
apparently never has been raised, 145 it would seem that such
judgment would not have the effect of res judicata.
(iii) A third group is characterized by much more severity.146 The corporation is deprived not only of the right to
be a party in the courts of the state in question but of its rights
under the contract. It follows, on the one hand, that the other
party is given in effect the option of suing on the contract or
cancelling it. On the other hand, the corporation is prevented
from suing in other than the state courts. For whether the
statute maintains or prohibits with annulling effect transactions of a nonqualifying corporation, it is recognized in the
529; Strampe v. Minnesota Farmers' Mutual Ins. Co. (I 909) I09 Minn. 364,
123 N. W. ro83; Ann., z6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 999; Ann. Cas. 1914A 7o6.
145
Incapacity to sue is generally considered a bar to come into court as contrasted with the elements of the cause of action which give the right to relief
in court. See 6 Cycl. of Fed. Procedure (ed. 2, I 943) 148 § 21 oo.
146
Alabama: Code Ann. (I 940) tit. 1o § 191 ; Boddy v. Continental Inv.
Co. (1921) I8 Ala. App. 65, 88 So. 294.
Arkansas: Pope's Dig. (I937) § 225I.
Michigan: Gen. Corp. Act, §§ 93, 95; Hoskins v. Rochester S. & L. Ass'n
(1903) 133 Mich. 505, 95 N.W. 566.
Missouri: Gen. and Bus. Corp. Act, § Io9; Flinn v. Gillen (I928) po
Mo. 1047, 10 S. W. (2d) 923.
Oklahoma: Stat. Ann. (I94I) tit. I8 § 454; M.S. Cohn G. Co. v. Southern
S. Co. (1927) I29 Okla. I7I, 264 Pac. 2o6 ("contracts void at the option of
citizens of the state"), cf. 75 A. L. R. 450,451.
Oregon: Camp. Laws Ann. (1940) §§ 77-306, 77-307, 77-207.
South Dakota: Code Ann. (I939) §I I.2I03.
Tennessee: (Doubtful whether the contract is not considered absolutely void,
seen. I2I) Code Ann. (1938) § 4I19; Insurance Co. v. Kennedy (I896)
96 Tenn. (I2 Pick) 7II, 36 S. W. 709; Harris v. Columbia Water Co. (r9oi)
108 Tenn. (24 Pick) 245, 67 S. W. 8 I I; Peck-Williamson Heating etc. Co. v.
McKnight (I9I8) I4o Tenn. (13 Thomp.) 563, 205 S. W. 419; State Life
Ins. Co. v. Dupre (1935) 19 Tenn. App. 3or, 86 S. W. (2d) 894. 897.
Texas: Vernon's Rev. Civ. Stat. (I925) art. I5J6, as amended by L. I93I,
c. IsS.

Utah: Code Ann. (1943) § r8-8-5.
Vermont: Pub. Laws (I933) § 5988.
Wisconsin: Stat. (I943) § 226.o2; Fitzsimmons v. City Fire Ins. Co. of
New Haven (1864) I8 Wis. 246,86 Am. Dec. 761.
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sister states; hence, if the statute appears to treat the contract
as void or voidable, 147 other jurisdictions recognize its effect
accordingly.
While usually the contract is called "void" and might be
better denoted as "voidable" in these jurisdictions,148 yet
either term is inadequate.
(iv) Finally, there may be states in which the unlawful
contract is entirely "void," meaning that no action is granted
either party in any court. 149
These "penalties," if radically executed, may cause considerable hardship. In most of the jurisdictions involved, this
has been well noticed, and important mitigations have been
introduced. Always, however, at least a few states insist on a
radical sanction. Thus, for instance, it is fair that a corporation
should be allowed to make contracts preliminary to starting
business, such as the purchase of equipment, supplies, and raw
materials, appointment of agents or acquisition of a business.
While a distinct trend to exempt such preparatory transactions
from the ban is developing, it is far from a complete victory .150
The main relief for foreign corporations that have failed to
qualify, is furnished by the proviso, now widely prevailing,
that the corporation is prevented from suing only "until" it
147 Allegheny Co. v. Allen (1903) 69 N.J. Law 2.70, 55 Atl. 724; Hyde v.
Goodnow (1849) 3 N. Y. :z.66; Wood v. Cascade Fire & Marine Ins. Co.
(1894) 8 Wash. 42.7, 36 Pac. 2.67 (concerning the New York law on insurance
companies) but cf. Restatement, New York Annotations 146.
148 See for Michigan and Wisconsin, Bishop v. Hannan Real Estate Exchange (1934) 2.67 Mich. 575, 2.55 N. W. 599; see Martin Bros. v. Nettleton
(192.6) 138 Wash. 102., 2.44 Pac. 386 (dictum: the "penalty" by the statute
of Oregon measures the remedy of the individual who deals with the corporation
not complying with the statute.)
149 Arizona: Code Ann. (1939) § 53-8o:z., as construed in Eastlick v. Haywood (192.8) 33 Ariz. :1.42., 2.63 Pac. 936: "It is probable that no action of a
party dealing with a foreign corporation which failed to comply . . . , can
give the transaction validity."
Tennessee: Code (1943) § 4119, as construed in Peck-Williamson Heating
etc. Co. v. McKnight (1918) 140 Tenn. (13 Thomp.) 563, 2.05 S. W. 419;
State Life Ins. Co. v. Dupre (1935) 19 Tenn. App. 301, 86 S. W. (:z.d) 894,
897. A long list of cases given by :z. BEALE 86o n. 7 is antiquated.
150
See 2.3 Am. Jur. (1939) Foreign Corporations §§ 367, 368.
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complies with the requirements. Yet in a few states, belonging
to classes (ii) and (iii), this validating and retroactive effect
of compliance subsequent to the prohibited contract is expressly denied. 151 Generally contracts made outside the state
may be sued upon. 152 Yet the excellent Pennsylvania Annotations to the Restatement think that the disability in this state
includes any contractual claim wherever it arose. 153 The courts
are inclined, moreover, to grant suits for injuries to property,
even though there is connection with unauthorized business,
as where the corporation has assigned goods to an agent for
sale on commission/54 but a few statutes deny claims sounding in tort as well as in contract. 155 It is also ordinarily, though
not without exception, assumed that claims may be based on
the ownership of property or possession, including acquisitions of title, not immediately connected with doing business.156
Obviously, therefore, prohibitions of "all court actionsm 57
ought to be understood with restrictions, although, in an
opinion of the Attorney General of Louisiana, "any action
in the courts of the state" is declared precluded, even to a
151 New York Gen. Corp. Law, § :uS, cf. Restatement, New York Annotations § 179·
Tennessee: Code Ann. (1943) § 4II9. See Cary-Lombard L. Co. v. Thomas
(1893) 92 Tenn. 587, zz S. W. 743·
Wisconsin: Stat. (I943) § zz6.o2; Wisconsin Trust Co. v. Munday (I9I8)
168 Wis. 3I; I68 N. W. 393, I69 N. W. 6u, aff'd Munday v. Wisconsin
Trust Co. (192o) 252 U.S. 499·
In Idaho, Law of I940, see 1940 Supp. to Code Ann. (1932) tit. 29 c. 5,
2.2.4, belated filing was allowed only once within three months after the
provision came into force. Cf. WILLISTON, 6 Contracts§ 1772 n. 2.
152 Leverett v. Garland (I921) 206 Ala. 556, 90 So. 343i 2 BEALE 856
n. 4, 858 n. 5·
153 Restatement, Pennsylvania Annotations 78 § 178.
I 54 See 2 BEALE 857; Note, 136 A. L. R. (I942.) u,6o.
155 Indiana: Burns' Stat. Ann. (I933) § 2.5-3I4.
Wyoming: Rev. Stat. Ann. (I93I) § 28-I41 A, added in I939·
I 56 See 2. BEALE 856 § I79.2.3; Restatement§ 179 note; Note, 136 A. L. R.
(1941) n6o.
157 Maryland: Flack's Ann. Code ( 1939) art. 2.3 § I I9.
Missouri: Gen. and Bus. Corp. Act, § I 09.
North Dakota: Rev. Code (1943) § 10-1735.
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foreign corporation solely engaged in interstate business,
unless the corporation has qualified to do business and all
taxes due have been paid. 158
If we try, after all this, to ascertain the exact position of a
noncomplying corporation having wholly or partly performed
its own contractual obligations, when the other party refuses
performance and restitution, the situation seems to be as
follows:
If the contract is valid under the violated statute but the
corporation may not sue in the state courts for enforcement
of the other party's duty, it may, nevertheless, even in these
courts claim restitution on the ground of failure of consideration, with any of the normal remedies.
Where the contract is "void," we do not find any secure
doctrine. Only a handful of cases belonging to two or three
jurisdictions illustrate the situation.
Several Michigan decisions have the merit of establishing
with clear foundation the right of a noncomplying corporation
to revindicate ownership of a movable which it has retained
unconditionally159 or under a conditional sale. 160 They recognize that, if a contract is void because the plaintiff had no
authorization, it does not follow that it must forfeit its property to the defendant. 161 This answers the argument, expressed for instance in Tennessee, that the Singer Manufacturing Co. could not be allowed to recover a machine sold
conditionally on default of the buyer in payment, because
"to allow it would be to enforce the contract ... and to put a
premium on its violation of law.m 62 But a federal court in
158

Louisiana: Opinions of the Attorney General1936-J8, 125.
Klatt v. Wayne C. Judge (1920) 212 Mich. 590.
160
Mojonnier Bros. v. Detroit Milling Co. (1925) 233 Mich. 312; cf.
Tuttle, J., in In re Rosenbloom ( 1922) 28o Fed. 139.
161 Rex Beach Pictures Co. v. Harry I. Garson Production (1920) 209 Mich.
692, 706.
162
Singer Mfg. Co. v. Draper (1899) 103 Tenn. 262.
159
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Minnesota correctly adds that also an agreement of absolute
saJe is equally void "so that there is no contract and the title
has never passed from the corporation to the buyer.m6 a
Hence, actions of detinue or replevin as well as trover for
conversion, 164 and cross bills at the suit of the other party are
available. Where a bill was brought to set aside foreclosure
proceedings and cancel a mortgage on the ground that the
defendant was a foreign corporation unlicensed in Michigan,
the bill was dismissed. The plaintiff could not equitably
rescind the contract and fail to tender the amount due. 165
In the New York case establishing the principle that the
contract is valid, Cullen, C. ]., in a remarkable concurrent
opinion added that, even if the contract were considered void,
until a foreign corporation refuses to fulfill, the buyer would
not be entitled to recover back the money paid under the
contract, good or bad. 166
In a Missouri case a cross bill for assumpsit for money had
and received was granted to an Arkansas corporation, to
recover a large sum advanced for lumber which the plaintiff
did not deliver. The federal court said:
"Every principle of justice and fair dealing requires that
it should pay back this money to defendant .... One cannot
make a shield of a void contract to rob an associate.m 67
Should this not be true when the corporation has furnished
163 Dunlop v. Mercer (1907) 156 Fed. 545·
164 Lu-Mi-Nus Signs Co. v. Regent Theatre Co. (1930) 250 Mich. 535·
165 Windisch v. Mortgage Security Corp. of America (1931) 254 Mich. 492,
236 N. W. 88o.
166 Mahar v. Harrington Park Villa Sites (1912), supra n. 141, 204 N.Y.
231, at 237, 97 N. E. at 587.
The New York court constantly supports also the wholesome analogous doctrine that failure to procure an occupational or business license, excepting an
express statutory provision, is not deemed to make a contract void. Denying
recovery would be "a ruling wholly out of proportion to the requirement
of public policy." John E. Rosasco Creameries v. Cohen et al. (1937) 276
N.Y. 274,11 N. E. (2d) 9o8; cf. Annotation, n8 A. L. R. 646.
167 Lasswell Land & Lumber Co. v. Lee Wilson & Co. (C. C. A. 8th 1916)
2 36 Fed. 322, cert. denied 242 U.S. 6 52.
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material and work, and the compensation is refused? The
question has come up repeatedly in Alabama and has been
consistently negatived by rejecting any action of quasi-contract.168 The federal court, following the view of the Supreme
Court of Alabama, resumes the position:
"The fact that the statutory prohibition is directed against
the performance as well as the making of the contract is
convincing that no action can be maintained upon the implied
contract or upon a quantum meruit.m69
Yet, the Alabama Supreme Court itself, as early as I9II,
confessed:
"Viewed solely from the standpoint of the individuals
concerned, the apparent result of this conclusion is, it must
be conceded, abhorrent to the judicial conscience.m 7 o
The same court repeated this regret in refusing to enter into
examinatioin of a case where a bank building had been furnished with marble trimmings and other fixtures and installations on disputed oral orders for changes. 171 This disregards
the fact that "implied contract" is only a manner of speech,
while the undue enrichment results from the invalidity of
the contract and not from the contract.
This radical view seems not to have been expressed in any
other jurisdiction, but neither is such an action known to have
been brought anywhere except in Alabama. 172 Could it be
that counsel are still unfamiliar with the remedies against
undue enrichment?
168 Leading case, Dudley v. Collier (1888) 87 Ala. 431, 6 So. 304; accord,
Alabama Western R. Co. v. Talley-Bates Construction Co. ( 1909) 162 Ala.
396, 402, so So. 341, and see the three following notes.
169 Thomas v. Birmingham Railway Light and Power Co. (1912) 195 Fed.
340.
170 American Amusement Co. v. East Lake Chutes Co. (1911) 174 Ala. 526,
56 So. 961 (improvement of an immovable).
171 George M. Muller Mfg. Co. v. First National Bank of Dothan (1912)
176 Ala. 21:9, 57 So. 762.
172 Amos Bridge's Sons, Inc. v. State of New York (1921) 188 App. Div.
soo, 231 N. Y. 532, sometimes cited in this connection, rejects an action for
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If in a state of class (ii), prohibiting the corporation from
suing but without invalidating the contract, the other party
elects to sue on the contract, the corporation has the right of
defense, which means that it may claim any right arising out
of the contract, but in some statutes even this is prohibited. 173
Finally, if the contract has been executed on both sides, invalidity may not be further claimed. 174
In a number of statutes it is stated that the directors, officers, or other persons acting on behalf of the corporation,
contrary to the licensing provisions, are personally liable,
if more than one, jointly and severally/ 75 in another group,
they are punishable as for a misdemeanor. 176 Most statutes are
silent on the point. It seems settled that whether or not the
contract is valid in regard to the corporation, the agents may
not be sued except where the statutes so provide. 177
Complicated situations arise, if contracts made lawfully in
one state are to be performed in another where the corporation
damages for delay having increased the costs of building a state street. The
parties disputed whose fault the delay was. In this case, at least, the work
employer was not enriched and the action could correctly be qualified as based
on the contract.
173
Arkansas: Pope's Dig.§ 2251.
California: C. C. § 408.
Connecticut: Gen. Stat. (I93o) § 3491.
Illinois: Stat. Ann. (Smith-Hurd I9J4) c. 32 § I57.125; Ryerson & Son v.
Shaw (I917) 277 Ill. 524, IIS N. E. 650.
Indiana: Burns' Stat. Ann. (1933) § 25-3I4.
Iowa: Code (1946) § 494·9 (2 Annotations 775 but see also 774 for notes
on the same case).
Maine: Rev. Stat. (I 944) c. 49 § I 24.
Montana: Rev. Code Ann. (I935) § 6653.
174
See 2 BEALE 862; FLETCHER, I 7 Cyc Corp. §§ 8527, 85JI, ns. 44, 45·
175
Colorado: Stat. Ann. (Michie I 9 35) c. 41 § I 13.
Idaho: Code Ann. (1932) § 29-506.
Massachusetts: Ann. Laws (1932) c. r8r § 5·
Utah: Code Ann. (I943) § IS-8-5.
Virginia: Code Ann. (1942) § 3848.
Wyoming: Rev. Stat. Ann.,§ 28-204.
17
<l See Indiana: Burns' Stat. Ann (1933) § 25-314.
Iowa: Code (1946) § 494.13.
Montana: Rev. Codes (1935) § 6656.
177
See Karvalsky v. Becker (r94o) 217 Ind. 524, 29 N. E. (zd) 56o.
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has not qualified for doing business. The Restatement has
attempted to reach a uniform solution. 178
On many problems, however, the courts are divided. In
particular, on the important topics of estoppel and recovery
of chattels sold on conditional sale, the prevailing liberal
trend encounters more substantial opposition.
Public policy was the ground of objection to the recognition
of a foreign statute in one Illinois case. The court held that
an Illinois corporation, contracting in another state in good
faith and partly executing the contract, had a good cause of
action in the forum and could not be turned away because the
action could not be maintained in the other state. 179
Other countries. In Austria it has been discussed whether
a foreign insurance company, not admitted to do business in
the country, may sue/ 80 and the general question is doubtful
whether persons not admitted by administrative license can
validly engage in contracts. 181 The liberal view has been
maintained in Czechoslovakia182 and Prussia. 183
The German law on stock corporations of 1937 prescribing
licensing of business seems not to impede either recognition
of the foreign corporation's personality or the efficacy of
178 Restatement § I 8o; cf. the divided cases of Restatement, Michigan Annotations § I 8o.
179
Hunter W. Finch & Co. v. Zenith Furnace Co. (191o) 245 Ill. 586 at
594, 92 N. E. 521 at 524, aff'd, I46 Ill. App. 257.
180 Denied by OGH. {July z, 1903) GIU. NF. 2398, 13 Z.int.R. 463.
Contra: the Appeal Court, see WALKER 204; PISKO cited by WIELAND, 43
Z.Schweiz.R. {N. F.) at 227 who seems to approve for all of Central Europe.
181 For invalidity OGH. {May 8, 1912) GIU. NF. 5910; {May 2o, 1913)
GIU. NF. 6453. Contra: OGH. {June 5, 1901) GIU. NF. 1449 and WALKER
206.
182 S. Ct. Nos. z86 3, 3 6o9, 5 82o, 6409, cited by LAUFKE, 7 Repert. 186
No. 59·
183 Prussia: Law of June 22, 1861, Preuss. Ges. Samml. 1861, 441 § 18 (1)
has sanctions in the law of January 17, 1845, Preuss. Ges. Samml. 1845, 41 at
7 5, §§ 176, 177, 189 not including the nullity of transactions. More severe
are the special laws regarding insurance. In the case of a domestic insurance
company doing unauthorized business in another German state, voidness of
the policy has been recognized under § 134 BGB. by OLG. Hamburg {May 23,
1907) Leipz.Z. 19o8, 249·
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contracts concluded without compliance. In all cases, the state
agencies may stop unauthorized carrying on of business. 184
In Latin-American jurisdictions, noncompliance is commonly stated as a ground for individual and collective liability
of the persons who conclude a contract on behalf of the corporation.185 Whether this is an indication that the company itself cannot be sued/ 86 seems doubtful. For in a few statutes it
is expressly declared that both may be sued. 187 On the right to
sue, the doubts seem to be analogous to those experienced in
the United States.
Appraisal. The fact that a foreign corporation intrudes
into a jurisdiction without having obtained permission to
enter, should certainly not excuse it from any liability that it
would incurr if doing lawful business there. For this reason,
rules are wrong that deny all effect to transactions made in
the state. But, on the other hand, no better solution is reached
by giving an option to the other party either to enforce the
contract or to hide behind its invalidity. Such privilege will
naturally be exercised according to how the business venture
inherent in the contract turns out. But a legally riskless
gamble should not be included in a statutory provision intended to serve the public interest.
This one-sided justice, however, is much restricted in most
jurisdictions of the United States, inasmuch as the corporation
may sue on the contract by belatedly qualifying for doing
184

BEITZKE, Jur. Personen I 66.
Expressly foreseen in Guatemala, C. C. (I933) art. 26; Legislative Decree No. I37o, of April I6, I925, art. 2..
186
Regimen ] uridico 34ff., I ooff.
187
The models were the Italian C. Corn. art. 2.31, and the Portuguese C.
Corn. art. I I 2..
Brazil: C. Corn. art. 30I par. 3 (action against all members of a nonregistered company).
Chile: C. Com. art. 468 par. z, followed by:
Ecuador: C. Corn. art. p6.
Guatemala: C. Com. (I942.) art. 418.
Venezuela: C. Corn. (19I9) art. 362. (new 337).
185
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business. Also other restrictions to the provision denying the
right to sue have been recognized. Nevertheless, it happens
sometimes in this country and seemingly much more often
abroad that the other party may retain values received on
execution of the contract as pure enrichment. This principle is
of a rather doubtful morality. Noncompliance with general
statutory impositions should not grant other private parties
free speculation nor unearned gains. In addition, the deprivation of contractual rights, though not an unconstitutional
impairment, is essentially a punishment executed without the
guaranty of regular criminal investigation and judgment,
which, in contrast to normal penalties, is enforceable in third
states. 188 Moreover, when a case is on the border line between
"carrying on" business and "isolated" acts/ 89 too much depends upon the answer when the validity of the contract is
also at stake.
The Uniform Foreign Corporations Act, in a comparatively moderate proposal, reduces all penalties for doing
unlawful business to fines supposed to be severe and a stay
of any action instituted by the corporation until license is
procured or a year has expired after the stay. 190 The commissioners were afraid that, if the foreign corporation had no
188
See Allegheny Co. v. Allen (1903) 69 N.J. Law 270, 55 Atl. 724. In
a particular case, the Supreme Court of Indiana has felt the necessity of justifying why it could apply the statute of West Virginia making officers of a foreign,
noncomplying insurance company personally liable on the contract: "It is a
penalty designed primarily to provide a private remedy to a person injured
by a wrongful act," Karvalsky v. Becker (1940) 217 Ind. 524, 29 N. E. (2d)
s6o. However, this could not be said with respect to an unreciprocated suit
of the third party. See furthermore, supra n. 147.
189
That in many cases this border line may be difficult to trace, is confirmed
by the considerations of the Bar Commissioners stating that "it must be borne in
mind that frequently the question as to whether or not a foreign corporation
is doing business in a state and thus as to whether or not it must secure a license,
is a question involving fine distinctions and one which is not so readily
answerable. A foreign corporation may, therefore, violate the act by doing
business without a license and yet be innocent of any willful intention to do
wrong. For this reason the provisions for penalty must be flexible." National
Conference of Commissioners, Handbook 1934, 328.
190
I d.§§ 25-27 and comment 328-330.
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property in the jurisdiction, the fine could not be enforced.
But a successful suit would produce just the desired assets in
the state. Administrative regulations should consistently
refrain from interfering with private law and civil procedure.
Of course, in most foreign countries, acceptance of the principle of the draft would present an enormous progress.
2.

Failure to Register

Prevailingly, the provisions that prescribe registration of
foreign corporations have the same effect as those applying
to domestic corporations. Most have merely "declaratory"
effect, i.e., they are destined to make public the existence,
conditions, and purpose of recognized organizations. The personality of foreign corporations, however, is not dependent
either on compliance with the duty of filing or on the favorable decision of the registrar. 191 Hence, in countries such as
England, Germany, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Switzerland/92 contracts concluded by an unregistered but existing
foreign company, whether domestic or foreign, are valid.
Penalties, of course, are pronounced; 193 the evidentiary value
of the company's books may be impaired, and the place of
business may be threatened by closure. 194 Third persons who
without fault ignore nonregistered facts are protected by the
more elaborate legislations. 195 The agents may be declared
191
192

HACHENBURG in 3 Diiringer-Hachenburg (x 934) 553 n. 31.
England: Companies Act, I9Z9 (19 & zo Geo. s. c. :I.J) soo-soz, Part XI,

s. 344·

Germany: HGB. § 15 (implicit).
Switzerland: BG. (July zz, 1887) Clunet 1893 1 z4o; WIELAND, 43
Z. Schweiz. R. (N. F.) Z75 n. u8.
Austria: OGH. (February s, 1929) Clunet 1930, 746.
Czechoslovakia: S. Ct. (May 5, 1934) No. IJ5II, 1oZ.ausl.PR. (1936) 169.
Yugoslavia: C. Corn.§ 231.
193
England: Companies Act, 1929 (19 & 20 Geo. s, c. z3) soo, Part XI,
s. JSI.
Yugoslavia: C. Corn.§ su par. 9·
194
Expressly so Japan: C. Com. art. z6o. Cf. Guatemala: Legislative Decree
No. 137o, of April x6, 19zs, art. z (for failure to appoint a representative).
195
Germany: HGB. § 151 Aktiengesetz § 34·
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collaterally liable for all debts incurred by them on behalf of
the company/ 96 although this is rejected in some countries,
since under this system the corporation itself is answerable. 197
In Italy the problem has been extensively discussed on the
basis of the Commercial Code of 1882, practically speaking,
with the result that the only effect of nonregistration of a
foreign corporation, having an agency or succursal in the
country, was the liability, personal, joint and several, of the
agents in addition to that of the corporation. 198 In the case
of a French partnership, a juristic person, it was declared
operating in Italy de facto and the partners to be liable without restriction. 199
This system has also been adopted in Argentina and Venezuela.200
However some regulations are more severe. For instance,
in Belgium the sanctions applicable to domestic as well as
to those foreign corporations having a succursal or other
business place in the country, are differentiated in various
cases, and include the right by third parties to oppose being
sued on a contract if the constitutive documents or th~ yearly
balance are not published. 201 Colombia declares void all acts
196 For Latin America, see supra n. 187.

197 E.g., Czechoslovakia, S. Ct. (May 5, 1934) supra n. 192.
198 Ita!. Cass. {June 8, 1932) Foro Ita!. Mass. 1932 III c. 431; App. Torino
(January 7, 1936) Foro Ita!. 1936 I 397; DIENA, 1 Dir. Com. Int. 245;
BALLADORE PALLIERI in Riv. Dir. Com. 1929 I 207; CAVAGLIERr, Dir. Int.
Com. 261, 263, 279, 284.
Similarly, Rumania, C. Com. art. 247·
199 App. Cagliari {January 17, 1924) Riv. Dir. Com. 1924 II 441.
200 Argentina: C. Com. art. 288 states only the personal liability of the
agents; C. C. art. 36 declares authorized acts by agents of {any) corporation
binding on the corporation.
Followed by Venezuela: C. Com. (1919) art. 362 (new 337), cf Goldstone, "The Judicial Status of Non-Registered Foreign Corporations in Venezuela," 17 Tul L. Rev. (1943) 578; personal liability of the acting persons,
no obstacle for actions on contracts, no penalties.
201 Belgium: Consolidated Companies Act 1873/1935, arts. 198 and II;
Cass. (March 24, 1930) Clunet 1930, 1113 (the action of a foreign company
not having filed for publication of its acts is not "receivable." Trib. com.
Bruxelles {June 27, 1936) Jur. Com. Brux. 1939, 55; (February 1, 1938)
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executed without complying with the prescribed formalities.202 The Japanese Commercial Code says that "a third
person may deny the existence" of a nonregistered branch
office as he may in the case of a nonregistered Japanese
corporation. 203
There is, however, much ingenuity deployed in the various
laws. In Panama, for instance, the Commercial Code punishes
noncompliance with the duty of registration by a penalty in
money and the loss of the rights to exercise commercial
privileges and to file documents for evidence; the stock
corporation law provides that nonregistered companies cannot sue and also incur penalties up to s,ooo dollars. 204
Finally, as has been seen earlier, registration is sometimes
considered a condition precedent to recognition of the company's personality or, if this exaggerated manner of speech is
avoided, to the lawfulness of business done in the state.
A similiar variety of views obtains with regard to the
failure correctly to appoint a representative.

I.

VI.
Existing Treaties

TREATIES

The two Latin-American multipartite, and the numerous
bipartite treaties throughout the world, concerning establishment, commerce, or tax burdens, regularly provide for
reciprocal treatment of corporations in decoratively styled
clauses. However, the result is somewhat inadequate.
id. 1939, 6r; see FREDERICQ, 2 Principes (1930) 575; Novelles Belges, 3D.
Com. No. 5283. App. Bruxelles (May 3, 1939) Jur. Port d'Anvers 1941, 3o,
3 3, therefore, denied the right to sue to the United States Shipping Merchant
Fleet Corporation, although not to the United States Government.
202 Colombia: Legislative Decree No. 2 of r 9o6, art. 6.
Ecuador: Companies Law of Oct. 15, 1909, art. 14 for insurance companies
in addition to pecuniary penalty.
203
Japan: C. Com. art. 257. The defect, however, is cured by subsequent
registration, Japan, S. Ct. (April 27, 1928) 1 C. Com. of Japan Ann. 410
case 167.
204
Panama: C. Com. (1916) art. 296; Stock Corporation Law No. 32, of
Feb. 26, 1927,art. 91.
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(a) Commercial clause. The usual clause guaranteeing the
carrying on of business runs substantially as in the Treaty
between the United States and Poland of 1931, declaring
that the right of corporations and associations of either Power
to establish themselves within its territories, establish branch
offices, and fulfill their functions therein, shall depend upon
and be governed solely by the consent of such Party as expressed in its national, state, or provincial laws and regulations.205
(b) Special clauses. Essentially more substance is contained in a unique clause of the Treaty between France and
Germany of 1934, prescribing that authorization for doing
business cannot be refused for the reasons of contravention
against the internallaws. 206
Another special clause in the Treaty between Germany and
the Soviet Union of 1926 states that an enterprise may not
be impeded in the regular course of its business by laws, decrees, or other measures by authorities. 207
(c) Most-favored-nation clause. Such provisions are considered to extend to all countries enjoying the rights of the
most favored nation especially for the purposes of foreign
organizations of the kind in question. Thus, the privileges
conceded by Germany to France and Russia have been recognized in Germany also in favor of the United States on the
205 United States-Poland Treaty, of June IS, I93I, art. II, U.S. Treaty
Series No. 862, I39 L. of N. Treaty Series (I933) 397 at 407.
206 Art. 2 par. 5, RGBI. I 934 II 423: The high contracting parties agree,
however, not to hinder by the means of foregoing authorization, the establishment of companies exercising an activity generally permitted to companies of
all other countries, and not to revoke a once-granted authorization, except in
case of violation of laws and regulations of the country, and to refrain in
addition from any denial or revocation exclusively grounded upon reasons of
economical competition.
207 Art. I 7, RGBI. I 926 II 1.
Also the Treaty between Canada and France, of May u, I933, art. 7 (Revue
Crit. I937, 257) has been interpreted to the effect that Canadian companies for
maritime insurance or reinsurance do not need in France the individual
authorization otherwise required, see NIBOYET, 2 Traite 3 73·
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ground of such a clause providing for reciprocity in the treaty
between the United States and Germany. 208
Whether the usual general stipulation guaranteeing the
right of the most favored nation, covers the treatment of legal
persons, is an old controversial problem. Prevailing opinion
denies it. 209 But more recently special clauses have been added
for this purpose. Thus, the United States has concluded
treaties with detailed stipulations declaring the right of most
favored nations as including the right to organize, control,
participate in limited liability and other corporations and associations, for pecuniary profit or otherwise, or similarly to the
same effect. 210
(d) Clause of reciprocity. The traditional provision for
reciprocity of treatment has significance, for instance, in
Poland and Germany, while in most countries, as we have
seen, licensing is not dependent on reciprocity. Beyond that,
the clauses leave everything to the pleasure of the "laws and
regulations" of each state. Nevertheless, such clauses stand
unaltered in the Treaties of Montevideo211 and Habana. 212
208
Treaty of Dec. 8, I 923, art. u, U. S. Treaty Series No. 725, 52 L. of
N. Treaty Series (1926) 133 at 141 RGBI. 1925 II 795> 8oo. See BEITZKE,
Clunet 1937, roo4.
209
See 2 L YON-CAEN et RENAULT 924 § 1 I 02; LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIERE 2 I 3
§ r 8 r. See also E. SPRINGER, 2 7 Z.int.R. ( 191 8) 3 I 4·
210
Treaties of the United States: with Austria (June 19, 1928) art. 1o, U.S.
Treaty Series Nos. 838 and 839, II8 L. of N. Treaty Series (1931) 241 at
250;
with Germany (Dec. 8, 1923) art. u, U. S. Treaty Series No. 725, 52 L. of
N. Treaty Series (1926) 133 at 141;
with Turkish Republic (Oct. z8, 1931) art. r, U.S. Treaty Series No. 859,
138 L. of N. Treaty Series (1933) 345 at 347;
with Poland (June rs, 1931) art. II, u. s. Treaty Series No. 86z, 139
L. of N. Treaty Series (1933) 397 at 407;
with Greece (Nov. zr, 1936) art. r, U. S. Treaty Series No. 930, r83
L. of N. Treaty Series (1937) 169 at 17o;
with El Salvador (Feb. 22, 1926) art. 13, U.S. Treaty Series No. 827, 134
L. of N. Treaty Series (1932) 207 at 209.
211 Treaty of Montevideo on International Commercial Terrestrial Law
(I 940) art. 8 par. 2.
212
Codigo Bustamante, arts. 32-34.

220

2.

CORPORATIONS, KINDRED ORGANIZATIONS

Draft Proposals

Real progress has been sought through the efforts of
numerous international congresses and committees, from the
Paris Congress ( 1 8 8o) on stock companies to the Draft of the
Experts of the League of Nations (1928) on juristic persons.213 But, from the last instance, the preliminary draft of
the Economic Committee of the League of Nations on the
treatment of foreigners (1929), 214 it appears that an embarrassing struggle is going on between this endeavor and the
deference to "the laws and regulations" of the territory in
which activities are exercised. The draft subjects the doing of
business to preliminary and revocable authorization, with no
remedy against arbitrary refusal but the right of retaliation.
But if authorization is once given, the proposal is that it
should not be revoked except for infringement of the laws
and regulations of the country.

VII.

CoNCLUSIONS

1. The view expressed in old as well as recent American
decisions as a natural conception that a state may exclude
corporations created in other states from doing business in
the forum, is just one of several theories of the past. For a
time, it was also widely believed that, by natural justice, the
toleration of foreign corporations depended on formally assured reciprocity of treatment. Some Latin-American authors
maintain that the theoretically equal position conceded to
foreigners implies their complete subjection to all domestic
· laws. Such theories have been but a poor screen for economic
and social, if not mere power, policies. The requirement of
213

See the history of recent efforts in Hudson, 7 Int. Legislation 355·
League of Nations Publ., c.36.M.21.1929.II., p. 16; c.97·M.23.1930.II.;
Revue 1930, 236. Cf. KuHN, Am. J. Int. Law 1930, 570. Opposition was
raised from several states, and the full conference of 4 7 states has not discussed the committee draft.
214
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governmental authorization or treaty privilege has been established either as a means for the government to bolster its
power of domination or bargaining, or in the belief that
national autarchy was needed, or that a firm protection of the
national resources and labor was necessary. On the other
hand, the theory of freely admitting foreign juristic persons
has derived from credence in the usefulness of the capitalistic
system and of the broadest exchange of goods and services.
The methods of thinking have alternated in the periods of
modern industrialism and have contended with each other in
most countries. It would seem, at last, that the real problem,
the contrast of interests, has made itself acutely felt, particularly in the historic relation between the highly equipped
corporations of the United States and Latin-American countries rich in raw materials and labor, but wanting capital and
skilled management. There may have occurred errors and
abuses on both sides, and there exists also a natural opposition of interests. But if we hear in this country the industrial
leaders profess that the times of colonial exploitation have
gone forever, that it is an American interest to raise foreign
wages and help foreign production and that investing countries should send their capital as private capital rather than
as an arm of nationalized economic agression, 216 the clash of
real interests would seem easily dissolvable.
2. We have found recognition of foreign corporations
made dependent in some jurisdictions on reciprocity, in others
on general or special authorization or on registration requiring sometimes very exacting documentation. The right to sue
in a state court is characteristically included in the effects thus
conditioned. (Chapter 22). Even though foreign organizations may be recognized with some effects, their permission
to do business, in a number of states, is granted only according
215
See, for instance,
Digest, June 1945, 5·

ERIC JoHNSTON,

"America's World Chance," in Reader's
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to the pleasure of the government. In not a few states, they
are subjected to an unlimited amount of domestic law, with
respect either to their constitution or to their affairs out of
the state, or to both. If the statutory requirements concerning
authorization of business or registration of the company's
place of business, its agents, balances, and often many other
items, are not observed, contracts made in the state may be
declared void, or the other party may enjoy the option, according to his advantage, of regarding the contract as valid or
invalid, and frequently the right to sue on the contract may be
denied to the company. (Chapter 23).
The harshness of legislative requirements in certain parts of
the world is surpassed by vexatious bureaucratic procedures,
abuses, and the necessity of personal connections, if not
bribery. Of one state, Panama, which might have been expected to understand the need of peaceful collaboration, an
excellent author has recently collected a long list of difficulties
wantonly created for foreign corporations, such as the obscure
definition of business requiring registration, exaggerated requirements for registration of powers of the prescribed general agent and for the proof of corporate existence, potential
danger that nonregistered companies that have no business
place or habitual business are not allowed to sue in the courts,
taxation policies deliberately intended to close the country to
capital unless it submits to complete domination, and so
forth. 216
Some hostility, with uncertainty as to the law, has also
appeared in this country. A complaint of uncertainty has been
raised, for instance, with respect to the nature of the refusal
to allow suit, in the Pennsylvania Annotations to the Restatement. 217 A New York attorney once wrote in Clunet's Journal
for the information of European readers that the difficulties
216 EDER, IS

see supra n.
217

us.

Tul. L. Rev.

(1941)

s:zr. With respect to powers of attorney,

Restatement, Pennsylvania Annotations 77·
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of security for costs, of standing in court, and of acquiring
immovables in New York made it inopportune for a foreign
corporation to do business there otherwise than by creating a
local affiliate. 218
3· In view of the various circumstances of countries as
well as of corporate purposes, a uniform regulation may not
be possible or even desirable. However, an average pattern
of normal relations can well be envisaged. If a state has no
reason for intensified control such as is justified over public
utilities, finance and insurance enterprises, it should cooperate
with the world and limit its supervision to the really necessary
measures. Corporations created in one country, particularly
if their central management is also located there, should be
fully recognized, without petty obstacles, throughout the
world as persons capable of acting in transactions and law
suits. Normative regulation may be imposed on the habitual
business of a foreign corporation rather than on the corporation itself. If qualifying to do business is made relatively
easy as in the United States, due to the professional services
of special companies for the filing of applications, and to the
moderate fees imposed by the states, this method of control
is not objectionable. Also, a foreign organization entering the
life of a national economy by deploying commercial or industrial activities, has naturally to obey the local laws and
decrees destined to govern such activities. They include fiscal,
jurisdictional, and administrative laws, and above all the laws
concerning health, labor, and social security, but exclude the
legal provisions concerning the creation and internal organization of corporations. Nor should domestic private law without qualification be extended to all contracts made in the
state; what law governs these is to be determined by conflicts
rules following entirely different lines of policy.
Legitimate interests of a state are involved in safeguarding
218 LOEB, Clunet 19ro, 96.
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the interests of its citizens dealing with foreign enterprises
that have an establishment in the state. It is a perfectly sound
policy to require that the legal capacity of a foreign organization permitted to carry on business in the territory and its
locally pertinent economic situation be made recognizable to
the indiv~duals coming in contact with it either as employees
or as third parties. Acts of publication for this purpose are
prescribed almost everywhere, sometimes not sufficiently but
more often with exaggeration. The proper effect of registration is well expressed in an Italian decision. Although a
foreign corporation may be dissolved by appropriate proceedings at its seat, this dissolution cannot be opposed to a
third party in the country, unless it has been publicized according to the domestic law. 219 But it is crude, almost barbaric
law, under any circumstances, to refuse foreign legal persons
access to the courts or to deny the validity of their contracts.
A borderline problem is raised by the statute of New
York imposing liability on the officers, directors, and stockholders of a foreign stock corporation transacting business in
the state, among other things, for unauthorized dividends
and unlawful loans to stockholders. 220 Not only is jurisdiction
taken, but the liability is authoritatively construed as an
offense against the New York prescriptions rather than
against those of the charter law. 221 This protection of creditors
exceeds the normal scope of domestic law as traced in the
Restatement. 222 It may be regarded, however, as a control
measure defendable in the biggest financial center of the
world, which would not be justifiable everywhere. Whether
219

Cass. Ital. (July 13, 1936) Moulenet v. D'Amico, Foro Ital. Rep. 1936,

1752 Nos.
220

sss-ss6.

Stock Corporation Law of 1939, § 114, derived from the Law of 189o,
c. 564 § 6o, as added by L. of 1897, c. 384 § 4·
221
German-American Coffee Co. v. Diehl (1915) 216 N.Y. 57, 109 N. E.
875·
222
Restatement, New York Annotations 15 7 § 1 8 8. The courts of New York
emphasize this exception to the law of the state of incorporation which is
applied whenever the statutes do not expressly extend their domain to foreign
corporations. Exceptions are provided in addition to § 114 of the Stock Cor-
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rules in the interest of creditors extend to foreign corporations, such as those prohibiting purchase of their own stock
out of the capital, seems an unsettled question also in New
York. 228
That domestic share- or bond holders should be protected
by special measures, only because the company does business
in the state, goes certainly too far. Nor does acquisition of
securities by local investors need any particular legal favor.
German judges deciding on the registration of foreign companies have conveniently investigated into the amount of
the capital stock and its sufficiency for a minimum standard
of trustworthiness for creditors, but have refrained from any
regard for the organization and the rights and interests of
shareholders. 224
Finally, no objection can be made to the exaction by certain
states of a reasonable compensation from foreign enterprises
which they admit, as an additional burden on capital profit
leaving the country. From this angle, discriminatory taxation
can be vindicated, while overtaxation in order to lower the
competitive strength of foreign capital is a measure of economic warfare rather than a policy of neighbors.
That these are the basic lines of a satisfactory compromise
must have been felt in many quarters. It is the more regrettable that not one of all the positive enactments is entirely
commendable, and that, to my knowledge, not much has been
done even in legal and economic science to develop the particulars. The elaboration of a comprehensive model statute
for foreign organizations would be a worthy object of international endeavor.
poration Law by § 222 of the General Corporation Law, but not with respect
to §§ 71-73 of the Stock Corporation Law; Bogardus v. Fitzpatrick (1931)
139 Misc. 533, 247 N.Y. Supp. 692; Armstrong v. Dyer and Hobby (1935)
268 N.Y. 671, 198 N. E. 551; Gonzales v. Tuttman (1945) 59 F. Supp. 858,
862 (stockholders' liability to laborers, servants, and employees).
223
The question was left undecided in Hayman v. Morris (S. Ct., N. Y.
County, 1942) 36 N.Y. Supp. (2d) 756.
224
HACHENBURG in 3 Diiringer-Hachenburg ( 1934) § 201, ns. 40-46.
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In this part, the following books and articles will be cited in abbreviated form:
Common law: Hancock, Torts in the Conflict of Laws ( 1942) ;
Lorenzen, "Tort Liability and the Conflict of Laws," 4 7 Law Q.
Rev. ( 1931) 483, with comparative research; Goodrich, "Tort Obligations and the Conflicts of Laws," 73 U. of Pa. L. Rev. (1924) 19
(a chapter of his handbook) ; Stumberg, "Conflict of Laws-TortsTexas Decisions," 9 Texas L. Rev. (1932) 21; Cook, "Tort Liability
and the Conflict of Laws," 35 Col. L. Rev. ( 1935) 202 and Logical
and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws ( 1942) 311, mainly concerned with polemics.
Henri Mazeau, "Conflits de lois et competence internationale dans
le domaine de la responsabilite civile delictuelle et quasi-delictuelle,"
Revue Crit. 1934, 377; von Schelling, "Unerlaubte Handlungen,"
3 Z.ausl.PR. ( 1929) 8 54·
For comparative substantive law, see Rabel, "Die Grundziige des
Rechts der unerlaubten Handlungen," in Sonderheft, 6 Z.ausl.PR.
( 1932) 1o; ten articles on "Haftung" in 4 Rechtsvergl. Handworterbuch 43-113; Titze, "Unerlaubte Handlungen," in 6 Rechtsvergl. Handworterbuch 6']6.
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The Principle
I.

THE MEANING oF ToRT

r. Delict and Quasi Delict

T

HE conflicts rules applicable to torts have been developed mostly with respect to delicts, viz., torts committed by fault, that is, intentionally or negligently. 1
The expression lex loci delicti commissi is still used to denote
the principle that refers to the law of the place where the
alleged tort occurs. However, in modern legislation, the
separate position of liability quasi ex delicto-of "quasi delicts"-is practically abolished, 2 and accordingly by universal
understanding, this conflicts rule at present covers any unlawful conduct without fault generating liability. 3
1

See, for instance, Codigo Bustamante, art. r68.
TITZE, 6 Rechtsvergl. Handworterbuch 678ff.
In a part of the French literature, quasi-dilit is understood to mean liability
for negligence, but such terms are ordinarily used to denote liability without
fault, as by PoLLOCK, Torts (ed. 13) 17.
3
Restatement§ 379 (c) comment f; Le Forest v. Tolman (r875) 117 Mass.
ro9; Young v. Masci (1933) 289 U.S. 253,53 S. Ct. 599·
England: Walpole v. Can. Northern R. Co., Privy C. [1923] A. C. rq,
120.
Austria: GlU. NF. 7252 (automobile); 3469, 5219, cf. 3439 (railroad);
6 51 r (fraud).
Belgium: PouLLET § 317; Trib. Arion (July IJ, 1904) Revue 1905, 539
and (July 20, 1904) id. 543; Cass. (Feb. zr, 1907) and {Nov. ::.6, 1908)
Revue 1909, 95 2, the latter decision also in Clunet 1909, 1178.
France: PILLET, 2 Traite § 549; WEISS, 4 Traite 415; NIBOYET 6r6 § 490;
ARMINJON, 2 Precis 278.
Germany: RG. (June 14, 1915) Leipz.Z. 1915, 1443 No. 16; RG. (Feb. 25,
1904) 57 RGZ. 145; OLG. Karlsruhe (Oct. 28, 1931) IPRspr. 1932 No. 41.
Italy: Disp. Prel. (1942) art. 25 par. 2, and previously 3 FIORE§ u62ff.;
DIENA, 2 Prine. 266; CERETI, Obblig. 195; Cass. Torino (Dec. 19, 1911)
Riv. Dir. Com. 1912 II 177.
Spain: LASALA LLANAS 365.
Sweden: S. Ct. (Sept. zo, 1933) NJA. 1933, 364, see 7 Z.ausl.PR. (1933)
931.
Switzerland: BG. (Sept. ro, 1925) 51 BGE. II 327·
2
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This liability is based on the idea that a person who conducts for his own benefit a business subjecting other persons
to possible loss, should bear the risk of the damage as a part
of his business costs. In the terms of the civil law doctrine,"
it is a liability for risk ( Gefahrdungshaftung, responsibilite
pour risque). Among the classes of persons frequently subject to such liability, we find the owners or keepers of animals,
vessels, railroads, motor vehicles, aircraft, houses, inns, laboratories, et cetera. Thus assimilated to delictual obligations,
obligations to pay damages irrespective of fault, when imposed by the state of the place where the act is done, are
enforced outside this state. In fact, the liability for risk,
whether based on the mere fact that the defendant has caused
the damage or on a presumption of his fault, cannot be reasonably subjected to a conflicts rule entirely different from that
selected for liability based on the proved fault of the defendant. The policies pursued in the national laws by all these
various tort rules are too closely related to permit divergent
determination of the applicable law.
The scope of the conflicts rule ought even to include
in addition certain liabilities without fault attending acts
that, although damaging to the interests of other persons, are
permitted on account of the superior interests of the actor,
acts, which, therefore, are termed lawful only in a formal
or restricted sense. 5 For instance, it is formally lawful to effect
an arrest or seizure on the mere probability of a claim, but
the claimant will be liable, if in a subsequent suit he is shown
to have known or negligently failed to ascertain that his claim
did not exist or, as frequently enacted, even merely because
4
Basic: JosEPH UNGER, Handeln auf eigene Gefahr (ed. z, 1893); id.,
Handeln auf fremde Gefahr (1894); MATAJA, Das Recht des Schadenersatzes
vom Standpunkt der Nationalokonomie (1888); for the modern literature
see MOLLER-ERZBACH, "Ersatz durch Gefahrdungshaftung und Gefahrtragung," 106 Arch. Civ. Prax. (1910) 309.
For common law, see infra p. 2.74 n. 87.
5
TITLE, 6 Rechtsvergl. Handwiirterbuch 68o; ENNECCERUS-KIPP-WOLFF,
AUg. Teil § 199.
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he had no actual claim. Here again liability is based on the
idea of acting at the actor's own peril, although the damaging
act is permitted by the law. Arrest and seizure have been
subjected, therefore, to the law of the court that grant~ them
provisionally. 6
It. is true that the differences between the laws of the
various countries are greater with respect to liability for risk
than with respect to liability for intentional or negligent
harm. For a while in the past, radical tendencies swung to
extreme elimination of the principle of fault. A few recent
drafts and codes, including the Soviet Code, have conferred
on the victim of fortuitous damage a claim for indemnification
to an equitable extent/ and the Mex1can Civil Code imposes
a presumption of fault on any person who:
Makes use of mechanisms, instruments, apparatus or substances dangerous in themselves, or in the velocity they
deploy, in their explosive or inflammable nature, in the
energy of the electric current conducted or for any other
analogous causes ....8
At times, judges of more conservative jurisdictions may hesitate to apply such a foreign extracontractual liability based
upon the mere fact of keeping a dog or carrying on an industrial enterprise, owning a house, or granting a third person the use of a car. 9 The way to overcome such doubts has
been shown in the following classical reasoning of Judge
Learned Hand:
"There is nothing inherent or antecedently necessary in
6
Germany: RG. (Sept. zo, I88z) 7 RGZ. 378; z BAR 396.
Switzerland: App. Zurich, I I HE. I 97, cited by z MEILI 96.
7
Soviet Russian Civil Code, art. 406; Hungarian Draft, C. C. (I9I4)
§ I486; id. (I928) § I737; also the second draft of the German BGB. § 752·
contained such rule.
8
Mexico: C. C. (I928) art. I9I3·
9
Characteristically, BARTIN, z Principes 410H., 433, as late as I9JZ, tries to
explain the liabilities for risk as diverted liabilites for fault, and confesses embarrassment where his effort fails.
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the conventional limitation of liability to such consequences
as may be anticipated by ordinary foresight, within which
limits the law of the state where the damage occurs concededly controls. No such limitation existed in ancient times,
and the law is abandoning it in field after field; fault is by
no means an inevitable condition of liability. Provided that
the result be not too distasteful to the mores of the forum,
we think that the state where the damage occurs may impute
liability to one outside, if he be in fact the voluntary author
of it... .mo
Some statutory provisions, apparently or really, go even
farther, by subjecting all "extracontractual" claims to the
law of the place where the act in question has been done. 11
This would include all causes of action claimed to arise out
of formally and substantially lawful acts, such as, on the one
hand, the so-called quasi contracts-e.g., negotiorum gestio,
unjust enrichment, constructive trust-and on the other hand,
destruction of private property for public use, if connected
with the duty of compensation, and the like. All these cases
must be reserved for discussion separate from torts and contracts.
2.

Characterization of Tort

How do we determine the meaning of the term "tort" in
the conflicts rule referring "tort" to the law of the place
where the act alleged to be tortious has been done?
If the usual doctrine of characterization according to the
law of the forum is taken literally, an act done abroad cannot
support a claim for liability, except where it is an actionable
tort also by the internal private law of the forum. This, in
fact, is the British, Japanese, and Chinese approach (soon to
10 Scheer v. Rockne Motors Corp. (I934) 68 F. (zd) 942. at 944·
11
Belgian Congo: C. C. art. II par. 3·
Italy: C. C. (I942.) Disp. Prel. art. zs par. 2..

Poland: Int. Priv. Law, art. I 1 No. r.
Treaty of Montevideo on International Civil Law of I889, art. 38: place
where the licit or illicit act has been done.
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be discussed), but it has been very decidedly rejected in all
other countries. Moreover, the extension of the conflicts rule
on tort so as to include foreign liabilities for risk is not compatible with this view.
To escape these obvious inconsistencies, the advocates of
the lex fori are prepared to recognize any foreign type of
liability that would be classified as tort if it were ordained
by the domestic statutes of the forum. 12 This idea has some
significance but in reality points to systematic problems beyond the domain of the internal law.
In consideration of the impossible consequences of the
lex fori theory, the opposite theory of characterization according to the law referred to, has had more followers in this
special field than generally. 13 In this view, the commonly
used conflicts rule refers to the law of the place where an act
is done to decide whether it is a tort, and no limitation is
added. The result would seem acceptable in most cases. But
no easy solution is afforded by this method where the positive laws disagree in characterizing certain obligations, as the
duty to support illegitimate children or the liability for
breach of promise to marry, which are based on tort in one
country and on entirely different theories in others. In these
cases, it does not help to say that "the predominance of the
territorial law is justified only insofar as one is in the presence
of an obligation of tortious character.m4
Once more resorting to comparative law, we have to form
a category of tort broad enough to embrace all definitions
that may be given to the term on the basis of a conscientious
general system of law. Actually or virtually, this concept
underlies the thinking of lawyers, not only in civil law
countries but also in England and the United States.
We do not touch hereby, of course, the great controversy,
12

RAAPE zo8, and D. IPR.
13
POULLET 355; WALKER
14
PILLET, 2 Traite 3 r 3·

325 Ill.
523·

TORTS
234
pending for a long time in the English literature, which concerns the existence of a general liability that would overshadow the historical separate categories of tort, 15 such as
assault, trespass, conversion, nuisance, defamation, etc. However this problem may be solved, it has become common
ground that, by inductive generalization from the recognized separate types of peculiar tort liabilities, principles of
tort can be formulated. 16 This is quite enough to reach the
doctrinal state of German private law. Neither system imposes by a general rule liability for all negligent conduct.
Nevertheless, the provisions given in the Civil Code for a
number of important types of tort serve as a subsidiary regulation for tort actions established in special laws, including
liabilities without fault. 17 The general rules of tort thus
achieved, though more compact, are comparable to what may
be called principles of tort in England, and still more so to
the American doctrine.
On the other hand, the French Civil Code has formulated
its famous principle of responsibility for fault-the product
of the European pandectistic practice and itself the model
of innumerable codes- in the broadest terms, too broad in
fact for the purpose of municpal law. Article 1382 of the
French Civil Code reads as follows:
Any act whatever done by a man, which causes damage
to another, obliges him by whose fault the damage was
caused to repair it.
This definition has been narrowed by common opinion as
well as in more modern reproductions in other countries,
such as article 41 of the Swiss Code of Obligations. The conduct must not only be tainted by fault but unlawful. In the
prevailing conception of modern continental lawyers, be15
See G. W. WILLIAMs, "The Foundation of Tortious Liability," in 7
Cambr. L. J. (1941) I I I .
16
SEAVEY, "Principles of Tort," s6 Harv. L. Rev. (1943) 72·
17
67 RGZ. 144, cf. 122 RGZ. 326.
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havior is unlawful, if it is prohibited by the rules establishing
general duties for the protection of individual interests or
the interests of the community. In this view, breach of contract, at least by the debtor himself, is not "unlawful" in
itself, since it is the violation of a relation between two persons rather than of a duty incumbent on every one. With this
supplement, the concept holds true as a basic definition of
tort in comparative consideration of any municipal system,
special types as established in the various laws being defined
by additional requirements.
The only concept of delict, useful on an international scale
to the prevailing conflicts rule, is identical. It is equally easy
to extend this concept to responsibility for risk. "Tort,"
thus, in the meaning of the conflicts rule, is any unlawful
invasion of the interests of another person, causing damage
or harm to a person. The conflicts rule, of course, will predicate what system of law shall determine these elements.
It is immaterial on what basis the law of the forum
establishes the protected sphere, whether as property, status,
or bodily integrity, and which unlawful invasions it recognizes
as ground for actions or injunctions.
It is submitted that in practice the courts apply this very
concept. 18

II.
I.

THE PRINCIPLE

The Dominant Principle

The principle unanimously established by the canonists
and later the statutists since the I 3th century19 and generally
adopted today is that the lex loci delicti commissi governs. 20
This predicates that the law of the place where an alleged
18 See RG. (March 12, 19o6) JW. 1906, Z97; z3 ROLG. 14 and RABEL,
3 Z.ausl.PR. (19z9) 75Si NEUNER, Der Sinn 105.
19
See NEUMEYER, Gemeinrechtliche Entwicklung 138ff; z BAR 115; 2
MElLI 90·
20
Mr. Justice Holmes in Cuba R. Co. v. Crosby (1912) 222 U.S. 473, 477,
and in Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Brown (1914) 234 U.S. 542, 34 S. Ct.
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tortious act in the broad meaning described above has been
done, determines whether, under what conditions, to what
extent, and with what consequences, this act constitutes a
cause of action.
955; Walsh v. New York & New England R. Co. (1894) 160 Mass. 571, 36
N. E. 584; 2 BEALE 1289; GOODRICH§ 89; LORENZEN, 6 Repert. 325; Restatement§§ 378, 379, 381, 383, 384, 385, 386, 390.
Austria: OGH. (Nov. 2, 191o) 13 GlU. NF. 5219; (July 2, 1913) 16
GIU. NF. No. 6sn.
Belgium: Cass (Feb. 21, 1907) Pasicrisie 1907.1.135; (Nov. 26, 1908)
id. 1909.1.25.
Belgian Congo: C. C. art. 11 par. 3·
Brazil: See ESPINOLA, 8 Tratado 478.
Czechoslovakia: Draft (1931) § 14.
Denmark: Trib. Marit. Copenhague (May 31, 1905) Clunet 1909, n84;
BoRUM and MEYER, 6 Repert. 224 No. 85.
France: Cass. (req.) (Feb. 24, 1936) S.193 6. 1. I 61, first formal confirmation of the rule (see BATIFFOL, Revue 193 7, 441) which was certain; however,
see Cass. (req.) (Feb. 15, 1905) S.1905.1.209; Cass. (civ.) (May 16, 1888)
S.I89I.I.509·
French Morocco: Dahir of II-13 August, 1913, art. 16.
Germany: EG. BGB. art. 12 (implicitly) ; formerly common practice, starting from OLG. Miinchen (Dec. '• I829), I Seuff. Arch. No. I53; see in particular ROHG. (Jan. 19, I878) 23 ROHGE. 174; RG. (Sept. 23, I887)
I9 RGZ. 382; and constant practice.
Greece: C. C. (I 940) art. 3 1.
Hungary: Curia, Nos. 7674 (of I 9os), 9016 (of I926); see ScHWARTZ,
40 Z.int.R. 2o6; SZASZY, 11 Z.ausl.PR. (1937) I72; Curia, (Oct. 27, I937)
5 Z. Osteurop. R. (1939) 396.
Italy: C. C. Disp. Gen. (I 942) art. 2 5 par. 2; the rule was recognized
before, although it was controversial whether it was included in art. 9 par. 2,
Disp. Prel. of 1865, see FEDOZZI 759; Cass. (July 19, I938) Foro Ital. 1938
I 1216.
The Netherlands: Rb. Utrecht (Feb. 4, 1927) W. n675, N.J. (1927) 99I;
Rb. Amsterdam (June 22, 193I) N.J. (I932) 325; VAN HASSELT 305.
Norway: S. Ct. Christiania (Dec. IS, 1905) Clunet I9o7, 852.
Poland: Int. Priv. Law, art. I 1.
Portugal: C. Com. art. 674 (as to collisions); CUNHA GON<;ALVES, 1
Direito Civil 670.
Scotland: The rule seems certain, although the courts still have difficulties
in ascertaining their own jurisdiction. See Dalziel v. Coulthourst, Executors
(I934) s. c. 566.
Sweden: S. Ct. (Sept. 20, I933) 7 Z.ausl.PR. (1933) 93I; (Dec. 2, I935)
10 id. (1936) 624.
Switzerland: 22 BGE. 486 and I17o; 35 id. II 48o; 43 id. II 315; 5I id.
II 328; 66 id. II 167.
Montenegro: C. C. art. 793·
Treaty of Montevideo on International Civil Law (I889) art, 38; (1940)
art. 43.
Codigo Bustamante, arts. I 67, 168.
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Lex Fori
Against the dominant rule, in the early half of the nineteenth century, Waechter and Savigny advanced the opinion
that tort problems should always be governed by the law of
the forum. 21 They both believed that the tort rules of the
various municipal laws were of such an ethical and imperative nature that no country would ever apply the tort rule
of another country, especially when it does not consider the
act unlawful. This thesis, formed in too close relationship with
ideas current in penal law, has sometimes influenced courts
in England, 22 Spain, 23 and elsewhere. 24 In Greece, it was
repealed only by the Civil Code of I 940/5 and a recent
French writer has attempted to revive it. 26 Soviet Russia
has no fixed rule, but most writers seem to agree that application of Soviet Russian law even to acts done abroad suits
the spirit of Soviet law. 27
2.

3. Rule of Similarity
The idea that a "foreign tort" could be sued on without
regard to the internal law of the forum has encountered
opposition in the conception that in every case the foreign
municipal law should be substantially similar to the law of
the forum.
American cases. This view has been held in a number of
21

WAECHTER, 25 Arch. Civ. Prax. (I842) 392; SAVIGNY (tr. Guthrie) 2I7

§ 3 7I, cf. 2 53 § 3 74; their opinion was followed by some now obsolete
German decisions: 9 Seu.lf. Arch. No. I, I I Seu:ff. Arch. No. 3; 25 Seu:ff. Arch.
No. I I 5; in partial sympathy with the lex fori theory, ROLIN, I Principes
§§ 363-365.
22
See CHESHIRE's (297) resume of the case of The Halley.
23
See the case history by LASALA LLANAS 365, where he has difficulty in
reaching the dominant opinion.
24
France: Cass. (req.) (May 29, I894) S.I894·1.48r.
Italy: App. Milano (July 8, 1925) Rivista 1926, 125. Contra: DE SANcrJs,
id. 12 7; FEDOZZI 758 ; ScHNITZER 2 8 9 n. r.
25
Greece: C. C. (1856) art. 6; cf. 2 STREIT-VALLINDAS 26o; C. C. (1940)
art. 31.
26
HENRY MAZEAUD, Revue Crit. 1934, 377; PRUDHOMME, Clunet 1936,
626.
21
MAKARov, Precis 305 and authors cited.
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American cases involving foreign death statutes. Such statutes
have been introduced in practically all jurisdictions in the
United States to abolish the common law rule that "actio
personalis moritur cum persona," that is, that an action for
injury to a person cannot be maintained after his death by the
deceased man's heirs. As the statutes vary in many details,
extraterritorial application is important. But originally they
were considered to create a new right on the ground of wrongful death rather than on that of a precedent tortious invasion
of the body, and were construed as penal statutes, inapplicable in other states. It was a progressive step to apply them
where there were similar domestic statutes. 28 The entire
peculiar conception was forcefully refuted by the Court of
Appeals of New York in Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. of New
York. 29 Although the rule was followed as late as in I 93 I and
I9J6 in Maryland,S0 and has not yet been expressly overruled in Texas/ 1 American law as a whole may be claimed,
at present, to agree with civil law in submitting injuries
ending in death, like all others, exclusively to the statute of
the place of wrong. 82
British rules. A famous double rule is generally regarded
as governing tort problems in England, in a formula repro28GoooRrcH, 73 U. of Pa. L. Rev. (19:14) I9, z8; HANCOCK, Torts z1-z9;
Texas & P.R. Co. v. Richards (1887) 68 Texas 375, 4 S. W. 6z7 and other
Texas cases. See also STUMBERG, 9 Tex. L. Rev. (I931) at z9; furthermore,
Wooden v. Western New York and Pennsylvania R. Co. (r89r) rz6 N.Y. Io 1
z6 N. E. 1050, cf. STUMBERG, id. I63.
29 (r9r8) zz4 N.Y. 99, rzo N. E. I98; see also Powell v. Great Northern
R. Co. (1907) IOZ Minn. 448 1 II3 N. W. IOI7·
80 London Guarantee & Accident Co. v. Balgowan S. S. Co. (I93I) I6I
Md. I45, 155 Atl. 334, 77 A. L. R. I3oz; Davis v. Ruzicka (I936) 170 Md.
ru. Cf. 155 F. (zd) 67 n. 3·
81 El Paso & Juarez Traction Co. v. Carruth (Tex. I9z3) :155 S. W. I 59> declaring Mexican law substantially dissimilar. No recent case has treated the
law of a state of the United States likewise. The theory has been confirmed despite art. 4678, Rev. Civ. Stat. (r9z5) in Wells v. Irwin (I94z) 43 F. Supp.
zrz, :114. See STUMBERG, 9 Tex. L. Rev. (1931) z1, Texas Annotations
to the Restatement (I936) § 384.
On a California case see infra pp. :149 f. (public policy).
82 Restatement§§ 38I-39z. The contrary statement in I I Am. Jur. 496 § 184
seems to be founded on antiquated cases.
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J., in

Phillips v.

"As a general rule, in order to found a suit in England,
for a wrong alleged to have been committed abroad, two
conditions must be fulfilled. First, the wrong must be of such
a character that it would have been actionable if committed
in England. . . . Secondly, the act must not have been
justififlble by the law of the place where it was done." 83
Independently of the meaning Willes, J., himself clothed in
these words, 34 they have become a rigid rule of secure, though
very unhappy, standing.
The second part of this rule has an old history. In its
oldest phase, this rule was intended to excuse a defendant
who would be liable to damages under English law-for
Seizure35 Or Capture Of a Ship, 36 detentiOn37 Or arrese 8 Of a
man-in view of the lawfulness of such act in the instant case
as done under a foreign sovereign. Thus far, the English rule
aims at the same result as the prevailing rule that makes the
local law of the place of wrong alone decisive. However, by
strange complications the English judges arrived at the idea
that the law of the place of wrong controls only the "justi33 ( r8 70) Q. B. r at z 7; Lord Macnaghten in Carr v. Fracis Times &
Co. [r9oz] A. C. I76, r82..
34
HESSEL E. YNTEMA suggests the possibility that "The celebrated two
rules are an effort to formulate-as the event has shown, an unhappy one-the
theory that 'a right of action,' as well as the obligation, is 'the creature of the
law of the place and subordinate thereto.' The first rule might thus be regarded as an expression of the truism that the case must be one of which the
court of suit will take jurisdiction, a construction to which the immediately
preceding observation, in the opinion, instancing the local nature of actions
for trespass to land, that English courts do not undertake 'universal jurisdiction'
over foreign transactions, lends countenance. This supposes that Willes, J., did
not intend to suggest that the lex fori is the primary measure of the existence
of either the 'obligation' or the 'right of action.' In subsequent cases, the two
rules have come to exercise an autonomous and unwarranted fascination,
eclipsing the more detailed analysis that formed their context. Which, if so,
would serve to remind us of the great dangers inherent in formulae as a means
of transmitting doctrine."
85
Blad's Case (I673) 3 Swan. 6o3, Blad v. Barnfield (r674) 3 Swan. 604.
36
Dobree v. Napier (I836) z Bing. N.C. 781.
37
Regina v. Lesley (I86o) Bell C. C. no, Z33·
88
Carr v. Fracis Times & Co. [I 9oz] A. C. I 76.
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fiability" of the act. They did not ask whether it was a tort
entailing damages at that place. The case definitively causing
this deviation from the world-rule was Machado v. Fontes. 39
A libel published in Brazil injured the plaintiff. The defendant seemed to raise in objection the absence of a civil
action for damages in the case of a libel under Brazilian law
and requested inquiry into that law by a commission to be
sent to Brazil. The Court of Appeals reasoned in the following way: A libel certainly was a criminal offence also in
Brazil, hence not "justifiable." Even if no action for damages
ensued there, it had to be granted according to English law.
It should be conceded that the judges felt strongly the inequity of dismissing the action, under such extraordinary circumstances.40 It has been suggested, therefore, that the court
should have contented itself with an exceptional ruling on
the basis of stringent public policy; 41 this, in fact, would have
prevented the crystallization of a rule that generally substitutes the law of the forum for that of the place of wrong.
However, the court and its numerous critics would have done
still better by examining the assumption of the "unusual," 42
nay fantastic, legal situation ascribed to Brazilian law. There
was a double ground for not denying a civil action for
damages on the ground of a punishable act in Brazil. On
the one hand, the general liability for fault, embodied in
the French Civil Code, article 1382, adopted in the Portuguese Civil Code of 1867, articles 2361 and 2362, which
now appears in the Brazilian Civil Code of 1916,43 was recognized in all drafts 44 and no doubt was a living rule. On the
39

[1897] 2 Q.B. 231.
review of CHESHIRE, 55 Law Q. Rev. (1939) 131.
41 ROBERTSON, "The Choice of Law for Tort Liability in the Conflict of
Laws," 4 Modern L. Rev. (1940) 27.
42 HANCOCK, Torts 17, 121.
43 Brazil: C. C. art. 159 and for defamation, the special provision in art. 1547·
44 See CARLOS AUGUSTO DE CARVALHO, Direito Civil Brasileiro Recompilado
ou Nova Consolida~ao das Leis Civis (Rio de Janeiro 1899) 302 art. 1014.
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other hand, the Penal Code of r 890, conforming to another
French rule/ 5 stated a duty of indemnification, as an effect
of every final criminal condemnation/ 6 Thus, the feeling
of the English courts would have been shared by Brazilian
lawyers. In this case, the helplessness of the court in regard
to foreign law was to be blamed on the pleading, but it
became consequential. In a later case in the Privy Council,
the difficulties of workmen's compensation in Canadian
provinces caused incidental argument to the effect that an
accidental injury to a worker was "justifiable" as it was
"neither actionable nor punishable," a manifest lapsus linguae
in a case where the Privy Council in fact dismissed a claim
that was not actionable by the lex loci actus. 47 Cheshire, in
demonstrating this, has concluded that the second part of
the rule in Phillips v. Eyre has been overruled and that the
act must be actionable (also) under the law of the place of
wrong. 48 The Scotch courts, in fact, have adopted the same
view when they refuse to award "solatium" (satisfaction) for
mental anguish in cases of wrongful accidents on English
territory or vessels, despite the Scottish law. 49 The Canadian
courts, however, follow the English rule and in constant
practice, before granting damages for a foreign act, state that
it is not justifiable where committed. 50
45
2

I5.

SeeM. S. AMos and F. P. WALTON, Introduction to French Law (I935)

Penal Code, Decree No. 847, of Oct. I I, I 89o, art. 69 (b), cf. BENTO DE
FARIA, Anotac;iies ao C6digo Penal do Brasil (ed. 4, 1929) 16o; cf. art. 315
et seq. on "Cal umnia e Injuria."
47
Walpole v. Canadian National R. Co. [1921] 66 D. L. R. 127; [1923]
A. c. I q, 70 D. L. R. 201.
48
CHESHIRE 301ff.
49
Ld. Pres. Robertson in Kendrick v. Burnett (1897) 25 R. 82; law of
the flag applied, as interpreted by Lord Dundeen in Convery v. Lanarkshire
Tramways (1905) 8 F. 117; Naftalin v. London, Midland & Scottish R. Co.
(1933) S.C. 259; See O'RIORDAN, "Choice of Law in Actions ex Delicto under
Scots Law," in 4 Modern L. Rev. (r941) 214.
50
S. Ct. of Canada: O'Connor v. Wray [I93o] S. C. R. 231, [1930] 2
D. L. R. 899; Howells v. Wilson (C. A. 1936) 69 Que. K. B. 32.
46
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The "first rule" of Willes, ]., has been developed in the
converse case of a defendant liable under the foreign law
who would not be liable under English law if the facts had occurred in England. This doctrine also rests mainly on one
decision, The Halley, 1868,51 concerning the liability of a
shipowner for negligence of a compulsory pilot in Belgian
waters, a liability existing under Belgian but not under
English maritime law. A perfectly analogous case of compulsory pilotage was decided by the German Reichsgericht
in I 891 to the same effect,S 2 both decisions being equally
overridden by later events. 53 Yet while the latter court referred to public pblicy as the basis of an exceptional objection
to the suit on the foreign tort, the Privy Council went to the
length of asserting the principle that an English court of
justice will not:
"Give a remedy in the shape of damages in respect of an act
which according to its own principles, imposes no liability on
the person from whom the damages are claimed." 54
Since then, the formula demands that the tort be "actionable
in England." 55
The double rule with its twofold implication approaches
unconditional application of the law of the forum, with a
tempering proviso for the protection of a defendant whose
act was "justifiable" at the place where done. 56 This rule
is applied in Canada, far beyond the peculiar cases in which
51 (I868) 2 L. R. P. C. I93·
RG. (July 91 I892) 29 RGZ. 93· The analogy was first pointed out by
LORENZEN, 47 Law Q. Rev. (I93I) 498 ns. 57 1 62.
53
Infra p. 276.
54
L. J. Selwyn's dictum in The Halley at 204; repeated in Machado v.
Fontes [I 897] 2 Q. B. 23 I by L. J. Lopes and L. J. Rigby.
55
2 WHARTON Io96; GooDRICH 230.
56
FALCONBRIDGE, 17 Can. Bar Rev. (I939) 546, 549; 18 Can. Bar Rev.
(I94o) 308, 3IO. Even more definitely, M. WOLFF, Priv. Int. Law 494 1 soo
explains the double rule as restricting the lex loci delicti "to the question: is the
act that caused the damage justifiable? All other questions must be answered
by the (English) lex fori."
52
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it originated, so as to prevent enforcement of claims not only
arising in the United States but even in other Canadian
provinces, when the laws involved "differ slightly from their
own.ns 7 The Supreme Court of Canada has extended this unfortunate practice to Quebec, because in the Court's opinion
no sufficient authority was cited for a prevailing more generous rule. 58 A recent application has afforded a true counterpart to Machado v. Fontes, even better substantiated in its
facts. The Ontario Highway Traffic Act, 1937 (s. 27) makes
careless driving punishable but ( s. 4 7) denies civil relief to a
gratuitous passenger of the car causing the accident. On this
premise, the Canadian Supreme Court awarded damages to
the victim on the ground of the tort law of Quebec qua lex
fori, because the act was punishable, though not actionable
at the place of wrong. 59 A remedy against the rule has been
shown by the Supreme Court of Ontario. A gratuitous passenger injured in New York was granted relief according to
New York law, on the thesis that the Ontario statute of 1930
which excludes such claim was devoid of extraterritorial application. 60
A somewhat analogous conflicts rule has been adopted in
the conflicts laws of Japan and China,61 with the difference
57

HANCOCK, Torts 89 n. ro.
O'Connor v. Wray [r93o] S. C. R. 231, [r930] 2 D. L. R. 899, as
stated by Duff, C. J.,1n Canadian NationalS. S. Co. v. Watson [r939] S.C. R.
rr, q, [1939] I D. L. R. 273, 274, cf. FALCONBRIDGE, I8 Can. Bar Rev.
(I940) 308. Howells v. Wilson (C. A. 1936) 69 Que. K. B. 32; cf. 3 JoHNSON 357. Adde Lieff v. Palmer (I937) 63 Que. K. B. 278, and next note.
59
McLean v. Pettigrew (r944) [I945] S.C. R. 62, [r945] 2 D. L. R. 65,
affirming Pettigrew v. McLean (I942) 48 R. L. (N. S.) 400, See comment by
FALCONBRIDGE [I945J 2 D. L. R. 82, 23 Can. Bar Rev. (1945) 309. It is a
curious case also inasmuch as the Court, through Tascherian, J., in a learned
exposition adopts the doctrine of French writers that there is no such thing as
a contrat de bienfaisance, which in this case would have given relief under the
law of Quebec, qua lex loci contractus. The French, in fact, do recognize a
liability for fault which could have been correctly used as quasi-contractual
but not as quasi-delictual ground for damages.
6
° Curley v. Clifford [1941] 2 D. L. R. 729, [194I] 0. W. N. 154.
61 Japan: Int. Priv. Law, art. II par. 2; China: Int. Priv. Law, art. 25;
I ZITELMANN r86, 187.
58

TORTS

244

that both laws are clearly based on the foreign tort law
and, by exception, exclude its application, if the act is "not
unlawful" under the domestic law of the court.
4· Harm Done in a Territory Not Belonging to Any Country
Apart from injuries occurring on board a vessel or aircraft, a topic to be discussed later, doubts have been expressed whether harm done in a territory without organized
government, would be more appropriately subjected to the
personal law of the alleged tortfeasor,S 2 or to the law of the
forum. 63 In those places of the Orient where the personal law
determines jurisdiction, liability of the subjects of these
powers 1s usually determined by their respective national
laws.

III.

LIMITATIONS ON THE PRINCIPLE

Not so far-reaching as the emphasis laid on the law of
the forum in the British, Japanese, and Chinese rules, the
following exceptional rules have modified the main principle
to the benefit of the law of the forum.
r. Law Common to the Parties
In Latin countries, there is a tendency with respect to
contracts to apply to two parties having the same nationality
the law of their common country; it has sometimes found
expression in the field of torts. According to this opinion,
an act which is lawful under the lex loci, but unlawful under
the national law of the parties, is held to constitute a tort by
a court of the common country of the parties. 64 Some authors
62 2 FRANKENSTEIN 371; RAAPE 217, III; M. WoLFF, IPR. 103. Contra:
GIESE, 29 Archiv des offentlichen Rechts (N. F.) (1937) 310, 341; and for
Norway, CHRISTIANSEN, 6 Repert. 579 No. 155·
63
England: FooTE szo.
France: 2 ARMINJON ( ed. 2) 342, 348 §§ 12o, 122.
Contra: 2 BAR 121 : "a precarious way out of embarrassment."
64 Belgium: Cass. (Nov. 26, 19o8) Pasicrisie 1909.1.25, Clunet 1909, n78,
Revue 1909, 951; cf. Ministere Public in Pasicrisie 1909.1.27; RoLIN
§§ 363ff.
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have even gone so far as to advocate that the person.allaw
common to the parties should be applied also by the courts
of any other country where the case might come up for
decision. 65 Others have limited the national law to quasi
delicts. 66
The proposition has been defeated in France where it originated and is rejected in most countries. 67 It is certainly unreasonable in all those cases where private liability is closely
connected with the local administrative and insurance policies.
These bind every one in the territory, as expressed for instance in the International Convention on Motor Traffic,
providing that the driver is bound to observe the laws and
regulations of the country where he travels. 68
This seems also to be the general attitude of common law
lawyers. It is true that once, in r 862, an English judge,
Wightman, in a dictum stated that in an action brought by
France: Trib. civ. Strasbourg (Jan. 28, 1929) Clunet 1929, 1131.
Greece: App. Athens (1899) No. 885, Clunet 1904,450.
Italy: Cass. Torino (Dec. 19, 1912) Revue 19'3• 586; App. Milano (July 8,
1925) Rivista 1926, 125; 3 FIORE§ 1266.
Switzerland: BG. (June 15, 1917) 43 BGE. II 309, at 317, "as an ancillary
argument"!
65
WEiss, 4 Traite 417 n. 1.
66
3 FIORE§ 1266.
67
E.g., Austria: OGH., GlU. NF. 47 No. 5219 (accident on an Austrian
train having passed the border into Bavaria, German law).
Belgium: 8 LAURENT 25.
France: CREMIEU, 5 Repert. 491 No. 2: "out of question."
Germany: RG. (June 14, 1915) Leipz. Z. 1915, 1443 (automobile accident
in Austria, of parties domiciled in Germany, Austrian law); RAAPE, D. IPR.
324· (A contrary view in 2. FRANKENSTEIN 375 is isolated.) Nevertheless, the
;\lational Socialist Decree of December 7, 1942, RGBl., Part I, 706 provided
that all extracontractual damages between German citizens should be governed
by German law, wherever the act may be done.
Italy: Cass. Torino (Dec. 19, 1911) Riv. Dir. Com. 1912 II 177; 3 FIORE§
1264 and in Clunet 1900, 719; DESANCTIS, Rivista 19:1.6, 128; FEDOZZI 758.
Sweden: S. Ct. (Sept. zo, 1933) NJA. 1933, 364, see 7 Z.ausl.Pr. (1933)
931; (Dec. 2, 1935) NJA. 1935, 585, 1o Z.ausl.PR. ( 1936) 624.
Switzerland: BG. (Oct. 30, 1940) 66 BGE. II 165 (implicit); SCHNITZER
289 n. 1.
68
Paris Convention on Motor Traffic of April 24, 19:1.6, art. 8, HuDSON,
3 Int. Legislation at x 865; Pan-American Convention, Washington, Oct. 6,
1930, art. 1o, HuosoN, 5 Int. Legislation at 790.
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a British subject against a British subject the common law
should be applied if it was more favorable to the plaintiff
than the law of the place of wrong. 69 This proposition seems
never to have been followed in England70 and ,~here are
numerous cases in the United States where it was not even
taken into consideration, although the facts of the case might
have invited its application. 71
However, in a group of cases involving foreign-committed
unfair competition, the German courts and writers have considered that common German nationality of both parties or
rather their common German domicil, should determine the
application of the more severe German law. 72 This specific
problem is to be discussed in connection with the complex of
violations of commercial property. 73
Local Actions

2.

In the common law jurisdictions of both the British Empire
and the United States, actions involving determination of
title to real estate are still regarded as "local actions," i.e.,
as actions which can only be pursued in the forum where the
land is situated and which are always to be decided in accordance with the law of that place. 14 Prevailing English and
American opinion has extended this rule to actions for trespass to land. 75 This historical residue of the English juris69

'Scott v. Seymour (I86z) I H. & C. ZI9 1 Ex. Ch.
CHESHIRE 304·
11 American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co. (I9o9) ZI3 U. S. 347, z9
S. Ct. 5II; Cuba R. Co. v. Crosby (I9IZ) zzz U.S. 473 1 3Z S. Ct. I3Z;
Fitzpatrick v. International R. Co. (I9z9) z5z N. Y. 127 1 I69 N. E. I12;
Alabama, Great Southern R. Co. v. Carroll ( I89z) 97 Ala. u6, II So. 803.
72
I8 RGZ. z9; 55 id. I99 1 and others, see infra p. Z97 n. I78.
13
Infra pp. z95 ff.
74
See KUHN, "Local and Transitory Actions in Private International Law
( I91 8) ," 66 U. of Pa. L. Rev. ( I9I8) 30I; WHEATON, "Nature of Actions-Local and Transitory (I9:tz)," I6 Ill. L. Rev. (I9zz) 456; WICKER, "The
Development of the Distinction Between Local and Transitory Actions (I9:t6),"
4 Tenn. L. Rev. (I9z6) 55·
75 Restatement §§ 614
1 6I5; British South Africa Co. v. Companhia de
Mo~ambique [I893] A. C. 6oz; Livingston v. Jefferson (I811) I5 Fed. Cas.
7

°Cf.
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dictional doctrine has shocking results amounting to outright denial of justice76 and has no counterpart anywhere
outside the common law countries.
3· Protection of Defendant Nationals of the Forum
While the English and Japanese rules that a claim for
tort must be actionable under the law of the forum result in
protection for eve;y defendant, in Germany a special limitation upon the application of the law of the place of wrong
has been established in favor of defendants of German nationality alone. Article 12 of the Introductory Law to the German
Civil Code provides expressly as follows:
"By reason of an unlawful act committed in a foreign
country, no greater claims can be enforced against a German
than those constituted by German law."
The interference of the local law is understood to involve
the existence of liability as well as the measure of damages.
Thus, a defendant of German nationality is not condemned,
if under German private law he lacks capacity to commit
tort, or his act is deemed lawful, or the negligence of the
plaintiff was overwhelmingly superior, or the period of prescription has elapsed. 77 It suffices, however, that the award is
agreeable to German law under some other theory, such as
undue enrichment. 78 The application of article I 2 to the cases
has been proved very difficult. 79 For its nationalistic narrow66o; Ellenwood v. Marietta Chair Co. (r895) 158 U. S. ro5, 15 S. Ct.
771; Arizona Commercial Mining Co. v. Iron Cap Copper Co. (rqzo) 2.36
Mass. r 85, 128 N. E. 4· C,ontra: The Minnesota courts, Little v. Chicago etc.
R. Co. (1896) 65 Minn. 48, 67 N. W. 846; Peyton v. Desmond (r9o4) 12.9
Fed. r; and New York Real Property Law,§ 536.
76
GooDRICH states that "the more reasonable view seems opposed to the selfimposed limitation of jurisdiction, which seems an archaic survival of outworn
rules of venue." (73 U. of Pa. L. Rev. (192.4) 2.4-2.5; Handb. 2.2.9); KUHN,
supra n. 74, 301. LEFLAR, Arkansas Conflict of Laws 56 adduces a very impressive example.
77
RAAPE zii, VII, r; rr8 RGZ. 141; 12.9 RGZ. 385,388.
78
RG. (Sept. 2.9, 1927) ll8 RGZ. 14r.
79
See the laborious discussion by RAAPE 2.09, 2.13 (a); WALKER 530.
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ness, the rule was widely criticized,S0 until in the recent dark
period it has found praise in Germany. 81
4· Public Policy as a General Limitation
The various rules discussed above protecting the law of
the forum in certain cases against the law of the place of
wrong, are specially formed expressions of the general
principle that reserves the public policy of the forum. This
safety valve for an "outraged feeling of justice"82 remains
available in addition. For example, in case a man was wrongfully killed, a European court that regarded him a subject
of the forum would certainly disregard the common law existing at an American place of wrong and not providing a
satisfactory remedy. 83
A former opinion, which has been reflected in recent Italian
writings, has argJled that an obligation to pay damages resting upon a penal statute of the forum possesses extraterritorial
effect at the forum as a unilateral special norm, applicable
despite a foreign locus delicti. 84 By far the prevailing doctrine
rejects this thesis sharply. But the C6digo Bustamante has
80
2 ZITELMANN 505; KAHN, I Abhandl. 446·; WALKER 534; NEUMEYER,
IPR. (ed. 1) 32; LEWALD No. 326 in fine; RAAPE 209, I, and D.IPR. 324:
"the entire doctrine repudiates the provision."
81
RuDOLPH SCHMIDT, Ort der unerlaubten Handlung 193 enjoys "the protecting effect of article 12 for Germans by helping the German (defendant)
even though he may hurt a foreigner," and looks to EG. BGB. art. 30 (public
policy) for further tight protection.
The provision has been copied in China, Int. Priv. Law, art. 25 par. 2,
and in the Brazilian Draft, art. 86, which contained more such nationalistic
clauses (arts. 85-88), but does not appear in the Introductory Law of 1942.
The Swiss Federal Tribunal (Sept. 10, 1925) 51 BGE. II 327, 329, does not
exclude application of the law of the forum if it were more advantageous
to the defendant!
82 NIBOYET 616; 2 WHARTON 1095 required a fundamental difference of
policy.
83
App. Aix {Jan. 23, 1899) 15 Revue Int. Dr. Marit. 42 (collision on the
high seas); Germany: RAAPE 223. Similar isolated suggestions have been made
for acts deemed immoral at the forum (RUDOLF ScHMIDT, op. cit. supra n.
81 at 193) and fraud or gross negligence (PoULETT § 319).
84
The Italian writings by MANZINI, GHIRON, and SERENI are discussed by
MIELE, 5 Giur. Comp. DIP. 84 n. 3·
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turned a seemingly related consideration even into a general
exception to the application of the lex loci delicti, punishable
deeds or omissions being subjected to the law containing
the penal statute; it is very difficult to understand the working
of this rule. 85
Fortunately, the known cases where courts in this country
and elsewhere have refused the application of foreign tort
law on the ground of an offended policy of the forum are
very few. 86 There are ethically grounded divergences, such as
those regarding the right of a spouse to damages from a person who has alienated the other spouse's affection. An Italian87
and possibly a German88 court would dismiss such an action
based on English or American law. The Swiss Federal Court,
on the other hand, has upheld an action for disruption
of marriage, despite the contrary Danish domiciliary law of
the spouses, though basing the decision on an additional
Swiss place of wrong rather than on public policy. 89 Most
applications of public policy have been examples of the wellknown feeling of superiority. Thus, when a governess, who
had been gravely injured by the child of her employer in
Hawaii, sued for damages on the ground of parental liability,
adopted in the Hawaiian Islands as in all French-influenced
legislations, the Supreme Court of California in dismissing
85
C6digo Bustamante, art. I67: Those (obligations) arising from crimes
or offenses are subject to the same law as the crime or offense from which they
arise; art. I 68: Those arising from actions or omissions involving guilt or
negligence not punishable by law shall be governed by the law of the place
where the negligence or guilt giving rise to them was incurred.
86
For the United States see HANCOCK, Torts 86: "quite unusual"; STUMBERG
collects only a few cases.
87
3 FIORE§ 1267.
88
RAAPE I 9 8 advocates even in this case the enforcement of the foreign law.
H. and L. MAZEAUD, 3 Responsabilite civile (ed. :z, I934) § :z:z4o, and
EsMEIN in 6 Planiol et Ripert § 558, discard foreign rules that would not
recognize legitimate defenses; and adopting this suggestion for Belgium, PrRSON
et DE VILLE, 2 Traite de la responsabilite civile extra-contractuelle (I 935) po
§ 407 propose to eliminate foreign laws not making a person liable for fraud
and grave fault. Where do such laws exist?
89
BG. (June IS, I9I7) 43 BGE. II 309, 3I7.
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the claim, revived the similarity doctrine and applied-in
1927-the harsh common law rule of the state, as if it were
a model. 90 The Court seems to have felt as the Supreme Court
of the United States did considerably earlier in applying what it then regarded as the "true" common law rule,
namely, the antiquated fellow-servant doctrine under the
theory that it embodied the "general law"; for this reason,,
the claim of a fireman against a railway under Ohio law
was defeated, in a case where the plaintiff had suffered injury
in an accident in Ohio due to the locomotive engineer's negligence.91 The French Supreme Court once declined to give
effect to a bank monopoly in the territory of Monaco because of the freedom of commerce in France. 92 The courts,
including American and French, seem to have endeavored
more recently to avoid such "provincialism," as Cardozo
has termed it in a famous tort case. 93 We shall encounter,
however, a few borderline cases. 94 And occasionally courts
contrive the application of their own law by such devices as
finding at all costs a place of wrong within the forum. 95

5. Rationale
In some countries, the doctrine referring to the law of
the forum derived support from analogies with penal law,
90
Hudson v. Von Hamm (1927) 85 Cal. App. 323, 259 Pac. 374; see the
just criticism in the Notes, 13 Cornell L. Q. (1928) 266, 26 Mich. L. Rev.
(1928) 439·
91
Baltimore and Ohio R. Co. v. Baugh (I893) I49 U.S. 368. Chief Justice
Fuller, in his dissenting vote, said that the decision unreasonably enlarged the
fellow servant exemption of the employer.
92
App. Aix (Dec. 19, I892) S.I893.2.2oi, aff'd, Cass. (req.) (May 29,
I 894) S.1 894·1.481. Contra: NIBOYET 6I6 n. 3; BARTIN, 2 Principes 404.
93
Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. of New York (19I8) 224 N.Y. 99, xzo N. E.
I 98. See, for instance, the express denial of an objection drawn from public
policy in Loranger v. Nadeau (I932) 215 Cal. 362, IO Pac. (2d) 63 (liability
to a guest passenger) .
French Trib. Valenciennes (Dec. 19, I935) Revue Crit. I936, 468 (fraudulent seduction, as opposed to status questions).
94
Infra Chapter 25, pp. 274-276.
95
E.g., Germany: 150 RGZ. 265, 27I on which see infra pp. 297 n. I 79, 298,
3 I 3 n. 39·
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under the continuing influence of Savigny. This lasted longer
in Latin America than elsewhere, but it has ended also
there. 96 Neither jurisdiction nor choice of law can be organized on the same lines for criminal offenses and private
tort obligations. Even where a court of criminal procedure
is authorized to award equitable damages in ancillary proceedings-the so-called procedure by adhesion-it has to
follow its own internal law.
Application of the law of the place of wrong has often
been based on the idea that a right to damages is vested in
the injured person by that law, 97 or in the famous variant
of Mr. Justice Holmes, that the law of the place of the act
is the only source of the obligation on which the case depends.98 These attempted justifications merit the same reproach as the vested rights theory in general. 99
European authors, continental and English, have been
more inclined to explain the rule upon grounds of policy. A
person owes obedience to the law of the country in which he
is actually present. It is that law under which he is living
at the time of the conduct complained of, and it is that law
alone which can claim to determine the legality or illegality
of his actions/ 00 the law to whose standards he must elevate
his behavior. He who stays in a state is subject to the legal
Italy: Cass. (April z, I92.7) Foro Ita!. Mass. I92.7 II 472., cited by MIELE,
5 Giur. Comp. DIP. 84 n. r.
96
See, for instance, 2. BAR I I 8; ALCORTA, 2. Der. Int. Priv. 346; 3 Vrco 13 7

§ 159·

97
United States: BEALE, 3 Summary §§ I-5, reproduced 3 BEALE I 968;
Cardozo, J., in Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. of New York (19I8), supra n. 93,
224 N. Y. at I 20; more cautious, GOODRICH 2.20.
England: Strangely enough, CHESHIRE 294 adheres to this approach which
he generally rejects.
98
Mr. Justice Holmes in Slater v. Mexican Nat'l R. Co. ( 1904) I 94 U. S.
uo, 126; in Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Brown (xgx4) 234 U.S. 542,
547· Similarly, it is said in France that the law of the country is competent
where the accident as generating factor occurs; see CREMIEu, 5 Repert. 491
No.6.
99
CooK, 35 Col. L. Rev. (1935) 202, Legal Bases 311.
10
° CHESHIRE 294·
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order of that state, or, according to the old fiction, he "submits" himself to the state. 101 At the moment of the act, the
author and the victim of a wrong move in social surrl!>undings
in which they may appreciate their risks and potential liabilities under the local law. The reasonable expectations of the
parties cannot be protected otherwise. 102
In recent years, however, this individualistic and educational theory has been partly replaced by the governmental
consideration of social policy that regards the law of torts
as a law of "social defense" and under which it appears that
the state where the injury occurs has a predominant interest
to protect the injured private interests and to determine the
legal effects of the injury. The primary object of the law of
torts is to regulate the social order and prevent its infringement; the secondary concern is to compensate the victims of
violations of this order. The state cannot fulfill this duty
without including foreigners in its commands. 103
This line of thought leads back to the more solid part of
the ancient theory of territoriality. Every state has a legitimate interest, right, and duty to determine the licit or illicit
character and the effects of acts committed on its soiP 04
In this sense, the law of torts has been classified in France
under the heading of the "laws of public safety and police"
(lois de surete et de police), declared in article 3 of the
Civil Code to be imperative. 105 These laws do not present
"public policy" in contrast with a foreign applicable law, but,
as public law, are territorial by virtue of their normal force. 106
101
As late as 1933, Mr. Justice Brandeis in Young v. Masci (1933) 289
U. S. 253 applied this idea to a nonresident owner of a car who authorizes its
use in the state. See infra Chapter 23, p. 270 n. 72.
102
RHEINSTEIN, "The Place of Wrong," I 9 Tul. L. Rev. (I 945) 4, qff.
103
See the various arguments of 8 LAURENT 24 § Io; RoLIN, I Principes
577; LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIERE §§ 25I and 294; BARTIN, 2 Principes 4I7;
PouLLET § 3 r 7·
104
FEDOZZI 759: It is logical that the law governing on the territory determines the effects and consequences of its own violation; WALKER 522; BARTIN,
2 Principes 3 8 7 § 3 JO.
105
3 FIORE § I 263; NrBOYET § 490.
106
CREMrEu, 5 Repert. 493 No. I 3·
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Each state is said to be in the best position to evaluate its local
107
conditions, as well as the habits and needs of its population.
Finally, the interests of the injured person are emphasized
when it is apparently felt that the natural place for the victim
to seek redress would be the place where his injury occurred,
and if he cannot sue in this jurisdiction, he should at least be
treated upon the basis of its law.
Some of these arguments may appear phrased too neatly
and open to one objection or another. But the principle of
the lex delicti commissi ought not to be deduced from a
single, all-embracing rationale of absolute validity. In searching the relatively most convenient local contact for an alleged
tort, it is reasonable and relatively simple to connect it with
the territory where it was committed. There remains, of
course, the additional task of determining the territory in
which a tort should be considered as having been committed,
and this choice has been unhappily influenced by individual
selection from the mentioned reasons for the lex loci delicti
commtsst.
The advantages of the principle of the lex loci delicti commissi are strong enough to have secured to it an almost universal adherence. The English rule, on the other hand, although it has found favor with a solitary French author108
and indulgent consideration in this hemisphere/09 has lost
ground in England itself. Cheshire recognizes fully the
"superior claim of the lex loci." Inasmuch as the English
rule requires actionability under the English law of the
forum, he tries to excuse this requirement as a clear-cut application of the principle of public policy, easy to be applied
because of its simplicity. 110 This is an exorbitant and harmful
107

ARMINJON ( ed. 2) § I 20.
VALERY 974 § 676.
.
109
RHEINSTEIN, "The Place of Wrong," I9 Tul. L. Rev. (I945) 4, 23;
13 U. of Chi. L. Rev. (I 945) I I I advocates it; justice of the results only is
questioned by FALCONBRIDGE, "Torts in the Conflict of Laws," 23 Can. Bar
Rev. (I94S) 309, 3I4, 3I6; id., Conflict of Laws (1947) 701 ff.
11
CHESHIRE 302.
108

°
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kind of public policy, however, explained only, as ,Hancock
remarks, as a remainder from the time when the common
law jurisdictions "dimly perceived" the conflicts problem. 111
The consequences in the courts of Canada are deterrent examples.112 American and Continental lawyers alike claim
that a state which assumes to regulate conduct carried on upon
its soil ought to concede a corresponding power to all other
states. While a state may refuse to apply in its criminal courts
any criminal law other than its own, such an exaggerated extension of public policy in matters of private law contradicts
the very idea of conflict of laws.
111 HANCOCK,
112
HANCOCK,

Torts 88.
Torts 89, supra n. 57·

CHAPTER
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The Scope of the Principle
r. The Law of Wrong Governs Capacity to Commit a Tore

HIS universal rule operates in Continental and English courts as a considerable breach in the personal law,
while it conforms to the territorial doctrine maintained
in the United States subjecting transactions of various kinds
to the law of the place where the "act is done."

T

Illustration. An American youth of I 5 years, by driving
a car in Brazil, injures a person. In all courts, his responsibility
is to be determined according to the Brazilian Civil Code,
article I 56, which is understood as rejecting liability of persons under sixteen years. 2 A Brazilian boy of the same age,
acting in Venezuela, is capable according to his faculty of
discernment (Venezuelan Civil Code, article u86).
Equitable compensation for damage done by an irresponsible individual, now frequently provided after the pattern
of article 829 of the German Civil Code,3 is naturally included in the law of wrong.~
2.

Unlawfulness
Liability for tort, m contrast to other forms of liability

1
Restatement §§ 3 79-3 8I (by implication).
Germany: RAAPE I97·
Norway: CHRISTIANSEN, 6 Repert. 579 No. I 54·
Poland: Int. Priv. Law, art. II No. z.
Switzerland: BECK I37 n. zo. Contra: for the present law, ScHNITZER z89
( ed. z, 544) with formalistic arguments.
2 J. M. DE CARVALHo SANTOS, 3 Codigo Civil Brasileiro Interpretado (ed.
3, I94z) z98; Cwvrs BEVILAQUA, r Codigo Civil (ed. 6, I94o) 4zo.
3 The Belgian C. C. art. 1386 bis, as amended by Law of April I6, 1935,
formulates the idea more correctly: the judge may hold a lunatic or abnormal
person liable to pay what he would be obligated to, if he had control of his
acts.
4 However, BARTIN, z Principes 398 § 333 would follow French public policy
in the case of a French defendant.
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created by law, presupposes that the conduct causing the
harm be unlawful. This requirement has two phases regarding the type of interests invaded, and the circumstances of
the invasion.
(a) Illicit conduct. The various legislations determine differently the spheres within which private persons are protected and those left to free action by the other members of
the community. A fundamental cleavage exists between the
two great systems, of which one establishes separately shaped
torts and the other recognizes a general tort liability. The
first is represented by the common law as well as by the
Roman law and the German Civil Code, the second by the
French Civil Code and its numerous followers.
The primary question to be asked under the law of wrong
is, therefore, whether the facts complained of constitute forbidden conduct. In regard to omissions, which cannot be
tortious without violation of a general duty, it seems to be
recognized, conforming to principle, that the duty must be
imposed by the law of the place of wrong. 5 Thus, failure by
a locomotive driver to signal at a railway crossing, and failure
of an employer to guard dangerous machinery, are considered wrongful to the extent admitted by the law at the
place. 6 What the extracontractual duties of a bank are in paying a check, is determined by the locallaw. 7
(b) Authorized acts. An invasion of interests, not ordinarily allowed, may yet be lawful under particular circumstances constituting justification and excuse. The law of
wrong determines these exceptions to liability such as selfdefense, defense of other persons or of the interests of the
state, consent or assumption of risk by the injured person,
legislative, judicial, or executive acts, or authorization by the
state.
5 The question is, however, what place this is. See infra Chapter 26, p. 312.
6 See Restatement§ 384; HANCOCK, Torts 107.
7
App. Paris (June 23, 1899) Clunet 1901, 128.
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The Restatement ( § 3 82) mentions some of these defenses for the particular purpose of assigning them to the
law of the place of "acting" rather than to the law of the
place where the harm is done. At this juncture, it is important only that they are not governed by the law of the forum.
However, it should be noted that the existence and extent
of disciplinary rights of husbands, parents, guardians, teachers, and so forth are governed by none of these laws but
are subject to their proper conflicts rules. Whether, for example, a father may forcibly coerce his child or a husband
may open the letters of his wife, depends on the family law
applicable. As we have seen before, in American courts such
incidents are usually determined by the temporary common
residence of the parties, which may be, or may not be, identical with the place of wrong or the forum.
3· Causation and Fault
(a) Causation. There are not five or more meanings of
causation to deal with here, but only two, a logical and a
juridical denotation. Causal nexus, causation in its only
logical meaning, exists when the conduct complained of is
one of the antecedents in the sequence of events resulting
in the injury-a ccconditio sine qua non"-i.e., the harm
would not have happened if the act had not been done. Such
causal connection, although necessary for any liability, a
requirement sometimes neglected,8 is not the only qualification of a juridically significant causation. The doctrines concerning its other elements vary. The Anglo-American doctrine of proximate causation, the German theory of "adequate
causation," and the French view halfway between the first
two, have much in common, as they all seek to eliminate the
influence of extraordinary events on the reasonably foresee8

Even

POLLOCK,

Torts

r 23

fails to make these concepts clear.
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able course of things. But they vary in details. 9 Also a;nong
the jurisdictions of this country, certain differences exist, for
instance in regard to the scope of proximate effects. 10
The principle implies that all courts observe the rules of
the courts at the place of wrong.
(b) Fault. The law of wrong further determines, whether
fault is a condition of liability and, if so, whether it may be
ordinary negligence (culpa levis in Romanistic language) or
has to be gross negligence or wanton recklessness (culpa
lata) or some intermediary degree of culpability (culpa in
concreto) .11 A divergent standard used at the forum certainly does not involve public policy. 12
American courts, for instance, hold an automobile driver
liable to a guest passenger for injury suffered, as the law
of the wrong requires, either for nonobservance of ordinary
care and skill or only for gross negligence. 13 The law of
the forum is immaterial in this regard.
Mere questions of evidence respecting negligence, 14 of
course, are determinable by the law of the forum. Jury findings, moreover, may be uncontrollable to the extent to
which they follow a foreign view. 15
(c) Contributory negligence. The law of wrong governs
any behavior of the plaintiff influencing causation or avoidable consequences. This conduct, despite such expressions as
contributory negligence, cannot be "fault" in the strict sense
9
A comparative study has been undertaken in my Recht des Warenkaufs
473fi.
10 Illustrations in Restatement § 383 and by HANCOCK, Torts ro8.
11
Restatement § 3 79·
12 Expressly to this effect, in the case of a more severe standard for the forum:
Loranger v. Nadeau (1932) 215 Cal. 362., ro Pac. (zd) 63; Eskovitz v.
Berger (1936) 2.76 Mich. 536,2.68 N. W. 883.
13 See the collection of cases by HANCOCK, Torts 105. Against the usual
superficial assertions that degrees of fault are practically impossible, see Trueman, J. A., in Knutson v. Rawn [1943] z D. L. R. 582..
14 For burden of proof and presumptions see infra ro(b) pp. 2.83 ff.
15 HAMS HAW, Note, 4 Mo. L. Rev. ( r 939) at 305; cf. the informative note
by HANCOCK, Torts§ 33 on determination of facts by court or jury.
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of the word, which would require the existence and violation
of a duty toward another person. What the plaintiff may have
infringed, was a precept for his own benefit. But his conduct
is evaluated in analogy to the standards of the care due to
others. 16 The law of wrong is competent to define the effects :17
whether plaintiff is barred from his action according to the
common law principle of contributory negligence/ 8 whether
his action depends on somewhat more modern theories such
as that of "last clear chance," or the recovery of damages
is subject to a deduction proportionate to the plaintiff's contribution to the end result. 19
Illustrations: (i) A brakeman injured in the Province of
Quebec suing his employer in Vermont, was permitted recovery under the Quebec theory of comparative negligence,
although Vermont law shared in the common law doctrine
of con tri bu tory negligence. 20
(ii) The plaintiff's conduct having contributed to the damage, done in a place where French law was in force, the
Reichsgericht applied the doctrine of the French courts of
balancing the actions of both parties, although the Reichsgericht itself had developed a different theory when the Code
Napoleon was in force in the Rhineland. 21

If under a statute a party is liable without fault, as a
railway may be in case of accident, this party's own claim for
damages suffered in such case will generally also be reduced
by reason of having contributed to its own damage by mere
causation. In any case, the law of wrong decides how to
estimate the factors of the damage.
16

Cf. 2 Restatement of the Law of Tort § 463.
Restatement § 385.
The Canadian Supreme Court in Ottawa El. R. Co. v. Letang [I924]
S. C. R. 470 applying Ontario law as that of the place of wrong dismissed the
action, in subordinating contributory negligence (wrongly) to the maxim
"scienti non fit injuria."
19
For cases, see STUMBERG I 69 n. 25; HANCOCK, Torts I I I n. 6.
20
Morrisette v. Canadian Pacific R. Co. (I.9o4) 76 Vt. 267, 56 Atl. noz.
21
RG. (March u, I 906) JW. I 9o6, 297.
17

18
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Illustration. A street car of the plaintiff, a Swiss company,
collided on the territory of the Swiss Canton Basel with the
motor truck of the German defendant. The German courts
applied the Swiss law of March 28, 1905, on the liability
of railroads for risk, to judge the quasi liability of the plaintiff street car company; assumed negligence of the defendant
under article 41 of the Swiss Code of Obligations; and
distributed the damages in the proportion of two-thirds to
one, according to article 44 of this Code. 22

In a singular American case, a wife was injured by a third
person in an accident for which her own husband was jointly
responsible. Her claim against the tortfeasor was made dependent on the question whether her husband would benefit
by her recovery. This latter question was subjected to the
law of the place of wrong, 23 by exaggerating the usual encroachment of this law on family relations.
Characterization. All these rules are substantive and susceptible of foreign application. This has been fully realized,
not only in cases where the laws of the place of wrong and
of the forum agreed in characterizing their rules on contributory or comparative negligence as substantive in all respects, 24 but also where the rule of the forum was regarded
as "procedural for most purposes." 25 We may add that, even
if at the place of wrong concurrent fault of the plaintiff is
treated as a bar to his action under some procedural view,
the action has to be dismissed because this is the "law" to
which we are referred. This probably is true everywhere
without regard to the usual fallacies of "characterization."
22

0LG. Karlsruhe (Oct. 28, I93I) IPRspr. I932 No. 41.
Traglio v. Harris (I940) I04 F. (2d) 439; Note, I27 A. L. R. 8I3.
24
Fitzpatrick v. International R. Co. (I929) 25Z N.Y. I27, I69 N. E.
I I 2 (applying Ontario law); HANCOCK, Torts I 20 n. I 7·
25
Precourt v. Driscoll (I93I) 85 N.H. 28o, I57 Atl. 525; KinB:ery v.
Donnell (1936) 222 Iowa 24I, 246, 268 N. W. 617, 6zo; Restatement~§ 385,
595 comment a; RoBERTSON, Characterization 259.
23
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4· Proper Plaintiff
The lex loci delicti governs :26
(a)Beneficiary of the to,rt claim. Thus, a Scotch court dismissed an action of a woman seduced in London on the
ground that English common law gave the right of action
to her parents only. 27 In the United States, the death statute
of the state of wrong decides the beneficiaries on behalf of
whom representative action should be brought. 28
Suppose an American is negligently killed in Switzerland
by a German. The personal action does not disappear as
under common law, nor does any American death statute
apply, neither will the German rule govern, entitling the
relatives having a legal claim to be supported by the deceased. Instead, all courts will apply the Swiss rule under
which all persons deprived of their support by the death
may sue for compensation. 29
Consistently, the Quebec court has applied the domiciliary
law of Massachusetts to the action of a husband for the loss
suffered by himself through the death of his wife. 30 Notably,
the Belgian Supreme Court applying the French law of
workmen's compensation to a minor's death occurring in
France, has refused an exception of public policy against the
French provision granting the right to sue only to the relatives living in France at the time of the accident. 31
On the other hand, it is correct for a court of a civil
26
Sapone v. New York Central R. Co. (I927) 225 N.Y. Supp. 2II, Clunet
1928, 795 criticized in procedural respects in Note, 37 Yale L. J. (I928) 666;
WHARTON II27i GOODRICH 253 § IOI; LORENZEN, 47 Law Q. Rev. (I9JI)
at 497; KUHN, 21 Recueil (1928) I at 263.
27
Ross v. 'Sinhjee (1891) 29 Scot. L. R. 63.
28
HANCOCK, Torts 124; see ibid. his considered review of the cases dealing

with the interpretation of the statutes ordaining distribution of the damages in
the same proportions as personal property of a deceased intestate.
29
See Swiss Code Obl., art. 45 par. 3, cf. German BGB. §§ 844 par. 2, 845·
30
Lister v. McAnulty [I 943] Que. K. B. I 84.
31
Belgium: Cass. (Feb. 21, 1907) Pasicrisie 1907.I.IJ5.
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law country to assume that the applicable statute of distribution determines who is the beneficiary after the death of an
injured person having acquired an inheritable right against
a tortfeasor. Thus, where a domiciliary of New York had
suffered an automobile accident in France and died in New
York, and the surrogate's court of New York appointed an
executor, the French Court of Cassation recognized this
executor as a successor to be the right plaintiff to enforce the
tort action in France, whereas the court below had insisted that
according to the French law, being the lex loci delicti, the
heirs had to appear. 32 Evidently, the courts were not aware of
the American controversies regarding the application of death
statutes. In any event, an American court should recognize
in this case that French law, including its conflicts law, decided to whom the action belonged.
(b) Indirect harm. Whereas in many legislations, including the French, all persons injured by the tortious act are
entitled to claim damages, in others, particularly in German
law, only the person "directly harmed" may sue. If, for
instance, goods sold but not delivered are injured and the
title has not passed, the buyer may sue the tortfeasor under
French but not under German law. Which law governs depends on the place of wrong. The same is to be said with
respect to the Anglo-American rule that injury, not malicious
or fraudulent, inflicted upon a person does not give rise to
an action for damages by a third person suffering a loss in
his contractual right against the injured. 33
(c) Plaintiff in own name on behalf of the injured. The
question who may bring the suit on behalf of the party entitled, in the opinion of Beale, is a procedural matter, 34 but
32

Cass. (crim.) (June 4, 1941) Clunet 1945,112.
62. C. J. 112.o § 30. On the question of whether seller or buyer
or both may sue for tortious injury to the object of a sales contract, a complicated proposal appears in the Final Draft No. 1 of a Revised Uniform Sales
of Goods Act§ 127.
34 Restatement§ s88 j 3 BEALE 160J.
33 KENNY,
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this assertion conflicts with the prevailing practice of applying
the death statutes 35 governing the wrong. Whether a husband may enforce the claim of'his wife in his own name or a
parent in the name of his or her child is also determined in
this country by the law of wrong (see infra p. 265), whereas
abroad the law governing marital property311 applies.

5. Proper Defendant
(a) Co-obligors. Although a few authorities have appl;ed
local procedural law to the question whether co-obligors
must be joined in an action/ 7 it is the consistent and prevailing opinion that the entire problem of determining the persons to be sued pertains to the law of the place of wrong. This
includes the questions whether several debtors are liable for
the whole damage jointly, or jointly and severally, or separately, each for the damage done by him, and whether the
action may, or must, be directed against the several debtors
jointly or separately. 38 Only the manner of bringing the suit
against such obligors pertains to the procedure of the forum. 39
(b) Claim against the insurer of the tortfeasor. The injured person enjoys a direct action against the insurer of the
tortfeasor, if, and only if the law of the place of tort gives
it. The French law imposing direct liability on the insurer40
35

See HANCOCK, Torts u6ff.
Canada, Ontario: Lucas v; Coupal (I93o) 66 0. L. R. I4I (suit by
mother).
Germany: BGB. § 1380; E. G. art. IS·
37
General Steam Navigation Co. v. Guillou (I843) 11 M. & W. 877, IP,
Eng. Re. I o6 I ; Fryklund v. Great Northern R. Co. (I 907) I oi Minn. 3 7, I I I
N. w. 77.7; 3 BEALE I603,
38
Mosby v. Manhattan Oil Co. (C. C. A. 8th I93I) sz F. (zd) 364;
HANCOCK, Torts I o9, uo n. I 6, I 3:1..
39
STUMBERG zzo n. 74·
4
°C. C. art. zioz § 8, as amended by Law of May z8, I9I3; Cass. (req.)
{Feb. 24, I936) Ocean Accident v. Dewinter, D.I936.I.49, S.I936.1.I6I,
Revue 1937, 441. The Appeal Court of Orleans (Dec. 21, 1936) Nouv. Revue
1936, 75I, simply recognized the lex loci delicti, although it ascribed exclusive
jurisdiction over the Swiss insurer to the Swiss courts, under the then existing
text of the French-Swiss Convention of I 869. On the various arguments in the
lower courts, preceding these decisions, see J. DoNNEDIEU DE VABRES 595ff.
36
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necessarily applied in a case where an automobile accident
occurred in France. It was needless for the French Court of
Cassation to stress the public interest involved. 41
The problem, however, has been regarded as more complicated in this country. On one hand, a statute imposing
upon an insurer direct responsibility to the injured third
party has been held binding with respect to all contracts made
in the state, irrespective of the place where an injury occurs. 42
On the other hand, cases conflict on the question whether the
direct recourse provided by the state of the place of wrong
may be applied to a foreign insurer who has contracted
outside the state. 43 Although the refusal to apply the law of
the place of injury certainly should not be based on the
ground that it concerns only a remedy/ 4 both opinions have
been supported by policy considerations. 45 But it seems that
when the insurance contract covers injuries committed by
the insured party in the state where the tort occurs, there is
no valid reason why the statute of the state of wrong should
41 See the criticism of Cass. (Feb. 24, 1936) supra n. 40, by BATIFFOL,
Revue 1937, 441 and EsMEIN, 11 Z.ausl.PR. (1937) 861. But a Swiss writer,
Eo. ScHMID, "Zur Frage der Rechtsanwendung bei Verkehrsunfallen Schweizerischer Motorfahrzeugbesitzer im Ausland," 35 SJZ. 248, has urged that the
Swiss Law of 1932, art. 49, granting the injured person a direct suit against
the insurer should be applied in the case of Swiss insurance parties and a German
place of accident, while the Appeal Court of Ziirich (Feb. 23, 1938) 38
Bl.f.Ziirch.Rspr. (1939) 356 No. 145, 41 Bull. Inst. Int. (1939) No. 10753
conformed to the (German) law of the place of wrong.
42 HANCOCK, Torts 240; Cormier v. Hudson (1933) 284 Mass. 231, 187
N. E. 625 {statute of the forum); Farrell v. Employers' Liability Assurance
Co. (1933) 54 R. I. 18, 168 Atl. 911, Note, 18 Minn. L. Rev. (1933) 737
(implied).
4 3 Denying the liability: Riding v. Travelers' Ins. Co. (1927) 48 R. !·
433, 138 Atl. 186; Martin v. Zurich General Accident Co. (C. C. A. rst 1936)
84 F. (2d) 6; Lowery v. Zorn (C. A. La. 2d 1934) 157 So. 826, 831.
Allowing the recourse: Kertson v. Johnson (1932) 185 Minn. 591, 242
N. W. 329 (law of Wisconsin applied in Minnesota) ; Burkett v. Globe Indemnity Co. (1938) 182 Miss. 423, 181 So. 316; cf. HANCOCK, Torts 24di.
44 Thus McArthur v. Maryland Casualty Co. (1939) 184 Miss. 663, 186
So. 305. Contra: HANCOCK, Torts 242.
45 Correct: Kertson v. Johnson (1932) 185 Minn. 591, 242 N. W. 329;
but see cases and discussion by HANCOCK, Torts 241 whose arguments for doubt
I cannot follow.
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not be able to turn the claim for damages directly against the
insurer. Nothing more is done thereby than that the insurance
claim is transferred, by operation of law, from the injurer
to the injured, instead of the longer way of recourse by
assignment, which may be voluntary or by way of garnishment. The insurance company does not lose any advantage
and cannot complain about any mentionable extension of its
liability. Any other solution jeopardizes the efficacy of the law
of the place of wrong.
6. Influence of Family Relations
American courts extend the law of the place of wrong to
the problems: whether a married person may sue the other
spouse for tort suffered during the marriage, 413 and even
whether a claim for injury may be brought after the parties
marry each other in another state; 47 whether a claim belongs
to the injured wife 48 or to the husband49 or to the community property; 50 whether a wife may avail herself of the
claim of her injured husband. 51
Nevertheless, when New York law prohibited litigation
between spouses, the Court of Appeals of New Y ark extended the prohibition to domiciled spouses also in the case
of an injury committed in a state allowing such suits. 52 This
46
Dawson v. Dawson ( 1931) 224 Ala. IJ, 138 So. 414; Howard v. Howard
(1931) 200 N.C. 574, 158 S. E. xor; Gray v. Gray (1934) 87 N.H. 82,
I 74 Atl. soS j Darian v. McGrath (Minn. 1943) 10 N. w. (2d) 403 (injury
in Wisconsin, action against husband would be allowed despite the contrary
domiciliary law of the forum, hence wife is granted relief against the car
owner).
47
Buckeye v. Buckeye (1931) 203 Wis. 248, 234 N. W. 342 (law of
Illinois contrary to the domiciliary law of Wisconsin). See Notes, 29 Mich. L.
Rev. (1931) 937, 1072; 79 U. of Pa. L. Rev. (rgJr) 8o4; 44 Harv. L.
Rev. (1930) IIJ8; 31 Col. L. Rev. (r931) 884; 6 Wis. L. Rev. (1931)

IOJ.
48

Texas & Pac. R. Co. v. Humble (1901) 181 U. S. 57·
Snashall v. Metropolitan etc. R. Co. (r89o) 8 Mackey (D. C.) 399;
see GooDRICH p8 n. 18.
~ 0 Justs v. Atchison etc. R. Co. (1910) 12 Cal. App. 639, ro8 Pac. 32.8.
51 Usher v. West Jersey R. Co. (x88g) 126 Pa. 'St. z.o6, 17 At!. 597·
52 Mertz v. Mertz (1936) 2.71 N.Y. 466, 3 N. E. (2d) 597; Note, ro8
49
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decision has been followed in some other jurisdictions.53 The
action against the spouse or his insurer may thus fail due to
one or the other of both statutes involved. The New York
court has not allowed its own new policy of permitting the
suit, 54 to prevail against a foreign statute barring it. 55
However, the contrary approach, exclusively applying
the personal law that governs the marital relations, has increasingly found sympathy with American writers. 56 This is
the common view held in all the world. 57 In a recent case,S 8
Judge Learned Hand refused to give effect to the common
law rule governing tort in Florida, whereby a husband would
be liable for his wife's tort committed in Florida in his absence. Both spouses were citizens of New York, and the
various reasons for exonerating this resident from vicarious
liability may seem debatable. 59 But the emphasis on the
domiciliary law in this case confirms the trend.
The Louisiana Court, however, abandoned its domiciliary
principle60 in favor of the prevailing approach in a recent
case where a wife, injured by the negligence of her husband
in Louisiana, sued the insurance company in Louisiana. The
defendant objected that under the law of Texas, the domicil
of the spouses, the claim belonged to the community property
A. L. R. II26. Against the argument of the court that the common law prohibition of actions between spouses belonged to procedure, see HANCOCK, Torts
2J6.
53 Poling v. Poling (I935) 116 W.Va. I87, I79 S. E. 6o4; Kircher v.
Kircher (I939) 288 Mich. 669, 286 N. W. uo; Kyle v. Kyle (I94I) 2IO
Minn. 204, 297 N. W. 744 (no action despite the law of Wisconsin).
54 § 57 Domestic Relations Act, as amended by Laws I937> c. 669 § I.
55 Coster v. Coster (I943) 289 N.Y. 438, 46 N. E. (2d) 509; Note, I46
A. L. R. 7oz, 705.
56 STUMBERG I86; CooK, Legal Bases 248, 345; HANCOCK, Torts 236;
RHEINSTEIN, 4I Mich. L. Rev. (I942) 83, 95 and I9 Tul. L. Rev. (I944)
I99·
57 See Vol. I, 322, 6o6.
58 Siegmann v. Meyer (C. C. A. 2nd I938) Ioo F. (2d) 367.
59 Particularly in extending the position taken by Justice Brandeis and Judge
Learned Hand in the case of an absentee-nonresident employer, on which see
below pp. 267 ff. In other respects cf. Note, 52 Harv. L. Rev. (I939) 834;
HANCOCK, Torts 255.
so Williams v. Pope Manufacturing Co. (I9oo) 52 La. Ann. I417> 27 So.

s5I.
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fund and only the husband was entitled to sue. The court
disregarded the law of the domicil preferred hitherto. Instead, it stated that the right to sue would ordinarily be
subject to the law of the forum, but that suing the husband
is also concerned with a substantive problem governed by
the law of the place of wrong which therefore is also to
be consulted.'6 1 This approach is really untenable.
7. Vicarious Liability
(a) Principle. It may be stated as a universal principle,
though certain limitations are in discussion, that the law of
the place of wrong determines the liability of third persons
who are not tortfeasors, accomplices, instigators, or accessones.
This proviso should be noted. Vicarious liability is not in
question, if the third person is a tortfeasor himself. For instance, if the general concessionaire of an amusement park
has contracted with an independent manufacturer of fireworks
for a display, he may be sued for his own negligence, if he
did not take care that the premises were kept in a safe condition for the public invited by him. 62 He may incur vicarious
liability, however, if he is responsible under the applicable
law for the negligence of the independent contractor.
The liability involves such persons as masters of servants,
parents of minor children, custodians of juvenile or dangerous
persons, schoolmasters or artisans in respect to pupils and
apprentices, employers of independent contractors for risk
inherent to the work, or owners of vessels, as the various
laws may ordain their liabilities. 63 The English case of The
61
Matney v. Blue Ribbon, Inc. (1942) 12 So. (2d) 253; Note, 18 Tul. L.
Rev. (1943) 319.
62
Sebeck v. Plattdeutsche Volkfest Verein (19oo) 64 N. J. Law 624, 46
Atl. 631. Cf. in general, Restatement of Torts§ 875 in connection with§§ 430453·
63
United States: Restatement§ 387; Note, 47 Harv. L. Rev. (1933) 349·
Belgium: Trib. Antwerp (Jan. 23, 1936) Jur. Port d'Anvers 1936, 197.
See also PouLLET 398 § 318 (with some restrictions).
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Mary Moxham is typical for the negative side of this principle. Negligent navigation in a Spanish harbor not constituting a cause of liability of the vessel's owner according to
Spanish law, the court in England disregarded the English
law which would have made him responsible. 64 On the other
hand, a Michigan freight transport company using the services of a truck owner by contract for hauling freight is held
answerable even in Michigan courts for negligence of the
independent contractor, in conformity with the law of the
Ohio place of accident, whereby a common carrier cannot
delegate its duties to ensure public safety. 65
(b) Persons out of state. Although the principle is firmly
established everywhere, except under the dual requirement
of English law, some doubts have arisen respecting the
propriety of the imposition of liability by the state of wrong
on a person, not a subject, who, according to the premises
of our topic, is innocent, though a cause of the tort. These
scruples have taken diverse shapes in this country and in
Europe. A small group of European writers and courts have
claimed that liability cannot be imposed on an innocent third
person except by the law which is considered his personal
law. 66 Otherwise, it has been argued, foreigners lacking any
Germany: ROHG. (Jan. I9, I878) 23 ROHGE. I74; RG. (Sept. 23, I887)
I9 RGZ. 382; (July I, I896) 37 RGZ. I8I; (May 30, I9I9) 96 RGZ. 96.
See for other cases LEWALD 267 No. 324 sub (4); RAAPE n6.
The Netherlands: Hof Amsterdam (June 5, I9I4) W. 9753 (Englishmen
damaged by receipt with false signature issued in Germany by a bookkeeper
beyond the course of his employment in the service of a Dutch firm in Utrecht;
§ 83I of the German BGB. applied); H. R. (March I8, I938) W. I939
No. 69 as commented by the Note (MEIJERS) ibid.
Switzerland: 2 MElLI 94·
64 The Mary Moxham (C. A. I876) I P. D. Io7. Cf. RoBERTSON, "Law
for Tort Liability," 4 Modern L. Rev. (I94I) 35·
' 65 Laughlin v. Michigan Motor Freight Co. (I936) 276 Mich. 545, 268
N. W. 887. Restatement§ 387 (c) illustration 3·
66 2 BAR In; 2 ZITELMANN 533; OLG. Hamburg (April 5, I895) 6
Z.int.R. I70 and {Nov. u, I9o6) I4 ROLG. 39I; OLG. Karlsruhe (Dec. I8,
I917) 20 Badische Rechtspraxis 99 (cited byLEWALD 267).
Switzerland: BG. (April ro, 1896) 22 BGE. 471, 486. A particular
opinion has been suggested by BARTIN, 2 Principes 430 § 340: the law governing the contractual relationship between master and servant. Contra: z
MElLI 94·
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connection with a state, might be involved, at the pleasure
of the state, in heavy obligations without being able to avoid
them. 67 Hence, a Swiss principal employing a traveling salesman, who injures someone in France by negligently handling
inflammable material, would be free from liability under
Swiss .law, by proving that he has chosen and supervised his
agent with due care. 68 The prevailing approach allows no
such exemption, the commettant (master) being absolutely
liable for the fault of his prepose committed in the course
of the employment in France, according to French law. 69
In this country, in the same vein, two outstanding judges
have penetrated the problem from the angles either of the
constitutional requirement of due process or of a peculiar
requirement brought into the conflicts rule. In both cases
the question was whether the owner of a car, who had been
out of the state at all material times could be held liable for
negligence of the driver on the ground of a statute at the
place where the accident occurred subjecting the owner to
liability.
The first case was concerned with the New York statute
imposing absolute liability on the owner of a car, if the
negligent driver was "in the business of such owner or otherwise ... legally using or operating the same with the permission, express or implied, of such owner.mo The courts
of New Jersey, the domicil of the defendant owner, applied
the New York statute as lex loci delicti on the ground of the
owner's permission to take the car to the state of New York. 71
The Supreme Court of the United States affirmed the constitutionality of this choice of law. 72 Mr. Justice Brandeis,
in delivering the judgment, reviewed the various remedies
67

68

2

ZITELMANN 534·

Swiss Code Obi., art. 55·
French C. C. art. 1384, cf. AMos and WALTON, Introduction to French
Law (Oxford 1935) 259.
70
N.Y. Vehicle and Traffic Law,§ 59·
71
Masci v. Young (1932) 109 N. J. Law 453, 162 Atl. 623. Similarly,
Kernan v. Webb (1929) so R.I. 394> 148 Atl. 186, 188.
72
Young v. Masci (1933) 289 U.S. 253.
69
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introduced in American jurisdictions to supplement the insufficient doctrine of principal and agent, among which, in
a few jurisdictions including New York, statutory liability
has been imposed on the mere basis of the owner's permission
or consent to drive the car into the state. This condition,
under any circumstances, secured such due process of law
as a nonresident could expect. For the defendant who lent
his car to the driver, "subjected himself to the legal consequences imposed by that state . . . as fully as if he had
stood in the relation of master to servant.m 3
This line of thought has been transposed into the conflict of laws by the Federal Circuit Court of New York, in
a celebrated decision delivered by Judge Learned Hand, in
Scheer v. Rockne Motors Corporation. 14 An automobile sales
corporation of Buffalo, New York, employed a sales agent,
Clemens, who took an automobile owned by the firm to
Ontario and there caused an accident, supposedly by negligence. The statute of Ontario, taken literally (and probably
in its intended meaning), made the owner of the car liable,
unless the car was without his consent in the possession of
another person. 75 Since Clemens might not have acted within
the scope of his employment, the problem was whether the
73
Mr. Justice Brandeis added that "A person who sets a means in movement
whereby injury is inflicted, makes himself liable, whether by responsible agent
or an irresponsible instrument." This is an unfortunate confusion of our case of
an innocent third person with the cases of tortfeasors acting by an intervening
person or by an instrument. On the other hand, 2. BEALE I297 unnecessarily
interprets this passage to the effect that someone who puts an instrument into
the hand of a tortfeasor without knowing that it is to be used in another state,
should be liable under this state's law.
74
Scheer v. Rockne Motors Corp. (I934) 68 F. (zd) 942.
75 Two opinions of Canadian barristers on the construction of art. 41 (I),
in the Ontario Highway Traffic Amendment Act, 1930, submitted in Scheer v.
Rockne Motors, supra n. 74, contradicted each other.
No other case in point seems to have occurred. However, in the interpretation
of the majority in Thompson v. Bourchier [1933] 0. R. szs, [1933] 3D. L ..R.
I I 9, the intention of the legislature was to impose liability on the owner With
whose consent someone else has possession and control of the car. The court excluded the possibility for the owner to evade his liability by parting with the
possession and control and renting the car under an agreement whereby the

THE SCOPE OF THE PRINCIPLE

271

Ontario statute, if understood in its more rigid meaning,
could be applied by the court in New York. The court denied
this: "The mere possession of the car did not suffice for
Ontario to reach the defendant," and held that, only "if the
defendant authorized Clemens to take the car into Ontario,
it (the defendant corporation) became liable to the extent
contemplated by the statute."
It is well to bear in mind that neither decision dwells on
the fact that the law of the place of injury was more severe
than that of the defendant's domicil or of another place.
If no vicarious liability arose at the place of wrong, none
would result from the law of a state in which no harm has
been done, whatever this law may predicate.
Finally, the Restatement has concluded the evolution by
a general rule ( § 3 87, comment a) :
"In order that the law of the state of wrong may apply
to create liability against the absentee defendant, he must in
some way have submitted himself to the law of that state.
It is sufficient if he has authorized or permitted another to
act for him in the state in which the other's conduct occurs
or where it takes effect.... For analogous situations involving
this problem see §§ 343 and 344" (referring to cases of
contracts made on the authority of a third person). 711
This "analogy" is a delicate point. The Anglo-American
doctrine of the master's liability for torts committed by his
servant has been established traditionally on the assumption
of an authority, but this assumption is fictitious and not really
observed. Whatever is within the scope of the employment
is covered by the liability, even though it may strictly run
other person should comply with all duties of care. It would seem that the
owner should no more he exempted by an agreement not to drive the car into
New York. This broad construction of the statute agrees with the inferences
by the New York court (at p. 495) from two older Ontario decisions.
16
Restatement, comment a to § 3 8 7. The black letter text itself is too vague
and obscure to be discussed here.
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against the express orders of the employer. 77 To refer to this
old fiction confuses our problem the more as contract and
tort are essentially different sources of obligation. Where a
person grants a power of attorney to contract on his behalf
in another state, he fulfills an essential requirement for his
becoming a party to the contract; sending his agent to Rome,
he may be supposed to do as those in Rome do; it is reasonable, in this case, to argue that he has, in some sense, submitted himself to the law of the foreign state. The case of
apparent authority implied by the principal's conduct, is
"analogous." But regulations of traffic on highways and the
corresponding imposition of liabilities are in no sense dependent on the consent of private persons. Only the historical
connection of vicarious liability with the doctrine of master
and servant has induced an enlarged concept of "agency,"
broad enough to destroy its proper meaning. Judges Brandeis
and Learned Hand had still to break a path for the recognition of foreign liabilities beyond the acts of a servant committing a tort within the scope of his employment. Their
opinions have to be read in this historical connection and to
the affirmative effect. Judge Hand took care to express that
it did not matter whether the car owner knew the law of
Ontario and thus plainly accepted the risk of liability under
the Ontario statute. Not that he submitted himself to the
foreign law but that his conduct was a contributory cause
of the injury, was the basis of the New York judgment. It
may perhaps be asked why the mere fact of entrusting the car
to somebody else could not be equally regarded as sufficient.
In no case, however, is the problem concerned either with
agency proper, which requires a legal transaction on behalf
or on account of the principal, or with the proper concept of
instrumentality which presupposes that the third person
himself is a tortfeasor. The idea of the Restatement that a
77

See

WEIGERT, 4

Rechtsvergl. Handwiirterbuch 53·
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state could not make any private person liable for a tort
committed on its own territory, unless this person submitted
himself to this state, is antiquated. The old and universal
liability of the owners of vessels for collisions, irrespective
of their consent to anything, not to speak of the ancient
liabilities for slaves and cattle, should have been a warning.
A county court in Pennsylvania has correctly held that the
resident owner of a dog was absolutely liable for the dog's
biting a person thirty miles away in New Jersey, in accordance
with the New Jersey law and regardless of negligence required at the forum. 78 Moreover, the Restatement admits
that the law of the place of wrong decides whether an actor,
at the time of the injury,' 9 is acting within the scope of his
employment, 80 and whether an acting person is an independent contractor or a servant. 81 It would seem logical that the
same law should determine whether a car owner has permitted his wife to use the car; what the circumstances are under
which a car owner is deemed to permit his wife or son the use
of the car; and whether the permission of use must refer to
the particular state or only to foreign states in general, or
whether the simple abandonment of "possession" suffices (as
seemingly in the Ontario statute). If the foreign state's jurisdiction or law really depended upon a consent of the party, its
court would have to consult his domiciliary law respecting
the existence of this premise. Indeed, Zitelmann, who developed a line of thought similar to the two American
decisions, 82 considered vicarious liability governed by the
personal law of the third person.
Reducing the overextended and oversimplified rule of
78
Fischl v. Chubb (1937) 30 Pa. D. & C. 40; Note, 51 Harv. L. Rev.
(1938) 7J8.
79
Followed, Venuto v. Robinson (C. C. A. 3rd 1941) 118 F. (zd) 679,
per Goodrich, J.
80
Illustrations 1 and z to Restatement§ 387.
81
Illustration 3 to Restatement§ 387.
82
2 ZITELMANN 541,
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the Restatement again to the original thought, there remains
the constitutional limitation asserted by the Supreme Court,
and, as the result of the New York decision, a public policy
disapproving of foreign liability for risk, unfair to an absentee.
But there are few, if any, foreign types of liability to be
feared. Nowhere is a car owner made liable without any
possibility of exemption. 83 There exists a broad risk liability
under a German law84 and a severe liability established by
the French Court of Cassation for any injury by an "inanimate thing" (C.C. art. 1384) except when it is proved
that the injury was unavoidable or caused by concurrent fault
of the injured,85 yet in both cases not the car's owner as such
is liable but its "custodian" (Halter, gardien) i.e., a person
exercising all care, supervision, and factual disposition of the
vehicle. An American firm sending its car to Algiers to be
used there by an employee at his discretion would be liable
for the latter's negligent acts as master of a servant but not
because of the use of the "inanimate thing."
Thus, the case of the Ontario statute is rather infrequent.
Even in this case, it has been pointed out that liability for
transferring a dangerous object to another does not appear
extraordinary. 86 There is much to be said for this view.
Vicarious liability, in general, has often been conceived as
a special application of the doctrine that risk connected with
an enterprise should be borne by the person entertaining
the enterprise. Who has the profit should have the loss, on
the principle of acting at one's own peril-a classical principle of English law, lately recognized on the continent.87 A
principal's liability for his servant has usually been justified
83

See RHEINSTEIN, 4 Rechtsvergl. Handworterbuch 82 No. 2.
German Law of May 3, I 909 on traffic of motor vehicles.
Cass. (civ.) (July 29, I924) BESSIERES, S.I924.I.32I, D.I925.1.5;
Plenary Decision of the United Chambers (Feb. 13, I 930) D.r 930.1.57·
86
GOODRICH 236 § 95·
87
WIGMORE, "Responsibility for Tortious Acts: Its History," 7 Harv. L.
Rev. (1894) 315, 383, 441 at 454, and n. 4· On the various modern theories,
84

85
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in this way, and so it may also be explained why an acquirer
of a house in France becomes immediately liable for purely
88
accidental injuries caused by a collapse of the house. No
one will doubt that this liability extends to foreigners.
Applying the law governing the wrong to the accessory
liability of third persons affords, in the eyes of the German
Supreme Court, the additional advantage of consistency in
deciding, under one law, the obligations of both the tortfeasor
and his joint debtor in relation to the injured party. 89 Also
the assessment of indemnity and contribution between the
codebtors will be facilitated thereby, although, of course,
the internal recourse of one debtor against his faulty associate
is governed, according to its source, by the law governing
the employment contract, the bailment, the parental, or any
other underlying relation. 90
(c) Other effects of public policy. While the New York
Court has narrowed the application of a foreign tort law
for the sake of public policy, the Connecticut Court has enlarged the extraterritorial effect of a statute abnormally.
A statute in the latter state provides that "any person renting
or leasing to another any motor vehicle owned by him shall
be liable for any damage to any person or property caused
by the operation of such motor vehicle .... "The court applied
the provision to an injury occurring outside the state, by
the construction that the statute formed a part of every
contract. 91 Thus, by an unprecedented, broad statutory lisee YouNG B. SMITH, "Frolic and Detour," 23 Col. L. Rev. (1923) 444,453,
455·
UNGER, Handeln auf eigene Gefahr (r9o4) initiated an extensive literature.
88
See the commentaries on French C. C. art. r 3 8 6.
89
German RG. (July 1, 1896) 37 RGZ. 181; LEWALD 268; RAAPE 226.
90
BARTIN, 2 Principes 432.
91
Levy v. Daniels' U-Drive Auto Renting Co. (1928) 108 Conn. 333, 143
Atl. 163. Notes, 29 Col. L. Rev. (1929) 2ro; 42 Harv. L. Rev. (1929) 433;
27 Mich. L. Rev. (1929) 462; 77 U. of Pa. L. Rev. (1929) 410. The New
York Statute has not been applied to injuries in other states, Miranda v. Lo
Curto (1928) 249 N.Y. 191, r63 N. E. 557·
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ability of the bailor to third party beneficiaries and its extraordinary extension to foreign injuries, the injured person
acquires a new and unexpected right. This decision has been
benevolently discussed by thoughtful writers under the supposition that a true and better justification of the statute
is that it may have been regarded as intended to induce renting companies to select their customers carefully. 92 But, if so,
why should not a dealer selling cars be subjected to a similar
educational policy? There does not seem to exist any urgent
reason for interfering with conflicts law by unusual local
policies.
The famous rejection of the foreign liabilities of a shipowner for the negligence of a compulsory pilot in The Halley
and by the Reichsgeriche 3 have been ironically illuminated
by the English Pilotage Act of I9IJ, which introduced such
liability into the English law, and the Brussels Convention
of 1924 on the liability of owners of seagoing vessels, which
provided for liability in case of definitive international
arrangements.
8. Damages for Tort
At common law, the right to damages was regarded as
a remedy subject to the law of the forum, 94 with the questionable justification that it is a general right to recover such
damages as the court may choose to give. At present, however, excepting some doubts in England, prevailing opinion,
92

STUMBERG I 84ff; HANCOCK 2.38.
Supra p. 2.42.; see RoBERTSON, 4 Modern L. Rev. (I94I) 33 n. 35·
94
England: See, for example, Baschet v. London Illustrated Standard Co.
(I 900) I Ch. D. 7 3 (infringement of French copyright in France).
United States: MINOR 488; Dorr Cattle Co. v. Des Moines Nat'l Bank
(I904) 12.7 Iowa I53, 98 N. W. 9I8, I02. N. W. 836, but evidently the court
disapproved of the Illinois liberal rule on credit damages, cf. RoBERTSON,
Characterization 2.69; for other cases see Note, What Law Governs the Measure of Damages? I4 Minn. L. Rev. (I930) 665,669 n. I7.
93
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abroad 95 as well as in this country,06 does not hesitate to
include the right to damages in the substance of the tort
obligation or, for that matter, of any obligation. Accordingly,
the law of the place of wrong governs the problem universally
and in all respects. As Holmes stated in a famous dictum, the
law of the place of the act, "only source" of the obligation
for tort, "determines not merely the existence of the obligation but equally determines its extent,"97 or, without the
peculiar note reminiscent of the vested rights theory, "the
measure of damages for a tort is determined by the law of
the place of wrong.ms The great weight of Anglo-American
authority supports this doctrine. 99
Thus the Minnesota court has awarded damages superior
to the amount recoverable under the law of the forum, for
wrongful death in an accident in Montana. 100 In Connecticut,
damages for a tort committed in New York have been regarded subject to New York law/ 01 "Remoteness" of damages finds the same treatment. 102 In case a sailor has been
negligently killed in Dutch waters, a Belgian court awards
damages, estimating the circumstances and excluding funeral
expenses in accordance with Dutch law. 103 Damages for non95 HARTIN, 2 Principes 407 § 336.
Canada: Mr. Justice Duff in Livesley v. Horst [1924] S.C. R. 6os, [1925]
r D. L. R. 159, construing Cope v. Doherty (r8sS) 2 De G. & J. 614, 44 Eng.
Re. I I 2 7; cf. HANCOCK I2 3·
96
See SEDGWICK, I Measure of Damages (ed. 9) § 1373; WHARTON
§§ 427a, 478c.
97
Slater v. Mexican Nat'l R. Co. (1904) 194 U.S. no, 126.
98
Restatement§§ 412,414,415,417,419,421.
99
More recently, e.g., Rauton v. Pullman Co. (1937) 183 S.C. 495, 502;
191 S. E. 416, 419; Wynne v. McCarthy (C. C. A. roth 1938) 97 F. (2d)
964, 970 with references; Smyth Sales v. Petroleum Heat & Power Co. (1942)
128 F. (2d) 697, 702 (by Goodrich, J., speaking of tort and contract); 2 BEALE
§ 4n.2; GoODRICH 211 § 88; CHESHIRE 657; HANCOCK, Torts 113ff.
100
Northern Pacific R. Co. v. Babcock ( r 8 94) r 54 U. S. I 90.
101
Commonwealth Fuel Co. v. McNeil (1925) 103 Conn. 390, 405, 130
Atl. 794, 8oo.
102
See for England, CHESHIRE 657; ROBERTSON, Characterization 270.
iOa Trib. Antwerp (Jan. 23, 1936) Jur. Port d'Anvers 1936, 197, 36 Revue
Dor 1937, 158.

TORTS

pecuniary loss, physical pain, and suffering, as well as for
mental anguish, are accorded when granted by the law of
the place of wrong, irrespective of the lex fori. 104
Influence of lex fori. But the last mentioned problem has
sometimes been treated in another way. Although such types
of damage as were not foreseen at the place of wrong will
be refused, recovery has also been denied in the converse
case where they were alien to the law of the forum. How
much does public policy interfere in this matter? Pure
penalties, certainly, may not be awarded on the ground of
a foreign law. 105 But a statute providing for recovery of
exemplary damages "is not a penallaw.mos Nor are statutory
provisions that include pecuniary recovery, inestimable loss,
and compensation for injured feelings, in a lump sum ("penance," "satisfaction," "Bussem 01 ) . An amount fixed in a
death statute for all cases represents "the legislature's approximate estimate of reasonable compensation" and is enforceable in other states. 108 On the ground of a railway or
automobile accident in France, damages for "tort moral"
104 Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Smith (1909) 135 Ky. 462, 122 S. W. 8o6;
Texas etc. R. Co. v. Gross (1910) 6o Tex. Civ. App. 6:u, 128 S. W. 1173;
Davis v. Gant (Civ. App. Texas 1922) 247 'S. W. 576; Boyle v. Southern R.
Co. (1901) 36 N.Y. Misc. 289, 73 N.Y. Supp. 465; BEALE§ 421.I p. 1339
n. 8; HANCOCK 118 n. 11, 120 n. I6.
Germany: OLG. Kolmar (April 29, 1913) 6 Rheinische Z. f. Zivil-und
Prozessrecht I 3 7.
Scotland: Cf. supra p. 241. Naftalin v. London, Midland & Scottish R. Co.
(1933) S. C. 259 (accident in England, no solatium, under Lord Campbell's
Bill).
105 2 BEALE § 42 I. I.
106 Mr. Justice Brandeis in James-Dickinson Farm Mortgage Co. v. Harry
(I927) 273 U.S. II9, citing Huntington v. Attrill (1892) 146 U.S. 657,
666.
107 Examples are the double and treble damages and fixed monwtary penalties,
incorrectly refused extraterritorial application in various state decisions, see
HANCOCK, Torts xI 8 ; Swiss Code Obl., art. 4 7, "reparation morale"; German
BGB. § 847 and special laws.
108 HANCOCK, Torts 1I9 and n. I3; Atchison etc. R. Co. v. Nichols (1924)
264 u. s. 348.

THE SCOPE OF THE PRINCIPLE

279

in accordance with French law have been awarded in Austria
and Germany. 109
It should be added that courts may easily find the
desired liberty of discretion under almost any rule of the
world. Modern legislations without provision for juries,
which follow the pattern of the Swiss Code of Obligations,110
leave the judge a broad margin in appreciating the damage
and equitably considering the reciprocal situation of the
parties. Even apparently unpliant rules are usually applied
in their own jurisdictions with considerable discretion.
The only serious restriction to the rule may result from
insufficient procedural machinery at the forum. However,
it may be questioned how rigidly the domestic procedure
ought to be conceived. The Supreme Court in a famous
case 111 has correctly stated that the Mexican law governing
the tort obligation would have granted the plantiffs an
annuity that could be judicially modified under circumstances,
while the law of Texas, the forum, provided a lump sum,
and that the court had to follow the conflicts principle and
hence not award a lump sum. Nevertheless, by the determination that the Texas court had no power to make and superintend a decree such as the Mexican law prescribes, and the
consequent dismissal of the suit, both the assumption of
jurisdiction and the conflicts rule were practically frustrated.
So long as courts must stumble over limitations on their
power and narrowly construed procedural rules, adjustment
109
Austria: OGH. (Nov. z, 1910) GlU. NF. 5Z19.
Germany: OLG. Kalmar (April z9, 1913) 6 Rheinische Z. f. Zivil-und
Prozessrecht 1 3 7.
Similarly, France: BAR TIN, z Principes 409.
110
Swiss Code Obi., arts. 43, 44 par. z.
Mexico: C6digo Penal, art. 31 par. I.
Thailand: C. C. art. 43 8 par. 1.
China: C. C. art. 218.
111
Slater v. Mexican Nat'l R. Co. (1904) 194 U.S. uo.
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of the machinery necessary for reciprocal application of laws
is severely impaired. Why should any American court not
be directed by its legislature to render decrees which Mexican
courts are able to issue and which are perfectly similar to
alimentary decrees familiar to this country? Under the constitutional conceptions of most other countries such doubts
do not even appear. Otherwise, the characterization of damages as a problem of procedure, wrong as it is, would have
a great practical advantage!
How simply the problem can be internationally managed,
is illustrated by the Warsaw Convention on International
Air Transport concerned with the converse case. In the
carriage of passengers, liability of the carrier is limited to
the sum of 125,000 francs. "Where in accordance with the
law of the court seised of the case, damages may be awarded
in the form of periodical payments, the equivalent capital value of the said payments shall not exceed 1 2 5,ooo
francs." 112
9· Other Sanctions
Apart from damages, the effects of a tort may consist
in a declaratory judgment or exemplary damages, specific
restitution ("in integrum," "in natura"), and restraint from
continuance or repetition. A lively discussion in France has
been concerned with the interprovincial treatment of "astreinte," i.e., an order to pay a sum periodically so long as the
cause of damage continues or so often as the cause is reiterated.
Was this kind of judgment, developed in the French courts,
to be applied in the case of a tort committed in France
proper, by a court of Alsace-Lorraine where alongside of
French private law German civil procedure was in force?
112 Art. zz, I, HuDSON, 5 Int. Legislation I oo «t I I 2. We may also point to
the treatment of damage in admiralty proceedings infra Chapter 27, p. 353·
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The literature has recognized the "astreinte'' as substantive
despite its origin in the courts and enabled the plantiff to
elect this relief, in addition to direct enforcement provided
by the procedurallocallaw. 113
Also, all other forms of injunctive decrees or judgments
serve special purposes of the substantive right and should
be granted, on principle, on the basis of the law governing
tort. Thus, such specific reparation as recovery of an unlawfully opened letter, public revocation of a public libel,
reemployment of a worker improperly dismissed, may be
decreed, unless the machinery of the forum is really unable
to accommodate itself to the task.
IO.

Relation to Procedural Law

(a) In general. In the traditional view, conflicts law provides for the application of rules and standards of the state
considered most closely connected with the legal relations
of the parties; but by what steps and in what order of activities the rights and duties thus created are to be enforced, is
the object of the procedural law of the forum. This apparently simple distinction between "substance" and "procedure"
has more recently revealed its difficulties in incipient special
investigations; it has been materially affected, on the other
hand, by a gradual reduction of the large scope assigned to
procedure in the Anglo-American courts. The Restatement
started with the orthodox principle, yet it seems to concede
considerable space to the application of foreign law, though
its statements, vague and contradictory,114 testify to the
draftsmen's uneasiness. In fact, among the various problems
involving demarcation between foreign substantive law and
113

See the description of the controversy by

J.

DONNEDIEU DE VABRES 589,

590·

114

Restatement§§ 584ff.; criticized by MoRGAN, "Choice of Law Governing
58 Harv. L. Rev. (1945) 153ff.

Proof,"
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the procedure of the court seized of litigation, few are ripe
for solution, and not a few arguments of contemporary discussion are debatable. The well-justified tendency to enlarge
the domain of the applicable foreign law, indeed, should not
be exaggerated. One would think that an Anglo-Saxon institution such as the bipartition of judicial functions between
judge and jury is an exclusive concern of the forum. Despite
all the influence on the decision of cases exercised by jury
verdicts or by the different mentalities of learned judges and
laymen, 115 the modes of organizing matters of procedure,
are a part of the administration of justice. Conflicts law does
not purport to counterbalance all the differences of countries
and courts. We have to be satisfied with presenting to the
court the requisites of the cause of action ("substance") and
the final request in the form most similar to that in a court
of the state referred to. A party seeking redress for a tort
or even defending in a state where the tort has not been
committed, must be content with the machinery and the
habits of the forum in finding the facts. Nobody could seriously insist on the privilege of having a jury decide his case,
despite any guarantee furnished at the locus delicti, if the
forum does not allow a jury in his case. Theoretically, the
two questions involved are rather simple and seem wellknown to the courts. The first question concerns the set of
facts forming the cause of action; this set is determined by
the law governing the tort. Thus, if the plantiff's alleged
conduct, under the statutes and authorities of the foreign
place of wrong, constitutes contributory negligence barring
relief, the forum takes over the foreign qualification of this
conduct as a part of the applicable substantive law. 116 The
115 On this point, after a most interesting discussion of the cases, MoRGAN,
supra n. 114, at 1 71 is hesitating. He believes in a balance of arguments and
refrains from advising the courts whether the forum should conform to the
foreign rules concerning the use of the jury.
116
Wieden v. Minneapolis, St. Paul etc. R. Co. (1930) 181 Minn. 235, 238;
232 N. W. 109, 1lo; Smith v. Brown (1939) 302 Mass. 432, 433, 19 N. E.
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second question, procedural under all theories, is that of
ascertaining the facts, and judging them according to the
foreign standard. It is naturally the law of the forum that
decides whether a jury is to be charged and how the verdict
is to be framed.
Of course, there are difficulties inherent in the distinction
between facts and law; they are enhanced by the subtle
shades of distinctions concerning verdicts in the courts of
this country. However, these difficulties would be considerably aggravated by their transfer into conflicts law. Maintaining the principle that the applicable law is that of the place
of wrong and that the ascertainment of the facts pertains
to the procedure of the court, including the intervention and
direction of a jury, the task of the forum will be facilitated
rather than involved.
(b) Burden of proof. At civil law, distribution of the
burden of proof, always understood as fixing the burden of
persuading the courts, is sharply distinguished from trying
of evidence, and is considered substantive law in every
regard. 117 Therefore, no one doubts that a rule, under which
a plaintiff suing a railway for injury is relieved from the
burden of showing the defendant's negligence, belongs to the
law governing the wrong. 118 This is the more readily acknowledged, as this lightening of the plaintiff's task is commonly
(2d) 732, 733 and later decisions of the Massachusetts court, see MoRGAN,
supra n. II4, at I66. The decision in Pilgrim v. MacGibbon (1943) 3I3 Mass.
290, 47 N. E. (zd) 299 seems to apply the same principle, advocated here:
the Nova Scotia law of the place of the accident, including judicial decisions
defining gross negligence in a comparable case, determines whether a given set
of facts does or does not constitute gross negligence, requisite of an action of a
gratuitous passenger; the law of procedure, however, determines whether there
is sufficient evidence to take the case to the jury on the question whether the
defendant conformed to the standard. Similarly, Gregory v. Maine Central R.
Co. (r945) 317 Mass. 636, 59 N. E. (zd) 471, I59 A. L. R. 7I4.
117
RG. (April I 7, 188:z.) 6 RGZ. 4I 3·
Switzerland: 16 BGE. 783, 790; 20 id. 496; 24 id. II 357,390.
C6digo Bustamante, arts. 398, 401.
118
2 BAR 383; 2 ZITELMANN 253; DIENA, 2 Prine. 399; MEILI-MAMELOK,
IPR. 403; I FRANKENSTEIN 363; NussBAUM, D.IPR. 413.
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felt to rest half way between the traditional liability for
negligence and the modern cases of absolute liability. It may
be construed either as a qualified liability for fault or as a
moderated liability for risk. 119 One of the most powerful
reasons for reforming the law of tort was the experience
that victims of business carried on by big and complexly
organized enterprises are unable to identify the source of
harm somewhere in the central or local machinery responsible
-an "emergency of evidence." 120 This difficulty may be
overcome by reversing the roles and presuming the negligence, without entirely eliminating the requirement of fault.
Not all "presumptions" have an analogous meaning, but
they are generally deemed to present rules modifying the
burden of proof. 121 Prima facie cases, however, are often
believed to pertain to the procedural field of evidence. But
this does not agree, for instance, with the universally settled
practice in maritime tort cases, that navigation contrary to
the local port or river regulations amounts to negligence by
an average experiential conclusion (prima facie case), so
long as the assumption of fault is not deprived of its empirical
value of counterproof. The evidence that the defendant
vessel has followed the wrong side of the road or shown
red instead of green lights, replacing until counterproof the
evidence of negligent navigation, reverses the burden of proof
for negligence, quite as a legal presumption de facto does;
the judge need not be convinced of the truth of negligence,
because this additional fact is supplied by experience. 122
Likewise, negligence is assumed from the breach of a statu119

TITLE, 6 Rechtsvergl. Handworterbuch 681.
"Beweisnotstand," ADOLF ExNER, Der Begriff der hoheren Gewalt (vis
major) (1883) esp. 46, 50.
121
See, e.g., VON TUHR, Allgemeiner Teil des Schweizerischen Obligationenrechts (1924) 142.
122
RABEL, Der Prima Facie Beweis, in Festheft fiir Adolph Wach, I2
Rheinische Zeitschrift fiir Zivil-und Prozessrecht 428; accord, HEINSHEIMER,
1J id. I.
120
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tory duty, such as the obligation to clean the sidewalk, until
a more probable causal connection is shown by expert evidence.123 In a suit of a guest passenger injured in a territory
of German law, a French court even adopted the reduction
of proof resulting from the practice of the Reichsgericht,
which presumes prima facie that any unlawful bodily harm
is negligently done. 124
American law. American courts, in the wake of English
tradition, have long persisted in allocating all these matters
to the broad procedural field of evidence. 125 However, not
only are "conclusive presumptions" commonly said to be of
substantive nature, 126 but a vigorous trend favors the same
characterization for other rules regulating the burden of
persuasion. 127 The matter evidently pertains to those slowly
shifting from informal preferences of judges hearing evidence
to tight rules of law for deciding cases. The New Hampshire
court has recognized as a part of the Vermont tort law the
rule that the plaintiff has to show his freedom from contributory negligence. 128 In other cases there may be doubt.
123
Dawson v. Murex, Ltd. [1942] 1 All E. R. 483, C. A.
Germany: RG., JW. 1904, 408; 1909 1 687; 1911 1 98o; 1912, 390 and
often since.
124
App. Colmar (May 29, 1934) Clunet 1936, 626.
125
Philip L. Gregory v. Maine Central R. Co. (1945) 317 Mass. 636, 59
N. E. (2d) 471, 159 A. L. R. 714.
126
WIGMORE, Evidence (ed. 3) § 1354, cf. §§ 2483-2491; Restatement
§ 595 comment c.
127
See MAGUIRE and MoRGAN, "Looking Backward and Forward at Evidence," so Harv. L. Rev. (1937) 91o; HAWSHAW, "Conflict of Laws as to
Presumptions and Burden of Proof," 4 Mo. L. Rev. (1939) 299; HANCOCK,
Torts I 12, 155. Rationes dubitandi, however, have been developed by MORGAN
in his important article cited supra n. 1I4, 58 Harv. L. Rev. (1944) at I9off.
On the difficulties wrought by ( 1) the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure of
I 9 3 8, (2) the submission of the federal courts to the conflicts law of the state
where they sit, see UHL, Note in 37 Mich. L. Rev. (1939) 1249; MoRGAN,
op. cit. at 1 7off.
128
Precourt v. Driscoll (1931) 85 N.H. 28o, 157 Atl. 525; accord: Fitzpatrick v. lnt'l Railway Co. (1929) 252 N.Y. 127, 169 N. E. 112, cf. KuHN,
Comp. Com. 307; Francis v. Humphrey (1939) 25 F. Supp. 1. Cf. LEFLAR,
Arkansas Conflict of Laws 198 on the application of the Arkansas statutory presumption against railroad companies.
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The Restatemene 29 seems to reflect this uncertainty. While
it assigns "presumptions" to the law of the forum, it contrasts them with foreign requirements concerning proof of
freedom of fault, which are interpreted at the place of injury
"as a condition of the cause of action itself, or as affecting
the nature or amount of recovery." But the comment adds as
explanation, what in reality stands as a well-established
rule, 130 that foreign rules shifting the burden of proof should
be applied where "the remedial and substantive portions of
the foreign law are so bound together that the application
of the usual procedural rule of the forum would seriously
alter the effect of the operative facts under the law of the
appropriate foreign state." 131 This formula evidently is a
sign of the present transitory stage in recognizing the substantive nature of permanently fixed presumptions for the
purpose of conflicts law. Any rule including a presm11ption
fixing the burden of persuasion, should always be taken as
a part of the applicable law, 132 while no such rule can be
advocated with respect to other categories of presumptions. 133
(c) Conditions of bringing suit. If the wrongdoer in an
automobile accident in Florida has died, the administrator
of his estate may be sued in Tennessee despite the domestic
rule of this state allowing such suit only in case the wrongdoer has been previously sued in his lifetime. 13"
In a similar way, provisions requiring service of notice
129 Restatement§ 595 and comment a; see also 3 BEALE §§ 595.2, 595·3i
GOODRICH 199 § 81; STUMBERG 131; Note, 78 A. L. R. (1932) 883.
13 Central Vermont R. Co. v. White (1915) 238 U.S. 507; New Orleans
etc. R. Co. v. Harris (1918) 247 U.S. 367; Lykes Bros. S. S. Co. v. Esteves
(1937) 89 F. (2d) sz8, 530·
131 Restatement§ 595 comment a.
132 But MoRGAN, supra n. 114,58 Harv. L. Rev. (1944) at 190,193,
professes grave doubts. On the different meanings in which res ipsa loquitur
is understood, see PROSSER, "The Procedural Effects of Res Ipsa Loquitur,"
20 Minn. L. Rev. (1936) 241.
133 Approximately to the same effect, MoRGAN, supra n. 114, at 193.
134 Parsons v. American Trust & Banking Co. (1934) 168 Tenn. 49, 73
S. W. (zd) 698.
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of the claim upon the defendant before suit for damages can
be brought, are applicable when part of the law of the place
of wrong, 135 irrespective of the law of the forum. 136
I I.

Relation to Contractual Obligations

(a) Distinction in the municipal laws. Tort and contract
form an antithesis, but historic connections between them still
persist, as in the English controversy whether an anticipatory
breach of contract may not be a tort, or in the French discussion whether a breach of contract produces an obligation
for damages under article I382 of the Civil Code, the
cornerstone of tort recovery. The general view of modern
legal science, however, precisely separates tortious and contractual obligations. Each source of obligation is characterized
by its own premises and effects. It may be that the facts of
a case create a claim in contract and another in tort. The
normal rule is that in such case both rights are at the disposal
of the injured party137 in some kind of concurrence. If a
tenant wantonly cuts the trees surrounding a rented cottage,
the landlord may sue him on the contract or for destructive
135

Sawyer v. El Paso & N. E. R. Co. (1908) 49 Tex. Civ. App. 106, 108
S. W. 718; Husted v. Missouri Pac. R. Co. (1910) 143 Mo. App. 623, 128
S. W. 282.
136 Contra: Arp v. Allis Chalmers Co. (1907) 130 Wis. 454, 110 N. W.
38 6 under the theory of a general statute of limitation.
137 England: PoLLOCK, Torts 426; WINFIELD, Text-book of the Law of Tort
(ed. 2, 1943) 717 § 191; SALMONo-STALLYBRAss, Torts 8. United States:
PROSSER, Torts 201ff.
France: Despite great confusion the practice tends to accumulate the benefits
for the plaintiffs, as in the case of carrier liability for personal injury, see the
critical review by JossERAND, Les Transports (ed. 2, 1926) § 894 bis, ter.
and the resume by EsMEIN in 6 Plano! et RIPERT 683 § 493·
Germany: 88 RGZ. 317, 433; 89 id. 385; 90 id. 68, 410; 99 id. 103; 103 id.
263; 106 id. 133. The doctrine followed therein, with its exceptions (infra
n. 149) was initiated by FRANZ VON LISZT, Die Deliktsobligationen im System
des Biirgerlichen Gesetzbuchs (1898) 12-15.
Italy: Cass. (April 27, 1937) Giur. Ital. Mass. 1937, c. 395; App. Milano
(Nov. 5, 1937) Giur. Ital. 1938 I 2, 53; App. Bologna (April 20, 1938)
Foro I tal. Mass. 193 8 No. 34·
Switzerland: 64 BGE. II 259; 67 id. II q6.
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waste (Aquilian culpa, in other laws). Of course, he cannot
request damages twice for the same loss. The concurrence
is not "accumulative" in this sense. Sometimes, it is true,
there exists reluctance to admit concurrence. Thus, for instance, the Restatement of the Law of Torts, in a modern
view, 138 recognizes a tort liability when a lessor of land fails
to make repairs that his contract calls for and the lessee is
bodily harmed thereby; but it denies that there is a contractual obligation for damages. 139 In a similar thought, the
same Restatement carefully states a tort liability for negligence in performing gratuitously promised services for the
safety of another person, evidently on the assumption that
when services are promised for consideration, the contractual
claim takes care of the damages and no tort action is given. 140
Such exclusion of rights should be confined to certain narrow
common law situations. 141
Another difference of views concerns the nature of the
concurrence. At common law, from the times when the
plaintiff had to "waive the tort" for the purpose of suing
in assumpsit on a fictitious contract, there seems to exist a
strong tendency to think in terms of remedy rather than
of rights and to offer the plaintiff the remedies only for his
selection. Sometimes, the plaintiff's declaration of choice is
even said to be final. 142 In this country, the jurisdictions are
divided. At present, however, many courts allow the injured
to pursue both actions, 143 and this is the prevailing Continental doctrine. 144 Therefore, the plantiff is entitled to all
138 See HARPER, Torts§ 103 n. 84.
139§357·
140 § 325·
141 On the reluctance of a part of the American courts to recognize that the
modern liability of carriers for safe transportation may produce contractual
as well as tortious effects, see infra p. 291. ·
142 See PROSSER, Torts 1127 n. 12. Similar views occur in Latin America,
e.g., CARVALHO SANTos, 3 C. C. Brasileiro, supra n, z, 317 No.4·
143 See PROSSER, Torts 202 n. 85; WILLISTON, 6 Contracts § 1528.
144 Germany: 63 RGZ. 308; 87 id. 309; 88 id. 317; 88 id. 433; 89 id. 385;
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advantages either remedy may afford him, as to facts to be
proved, defenses, joint liability of defendants, statutes of
limitation, extent of compensable material damage, reparation
of nonpecuniary damage, vicarious liability of third persons,
and so forth. In the United States, tort actions as a whole,
are considered to be the more advantageous remedies, 145 while
they are usually less profitable in Germany. 146
A similar relation exists with respect to the parties involved. A passenger injured in a railway accident may sue
the railway company which sold him the ticket in contract,
as well as the company on whose tracks he suffers harm in
tort. 147 Or one plaintiff may sue the defendant for tort
damages, while another on the same facts claims a breach
of contract by the defendant. 148
On the other hand, if the law of contracts restricts the
extent of the promisor's duties, the French and German
doctrines definitely infer that he cannot be deemed liable
for more under tort law. Also, an English plaintiff is now
allowed to disregard any limitation of liability under the
contract by alleging a broader liability in tort. 149 For instance,
as a gratuitous deposit makes the bailee liable only for fraud
and gross negligence under French and German laws/ 50 a
90 id. 68, 4 I o etc.
Switzerland: 26 BGE. II 105; 35 id. II 424; 37 id. II 1o; so id. II 378
sub (2).
145
PROSSER, Torts 1123. A similar opinion prevails in France.
146
RABEL (supra p. zz&) 26.
147
PoLLOCK, Torts 432·
148
PoLLOcK, id. 437·
149
England: SALMOND-STALLYBRASs, Torts 9> although not really supported
by the case of I933 cited ibid. note (i).
France: Cass. (Jan. u, I922) S.1924.1.Io5 and Note; JossERAND, Les
transports ( ed. 2) 6 I o § 62 8: "La responsabilite contractuelle refoule la
responsabilite delictuelle a laquelle elle vient se substituer, ... du moins dans
la mesure ou les rapports (des parties contractantes) sont £xes par la convention."
Germany: RG. (June 20, I916) 88 RGZ. 3I9, 320 as generally interpreted.
Switzerland: BG. (May 2I, I94I) 67 BGE. II 132, 137·
15
°French C. C. art. I92?; German BGB. § 690.
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simple failure of ordinary care in the custody is not enough
to substantiate a tort action. The American courts that have
borrowed from Roman law a similar restriction of the bailee's
contractual liability, by the intermediary of Chief Justice
Holt's doctrine, 151 are likely to decide in the same manner
on the tort aspect in the absence of statute, on the theory that
the creditor has assumed the risk.
(b) Conflicts law. Obviously, on principle, conflicts law
ought to follow the described conceptions prevailing in the
modern municipal laws that tort and breach of contract
generate two independent and concurrent rights, also when
the supporting facts (excepting the existence of the contract)
are identical. The correctness of this proposition is even more
self-evident when the causes of action arise from a tort
committed in one jurisdiction and from the breach of a
contract governed by the law of another jurisdiction. 152 In
further conformity with this general approach, the injured
may combine both actions, unless the court following procedural rather than substantive considerations, restricts the
plaintiff to a choice between the causes of action.
The American cases, unfortunately, lack consistency, but
they seem to approach the same result. Apart from workmen's
compensation, to be discussed separately, they are mainly
concerned with railway and carrier liability.
Injury inflicted on a passenger in railway accidents has
always been held. sufficient as a possible ground of tort.
Several courts, however, following the lead of the New
York Court of Appeals, have awarded damages on the ground
that the plaintiff entered into a contract with the railway
151 Coggs v. Bernard ( r 704) 2 Ld. Raym. 909, 92 Eng. Re. 107; PROSSER,
Torts 257.
152 This argument has been pointed out by BARTIN, 2 Principes § 335· For
Germany the obvious result has been briefly mentioned by M. WoLFF, IPR.
92 § 26 I.

THE SCOPE OF THE PRINCIPLE

291

153

whose ticket he bought. Thus, the contract was a protection
to the plaintiff, in the New York court, in a case in which
the tort action was barred by statutory limitation at the place
of wrong/ 54 as also in a Texas case where the tort action was
frustrated by the plaintiff's failure to give notice of his claim
under the law of New Mexico, while the contractual claim
was independent of this failure according to the law of
Pennsy1vania. 155
The contrary leading case of Pittsburgh Railway v. Grom 156
contends that "the duty of the carrier to use proper care in
the transportation of the passenger is one imposed by law,
and the right of action grows out of the liability which the
law imposes rather than out of the contract of transportation."
The court construed this contract as evidenced by the ticket
which contained no express promise of care or to transport
the passenger in safety. We are, thus, in the continued presence of an ancient theory, which is evidently also connected
with the idea that the tort is exclusively committed at the
place where the injury occurs. 157 More advanced thinking
has realized that the ordinary carrier's liability at common
law also presupposes a contract of transportation, is implied
in the contract, has to be read into it. The modern development needs a clear vision of the contractual fundament of
accessory duties. It goes even farther, by acknowledging also
the contractual ties between the customer and ulterior carriers.
It is interesting to compare with both views the international conventions on carriage of goods, and more recently
also on transport of passengers, which support "actions arising
out of the transport contract" against the railway of dispatch
153
See HANCOCK, Torts 192, I93· RoBERTSON, Characterization I82 seems to
advocate the same solution.
154
Dyke v. Erie R. Co. (I87I) 45 N.Y. I I3·
155
Sawyer v. El Paso etc. R. Co. (I 908) 49 Tex. Civ. App. I o6, I o8 S. W.
718.
156
Pittsburgh etc. R. Co. v. Grom (I911) I42 Ky. 51, 133 S. W. 977·
157
Infra Chapter 26 pp. 3o2f.
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or departure, respectively, the railway of destination, and
"the railway on which the cause of action arose.mss The last
mentioned action, despite its possible connection with the
contract, is visibly based on tort.
An extreme variety of treatment appears in the cases concerned with misdelivery or delayed delivery of goods by
carriers or of messages by telegraph companies, dating from
the period before federal legislation regulated a large part
of such business. The courts have referred to the law of the
place of contracting, to that of performance, or to the law
of the place of wrong, which again has been found either
at the place where prompt and correct delivery should have
been made or at the place where the negligent acts were
done. 159 The Restatement does not even mention contractual
actions in this connection. The apparent inconsistency of the
courts may be explained in part by their desire to help the
plaintiff, because he lacks the benefit of the option that he
ought to have. In the telegram cases of Arkansas, Leflar has
demonstrated how this benevolence has been manifested
in a striking manner. In order to allow recovery under Arkansas law, which annulled clauses exempting the telegraph
company from liability, the Arkansas courts applied their
own law as the law of contract to outgoing messages and
as the law of the place of wrong when the delivery had to
be made in the state.160
The liability of employers for injury suffered by their
employees, before the workmen's compensation legislation
came into force, was clearly determined. The employee had
158 International Convention concerning the Transport of Goods by Rail,
Rome, Nov. 23, I933> art. 42 § 3, I92 L. of N. Treaty Series 39I, 443,
HUDSON, 6 Int. Legislation 527, 554·
International Convention concerning the Transport of Passengers and Luggage by Rail, Rome, Nov. 23, I 933, art. 42 § 2, I 92 L. of N. Treaty Series
329, 36I. HUDSON, id. S68, S82.
159
See HANCOCK, Torts I 94-I 98 and resume I 99·
160
LEFLAR, Arkansas Conflict of Laws I88 § 78.
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the choice between the law governing the employment contract arid the tort action governed by the law of the place of
the accident. The courts maintained this liberal attitude in
regard to the fellow servant doctrine and its counterparts;
even if in the state whose law governed the employment
the common law doctrine still barred suits on the contract
as well as for the tort, the courts of this same state awarded
tort damages upon the foreign law of the place of tort. 161
Stipulations for exemption from liability. Agreements
"contracting out" or limiting the responsibility for tort, if
they are not covered by international agreement, ought to
follow appropriate conflicts principles concerning contracts.
In fact, in the United States the question whether future
personal injury claims can be reduced by agreement between
a passenger and a transportation enterprise, is usually treated
as a contract problem, although the claims themselves are
regarded as tort claims. 162
Thus, the law governing a contract clearly is competent
to answer the question whether a stipulation generally exempting the debtor from future liability is to be construed
as including his responsibility under the theory of tort. Under
the same rule, a waiver by which a debtor is released from
his existent obligation arising out of tort, must be judged
according to its own merits rather than to the law of the
place of wrong. But the main problem, of course, is that
concerning the permissibility of exemption clauses. This problem, commonly complicated in the courts by a rivalry between the law governing a contract and the public policy of
the forum, may entail more difficulties when the law of the
place of wrong prohibits an anticipatory renunciation of
161

For cases see HANCOCK, Torts 207 n. 3·
Conklin v. Canadian Colonial Airways, Inc. (1935) 266 N. Y. 244, 194
N. E. 692; Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Corcoran (1925) 9 F. (2d) 724.
England: Jones v. Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. [1924] 2 K. B. no.
Quebec: C.P.R. v. Parent (1914) 24 Que. K. B. 193.
162
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responsibility for tortious negligence. Consistency and convenience require that the law governing the agreement should
prevail.
12.

Statutes of Limitation

In civil law countries the principle of the place of wrong
extends, as a matter of course, to those limitations upon the
time for bringing the action, that are regarded as a part of
the substantive law of the place of wrong. 163 The same ought
to be recognized in American law. 164
The well-known difficulties, however, existing in this country with respect to general statutes of limitation, classified
as procedural, make themselves felt in this matter. European
courts, nevertheless, no longer hesitate to apply English and
American limitations of this kind as a part of the English
or American tort law, although some courts prefer their own
periods of limitation if they are shorter than the foreign
one. 165 Certain American statutes barring suits upon an
obligation barred by its proper law take the right way, provided they are not of the kind of the Wisconsin statute
163 The problem has prevailingly been treated with respect to contracts, but
is general. See FICKER, 4 Rechtsvergl. Handworterbuch 386.
A problem of international procedural law concerning foreign torts has been
discussed in two German cases, OLG. Stettin (Dec. 5, 1929) JW. 1930, 1882,
IPRspr. 1930, No. 151, and OLG. Hamburg (Oct. 18, 1929) Hans. RGZ.
1930 A 68z, IPRspr. 1930, No. II5; aff'd, RG. (July 8, 193o) 129 RGZ.
385, IPRspr. 1930 No. 156: An action brought at the foreign place of tort
interrupts the period of limitation at the forum running for a German tortfeasor
(significant under art. 12 of the German EG. BGB.) only if the judgment of
the foreign court would be recognized as binding at the forum. Contra: correctly, NEUMEYER, JW. 1926, 374·
164
According to the usual formula, a statute extinguishing the plaintiff's right
is applicable. More appropriate rules appear in the frequent statutes against
entertaining foreign suits barred by the applicable law. See Note, 75 A. L. R.
203; HANCOCK, Torts 136, 137.
The limitation of twelve months for tort actions arising from accidents, under
Lord Campbell's Act in England, has been applied, as the ground of action
"entirely arose in England", Goodman v. London R. Co. (1877) 14 Scot. L.
Rep. (1877) 449, 450.
165
Cf. Vol. I, pp. 64, 66.
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declaring that a claim for personal injuries shall be barred
by the lex loci delicti "unless the person so injured shall,
66
at the time of the injury, have been a resident of this state.))l
This, indeed, is an illogicaJ1 67 and narrow-minded public
policy.
The topic is too broad to be discussed at this juncture.
1 3·

Industrial Property

(a) Territorial limitation of protected interests. Patents
are granted in every state for the territory of the state only.
Hence, the rights accorded by a patent cannot be violated
outside the state. 168 The same is true with respect to trademarks169 and designs, 170 barring the cases in which imitation
constitutes liability for unfair competition. The existing international unions and treaties in these matters intend to
assure these territorially limited rights to foreigners.
If, however, such a right is tortiously invaded in the territory where it is protected, a claim for damages on this ground
may well be brought in a foreign court having jurisdiction
over the defendant. 171
(b) Unfair competition. Being of a different nature, liability arising from unfair competition is not bound to a certain
territory. The law of the jurisdiction in which the competi166 See 48 L. R. A. (r9oo) 639; 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) (r9o6) 1029; 51 id.
(1914) 96; L. R. A. r9r5C, 976.
167 AlLEs, "Limitation of Actions and the Conflict of Laws," 31 Mich. L.
Rev. (r933) 474, sor.
168
German RG. (Oct. 15, !892) 30 RGZ. 52; WEISS, 4 Traite 502; HERM.
ISAY, Patentgesetz (ed. 6, 1932) 230.
169 United States: Vacuum Oil Co. v. Eagle Oil Co. ( C.C.D.N .J. 1903) 122
Fed. ros and (C.C.D.N.J. r9o7) 154 Fed. 867,869.
France: PICHOT, 9 Repert. 120 No. r r r.
Germany: RG. (Sept. 20, r 927) ll8 RGZ. 76 (against previous practice);
(April 2o, 1928) JW. 1928, 1456; RG. (July r, 193o) 129 RGZ. 385, IPRspr.
'939 No. rs6.
Italy: DESANCTIS, r8 Rivista (r926) 127, 132.
170 WEiss, 4 Traite 509.
171
RG. (July 8, 1930) 129 RGZ. 385, against former cases, see NussBAUM,
JW. 1931, 428.
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tion occurs, governs the claim. When the Swiss Federal
Council submitted the draft of the Swiss Law of I 943 on
Unfair Competition to the parliament, it said: the law
applies according to the general principles of conflicts law,
that is, according to the law of the place where the wrong
is committed, as well as by analogy to arts. 3ff. of the Pemil
Code. If an act of unfair competition is committed in Switzerland, this law applies. Hence, it applies also in case the act
has effects not only on the Swiss market but also on a foreign
market; the Swiss and foreign competitors are equally entitled to sue. This solution conforms to the obligations assumed by Switzerland in the Convention of Paris, of March·
172
20, I88J.
The case of unfair competition alleged .to have been committed by the use of a trade-mark is of particular interest.
The practice of the federal courts in the United States has
been recently clarified. The courts have taken jurisdiction
and granted injunctions when a fraudulent scheme of unfair
competition was carried out in essential part in this country,
such as when upon a conspiracy undertaken in this country,
barrels were sent unmarked from American ports and then
marked abroad with the plaintiff's brand. 173 A complainant
protected by an American trade-mark is also granted relief
against a competitor who uses the mark in the United States
for export to another country in which the complainant is
likewise entitled to a trade-mark right against the respondent.174 But if in the foreign country the defendant
himself has the trade-mark right, the employment of the
mark which will be consummated in this foreign country is
172
MESSAGE, I 942, ad C III 3 p. I 9, see 0. A. GERMANN, Concurrence
deloyale (Ziirich I 94 5) I 34·
173
Vacuum Oil Co. v. Eagle Oil Co. (C.C.D.N.J. I907) I54 Fed. 867, aff'd
(C.C.A. Jd I9o8) I62 Fed. 67I; cert. denied 2I4 u.s. 5I5.
174 Hecker H-0 Co. v. Holland Food Corp. (C.C.A. 2d I929) 36 F. (2d)
767, as commented on or rather corrected in Luft v. Zande, next note.

THE SCOPE OF THE PRINCIPLE

297

175

not considered to constitute unfair competition.
The German Supreme Court, however, which had followed somewhat similar lines,176 more recently favors the
application of its own domestic rules by multiple devices, on
the assumption that the German rules repressing unfair
maneuvers are particularly exacting. One principle held is
that a plaintiff, having his principal establishment in Germany, can sue under German law, because his suffering damage there has constituted the forum a place of wrong. 117 Later
decisions advance the idea that, if both parties are of German
nationality or domicil, they have to observe also in their
foreign activities the mutual duties flowing from honesty of
business as prescribed in the German law. 178 Finally, places
of wrong have been construed in Germany and Italy on.
various theories. 179 The Dutch courts have resisted the temptation to adulterate the principle for any such reasons/ 80 but
National Socialist writers made capital out of the nationalistic
elements of the Reichsgericht decisions. 181
175
George W. Luft Co. v. Zande Cosmetic Co. (C.C.A. 2d I944) I42 F.
( 2d) 53 6, 540. On the difficulties of determining whether a federal court has
to follow on this subject state conflicts rules, see also Kerner, J., in Philco
Corp. v. Phillips Mfg. Co. (1943) I33 F. (2d) 663, and the annotation by
SCHOPFLOCHER, Conflict of laws with respect to trademark infringement or
unfair competition, including the area of conflict between federal and state law,
148 A. L. R. '39·
176
See RG. (June 5, 1928) Markenschutz und Wettbewerb 1927/28, 491ff.;
(March 31, 1931) JW. 193I, 1904.
177
Decisions from 18 RGZ. 28, 31 (1886) to 108 RGZ. 9 (1923); see
MELCHIOR, 5 Giur. Comp. DIP. 86. The contrary thesis by BAUMBACH,
Unlauterer Wettbewerb (ed. 2) 82 that this meant a trespass on foreign jurisdiction was approved by RG. in I40 RGZ. 29 (next note), but the theory is
repeated in the literature.
178
RG. (Feb. 2, I933) I4-0 RGZ. 25, 29, approving a thesis of NussBAUM,
D.IPR. 34-o; the RG. was understood in this sense by OLG. Kiiln in I5o RGZ,
265. Also RG. (May 19, 1933) Markenschutz und Wettbewerb I933, 446;
(Jan. 10, 1936) JW. I936, IZ9; and other decisions followed this approach.
C/. 7 Giur. Comp. DIP. Nos. 4o, 4I.
179
See RG. (Feb. I4, 1936) 150 RGZ. 265 and Italian Cass. (April 2,
1927) Foro Ital. Mass. 1927 II 472; infra Chapter 26, p. 313.
180
See KoSTERS 794 and n. 2.
181
RUDOLF SCHMIDT, Ort der unerlaubten Handlung I 8 3, I 8 7 endorses all
three contradictory theories of the Reichsgericht and surpasses them. A previous
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Illustration. In the last-mentioned German case, P. and
D., both firms in Aachen, manufactured pins and needles of a
certain kind and exported them to the United States. The
defendant firm founded an American subsidiary corporation
and advertised its needles in this country as "entirely American," "a truly American product," "buy American pins,"
and so forth, and agitated for boycott against the plaintiff
company. The court considered that, if the defendant in
Aachen participated in the acts or used the American firm
as an instrument in America, it would be subject to the
German law, because German merchants have to adjust their
competition to this law even abroad. But also, if the defendant merely tolerated or approved the conduct in question,
it violated its duty in Germany itself. Perhaps the authority
of this case may be restricted to the liability of a domestic
firm for torts of its foreign subsidiary companies. 182
These attempts to apply the law of the forum to foreign
happenings, as usual, confuse equitable considerations with
national peculiarities. What seems fair or unfair at a distant
place, may not seem so at the forum. How can a German
court judge foreign commerce by German standards? The
court would have done better by insisting on ascertaining
the American law on unfair competition, of which the published text of the decisions makes no mention. On the other
hand, to burden the defendant with additional duties not
owed by other merchants in the foreign market or to equip
a national competitor with additional weapons, is contrary
to the principles of economic equality. 183 The desirable prowriter (DANIELCIK, JW. I936, 26I4) proclaimed that acts done abroad are
always subject to German law if they infringe "the fealty among the fellows
of the race" ("volksgeniissische Treupflicht"). Schmidt declares this is not
enough; German law should be applied whenever a damage is felt in Germany.
BEITZKE, Book Review on REu, Anwendung fremden Rechts in 66 Kritische
Vierteljahrschrift (I938/39) 4I4, 4I7, has generalized the second of the
theories above by suggesting that the nationality principle should replace the
law of the place of wrong.
182
Cf. RAAPE, D. IPR. 327 n. r.
183
DESANCTIS, Rivista I 926, at I 34·
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motion of mercantile ethics should be pursued along the
international road promisingly initiated by the Union of
Paris. 184
This question whether merchants domiciled within the
forum are bound to the domestic rules in competing abroad,
has not yet been raised in American cases. 185 It was under
an essentially different aspect that certain famous decisions
examined the application of the Anti-Trust laws to foreign business of American firms. In American Banana Co.
v. United Fruit Co./ 86 Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking for
the Supreme Court of the United States, dismissed an action
by an American firm against an American competitor in the
banana trade, because the Sherman Act on which the action
was based, being primarily a penal statute, was not intended
to contemplate acts done in Panama and Costa Rica; the
Court, therefore, contented itself with the statement that
under the law of the place of acting, the acts of the defendant
were no torts at all. 181 In a later case/ 88 the Supreme Court
granted relief by enjoining violations of the Sherman and
Wilson Acts, on the assumption that the defendants had
established a complete monopoly over the purchase and commerce of sisal, a product of Yucatan, obtaining excessive
profits. The steps necessary to bring about these results were
deliberately taken by the defendants, and the action was held
to be based on "a contract, combination and conspiracy entered
184

Treaty for the Protection of Commercial Property, of Paris I 8 8 3, Bruxelles
1900, Washington I9I I, and The Hague I925 (revised London, I934) in
force in one of its phases almost throughout the world. Under article IO his
the states are obligated to establish efficient protection against unfair competition.
185 This statement is supported by the discussion in the recent work, CALLMANN', 2 Unfair Competition and Trade Marks (I94-5) 1756-8.
186 (r9og) 2IJ U.S. 34-7, 357·
187
The criticism of this case by HUNTING, "Extraterritorial Effect of The
Sherman Act," 6 Ill. L. Rev. (I 912) 34 is inconclusive.
188 United States v. Sisal Sales Corp. (I927) 274- U.S. 268,276. For other
cases, see CALLMANN, supra n. r 85, I 754-, I 755·

300

TORTS

into by parties within the United States and made effective
by acts done therein." Indeed, in the meantime between the
two cases, the danger of international monopolies, frequently
fostered by cartels,189 had been realized, and the potential
weapons offered by the anti-trust laws were used more
consciously. Such repression of monopolistic conspiracies is
intended to protect the domestic commerce rather than the
individual interests involved. The forum applies its public
law with its reflections in private spheres. This development
is fundamentally distinguishable from the idea of subjecting
competing domestic firms to a domestic standard of behavior
in foreign markets.
189 See MoLLOY, "Application of the Anti-Trust Laws to Extra-territorial
Conspiracies," 49 Yale L. J. (1940) IJIZ.

CHAPTER

26

The Place of Wrong1
I.

SuRVEY OF SoLUTIONS

T

HE rule that problems of the law of torts are to be
decided in accordance with the law of the place of
wrong presupposes a determination of the place where
the wrong has been committed. The following illustrations
show some of the many situations in which this problem presents difficulties.
Illustrations: (i) A letter containing defamatory statements about B, a person residing in Y, is mailed by A in
state X and received by C in state Z.
(ii) A in state X sends poison concealed in candy to B
in state Y. B takes the candy to state Z where he eats some
of it, falls ill in state M, and dies in state N.
(iii) A, standing in state X, fires a gun and lodges a bullet
in the body of B, who is standing in state Y.
I.

Theory of the Place of Injury (The American Rule)

Under the traditional American rule, the wrong is considered as being done where the injury takes place.
The Restatement has expressed this rule in the following
terms:
"Section 3 77. The place of wrong is in the state where
the last event necessary to make an actor liable for an alleged
tort takes place."
Applying this rule to the illustrations stated above, we
1
RHEINSTEIN, "The Place of Wrong, A Study in the Method of Case Law,"
19 Tul. L. Rev. (1944) 4, t6s; RUDOLF ScHMIDT, Der Ott der unerlaubten
Handlung im internationalen Privatrecht in Festgabe fiir Heinrich Lehmann
(t937) 175·
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2

are informed that the place of wrong is where the defamatory letter arrives, where the· poisoned person falls ill, and
where the bullet meets the body. (That these answers are
not quite obvious is a separate point.)
3
Although this rule has met with some substantial criticism
and is contrary to the prevailing opinion of European writers,
it thus far has commonly been taken as firmly established
and supported by an "almost unbroken line of authority."•
While this is written, however, Max Rheinstein in a highly
suggestive study has undertaken to destroy the doctrine of
the Restatement and of the encyclopedias. His detailed historical analysis of the cases results in the finding that the
rule has not been applied as ratio decidendi in all jurisdictions as often as lip service has been paid to it, and that the
formation of the rule was unduly influenced by precedents
regarding the demarcation of ordinary jurisdiction from
admiralty cases, criminal cases, and cases dealing with local
actions. 5
After this penetrating analysis, the traditional rule, applied in a mechanical way for such a long time, will have
to stand the test of an examination according to standards
of convenience. In the present writer's opinion, much is to be
said in its favor, but a few modifications seem to be suggested
by comparative considerations.
What idea actually supports the rule in the American
doctrine? Historically it may have originated in the field of
interstate transportation and communication, as a simple device to identify the applicable law at the place where the
physical impact occurs. 6 This idea seems to conform well to
the old construction that a carrier's duty of care is not com2

Restatement, Note to§ 377·
66.
4
Note, I 33 A. L. R. z6o.
5
RHEINSTEIN (supra n. I) ; see in particular at
I 8 II, Livingston v. Jefferson.
6
This is a kind suggestion by Yntema.
3 8TUMBERG I

I

7 I on the political case of
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prised in the contract of transportation without express stipulation. 7 The view is exclusively focused on the time and place
of the actual harm. The theory of vested rights found here
an apparently suitable example. For advocates of this theory,
such as its last (we hope) defender, Beale, it was natural that
the injured person should acquire an indefeasible right at
the moment in which all elements of a tort action are existent
and hence the cause of action is born. While today the vested
rights doctrine may be regarded as moribund, the conception
still lingers in the mind of the courts that a tort must be
localized at the place where its last element is added to the
others, because then only a cause of action arises. An unlawful
and faulty act is not a tort until it creates an injury.
"It cannot be denied that negligence of duty unproductive
of damnifying results will not authorize or support a recovery."8
"Until all the elements are present a cause of action cannot
arise, and the tort is considered as transpiring as a whole in
that place where the combination becomes complete.m
By an interesting though erroneous variant it has been
asserted that "the locality of the act is deemed at common
law to be the same as that of the damage.mo
Theory of the Place of Acting (The Civil Law Rule)

2.

The great majority of the European writers/ 1 followed
7

See supra Chapter 2.4 p. z88.
Alabama, etc. R. Co. v. Carroll (I 892) 97 Ala. u6, I I So. 8o3.
9
ScHERMERHORN, Tennessee Annotations to the Restatement § 3 77·
1
Connecticut Valley Lumber Co. v. Maine Central R. Co. (I 9 I 8) 7 8 N. H.
553, I03 At!. 263.
11
Institut de Droit International (Munich, 1883) 7 Annuaire (I88s) u9,
I56; 2 BAR IZo; GIERKE, 1 Deutsches Privatrecht 234; I ZITELMANN 112; 2
id. 480 (on ground of alleged public international law, but also the most
elaborate writing on the practical effects of the theories in question) ; WALKER
526; NEUMEYER, 2 Int. Verwaltungs R. 48; cf. RAAPE 203 and D. IPR 325;
2 ARMINJON (ed. 2) 342 n. 2; BARTIN, 2 Principes 4I6 (place of the "fait
illicite generateur du prejudice"; CuNHA GoN<;ALVEs, I Direito Civil 673.
8
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by some courts,12 define the place of wrong as that where the
allegedly tortious conduct was carried out by the defendant.
In the case of a commissive tort, this is the place where the
actor has engaged in the bodily movements resulting in the
damage. Under this approach, in our examples, defamation
is committed where the letter is mailed, poisoning where the
candy is sent, and personal injury where the shooting person
stands.
This literature objects to the law of the "place of effect"
that it is often difficult to ascertain, that effects may occur in
a plurality of states, and that they may obtain at a place by
accidental causation, to the surprise of the actor and possibly
also of the victim. It is considered unfair that conduct should
be subjected to a law the intervention of which could not
be foreseen. Stated positively, the argument is that the
actor is entitled to count on the laws of the state where he
acts. While he has to obey these laws, he should be protected by them. The educational reasons of the laws that
regulate human behavior and distribute the pecuniary effect
of a damaging conduct are concerned with the acts or omissions rather than the effects in individual cases.
3· Elective Concurrence of Claims (The Reichsgericht Rule)
The German Reichsgericht has combined the first two
theories. This court holds that a tort is committed in both
the place where the actor engages in his conduct and the place
where the effects of his conduct occur. The injured person
may choose to sue under one law or the other; in each case,
the chosen law is applied in its entirety on the whole facts
so as to determine all requirements of the cause of action and
12

France: Trib. civ. Seine (May 27, 1 896) aff'd, Cour Paris (June 23,

1899) Clunet 1901, 128.

Germany: RG. (April 24, 1889) 44 Seuff. Arch. 257 No. 161.
Italy: App. Milano (Sept. 19, 188 1) Clunet 1883, 73 (insertion of a libelow
article into a newspa per) .
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its effects. Hence, the victim is favored by being allowed to
elect the law most advantageous to his demand, but he is
not permitted to cumulate the benefits flowing from more
than one law .13
The formula employed in constant practice was first
established in a plenary decision of the Reichsgericht in 1909,
concerning the jurisdiction of the court at the locus delicti
commissi, but was soon extended to choice of law: "a place
of tort is assumed to be wherever an essential part of the tort
has been committed." 14
Applying this approach to the illustrative cases described
above, the defamation (i) may be localized where the letter
has been sent or where it was read; 15 the poisoning (ii) where
the candy was sent, where it was received, and where it was
eaten; 16 and the shooting at both the places of acting and
wounding. In addition, also the places where the victim
died, and where dependent persons lost maintenance, are
eligible for the purpose of choice of law.
This view has been followed by the Swiss Federal Tribunal/7 and in a case of unfair competition (a field in which
also the most characteristic German actions developed)
by the I tali an Supreme Court. 18
The arguments advanced by the Reichsgericht were precarious and easily criticized by the advocates of the place of
acting. Theoretical support has finally come forth. Neuner19
13 RG. (Nov. 20, x888) 23 RGZ. 305; and constant practice. See MELCHIOR
168 n. 3·
14 RG. (Oct. 18, 1909) 72 RGZ. 41; RG. (Nov. &, 19o6) 62 Seuff. "Arch.
No. ISO; RG. (Jan. 30, 1936) JW. 1936, 1291, 1292; RG. (Feb. I4, 1936)
I so RGZ. 26s.
15
Cf. 23 RGZ. 3o6.
16
Cf. RG., JW. 19oo, 477·
17
BG. (Nov. 6, 1896) :u BGE. II64; (March 6, 1914) 40 BGE. I&, 2o
(sending and arrival of a deceiving letter, in a criminal case but with general
argument).
18
ltaly: Cass. (April2, 1927) Foro ltal. Rep. 1927 I 472 No. SI.
19
NEUNER, Der Sinn II6; see also ScHELLING, 3 Z.ausl.PR. (1929) 866;
RAAPE zozff.
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remarks that a person doing a part of the tortious acts in the
state, or acting from abroad but effecting an injury in the
state, sufficiently deserves to be subjected to the responsibility
established therein. A sound international distribution of the
administration of justice allows that several states may concur
in suppression of tort. If a state regards conduct as nontortious, it ought, nevertheless, to tolerate a different view in
another jurisdiction where a part of the facts occur.
The same doctrine has been applied in Germany and other
countries to criminal 20 and civil jurisdiction21 based on the
locus delicti commissi principle.
4· Mixed Solutions
(a) Influence of the law of the place of acting. The Restatement contains a section seemingly inserted against Beale's
theoretical view, 22 which expressly refers to the place of acting. Where a person is required by law or authorized by
a privilege, to act or not to act in a state, he will not be held
liable for the events resulting from his act in another state.
The comment borrows an illustration from the old English
case Regina v. Lesley 22 a where a shipmaster was forced by
Chilean authorities to take a prisoner on board. The Restatement suggests that the legality of the detention by the shipmaster be determined according to the Chilean law, although
the man, by the effect of concurring circumstances, had to
stay on the ship during the entire voyage; all other requirements would be gover11ed by the law of the flag (replacing the
law of the place of wrong).
The other illustrations speak of a health officer burning
20
I BEALE 3I7 ns. 3 and 4; RHEINSTEIN, supra n. I, 19 Tul. L. Rev. (1944)
196 (as to England and most American states); Italian Penal Code of 1930,
art. 6; LILIENTHAL, Der Ort der begangenen Handlung, in Festgabe fiir
Georg Wilhelm Wetzell, Marburg r 890; see also 72 RGZ. 43 footnote.
21
Germany: ZPO. § 32; RG. (Jan. ro, 1936) JW. 1936, 129I, I292.
22
§ 382. See RHEINSTEIN, I9 Tul. L. Rev. (r944) at ro.
22
a (r86o) Bell C. C. 220.
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infected rags and a sheriff shooting a fleeing murderer, so
near the border that injuries result on the other side of the
frontier.
This rule has been regarded as an inadequate attempt to
narrow down the place of injury rule. 23 It may, however,
be questioned also from the contrary view, as going too far.
Commonly, the mistake is committed to treat on the same
footing cases where a tort is entirely done in one territory,
although effects occur elsewhere, and where the acting extends to more than one territory. Certainly, there is justification for recognizing that the arrest of a man, quite as much
as the seizure of an object/4 is no tort if it is lawful under the
law of the place where the whole act has been done and
completed. Any effects happening in another jurisdiction
ought not to alter this postulate which, perhaps, may be
generalized into an important rule involving all acts completely done in one jurisdiction and alleged to violate the
"law": the "law" in question ought only to be that of the
place where the act is entirely performed. While this is a
necessary modification to any theory of the place of injury, it
is not exactly the place of corporal movement per se that
accounts for it; if the Restatement (illustrations 4 and 5)
declares that someone shooting in state X and hitting a person
standing in state Y enjoys privileges conferred by law X, this
is a very doubtful proposition. We shall have to discuss below acts extending over several jurisdictions. Nor does the
evident equity of the postulate hold good for the entire field
of privileges and duties to act. Suppose, for instance, that the
Chilean law in reality did not empower the governor of the
province to give the order to the British shipmaster. Whether
the latter's erroneous belief that he had to obey excused him
23
24

RHEINSTEIN, 19 Tul. L. Rev. (1944) at 13.
See, for instance, the Netherlands: App. Leeuwarden (Feb. 6, 1929) W.

12014, VAN HASSELT 309.
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when he helped to deprive the plaintiff of his freedom need
not necessarily be, and probably should not be, determined
by the local (Chilean) law, by exception to the regularly
applicable law of the flag.
The inspiration received from Regina v. Lesley suggests
some connection with the English rule that the act must be
unjustifiable under the lex loci actus, although also actionable
at the English forum. However, all supporting English cases
deal with acts entirely done in a foreign country.
Indeed, in the Lesley case it was stated as a separate offense
that the continuing detention of the prisoner after the vessel
left the Chilean territorial waters, constituted false imprisonment by application of the British law of the flag. Thus, there
was no aftereffect of the Chilean privilege on the high seas
to be condoned because of the Chilean law. Neither do these
decisions fortify the theory of the Restatement, nor is their
own theory explained by the provision of the Restatement.
(b) Influence of the law of the place of effect. On the other
hand, a few writers who believe in the decisiveness of the
place of acting have made an exception in favor of the place
where the effects of a tort appear, when the acting person
either intends the effects in another state or recklessly does
not care where his acts take effect. 25
On another ground, Rheinstein has recently suggested that
while on principle the law of the place of acting should govern, another state where the effects take place may, in virtue of
its public policy, adjudicate a claim according to its own law of
tort, provided that the actor could foresee that it would cause
harm in that other state. Third states would not be, therefore,
in a position to apply this latter law. 26
(c) Differentiated solutions. A remarkable suggestion was
25 HABICHT 95; RAAPE zo6 (with restriction to cases involving the state
frontier).
26
RHEINSTEIN, 19 Tul. L. Rev. ( 1944) at 3 r.
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made by Meili 27 in r902 and regrettably fell into oblivion.
He knew the difficulty of finding a good formula for all cases
and advocated different rules for fixing the place of wrong
in the cases of seizures, press delicts, and defamations.

5. Differences of Policies
Another important contribution to our topic has been made
by pointing out that the law of torts has a threefold social
function and that the local contact of a tort depends upon the
function most emphasized. The three functions are said to
be the following:
"A primary purpose is to fix the standards of conduct of a
person so he can know what he may do and what he may not
do, and so that others can know what type of conduct to
expect from him. This purpose of delimiting tort liability
suggests that it is for the state where a person acts to determine whether his conduct and its consequences create liability.
"Another purpose ... is to fix the measure of protection
to which each person is entitled against his fellows. This
purpose suggests it is for the state where the damage is
suffered to determine whether the damage was wrongfully
inflicted and gave rise to a right of action in tort. The recent
extension of liability without fault with consequent emphasis
on the protection of the injured party rather than on the
wrongfulness of any conduct involved may indicate this
purpose is the fundamental one in a wide part of the tort
field.ms
Third, the purpose to give compensation is thought to
27

MElLI 96. Already 2. BAR I 2.0 n. 9 recommended a special rule for the
press, pointing to the publication rather than the sending of articles. I would
like to refer also to the (unfortunately unelaborated) observation of FEDOZZI
760: If it is true that one who acts at a certain place must respect the provisions of the localla w and incurs a liability by committing an illicit act according to this local law, it is no less true that, for determining the damages due to
the victim of the illicit act, the place where the harm has happened must be taken
into consideration. On the other hand, 2. ZITELMANN 478-480 has rejected
Bar's suggestion as unfounded, and this seems to be the general opinion.
28
CHEATHAM, Cases 4 I 6; the authors mention as a fourth purpose "civil
penology" which may play an additional role.
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lead possibly to the state of the "injured person's domicil."
Except for this third approach, which no law has followed
and which does not appear to be commendable, these remarks
are thought-provoking.
Obviously, however, the bulk of the tort laws cannot be
neatly divided into two groups, one of which, by virtue of a
policy protecting private interests, would be appropriately
allocated to the American rule, while the other, devoted to
the prevention of undesirable conduct, would belong to the
place of acting theory. Most tort laws are supported by both
policies in an unascertainable mixture. Besides, if the same
type of tort were to be characterized separately in each state
according to a particular shade of policy, new difficulties
would top the old ones.
Nevertheless, it is quite true, there are types of tort such
as liabilities without fault which ought to be localized in a
specific manner. It will appear, however, that their particular
localization is not directly due to the policy and still less to
the interest of the state, but to the technical shape of the
obligation, although this, of course, is conditioned by both
policy and interest considerations. For example, a railroad
enterprise must commonly bear the damage done to passengers in an accident on its rails without the plaintiff's proof
that the management or the agents were at fault. The policy
supporting such statutes is as much intended to lay a great
part of the risk on the economically stronger party, as to adjust the unequal procedural situation in litigating against a
complicated big industrial enterprise or to discourage railroads
from negligent methods of operation. It is impossible to infer
from one part of this policy a device for localization and not
from the others. Yet, the purpose of the tort rule in which
the legislatkre consideration; converge is sharply expressed
in the technical shape of an absolute or strict liability directly
established on the fact of the accident. This, indeed, ought
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to be a strong reason for localizing this kind of tort. It is
directly centered at one place through the very purpose of the
legislator, brought to evidence by the structure of the specific
tort.
It will be opportune, first to analyze the significance of
the various local contacts that may be produced by the several
elements of a tortious liability.

II.

THE PLAC;E oF AcTING

r. Preparatory Acts
As in penal law, 29 preparatory acts are distinguishable
from the elements of the cause of action. Writing a defamatory letter, loading a rifle, designing an imitated trade-mark,
are outside of the essential elements of defamation, killing,
or unfair competition, although they may constitute by themselves independent offenses in other categories under distinct
regulatory provisions, e.g., possession of dangerous weapons,
counterfeiting, industrial espionage, or make an accessory
liable in addition to the principal tortfeasor. Acts preparatory
to a tort do not characterize it and, hence, are unable to
localize a tort. Where, for instance, damages are sought for
an unfounded arrest, the place at which the defendant affixed
his signature to the power of attorney authorizing his lawyer
to file the petition for the arrest, is immaterial.80
This simple truth refutes many Continental authors and a
few European decisions advocating the place where a letter
containing a libel or unfair competition has been written and
mailed. It is a different case where a defamatory letter has
been "published" according to Anglo-American conceptions,
by dictating it to a stenographer or delivering it to a translator before posting.
~
29

Germany:

§ 3 n. 11..
30

MElLI

96.

EBERMAYER-LOBE-ROSENBERG,

Strafgesetzbuch (ed. 3, 191.5)
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Acts and Omissions

(a) Omissive torts. Acting in the field of torts is ordinarily conceived as a physical movement, one of the muscles
or the nerves. Thus, the health officer burning infected rags,
in the previously mentioned example of the Restatement,
"acts" at the place of the burning. Correspondingly, omission, as an element of a tort species, is the failure to act by
bodily movement. On the basis of their theory referring to
the law of the place of acting, the European writers have
been embarrassed by the question, how to localize an omission. They agree that an omission is committed where a
duty to act exists but disagree on the state entitled to impose
this duty. Is it the state where the alleged tortfeasor is
present at the time and, therefore, would be able to act
bodily? 31 Or where he is domiciled? 32 Or, after all, that of
the injury? 33 Or, does the criterion vary according to the
circumstances?
To support the third solution, the following example has
been discussed. 34 A resident of London, the owner of a house
situated in Vienna, is certainly liable for an injury to a passerby caused by a collapse of the building, according to the
Austrian statutory provision (deriving, like many others,
from the Roman cautio damni infecti). 35 The problem cannot
be determined by English law, which, by the way, produced
36
an analogous remedy only after this discussion in 1934·
This type of liability is unmistakably tied to the local situation
of the building, irrespective of the place where the owner
31

2 ZITELMANN 490.
2 FRANKENSTEIN 3 70.
33
WALKER 527·
34 WALKER 527; 2 FRANKENSTEIN 370; RAAPE 208.
35 Dig. Title 3 9> 2; Austrian All g. BGB. § I 3 I9 (as of I 9 I 6) ; French C. C.
art. q86; German BGB. § 836.
36 Wilchick v. Marks and Silverstone [I934] 2 K. B. 56, cf. Io Z.ausl.PR.
(I 9 3 6) 2 8o; WINFIELD, Text-Book of the Law of Tort ( ed. z, I 943) 506.
32
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might have written an order for inspection or repair. The
problem, in fact, materialized in the Belgian courts. 37 A
Belgian company owned a building in Germany which it
failed to repair. A Belgian citizen was killed by its collapse.
The court applied the national law common to both parties,
in this case an evident mistake.
Similarly, the failure of a locomotive engineer to give
a warning signal at a distance of three hundred yards before
passing a street crossing, cannot be judged under any other
standards than those offered at the place of the crossing. A
state boundary running two hundred yards from the crossing
cannot alter the duty.
On the other hand, if a man advises a friend to go with
his family to a resort where infection by scarlet fever may
easily occur, his duty of warning him, if any, cannot be imposed by the state of the resort but that where the advice is
given. The negligent counsel, not the injury, in this case is
the only possible basis of liability.
(b) Accomplices. A seizure of goods was sought and accomplished in British India on a pretended claim that later
proved unfounded. Damages were asked in a suit against a
firm in Bremen, Germany, and awarded under the German
law, the construction being that this firm had caused the
seizure by incitement. 38 The German Reichsgericht likewise
declared a German company liable, under German law, for
unfair competition committed by its American subsidiary,
where the German company "caused or decisively influenced"
the conduct of its affiliate. 39 If, however, the tort committed
by the chief actor was localized in India or the United States,
37
App. Bruxelles (Jan. 3, 19o8) Clunet 1909, 241; Cass. Beige (Nov. 26,
9o8) Clunet 1909, r 178.
38
OLG. Hamburg (Jan. 18, 1928) Hans. RGZ. 1928 A 431, IPRspr. 1928
r\o. 38.
39
RG. (Feb. 14, 1936) 150 RGZ. 265. The decision enumerates other facts
leading to a similar liability, which have been considered supra p. 298.
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it seems evident that the liability of an accessory to the act
should be determined according to the same law.
3· Acting in Several States
Two groups of situations ought to be distinguished. 40
(a) Separate torts in several countries. The conduct of the
actor may be carried on in more states than one as in the
following illustrations:
(i) Defendant has inserted a libelous statement about the
plaintiff in twenty newspapers, each of which is published
in a different state;
(ii) Defendant, by carrying on propaganda in several
states, has induced a group of employers throughout these
states to lock out their employees;
(iii) Defendant has committed continued assault upon
the plaintiff while he and the plaintiff were crossing a state
line on a train.
A common characteristic of these cases is the plurality of
acts each of which creates a tort. By mere logic, every partial
activity is subject to its own localization. The results, however, under any ordinary method of localization, are inconvenient. Thus, under the place of injury theory, where a
libelous article was inserted in a newspaper published in
Hamburg, then a territory of Roman law, and circulated in
various other places, the Hanseatic Appeal Court applied
to each defamation its own local law, 41 the damages being
assessed separately for each territory. The decision would be
the same under the prevailing approach in this country. Objections to such unsound complications are obvious. 42
40 2 ZITELMANN
41

486.

0LG. Hamburg (June 11, 1897) Hans. GZ. 1898, Beibl. No. 146,

cf.

LEWALD 263.
42
They are the same as in the case of a broadcast heard in several states, on
which see infra 4 sub (d), pp. 320 ff.
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Again, if the place of acting in its usual meaning should
be followed, each tort is characterized by the place where
a libelous statement has been dispatched to be published in
a newspaper or broadcast and, similarly in example (ii), by
that where the defendant has mailed his letters. This may
practically simplify localization, but mailing is in fact only
a preparatory act and, therefore, not characteristic at all of the
tort.
A more adequate approach ought to be found, abandoning
both contending theories.
(b) Single tort committed by partial acts in several states.
In the same way as a criminal offense, an intentional tort may
be committed by several acts connected by one volition. For
example:
(iv) Firm A, for the purpose of competition with B, uses
an imitated trademark in state X, publishes untrue statements
concerning this trademark in Y, and sues Bin a vexatious suit
for annulment of the latter's trademark in state Z. While each
of these acts may or may not present an independent cause
of action, they are normally made the subject of one lawsuit
for damages on the ground of unfair competition.
( v) A railway brakeman negligently couples two cars in
state X, and the train runs with the uncontrolled defect
through states Y and Z, finally derailing. Or, a truck affected
by engine trouble, due to the negligence of a garage employee
of the owner firm, injures a person after passing a state
border. No cause of action can be found unless all the elements
of partial acting occurring in several states are added together. Where is the tort ((committed" for the purpose
of conflict law?
The only existing answer to this question by a legal text,
article twenty-eight of the International Convention on the
Transport of Passengers, in the case of death, injury, or delaying of passengers, refers oracularly to ((the law of the state
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where the fact has occurred" 43-which fact, we do not learn.
From the basis of their place of acting theory, German
writers have discussed whether the place of acting should be
defined as where the "most efficient part" of the conduct
has been carried on; 44 or whether conduct carried on in several
states should never involve the actor in liability, unless it is
actionable in every one of such states. 45 While in the United
States the place of wrong is usually defined as the place where
the last part of the defendant's conduct is carried on, in
Europe the place of its first part also has been considered.
In this country, in fact, all places of acting are generally
disregarded. 46 In a rare attempt of justification, 47 the Mississippi Court, deciding the case in illustration ( v), explained
that the railway company is present everywhere in its network of lines, and any negligence committed is felt at the
place where the injury occurs. "The locality of the collision
was in Tennessee. It was there, if anywhere, that the company
was remiss in duty, for there is where its proper caution
should have been used." 48 If this means that the places of
negligent acts or failures to act may be unknown without
altering the liability under the law of the place of injury,
it is convincing. If, however, a definite cause has been proved,
as supposed in the example, it is difficult to see why the railway could not be sued also under the law of the state where
the fateful negligence was committed.
43

Convention of Berne, of October 23, 1924, art. 28 § 1; revised at Rome, on
Nov. 23, 1933, see HUDSON, 6 Int. Legislation s68 at 579·
44 NEUMEYER, IPR. 32; HABICHT 95·
45 Discussed and rejected by KAHN, 30 Jherings Jahrb. I I 9, I Abhandl. no.
46 Nashville, etc. R. Co. v. Foster (I882) 78 Tenn. 35I; Chicago etc. R. Co.
v. Doyle (I883) 6o Miss. 977; Cincinnati, etc. R. Co. v. McMullen (I889)
II7 Ind. 439, 20 N. E. 287; Alabama, etc. R. Co. v. Carroll (I892) 97 Ala.
126, II So. 8o3; El Paso, etc. R. Co. v. McComas (Tex. Civ. App. I9o3)
72 S. W. 629.
47
The Carroll case repeats the usual argument of injuries commenced in one
state and completed in another.
48
Chicago, etc. R. Co. v. Doyle, supra n. 46.
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It is noteworthy that the same decision added with respect
to negligence by active conduct: "Physical force proceeding
from this state and inflicting injury in another state might
give rise to an action in either state." Apparently, this court
would not entirely disapprove of the German practice granting a choice between the laws of all jurisdictions where faulty
conduct has occurred or harm is caused.
Among the suggestions contributed by the literature, the
proposition deserves attention that the most characteristic
part of the tortious activity should prevail in localizing the
tort. More appropriately, not just some part of the corporal
movements of the tortfeasor but the most characteristic
element of the entire cause of action should indicate which
is the decisive place and the law best qualified to govern.
4· Acting at a distance49
(a) Means of acting in foreign jurisdictions. A person is
generally said to act where his bodily movements occur. But
how does such an approach conform to the epoch of telephone
and radio? Half a century ago, the German Civil Code had
already assimilated an offer made by telephone to an oral
50
offer. The voice may be audible only to the person addressed. Messengers were used in most remote antiquity,
and the Roman common law, thoroughly adverse to contracts
made by agents, i.e., acting by another free person, opposed
no obstacle to declarations sent by a "nuntius" or, in other
words, transmitted through a person as an instrument. A
third equivalent situation derives from the concepts of criminal law: a responsible person-"indirect actor"--commits
a wrong by compelling another person or inciting a child or
lunatic, to do the material act.
49
Considerations of this sort, to my knowledge, have been only expressed by
RAAPE 204 and D. IPR. 326; KosTERS 794, on the spur of a decision of the
Dutch Hooge Raad, mentions acting by an instrument at a distant place.
50
BGB. § 147 par. r.
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In addition to the obvious, though in conflicts matters
strangely neglected, application of these devices to tortious
conduct, it has become fully recognized that a legal person
may commit a tort by the act of its representative. 51 Although
vicarious liability has been incorrectly construed on the basis
of agency,S 2 it also shows a case of liability for unlawful acts
done by other persons.
Hence, the theory advocating the law of the place of
acting is entirely antiquated, if it stresses physical movements.
Not the locality where a person operates, but that to which
his operations are directed, is material. A person who slanders
another over the telephone does not commit defamation in
the telephone booth, but rather where the words are heard.
(b) Letters. Although some older European decisions
have favored the place where a letter is written and mailed/ 3
the constant practice of the Reichsgericht, 54 followed by courts
of other nations, 55 regards both the places where the letter
is sent and where it is received, as places of wrong. The latter
is often identical with that where the suit is brought and
the law of which is applied. In this country, the cases reach
the same result upon the theory that the injury, prevailingly
a defamation, is inflicted at the place of arrival and reception. 56 But that a sender acts through the mail as instrument
51

Supra p. 128, cf. p. 74 n. 28.
Supra p. 272.
53
Bavaria: Oberappellationsgericht (March I6, I847) I2 Blatter fiir
Rechtsanwendung in Bayern 287: an injurious letter was sent from a place
under German common law to a place of the Prussian Code; the injury is
completed at the place where the letter was written and mailed, since the sender
was firmly convinced that the letter would reach the addressee.
Switzerland: Cass. Ziirich (March I6, I9I2) I2 Bl.f.Ziirch. Rspr. No. 7I, 25
Z.int.R. 296.
54
RG. (Nov. 2o, I 888) 23 RGZ. 305 (information about credit); (Dec. 2 I,
I9oo) 56 Seuff. Arch. 308 No. I75 (unfair competition); (Dec. 22, I9o2)
I3 Z.int.R. I7I; (Dec. 2, I92I) 22 Markenschutz und Wettbewerb 6I (unfair
competition).
55
Switzerland: BG. (March 6, I 9I4) 40 BGE. I 8 (criminal deceit by letter).
56
Restatement§ 377 note 5; Haskell v. Bailey (I894) 25 U.S. App. 99, 63
Fed. 873; cf. HANCOCK, Torts 252 n. 3·
52
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until the letter is delivered, is a construction familiar to the
courts. Consequently, with a slight difference, we may emphasize the delivery rather than the reading of the letter
and obtain a rule based on a time and place more easily evidenced. This is exactly what acting at a distance involves. 5 7
(c) Suppliers. Another important example is furnished
by the liability of suppliers to third persons without contractual connection, so remarkably developed in this country
from Cardozo's famous decision in McPherson v. Buick. 58 In
Hunter v. Derby Foods/ 9 fatally spoiled canned goods were
shipped to Ohio. The court applied the advanced law of
Ohio, the decisive place being where the victim ate and died
and not where the distributor shipped the food; the court
compared the case to shooting a firearm across the state line
or owning a vicious animal which strays over the state line.
However, in this case, the place was identical with that to
which the seller had shipped the food. Another case is particularly informative. To use the resume by Hancock: "In Reed
and Barton v. Maas, a coffee urn, which had been defectively
constructed in Massachusetts by the defendant was sold by
him to a caterer in Wisconsin. The urn, while in use by the
caterer, spilled hot coffee upon the plaintiff in Wisconsin.
Wisconsin law was allowed to define the legal position of the
manufacturer-defendant. " 60
Suppose the caterer had taken the urn to Alaska or Iran
or simply sold it to a colleague overseas. Would a customer
injured there have an action, too, according to the local laws
Similarly, Scotland: Evans & Sons v. Stein & Co. (I9o4) Court of Sessions,
42 Scot. L. R. I 03, Jurid. Rev. I 905, 402.
57
Also CUNHA GoN<;ALVES, I Direito Civil 673, an advocate of the law of
the place of acting, teaches that defamation by a mailed letter is committed at the
place where it is handed to the addressee.
58
McPherson v. Buick Motor Co. (I9I6) ZI7 N.Y. 38z, III N. E. 105o;
PROSSER, Torts 673 § 83.
59
(C. C. A. :zd I94o) IIo F. (:zd) 97o; Note, I33 A. L. R. z6o.
60
(C. C. A. rst 1934) 73 F. (:zd) 359; HANCOCK, Torts z54.
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of these parts? The prevailing American form of the supplier's liability requires an injury to such persons as the
61
supplier would expect to be in the vicinity of its probable use
and, thus, may prevent surprising references in conflicts law.
In fact, the place to which the manufacturer or merchant ships
the defective goods, marks the point where his responsible
acting ends for the purpose of choice of law.
Recently the English Court of Appeals considered the
sale by a New York corporation to an English distributor, of
a product for destroying vermin, the property passing in New
York. The American seller supposedly should have given
warning that purchasers should be given proper written instructions respecting safe use of the product. When after a
subsale in England, a farmer suffered damage from the product and obtained compensation from the buyer, an action for
recourse based on tortious negligence was set aside because
nothing had been done by the corporation in England.~ This
would have been a correct decision only if the warning was
due to a person in New York itself.
(d) Broadcasts, newspapers, and the like. Mass communication by broadcast and newspapers present analogous problems. The Restatement declares that harm to the reputation
of a person is done at the place where the defamatory statement is communicated and, in case of a broadcast, where
the broadcast is heard by people conversant with the plaintiff's good repute. 63 Evidently, if the broadcast is heard in
many states, the places of wrong may be multiplied. This
seems the more so, as "publication," a requirement of libel
or slander, is generally held to exist wherever the defamatory
64
statement is heard and understood by any third person.
2

61

2 Restatement of the Law of Torts§ 395·
George Monro, Ltd. v. American Cyanamid and Chemical Corp. [1944]
K. B. 432·
63
'
Restatement § 3 77 note 5.
64 3 Restatement of the Law of Torts§ 577; HARPER, Torts§ 236.
62
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A libelous newspaper article causes injury at the place of the
65
original publication as well as at all places of circulation.
66
European courts have decided on the same lines. The
Reichsgericht has argued that communication of a newspaper is analogous to that by a letter; the paper is sent t<.
other places as a letter is sent. 67 But an English court, even
with respect to assuming jurisdiction "at the place where
a tort has been committed," has conveniently added that an
inconsiderable circulation of a foreign newspaper in England
may be negligible. 68
With this feeble correction, all theories converge in the
assumption of a multitude of places of wrong and in senselessly complicated procedural burdens on court and parties.
In a few recent American cases, however, the disadvantage
of such "checker-board jurisprudence," as Federal District
Judge Wyzanski of Massachusetts called it, has been keenly
felt. Asked for a decree to enjoin unfair competition by the
use of trade-marks, he excluded "writing opinions and entering decrees adapted with academic nicety to the vagaries
of forty-eight states."69 Likewise, Judge Learned Hand,
in the Federal Second Circuit Court of Appeals, refused an
injunction to safeguard the exclusive right of an orchestra
conductor to broadcast disks of his phonographic records
publicly sold, a right recognized only in Pennsylvania, while
unauthorized reproductions would be lawful in the other
states. Any injunction on broadcasting under such Circumstances, was considered as going entirely too far, since it
could not be confined to hearers in Pennsylvania. 70
65

3 Restatement of the Law of Torts§ 58 I.
Germany: RG. (May IS, I89I) 27 RGZ. 4I8; RAAPE 205.
RG., supra n. 66, at 420, 42 r.
68
Krach v. Le Petit Parisien [I937] I All E. R. 725, C. A. The court, of
course, concedes that technically circulation in England has occurred, but uses
its discretionary power to refuse an order for service out of the jurisdiction.
69
National Fruit Product Co. v. Dwinell-Wright Co. (I 942) 4 7 F. Supp.
499> 504·
70
RCA Manufacturing Co. v. Whiteman (1940) r 14 F. (2d) 86.
66
67
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What law, then, should be applied? Should it be the
lex fori, as was the principle adopted in the first-mentioned
case? 71 The facts of this case seem to warrant another theory
to the same effect of applying the local law; the competition
was evidently centered in the state. When an action was
brought, in the same federal district court sitting in Massachusetts, to enjoin unfair competition committed by unlawfully reproducing horse-race charts in a newspaper, the
conflicts rule of the state court was supposed to be in favor
of the local law, for the reason that the defendants prepared
all their material, and the greater part of the competition
occurred, in Massachusetts. 72 In an older leading case discussed above on unfair competition committed by the use
of a brand which was protected as a trade-mark in the United
States but not in Germany, the American court took jurisdiction and applied federal law, because the fraudulent conspiracy to affix the brand in Germany on barrels to be sent
there, was conceived in the United States and the barrels
were manufactured and filled here and shipped from American ports; 73 in fact, the most important part of the activities
was carried out within the jurisdiction. Of particular interest
is another case where the circuit court of appeals in Chicago
purposefully stressed the main charge to be the misappropriation of a business system, the essential of this wrong being the
manufacture and sale of certain plates in Illinois. The circumstance that no tort was committed until the plates were
actually used in a foreign state by customers, was declared
merely incidental to the main charge and immaterial for the
71

This has been approved in the Note, 56 Harv. L. Rev. (1943) 298, 303.
Triangle Publications v. New England Newspaper Publishing Co. (D. C.
D. Mass. 1942) 46 F. Supp. 198, 203. The judge was the same as in the case
supra n. 69.
73
Vacuum Oil Co. v. Eagle Oil Co. (C. C. D. N.J. 1907) 154 Fed. 867,
supra Chapter 2 5 n. 17 3; see the comment in George W. Luft Co. v. Zande
Cosmetic Co. (C. C. A. 2d 1944-) 142 F. (zd) 536, 540.
72
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choice of law. This consideration rather than the application
of the lex fori as such conforms to the most desirable rule.
The only practical and theoretically justified solution is
furnished by centering the tort in its most characteristic
locality. In the case of periodicals this is clearly the publishing
house, 75 in that of broadcasting, the office responsible for the
radio transmission.

III.
I.

THE PLACE OF INJURY

Injury and Damage

In view of the argument popular among European writers
that the place where a tort takes effect is a vague and uncertain concept and that such a place may be found all over
the world, it is opportune to note the elaborate concept prevailing in the American doctrine and formulated in the
Restatement. 76 A tort is localized at the precise place in
which it is completed by "harm" to a person or tangible
thing, or, in a broader term, by "injury" inflicted on a protected interest. More closely, it is the first invasion of the
interest that counts, the intrusion upon bodily integrity,
a personal sphere, a land or chattel. Damage may develop
from there on in various ways. The harm may increase or
vanish, the losses caused may vary and change by proximate
or remote consequences, normal or extraordinary combinations of cause and effect, intervening acts of the parties and
of third parties.
Thus, once more, the antagonistic theories, referring to
the place of acting and that of injury, respectively, partly
74 Addressograph-Multigraph Corp. v. American Expansion Bolt & Mfg.
Co. (C. C. A. 7th I94I) I24 F. (2d) 7o6, 709.
75
This has already been advocated by 2 BAR 120 n. 9; 2 MElLI 96.
76 Out of insufficient knowledge, RuDOLF SCHMIDT, Der Ort etc., supra n.
I, at I 84 invokes the American example as though it supported the application
of the law of the forum in case damage has been suffered there,
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agree. The events posterior to the injury do not produce
significant local connections. Only the Reichsgericht finds it
relevant that a person, bodily injured in state X, incurs
medical expenses in state Y, loses wages in Z, and leaves
dependents in states L and M. This plain exaggeration has
attracted most of the attacks that have been inadvisably
directed against the entire doctrine of the Reichsgericht.
The later American cases concerning railway accidents
consistently declare immaterial at what place the death of
the victim occurs; only the physical impact on the body
counts. 77 A drug wholesaler in St. Louis, Missouri, sent
ginger extract containing poisonous wood alcohol to a grocer
in Oklahoma, who himself drank a bottle, and after having
been removed to Missouri, died from the beverage. The
court applied the death statute of Oklahoma according to
principle. 78 Most other cases follow the same ,line. 79 A death
statute is not construed as intended to apply to persons dying
in the state, but to persons harmed there so as to succumb
subsequently to the injury. Another consideration is fairness
towards the wrongdoer, as his liability possibly would be
increased if another law could be substituted after the deed. 80
However, all this is only a confirmation of the result that,
in looking for the center of tort, we cannot find it in any
event subsequent to the harm done.
Strangely deviating, however, in a well-known case of
a passenger boat sinking on the high seas because of negligent
77
Van Doren v. Pennsylvania R. Co. (1899) 93 Fed. 26o; Crane v.
Chicago, etc. R. Co. (1908) 233 Ill. 259, 84 N. E. 222; Centofanti v.
Pennsylvania R. Co. (1914) 244 Pa. 255, 90 Atl. 558. See moreover the cases
cited by HANCOCK 255 n. 12.
78
Darks v. Scudders-Gale Grocer Co. (1910) 146 Mo. App. 246, 130 S. W.
430. Another case involving a drug is Moore v. Pywell (1907) 29 App. D. C.
JI 2, 9 L. R. A. (N.S.) 1078 (infra n. 97).
79
See the Annotations to the Restatement § 3 77, for instance, those of
Maryland and Minnesota.
80 See HANCOCK, "Choice of Law Policies in Multiple Contact Cases," 5 U.
of Toronto L. J. (1943) 133, 138.
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navigation, it has been held that a passenger drowning in
the ocean was not injured on the vessel but on the high
seas and that therefore an action lay against the French
company under the French death statute, whereas the general
maritime law gave no action for death. 81 But even if it had
been proved that he jumped overboard to save himself, the
injury would have occurred on the vessel. The court required
death as the "substance of the injury," instead of regarding
death as a mere effect of the injury, a confusion that was
frequent in the early construction of death statutes. But if
the court had simply applied the French law, which is clear
on the point, it would have correctly decided on the theory
that the harm was done on the vessel when a passenger was
forced to leave it, and that the place of his ensuing death
was immaterial. 82 The true rule has been expressed in an
analogous case: "The crucial test is, where was the tortious
act committed, not where were the damages consummated,
... although the final injury be completed elsewhere." 83
Also, the Swiss Federal Tribunal has recognized that,
in a suit for seduction of a married woman, the place where
the husband suffered mental anguish is immaterial. 84
A right of privacy is invaded where the "plaintiff's name
and X-ray picture first became public property." 85 A libelous
letter to be sent to Switzerland produces an injury to the
addressee as soon as it is given to a translator. 86
Deceit. However, how can such ulterior damage be excluded from the process of localization when the tort, such
as fraud or unfair competition, consists in the invasion of
81

Rundell v. La Compagnie Generale Transatlantique (r9oo) roo Fed. 655.
See the correct statement by the Supreme Court on the French law: La
Bourgogne (r9o8) 210 U.S. 95, 138.
83
Lindstrom v. International Navigation Co. (C. C. E. D. N.Y. 1902) rq
Fed. 173.
84
BG. (June rs, 1917) 43 BGE. II 309, 316 sub 2.
85
Banks v. King Features Syndicate (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1939) 30 F. Supp.
J52.
86
Kiene v. Ruff (1855) 1 Iowa 482,486.
82
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pecuniary interests? As the writers who attack the Reichsgericht doctrine emphasize, in such a case the injured interest
is not located at one place only. The assets of the plaintiff
may be dispersed over the whole earth. "Is the plaintiff's estate situated wherever there are assets, or is it at his domicil,
following the maxim, res ossibus inhaerent?"81
The remarkable solution suggested by the Restatemene 8
seems to furnish the answer. It concentrates the cause of action
for fraud in the place "where the loss is sustained, not where
fraudulent representations are made." Beale reached this
proposition by construing the case Keeler v. Ley 89 as distinguishing the place where the defendant induced the
plantiff to sell his land from the place where he conveyed
it/0 the latter constituting the situs of the tort. The authority
is doubtful, 91 but Beale's interpretation is consistent. The
most characteristic fact, indeed, is that the plaintiff was
swindled out of his property. Raape by an argument ad
absurdum against the Reichsgericht, rhetorically asks where
the effect of the tort should be placed when a plaintiff domiciled in Berlin loses a law suit at a court in Lyons, France,
against a Spanish firm, because of perjury of the defendant
who was a witness. 92 The Restaters would probably not
87

RAAPE 203.
Restatement § 3 77 note 4· This section has been applied, by analogy, by
CALLMAN, 2 Unfair Competition and Trade Marks (1945) 1749 § 1oo.2(a),
to cases of trade-mark infringement: the wrong would take place "not where
the deceptive labels are affixed to the goods or where the goods are wrapped in
the misleading packages, but where the passing off occurs, i.e., where the
deceived customer buys the defendant's product in the belief that he is buying
the plaintiff's." But this is only the place where the deceit of the customer
occurs and neither that of the trade-mark infringement nor of unfair competition, cf. supra Chapter 25, pp. 2.95 n. 169, 2.96.
89
Keeler v. Fred T. Ley & Co. (1931) 49 F. (zd) 8p; (1933) 65 F. (zd)
499· On the basis of the Restatement, however, Judge Goodrich, in Smyth
Sales v. Petroleum Heat & Power Co. (1942.) 12.8 F. (zd) 697, 699 states
that in the instant case the sale of plaintiff's business for an inadequate consideration was the loss caused by the deceit and applies the law of the state
where the contract of sale has been executed.
90
2 BEALE u87.
91
RHEINSTEIN, supra n. I, I 78.
92
See RAAPE 203.
88
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hesitate to reply that the injury occurred in Lyons, while
all ensuing damages in Spain or Germany would have no
influence on localization. It was the mistake of the Reichsgericht to treat injury and damage on the same footing, a
view that seems to be abandoned in the latest phases of dealing with unfair competition. 93
2.

Injury and Acting

The efforts of the American doctrine to localize the tort
have another interesting side. Bodily harm is deemed to be
suffered where "the harmful force takes effect upon the
body," as when a bullet enters the body. 94 A tort against a
piece of land is committed at its situs and against a chattel
at the place where it is situated at the moment of the impact.95
These commendable solutions will in many cases be indistinguishable from the result of a theory of acting at a distance.
A slight divergence between these two theories would
occur if poisoning were located (following Beale) "where
the deleterious substance takes effect (that is, the poisoned
person falls ill) and not where it is administered." 96 This
solution, apparently devoid of any case authority, is inconsistent with the principle and highly impractical, nobody
being able to state exactly at which moment an already
poisoned man falls "ill." But the court in the Darks case,
mentioned above/ 7 directly declined to apply the law of the
place where the shipment arrived, namely at the business
place of the grocer in Missouri, and applied the law of Oklahoma where the addressee drank from the bottle. The court
there followed the traditional rule in express contrast to
93

140 RGZ. 25; see supra p. 297 and RAAPE, D. IPR p6.
Restatement § 3 7 7 Note x.
95
/d. note 3·
96
/d. note 2; 2 BEALE I z88 cites Moore v. Pywell, supra n. 78, but this
case is anything but clear.
97
Darks v. Scudders-Gale Grocer Co. ( 1 9 I o) I.j.6 Mo. App. 246, qo S. W.
430; supra n. 78.
94
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what we may call the law of the place of distant acting.
Damage by aircraft. Where damage is done to a person
or property on the surface of the earth by or from an aircraft
in flight over the territory of a state, such as by crash landing,
falling or thrown objects, including jettison, the place of
wrong, if any, cannot be conveniently located except on the
territory of the injury done. 98
IV. THE STRUCTURE oF ToRTs
r. Liability Without Proof of Fault
(a) Absolute liability. In a number of states, the statutory
liability of a railway company to a person injured by an
accident on its lines is based on the mere fact of carrying
on a dangerous activity. That the train has a collision or a
derailment then suffices to constitute the cause of action.
Whether such a statute intends to protect injured persons
rather than to impose on the railroads the necessity of establishing the safest system of equipment, organization, and
personnel, is an academic question. Important for localizing
the tort is the juridical isolation of the facts composing the
cause of action from the human acts and ommissions that
caused the mishap. Through the technical structure of these
torts, the obligation is rendered more independent of its
cause, more "abstract," than is an obligation written in a
negotiable instrument and thereby separated from its source.
The accident alone characterizes the facts of the claim; the
harmful conduct vanishes from the picture. For this reason,
absolute liability cannot be claimed under any statute other
than that of the state where the injurious accident happens.
98
The national laws, enacted in the 192o's, have been so different as to menace
reciprocal application by considerations of public policy, see SCERNI 365. The
unification reached by the Rome Convention for the Unification of Certain
Rules relating to Damages Caused by Aircraft to Third Parties on the Surface,
of May 29, 1933, HUDSON, 6 Int. Legislation 334 No. 329, was a necessary
step, but left important matters to conflicts, and has not entered into force.
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There is no serious reason, however, why the injured person should not be entitled to request damages under another
law for negligence, if this and its place are proved. It should
be considered that laws establishing liability without fault
very often limit the extent of recovery in contrast with the
ordinary tort actions not so limited. In addition to wellknown American statutes embodying a similar system, international examples of the modern technique are furnished
by the Bern Convention on the Transport of Goods by
Rail, whereby the carrier irrespective of fault has to bear
a limited responsibility for loss and delay while he has to
pay full indemnity for fraud or gross negligence, 99 and the
(not yet ratified) Rome Convention of 1933, granting any
person injured without his own fault on the surface of a
territory. by a flying aircraft a limited amount of damage
by virtue of the mere fact that "the damage exists and that
it was caused by the aircraft," and sets the limit aside, if the
damage was caused by gross negligence or wilful misconduct. 100
(b) Strict liability. Between pure liability for fault and
absolute liability for damage, modern statutes have adhered
to middle systems of varied degrees of requirements. Even
at common law there are instances involving the handling
of dangerous substances, where the defendant must prove
that no commercially practicable precaution was omitted. 101
Such rigid liability, just as the very frequent type of statutory
inversion of the burden of proof of negligence, is distinguishable from absolute liability which admits no excuse or only
that of act of God, but practically reaches the same result
in the great majority of cases. Accordingly, a suit against
99 Text of 1924, art. 36, MARTENs, Recueil, serie 3, vol. 19 at 505; text
of 1933, art. 36 (HunsoN, 6 Int. Legislation at 552).
100 Arts. 2, 8 and 14 (a), HunsoN, 6 Int. Legislation at 336, 338, 340.
101
See Owners of the Steamship Pass of Ballater v. Cardiff Channel Dry
Docks & Pontoon Co., Ltd. [ 1 942] 2 All E. R. 79·
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an innkeeper, a railroad company, a car owner, a laboratory,
allowed to be based on a rebuttable presumption of negligence, needs to be supported by the statutes of the place
of injury.
Whether the statutes of this place should be applied only
to railroads operating in the state, as the New Hampshire
court has asserted in a case as famous as unsatisfactory in
principle, 102 may well be questioned. Sparks from a locomotive on the Quebec side of a frontier river set an international bridge spanning the river aflame. The court divided
the bridge into separate halves, eliminating the Canadian
law (which would govern under the theory of the place of
acting) with regard to the American half, but also decided
not to apply the New Hampshire statute as not including
Canadian railways. Such a restrictive construction of statutes
seems inconsistent with the theory of the place of injury.
2.

Neighborhood Relations

(a) Flood. As illustrating the problems arising through
vicinity of immovables separated by a state boundary, the
case of Caldwell v. Gore103 deserves attention. The defendant
04
as a landowner in Louisiana, according to the local law/
owed the upper owners an absolute "servitude" (better expressed, a legal bu,rden) of drainage. Contrary to this legal
duty, he built a dam across a shallow depression through
which water found a natural drain, and thereby flooded the
land of the plaintiff situated upriver in Arkansas. As the law
of Arkansas105 permitted the establishment of a dam, unless
unnecessary damage was caused to a neighbor, the petition
1 0 2 Connecticut Valley Lumber Co. v. Maine Central R. Co. (1918) 78 N.H.
553, 103 Atl. 263.
103
(1932) 175 La. 5o1, 143 So. 387, 144 So. 151.
104 Louisiana Rev. C. C. art. 66o.
105 Morrow v. Merrick (1923) 157 Ark. 618, 249 S. W. 369; Burel v.
Hutson (1924) 165 Ark. 111, 263 S. W. 57·
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for removing the dam was good under Louisiana and bad
under Arkansas law. The Supreme Court of Louisiana,
applying its own statute, condemned the defendant. Various
annotators disagree: whether the p:oblem was one of property, in which case the decision would be a proper application
of the lex situs / 06 or one relating to tort, justifying the
application of the law of the place of injury, that is, Arkansas; 107 or whether Arkansas law should govern as the
lex situs of the dominant piece of land; 108 or the lex fori
should apply. 109 The following approach is suggested.
Among the landowners of the state, the Louisiana statute
declared the building of the dam unlawful. A contravention
would support an action for restitution of enjoyment and
damages for the obstruction, an action seemingly based on
the law of real ownership, after the model of the Roman
actio confessoria, without resorting to tort principles.110 But
even where the action for damages is construed as a tort
action, as in most modern systems, the solution depends on
the existence of a limitation to the ownership of the servient
estate, which naturally is governed by the lex situs of this
latter. 111 Hence the only problem for the court should have
been whether the statutes gave rights also to landowners outside the state. This could have been reasonably denied in view
of the lack of reciprocity by the neighboring states. Foreseeing
such cases, Bar denied the limitation on ownership under the
law of a state by which a reciprocal limitation would not
be recognized. 112 But the Louisiana court chose the most
106

Note, 7 Tul. L. Rev. (I933) 269.
Note, 32 Col. L. Rev. (I932) 1426.
10
8 Note, 8I U. of Pa. L. Rev. (I933) 466.
109 ROBERTSON, Characterization 228 n. 24.
11 Cf. French C. C. art. 64o; Vidrine v. Guillory (1925) 3 La. App. 462;
see also 6 La. Dig. (I9I8) Servitudes 692 §§ 25, 26.
111
Restatement § 23 I; 2 ZITELMANN JI 7, 328ff. requires that both laws
involved establish the limitation.
112
I BAR 629 n. 14 ;2 id. 1 I4 n. I.
101
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liberal construction and thereby left no room for consulting
the law of the damaged immovable. The place of acting
alone was decisive. Hence, in the converse case, a Louisiana
landowner injured by changes in Arkansas land has no
actionable cause, the defendant's act being lawful.
(b) Mine damage. In an old case, 113 the Reichsgericht
dealt with a mine situation in Brunswick. As an effect of
digging a gallery shaft, the water sources of an adjacent area
in the territory of the Prussian Mining Law were dried up.
The two laws established different periods of limitation for
the action for damages. The court reversed a decision applying the Prussian Mining Law and held that the acts complained of were accomplished exclusively in Brunswick, under
whose law the mine was operated, and did not go beyond this
territory, even though damage affected land in another jurisdiction. This decision has been regarded as contradicting the
Reichsgericht rule that allows the injured to base his claim
on the law of the place of the injury, 114 but the situation
is special. Mine laws are strictly territorial, not intended to
be applied to foreign mines or soil. They decide the lawful
or unlawful nature of acts as well as the liability for risk.
This seems to be the right decision for any country.

3· Fault
In contrast with liability per se, the tort action supported
by the evidence of a faulty act has the possible double local
contact of the act and the injury, if not several more provided
by partial acts leading to the injury.
(a) Intentional acts. An actor who intends to inflict
the injury (dolus directus) or foresees the harmful effect
as possible and approves of it in case it should occur (dolus
113
RG. (Feb. 6, 1889) 44 Seuff. Arch. 257; followed by OLG. Koln (April
21, 1914) Leipz. Z. 1914, 1140: damage by a Dutch mine to a Prussian

building.
114

RAAPE

203, but see 207 No. 5·
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indirectus ), manifestly deserves to have his act treated as
tortious under both the law of the place where the act is
intended to have effect as well as at the place where it
reaches its· effect. The law under which he physically acts
will ordinarily cover no more than an ineffective part of
the facts.
(b) Negligence. If the injury is not intended, but the
act is intended to reach another territory, such as a letter,
a newspaper, a broadcast, a shipping of goods, the result
should be judged according to the law of that territory.
Doubts are possible when a negligent person does not, and
particularly when he cannot, reasonably foresee that his behavior will have harmful consequences in other jurisdictions.
However, apart from the conflicts rules on tort, it should be
considered that in any modern municipal tort law the court
does not assume negligence unless a prudent person in the
situation of the acting person would regard the injury-not
the damage '''-as lying within the normally possible consequences of the act. Time and place are an essential part
of the circumstances to be envisaged in this hypothetical
judgment.

V.

CoNCLUSION

The number of jurisdictions with which the facts of a
tort may be locally connected, much extended in the opinion
of German courts, is considerably reduced if we eliminate
on one hand all preparatory acts, such as, in the case of
defamation, the writing and dispatching of letters and bodily
movements designed to affect objects at another place and,
on the other hand, the effects of a completed injury, such
as, in the case of personal harm, death and pecuniary losses.
Choice of law, consequently, is limited to the contacts realized
by:
115

See RABEL, Das Recht des Warenkaufs 504, against GoODHART, Essays
in Jurisprudence and the Commoh Law ( 1931) r qff.
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(a) The completion of tortious acts;
(b) Injury, i.e., the invasion of interests.
The traditional American rule following the latter local
connection is essentially nearer to this view than any other
present conflicts law. The two places indicated, in fact, are
in most cases identical.
Considering, however, that these places are different in
significant cases, it would seem desirable to stress one or the
other local connection according to the characteristics of the
various liabilities. We have found that tort claims based on
the right of vicinity or on mining law ought to be determined
by the law of the place where the physical act is done. This
represents a group of liabilities based on local restrictions
to the freedom of acting. On the other hand, absolute and
rigid liabilities for damages should be exclusively governed
by the law of the place where the injury has been suffered.
This does not exclude, in addition, giving an injured person
an option between the liability for risk at the place of the
injury and a liability for negligence otherwise localized and
correspondingly governed.
Indeed, as a general rule, intentional torts and negligence
are subjected most conveniently to the law of the place
where tortious acting at a distance is completed, even when
an injury ep.sues only at another place. The defect of an
automobile or of a machine originating in a factory in state
X may be the object of a tort action based on the fault committed in X, but such negligence cannot properly be said
to have been committed in state Y, if it causes harm there.
Nevertheless, the injury in Y may raise an action on the
ground of mere risk under the law of Y.
Numerous groups of torts, however, need special localizations, according to their most characteristic territorial
connections. Thus, fraud has been aptly localized by the
Restaters at the place where the deceived person delivers
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his assets. Torts committed by press or radio should be
governed by the law of the publishing house or the broadcasting office directing the transmission. Unfair competition
by misappropriation has been correctly held to be subject
to the law of the state in which the most essential part of
the wrongful behavior takes place.
Giving paramount importance to the place of "injury,"
we cannot reach in all cases the same results as through this
individualizing method. Moreover, the American theory has
necessitated in the Restatement a separate treatment of the
question of lawfulness. Exceptions of this kind will be easily
avoided, when the governing law is selected more carefully
and, under this law, the local contacts of the particular case
are duly evaluated for judging the guilt of a defendant acting
in the province of a foreign law.
More individual answers to single problems would be
desirable. The courts presumably would more readily follow
rules appropriate to particular situations than a radical change
which, in this country, does not seem warranted.

CHAPTER

27

Maritime and Aeronautic Torts 1
I.
I.

SuRVEY oF PRINCIPLES

"General Maritime Law"

E

NGLAND. English courts until I862 applied the
ordinary British rules of navigation to collisions of
any ships occurring in British waters or involving
two British ships on the high seas. They followed somewhat
different rules of seamanship if a collision took place between a British and a foreign, or two foreign ships, on the
high seas. The latter rules were assumed to be common to
seamen of all nations, a "general maritime law," though administered in special form in England. 2 The duality of
"British" and "general maritime" rules was abolished by
the Merchant Shipping Act Amendment Act of I 862 providing that all ships, British and foreign, should be judged
by British law with reference to the rule of the road and
the extent of the owner's liability. 3 Since then, the English
statutory law is the expression of the "general" law of maritime torts. 4
1
The abundant literature on collision-French ahordage, German Schiffszusammenstoss, Italian urto di na<Vi, Portuguese ahalroa(;ao-contains many contributions to conflicts law, of which the most useful at present are the following: MARSDEN, The Law of Collisions at Sea (ed. 9 by Gibb, 1934) Ch. IX,
209-224; (Anonymous) Abordage maritime, 1 Repert. (1929) 38; FRITZ
FISCHER, Der Schiffszusammenstoss im Deutschen Int.Priv.R. (Diss. Hamburg
1937); MARIO ScERNI, II Diritto Int. Priv. Maritimo (ed. Aeronautico 1936)
299-308.
Conflicts problems with respect to air navigation have been studied by
FERNAND DE VISSCHER, "Les concours de lois en matiere de droit aerien," 48
Recueil (I 934) II 279. "Largely conjectural rules" for English conflicts law
have been suggested by McNAIR in Winfield, Text-Book of the Law of Tort
(ed. 2, 1943) 197.
2
TheDumfries (1857) Swab. 63,125.
3
25 & 27 Viet., c. 63, ss. 54 and 57·
4 Chartered Mercantile Bank of India v. Netherlands India Steam Naviga-
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The persistent conception of a general maritime law represents a survival of the ancient idea that the law merchant,
of which the maritime law is a branch, was uniform throughout the civilized world, different interpretations by different
courts notwithstanding. It is significant that this idea has
survived the breaking up of the former unity of the Christian
world for a longer time in the English speaking countries
than in the narrow horizons of Continental Europe, where
reminiscences are found only in famous old texts. 5 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of the United States has made it
very clear that "the general maritime law is in force in this
country, or in any other, so far only as it has been adopted
by the laws or usages thereof." 6 But the rules of navigation
on the high seas found a new and broad unification when the
experiences of British seafaring were used throughout the
world in laws and treaties after the British model, and
the international conferences were reflected in the British
enactments.
Insofar as there remain differences, English courts apply
British rules. The chief principle is said to consist in the
duty of navigating vessels so as not to cause damage to the
life and property of others. 7 With respect to the obligations
of the shipowner, his liability under English law for the
negligence of master or crew is considered mandatory, whatever a foreign law of the flag may ordain. 8 Moreover, in all
cases of collision either in British waters or on the high seas,
the limit of the owner's responsibility is regarded as detertion Co. (r883) ro Q.B.D. szr, 537 per Brett, L.J.; The Belgenland (I88s)
I I4 U.S. 355> 366.
5
See LYON-CAEN in Clunet I88z, 6oo; DIENA, 3 Dir. Corn. Int. 425, I;
WESTLAKE § 2.02. (a).
6 Liverpool & Great Western Steam Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co. (r888) 129 U.S.
397, 444·
7
Submarine Telegraph Co. v. Dickson (r864) I5 C. B. N.S. 759, 779 per
Willes, J.
8
The Leon (I 8 8 r) 6 P.D. 148 per Sir R. Phillirnore.

TORTS

mined by the Merchant Shipping Act, I 894, s. 503. Thus,
it has been held that the owners of a British ship in collision
with a foreign ship on the high seas were liable only to
the limited extent prescribed by the statutory English law,
and that international law was not violated, since the owners
of any foreign vessel, too, in a similar case are entitled to
the benefit of the Ace The British rule concerning the
division of loss by collision is applied to all vessels everywhere.10
United States. The doctrine of general maritime law has
been adopted in the federal courts exercising admiralty
jurisdiction in this country, especially in cases of collisions
between any vessels on the high seas. Also limitation of
liability prescribed in acts of Congress is regarded as a part
of the "general maritime law as administered by the admiralty courts of the United States." 11 And in a proceeding
for such limitation, the speed a vessel has been allowed to
run in a fog is determined "by international usage as understood and applied in the forum.m 2 On the reason for preferring this part of the American law to any other law, in
the case of The Scotland (I88I) Mr. Justice Bradley
alluded to the situation on the high seas "where the law
of no particular state has exclusive force, when two ships of
different nationality collide,m 3 but in I 9 I 4 Mr. Justice
Holmes speaking for the Supreme Court shifted the emphasis to public policy as laid down in the federal statutes. 14
Modern writers in England/ 5 as well as in the United
9

The Amalia (1864) Br. & Lush. 151, 1 Moo. P.C.Cas. (N.S.) 471.
is true for Admiralty as well as the common law jurisdiction,
MARSDEN 218 adn. (e).
11 The Scotland (1881) 105 U.S. 24, 29; The Titanic (1914) 233 U.S.

10 This

718, cf. 2 BEALE 1331.
12 La Bourgogne (1908) 210 U.S. 95, II6, 140.
13
105 U.S. at 29.
14 233 U.S. at 733·
15
Lushington, J., in The Milford (1858) Swab. 362,166 Eng. Re. II67;
WESTLAKE 276; CHESHIRE 307.
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States/6 soberly state that "there is no such law" as a general
maritime law and that, all things considered, it is but another
name for the lex fori, although it has grown out of a worldwide traffic and a millennia! history. In the United States
its scope has been somewhat narrowed.
Collision is the historic prototype of a tort committed on
the water. That the same problematic general maritime law
should govern other torts also, seems to have been implied
in an English leading case where a submarine cable (before
the International Cable Convention and the Submarine Telegraph Act, I 8 85) was injured at the bottom of the sea by
the anchor of a navigating ship. 17 While Dicey advocated
this solution, 18 Cheshire contests it as unnecessarily enlarging
the scope of English law. 19
2.

Modern Principles

The International Maritime Congress held in Antwerp in
I 8 85 approved the following .conflicts rules on collision of
ships:
Collisions in ports and internal waters should be governed
by the lex loci, for both formalities (such as demurrers, time
limitations, prescription) and substantive rules, irrespective
of the nationality of the vessels.
The master of a ship suffering from a collision on the
high seas may preserve its rights by observing the form and
time prescribed (for protest or action) either by the law of his
flag, or that of the flag of the offending ship, or that of the
first port of refuge.
In the case of collision on the high seas, each ship is liable
16
2 BEALE I33I; HANCOCK 259 n. 3· See also the criticism by DrENA, 3
Dir. Com. Int. 424 § 2 8 I ; CRouvE:s, I Repert. 42 Nos. 12, I 3·
11
Submarine Telegraph Co. v. Dickson (I864) IS C. B. N. S. 759·
18
DICEY 783; approved by WINFIELD, Text-Book on the Law of Tort (ed.
2, I943) I96.
19
CHESHIRE 309.
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within the limits of the law of its flag, without being entitled
to more than this law grants. 20
These rules have been fully adopted in the Codes of
Portugal and Bulgaria. 21 The first rule has been accepted
everywhere in civil law countries with the exception that
certain courts have applied the law of the forum to the formal
requisites of actions.
On the high seas, the basic rule in civil law countries is
in favor of the law of the flag whenever a tort can be localized
on a vessel. In the case of collisions between two vessels of
different flags, some courts have earnestly tried to find such
a localization and have become resigned to the law of the
forum only when it seemed inevitable, because the two laws
involved appeared equally competent to govern and could
not be meaningfully combined.
Entirely isolated, the Soviet Maritime Law of I 929 prescribes the application of the domestic law to all collisions
wherever occurring. 22
II. UNIFICATION oF SuBsTANTIVE LAws

Collision. The municipal law on collisions on the high seas
has been internationally unified in important aspects by the
"International Convention for the Unification of certain
Rules concerning Collision" of Brussels (September 23,
23
I 9 I o).
Before the outbreak of the second World War, the
following countries were members:
Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Denmark, Danzig,
20

1 Revue Int. Dr. Marit. 427.
Portugal: C. Com. art. 674.
Bulgaria: C. Marit. of Jan. 6, 1908, art. 189.
22
Soviet Russia: Law of June 14, 1929, art. 4 (d); see FREUND, 95
Zeitschrift fiir das gesamte Handelsrecht (I 9 30) Beilage 70.
23
MARTENs, Recueil, Jrd Series, VII, 7 I I ; cf. RIPERT, 3 Droit Marit. ( ed.
2) § 2063.
21
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Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Dominions and
Colonies, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Mexico, the
Netherlands, Nicaragua, Norway,. Poland, Portugal, Rumania, Russia, Spain, Sweden, Uruguay.
Also bilateral treaties are in force between numerous
countries.
The Convention, however, does not apply to collisions
involving vessels of nonparticipant states/ 4 including the
United States which signed but did not ratify the Convention; does not deal with state ships; 25 and is restricted to
the case where at least one vessel is plying on the high seas. 26
The national laws remain for the time in force also with
respect to liability for compulsory pilots 27 and the scope and
effects of contractual or legal provisions limiting the liability
of shipowners to persons on board. 28 In all these respects,
there exist conflicts problems, but they often are mitigated
by the strong influence of the Convention on recent legislation.
Navigation. On the other hand, the navigation rules have
followed a vigorous trend of unification. International regulations of r897, r905, and r927, largely adopting the experiences of Great Britain, have succeeded in attaining a high
degree of uniformity. 29
Aerial law. Parallel to the endeavors of the Comite
Maritime, the Comiti International Technique d'Experts
Juridiques Aeriens (ciTEJA) has succeeded in obtaining
24

Art. 1 2 par. 2 ( 1 ) •
Art. 1 I.
26 Art. I.
27 Art. 5·
28 Art. 4 par. 4· See also the reservation in art. 7 par. 3·
29 At present, see in particular Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea,
Annex II, to the Convention of London, May 31, I929, on Safety of Life,
HuosoN, 4 Int. Legislation 2825; and the British Merchant Shipping (Safety
and Load Line Conventions) Act, 1932, 22 & 23 Geo. s, c. 9 Sched. I.
25
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a few very useful, though fragmentary, conventions. The
0
conventions of Warsaw, October 12, 1929, on transport,S
in which the United States participates, and of Rome, May
29, 1933 (not yet ratified), on damage done to third parties
on the surface of the earth, 31 unify a part of the liability
problems. But the remaining conflicts are even more important and less well worked out than the traditional maritime questions. The Warsaw Convention itself simply
envisages the application of the lex fori to the treatment of
contributory negligence, the possibility of paying periodical
amounts of damages, the concept of gross negligence, and
other problems. 32

III.
I.

ToRTS DoNE WITHIN A STATE TERRITORY

Torts in Territorial Waters

The territory of a state, according to the predominant
opinion, includes in addition to ports, rivers, and channels,
"a belt of sea," 33 the coastal seas of a certain mileage.
·(a) Rule. The universally settled rule calls for the application of the law of the state to which the waters belong. 34
In England, this rule is not unequivocally settled with respect
to foreign waters, but seems now to prevail over the doctrine
of "general maritime law.na 5

°

3 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules regarding International
Air Transport, HuosoN, 5 Int. Legislation 100, U.S. Treaty Series No. 876.
Great Britain: Carriage by Air Act, I 9 32, 2 2 & 2 3 Geo. 5 ., c. 3 6.
31 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules relating to Damages
Caused by Aircraft to Third Parties on the Surface, HUDSON, 6 Int. Legislation
334·
32
Arts. 2I, 22, 25, 28, 29.
33 Articles provisionally approved at the Hague Conference on International
Law, I930, see Am. J. Int. Law I93o, Supp. 239.
34
United States: 'Smith v. Condry (I843) I How. 28; The Albert Dumois
(I 900) I 77 U.S. 240; Restatement § 404. See citations infra n. 40.
35 This has been concluded from the dicta of Brett, then L. J., in Chartered
Mercantile Bank of India v. Netherlands India Steam Navigation Co. (I883)
Io Q.B. 52I, 537 (C.A.) and Mellish, L. J., in The Mary Moxham (I876)
I P. D. 107, III, II3. See MARSDEN 2I5; CHESHIRE 305.
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Illustration. After the English Pilotage Act, 1913, came
into force, in which the liability of a shipowner for fault of
a compulsory pilot was recognized (and no longer considered
to be against public policy, as it was deemed to be in The
Halley 36 ) , a suit was dismissed in the case of a foreign
pilot whom the ship was compelled to take on but for whose
fault the shipowner was not responsible under the local
law. 37
The territorial law governs the wrongs committed on
board a vessel, 38 as well as those inflicted through faulty
navigation/ 9 and has its particular and oldest application
in cases of collisions of ships in territorial waters. 40
36

See supra pp. 242, 276.
TheArum [r921] P. I2.
38
Uravic v. Jarka Co. (I93I) 282 U.S. 234, opinion of Mr. Justice Holmes
(a stevedore killed on board a German vessel in New York harbor); cf. HANCOCK 262.
39
Restatement § 407.
40
United States: Restatement§ 409; The Albert Dumois (I9oo) I77 U.S.
240 (domestic waters) ; Royal Mail Stearn Packet Co. v. Cornpanhia de
Navegaco Lloyd Brasileiro (D. C. E. D. N.Y. I928) 3I F. (2d) 757; Standard
Oil Co. of New York v. Tampico Nav. Co. (D. C. E. D. N.Y. 1921) 21 F.
(2d) 795 (foreign waters).
Treaty of Montevideo on Commercial Law ( r 889) art. t i ; text on Commercial Navigation (I94o) art. 5·
Codigo Bustamante, arts. 290, 291.
Belgium: App. Bruxelles (Nov. 21, I884) Pasicrisie I885.2.39 and many
other cases (domestic waters); Trib. com. Antwerp (March 4, 1853) Jur.
Port Anvers, I857.1.267 and many other cases, see I Repert. 73 Nos. I72-I74
(foreign waters); Trib. Antwerp (Jan. 23, I936) 36 Revue Dor (1937) 158,
Jur. Port Anvers I936, I97·
Bulgaria: C. Marit. of Jan. 6, I9o8, art. I89.
Denmark: Trib. Marit. Copenhague (May 3I, I9o5) Clunet I9o7, 1I78.
Egypt: Trib. civ. Alexandria (Feb. 2, 1926) I7 Revue Dor 328; see also
Trib. com. Alexandria (March 4, I929) 20 Revue Dor 237·
France: Cass. ( civ.) (July I 8, 189 5) S. I 895·1.30 5, Clunet I 8 96, qo;
Cass. (req.) (Feb. 15, 1905) S. 1905.I.2o9, Revue 1905, rr4, 128, Clunet
1905, 347i App. Rouen (June 26, 1907) Clunet 1908, 776. The cases refer to
domestic waters only, because the courts refuse jurisdiction as to foreign waters.
The rule, however, is recognized to extend to these in the literature, see 6 LYONCAEN et RENAULT 192 §§ ro48 to IOSI (despite personal opposition);
RoLIN, 3 Principes § ro71; PILLET, z Traite § 551; r Repert. 67 No. 143.
Germany: RG. (May 30, r888) 21 RGZ. 136; (Feb. r8, 1929) IPRspr.
1930 No. 59 (domestic waters); (July 12, I886) 19 RGZ. 7; (June zs, July
9> r892) 29 RGZ. 90 (foreign waters); OLG. Hamburg (April 17, 1907)
Hans. GZ. 1907, HBl. No. 73· Cf. RG. (July r, r896) 37 RGZ. r8r (fluvial
waters).
37
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According to universal custom, usually followed also
in the United States, the rule does not cover, however, the
internal management and discipline of a ship which, instead,
is governed by the law of the flag the vessel flies. 41 The
idea is that torts, like contracts creating obligations between
the owner, the shipmaster, the officers and the crew, are
subject to the individual law of the vessel. Ordinarily, port
authorities also refrain from taking jurisdiction in such
matters. 42
Through this important restriction on the local legal order,
the troublesome question regarding the subjection of foreign
warships to the private law of the territory is to a large
extent eliminated. For the rest of the problems, the ordinary
rules on immunity from territorial jurisdiction are observed. 43 The liability of state vessels, employed in the
transport of passengers or cargoes, has been defined by an
international convention/4 in which the United States does
Italy: As in France, Cass. (July 19, 1938) Foro Ital. 1938 I 12r6, 7 Giur.
Comp. DIP. 307 No. 16r. Jurisdiction is not taken as to foreign vessels in
foreign waters, Cass. (Jan. 16, 1939) Giur. Ital. 1939 I 1264.
The Netherlands: H.R. (June 2.4, 192.7) W. II704, 17 Revue Dor 52.2., Rb.
Rotterdam (Feb. 8, 1939) W. 739·
Norway: S. Ct. Christiania (Dec. 15, 1905) Clunet 1907, 852., 2.3 Revue
Int. Dr. Marit. 12.8 (Canal of Kiel, German law).
Portugal: C. Com. art. 674.
41 Grand Trunk R. Co. v. Wright (C. C. A. zd 192.8) 2.1 F. (zd) 814, 8rs;
see for other cases Restatement § 405; 2. BEALE r p8 § 405.1; HANCOCK 2.64
n. 7 who notes, however, a few contrary decisions. An exception has been recently made by majority vote in a case where a Greek seaman signed on a
Greek vessel in a United States port and was injured in United States territorial
waters, Kyriakos v. Goulandris (C. C. A. zd 1945) 1945 Am. Marit. Cas. 1041;
Judge Learned Hand (at rop) dissenting, urged the long list of precedents.
Treaty of Montevideo on Commercial Law of r889, art. zo; text on Commercial Navigation of 1940, art. 2. r.
42 Treaty of Montevideo, Draft on Commercial Navigation of 1940, arts. zz,
2.3. Preparation for an international convention on penal and civil jurisdiction
in the matters of navigation and collision was started by the International
Maritime Committee; instructive reports have been printed in the Publications
of the Committee, Nos. 98-roz.
43 Cf. BALDONI, "Les navires de guerre dans les eaux territoriales etrangeres,"
65 Recueil (1938) III r85.
44 Convention concerning the Immunity of State-Owned Vessels, Brussels,
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not participate. That the Soviet Russian State acting
through its commercial agencies is not exempted from liability has been declared in several countries. 45 Commercial
vessels chartered by a state but not commanded by a captain
appointed by the government, are not held exempt from
attachment and still less is the owner free from action for
damages. 46
(b) Exceptions. By analogy to the preference given in
some quarters to a national law common to plaintiff and
defendant in tort actions, it has been assumed in a few instances that the law of a flag flown by both vessels involved
should govern torts even in territorial waters. 47
The contrary opinion, however, prevails universally. It
is supported by the territorialism obtaining in tort matters,
as well as by the fact that the shipowners are not the only
interested persons; passengers, affreighters, and insurers of
ship or cargo or passengers share the risk/ 8 German courts,
however, inconsistently have resorted to the common national
law in the case of two German vessels colliding in foreign
waters. 49
2.

Collision of Aircraft Flying over State Territory
By no means a matter of course, it has nevertheless been

of April ro, 192.6, and Additional Protocol of May 24, 1934, 176 L. of N.
Treaty Series 199, HUDSON, 3 Int. Legislation 1837 and 6 id. 868.
45
See French Cass. (req.) (Dec. rs, 1936) Revue Crit. 1937, 7IO; cf. in
general, Cass. (req.) (Feb. 19, 1929) S.I9JO.L49 and Note, NIBOYET; cf. for
contracts, Ital. Cass. (Aug. 3, 1935) Giur. Ital. 1936 II 109, Rivista 1935,
372.. See later cases in Annual Digest 1938-40, 237, 246£., 249·
46
RG. (May r6, 1938) 157 RGZ. 389 explaining Continental, British, and
American concepts.
47
France: VALERY§ 979 n. 2.
Norway: s. Ct. (192.3) cited by CHRISTIANSEN, 6 Repert. sh No. 187.
C6digo Bustamente, art. 2 89, Convention of Brussels, supra n. 2 3, art. r 2
par. 2. (2).
48
See ARMINJON, 2 Precis§ u2..
49
OLG. Hamburg (Feb. 7, 1913) HansGZ. 1913, HBl. II? No. 52.; (March
19, 1915) id. 1915, HBl. 139 No. 69; see also (Nov. 12, 1906) id. 1906,
HBI. 312 No. 154 (river boats).
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categorically recognized by the international conventions
on air navigation "that every state has complete and exclusive
sovereignty over the air space above its territory and territorial waters." 50 It follows that collisions between two airplanes occurring in the air over a state territory are subject
to the law of this state. 51
That damage done by an aircraft to third persons on the
surface of the earth is governed by the law of the territory
has been noted earlier. 52
IV.
1.

ToRTs oN THE HIGH SEAs

Torts on Board One Vessel

According to a universally settled rule, a tortious act done
on board a vessel on the high seas, whereby only persons
or property on board are injured, is governed by the law of
the flag the vessel flies. 53 This rule covers personal injuries
sustained by seamen on the high seas, 54 including American
seamen on foreign-owned vessels. 55 Hence, a Yugoslav seaman on a Yugoslav vessel, even during the wartime occupation of that country, could not ask for relief under the American Seamen's Act for injury he suffered on board. 56
In England, it is discussed whether the analogy of wrongs
50
Pan-American Convention on Commercial Aviation, of February 2o, 1928,
art. 1. HUDSON, 4 Int. Legislation 2354, 2356; conforming to Convention of
Paris (19I9) art. I; lbero-American Convention of Madrid (1926) art. 1;
preamble to the British Air Navigation Act, I 920.
51
SCERNI 367 and cited authors, rejecting the exception made by others in
favor of the national laws common to hath aircraft.
52
Pan-American Convention on Commercial Aviation, of Feb. 20, 1928,
art. 28, HUDSON, 4 Int. Legislation 2365. Supra p. p8 and n. 98.
53
United States Federal Death Act, 1920, 4I Stat. 537 c. I 11 § 4, 46 U.S.
Code (1934) § 764 (summarizing the conflicts rule); Restatement § 406;
The Titanic (1914) 233 U.S. 718.
54
Petter Lassen (D. C. N.D. Cal. 1939) 29 F. Supp. 938: Norwegian fireman on Danish vessel time-chartered to an American company, Danish law.
55
Hogan v. Hamburg American Line (1934) 152 N. Y. Misc. 405, 272
N. Y. Supp. 69o.
56
Radovcic v. Prince Pavle (D. C. S.D. N.Y. 1942) 45 F. Supp. 15.
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done in a foreign country must be followed by requiring
that a maritime tort be actionable by English law. 57
Aircraft. It is an open question whether the rule should
be transferred to tortious acts committed on an aircraft flying
over the high seas or such territories as the North Pole.
Although it is well settled that aircraft, too, have nationality,
Fernand de Visscher has pointed out that in actual practice
the commercial airlines of many nations use the same fields
and the parties dealing with them do not care about the
flag, except in the case of contractual obligations subjected
to the law of the flag by express stipulation. As the Warsaw
Convention on Air Transport confines lawsuits to either the
principal business place of the carrier or the place of destination, at the election of the victim, de Visscher thinks it would
be in the spirit of the Convention to apply the law of the
forum of the court seized. 58 In the United States, courts
have been able to apply the Federal Statute concerning Death
on the High Seas by Wrongful Act to airplane accidents on
the high seas. 59
2.

Collision

Where two vessels flying the same flag collide on the
high seas, most courts apply the law thus common to the
vessels. so As in this case no other law is in co.mpetition, this
57
In contrast to DrcEY 778, CHESHIRE 306 hypothetically denies the requirement. For the latter view HANCOCK 269 invokes the precedent of The
Halley, supra p. 242.
58
FERNAND DE VISSCHER, 48 Recuei\ (1934) II at 335·
59
46 U.S. Code§§ 76df.; Choy v. Pan-American Airways Co. (1941) Am.
Marit. Cas. 1941, 483; Wyman v. Pan-American Airways, Inc. (1943) 181
N. Y. Misc. 963, 43 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 420.
60
Restatement§ 410 (a); The Eagle Point (1906) 73 U.S.C.C.A. 569, 142
Fed. 453; dicta in The Scotland (r88I) 105 U. S. 24, 31; The Belgenland
(r88s) 114 U.S. 355, 369.
Bulgaria: C. Marit., art. 1 8 9·
France: RIPERT, 3 Droit Marit. 21 § 2074; 6 LYON-CAEN et RENAULT

§

1050.

Germany: RG. (Nov. r8, rgor) 49 RGZ. r82 (holding that Danish and
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principle is the best possible and has appropriately been
extended to vessels whose flags are different but whose laws
are essentially the same. 61
English courts, however, apply their "general maritime
law" also in this case. 62
The case where two vessels, flying the flags of different
countries, collide on the high seas, is desperate. None of the
familiar contacts is suitable when no territory is affected
and the connections established by the flags neutralize each
other. Among the innumerable strained attempts to reach
a solution, the following have been supported by various
authorities:
(i) The Montevideo Treaty of 1889 on Commercial Law
provided that the law of the flag more favorable to the
defendant should be applied. 63
(ii) Another opinion distinguishes whether both vessels
have violated the rules of navigation or only one of them
is to blame. In the latter case, the law applicable would be
that of the vessel at fault. 64 Where both are found to be
guilty of fault, opinions are divided; each vessel should
pay 50 per cent of the damages to which it would be liable
Norwegian laws are essentially the same); RG. (Nov. n, 1932) 138 RGZ.
243 at 245.
Italy: BoLAFFIO, C. Com. 931; DIENA, 2 Prine. 354·
Portugal: C. Com. art. 674 No. 2.
Treaty of Montevideo on Commercial Law ( x8 89) art. xz, sent. I; Codigo
Bustamente, art. 292.
61
United States: Dicta in The Scotland (1881) 105 U. S. 24, 29; The
Belgenland (r885) 114 U.S. 355; The Presidente Wilson (D. C. D. Mass.
1929) 30 F. (2d) 466.
Germany: 49 RGZ. I 82, supra n. 6o.
62
Brett, L. J., in Chartered Mercantile Bank of India v. Netherlands India
Steam Navigation Co. (I88J) xo Q.B.D. 521, 537·
63
Art. xz sent. 2; probably this is also the meaning of the Treaty of I 940, on
Commercial Navigation, art. 7·
64
Congress of Genoa (1892) art. 7, see 8 Revue Int. Dr. Marit. r8r.
France: PILLET, 2 Traite § 551; CREMIEU, 5 Repert. 493 No. 2 x.
Germany: RG. (July 6, 1910) 74 RGZ. 46; overruled (Nov. u, I932)
138 RGZ. 246, infra n. 7I.

MARITIME AND AERONAUTIC TORTS

349

under its own law and 50 per cent of those imposed by the
other vessel's law/ 5 or liability is divided ex aequo et bono,66
or the law of the forum is applied. 67
(iii) More generally, as a consequence of the allegedly
general principle that the national law of the debtor or the
defendant should prevail, it has been advocated that each
vessel's liability should be determined in accordance with
the law of its own flag. 68
(iv) In I 8 85, the Institute of International Law and the
Congress of Antwerp advocated the rule that a vessel should
be liable only when it would be liable under both laws concerned. 69 This rule has found a following. 70
( v) The German Supreme Court, in a recent decision,
has attempted to apply to collisions on the high seas the
theory of that court that every place where a substantial
element of a tort occurs is a place of wrong. Thus, since the
vessel whose crew is guilty of fault as well as the vessel
which has been damaged through such fault, are places of
65

C6digo Bustamante, art. 294·
Congress of Genoa (1892) art. 7·
61
See below n. 76.
68
United States: Judge Learned Hand in The James McGee (1924) 300 Fed.
93; Note, 25 Col. L. Rev. (1925) 96; The Aquitania (1924) Am. Marit.
Cas. 1924, 1440; Powers v. Cunard S. S. Co. (1925) 32 F. (2d) 720.
England: Davidson v. Hill [1901] 2 K. B. 6o6.
France: App. Rennes (Dec. ZI, 1887) Clunet 1888, 8o, affirmed on other
questionable grounds, Cass. (civ.) (Nov. 4, I 891) Clunet I 89z, 15 3; Cass.
(civ.) (Nov. 7, 1904) 20 Revue Int. Dr. Marit. 517. The courts decide the
question of fault under French law reputed to be universally good and in the
case of fault apply varying tests. 6 LYON-CAEN et RENAULT roso, 1op.
Germany: RG. (July 6, 1910) 74 RGZ. 46.
Greece: App. Athenai (1933 No. roSs) 45 Themis z68; approved by
FRAGISTAS, 10 Z.ausl.PR. (1936) 643.
Italy: Cass. Torino (April 17, 1903) 19 Revue Int. Dr. Marit. 478.
69
Inst. Dr. Int. (Lausanne, r888) 10 Annuaire (r88g) 152; Congress of
Antwerp (I 8 85) supra n. zo, art. 8 sent. z.
70
Bulgaria: C. Marit. art. I 89.
Portugal: C. Com. art. 674, No.3·
Treaty of Montevideo, draft of 1940 on Navigation, art. 7. Recently ScERNI
308 resigns himself to this solution.
DIENA, 3 Dir. Com. Int. 432 called this view the only one based on solid
legal principles.
66
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wrong, the owner of the damaged vessel has the choice of
suing under that law which is more favorable to him. 71
This latter view may encounter the objection once raised
by Fedozzi 72 that the delict has been committed not on but
by a commercial vessel. Moreover, we have often been
warned not to take too seriously the fiction that a vessel
is a floating part of a territory. 73 However, looking for the
least inappropriate local connection, American courts, with
their traditional localization at the place of the injury, could
well apply the law of the vessel which, or on board of which
life or property, is injured. Occasionally, in fact, this view
seems to have been floating through the mind of a court. 74
(vi) The law of the forum is applied, either as representing a maritime custom of world-wide application, 75 or
as a last resort in all cases/6 or where one of the vessels
71
RG. (Nov. rz, I9J2.) 138 RGZ. 243, 246; IPRspr. I9J2. No. 6o; 2.8
Revue Dor 45; Nouv. Revue I935, 74; I Giur. Comp. DIP I77 (English
steamer Henry Stanley). Contra: RAAPE, D. IPR. 32.9·
72
Opinion, in the matter of the Lotus case, Revue de Droit International
(Lapradelle I928) 36I; cf. SCERNI 306 n. 3·
73
'See the argument of CHESHIRE 309.
74 2 BEALE I33I n. 4 mentions with hesitation La Bourgogne (I9o8) 210
U.S. 95, q8, and The Saginaw (1905) 139 Fed. 906.
75 England: The Leon (I88I) 6 P. D. 148. United States: The Windrush
(D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1922) z86 Fed. 2_p, aff'd (C.C.A. 2d I924) 5 F. (2d)
I425; but cf. HANCOCK 279, and against him, CooK, Book Review, 5 U. of
Toronto L. J. (I943) I92.
76
Belgium: Older practice, see CRouv.Es, I Repert. 7 3 No. I 75 and Trib. com.
Anvers (July 23, I892) id. n. 2.
Denmark: S. Ct. (May 10, I9o4) cited by CHRISTIANSEN, 6 Repert. 225
No. 89.
France: I Repert. 67 No. I44: the parties by bringing their suit to French
jurisdiction, implicitly submit themselves to French law, including all provisions and prescriptions of the French Commercial Code! AssER et RIVIER,
Elements § I 13; VALERY § 978; ARMINJON, 2 Precis§ I22.
Germany: Older practice: Oberapp. Ger. Lubeck (Jan. 30, 1849) 4 Senff.
Arch. No.4 (The General Washington).
Prussia: Obertribunal (Oct. 25, I859) I4 Seuff. Arch. No. 197 (The Columbus, British ship). RG. (Nov. 10, 19oo) cited and restricted by RG. (Nov. I8,
1901) 49 RGZ. I82, 187 (case of "Kong Inge") and RG. (July 6, I9Io) 74
RGZ. 46 (case of "Seine"). Return to lex fori has been advocated by REINBECK, "Schiffszusammenstosse auf hoher See etc.," Hans. RGZ. I933 A, 337,
345·

MARITIME AND AERONAUTIC TORTS

351

belongs to the forum. 77
3· Other Torts
English writers have discussed the case of two whale
fishers of different nationality contending about the same
whale. 78 The English case of an injury done to a submarine
cable on the bottom of the high seas, 79 and the American
case of the Titanic's collision with an iceberg80 are other
examples. Should an analogy be drawn from torts done on
board only one vessel, or from collision? This is just a nice
question for law students.

v.

SPECIAL PROBLEMS

r. Rules of Navigation

It is recognized in the United States that if the responsible
persons of a vessel on the high seas observe the sailing regulations of the government shown by the flag, they are not
to be blamed. 81 The case has become rare that regulations
are different, but the doctrine should be adopted abroad.
That local port and coast regulations ought to be complied
with by all ships is settled beyond need of proof.
2.

Extent of Damages

The old European customary rule that an innocent shipowner may exclude his personal liability for maritime tort
by surrendering (abandoning) the ship, or what is rescued

1,

Greece: 2 STREIT-VALLINDAS 2.64 n. 2.3.
Italy: Codice della Navigazione (1942.) art. 12..
U.S.S.R.: See supra n. 2.2..
77 This result is reached by a few recent writers, such as FISCHER, supra n.
and SCERNI, supra n. r, 307.
78
Supra ns. 1 8, r 9·
79
Submarine Telegraph Co. v. Dickson (r864) 15 C. B. N. S. 759·
80
(1914) 2.33 U.S. 718.
81
See 2. BEALE§ 408.1; 15 C.J.S. I?§ 3·
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from it, to the injured party,82 has not been transferred to
the common law countries, but the United States, in the
Act of I 85I, introduced by statute a remedy conferring on
the shipowner the election between abandonment and limited
pecuniary damages. 83 Great Britain and some other countries
have a different system of limiting the amount of damages
to certain maxima computed upon the tonnage of the vessel. 84
Certain features of this system have recently been adopted
in the United States. 85 The variants within the groups are
considerable.
British courts, being bound by the Merchant Shipping
Acts since I 862,S 6 and those of the United States87 apply
the domestic method of reducing damages, irrespective of
the place of tort and of the nationality of the ships. The
usual British argument is the long since refuted classification
of measures of damages as relating to the remedy rather than
to the right. The United States Supreme Court, however,
made it clear that at the bottom of the reasoning lies a plain
consideration of public policy. 88
Kuhn has wondered why resort should be had to American
law to limit the liability of a foreign vessel for injuries to
American citizens on the high seas. 89 Also a law review
note90 declared it "difficult to see why the principle of the
82
The rule is still in use in France, Germany, Italy, Mexico, Portugal, Rumania, Spain, Egypt; cf. NEUHAUSER, 6 Rechtsvergl. Handworterbuch I93·
83
Congressional Act of March 3, 1851, with amendments, Rev. Stat. §§
4983-89,46 u.s. c. A.§§ I83-189.
84
Great Britain: Merchant Shipping Act, I 894/t 932, s. 503. The Netherlands: C. Com. art. 541.
85
Congressional Acts of August 29, I935 and June 5, 1936, 46 U.S.C.A.,
Supp. I944, § 183, 49 Stat. 96o, 49 Stat. 1479.
86
Merchant Shipping Act, 1894, s. 503.
87
Restatement § 411; Oceanic S. N. Co. v. Mellor (The Titanic) (I 9I4)
233 u.s. 718.
88
Bradley, J., in The Scotland (I 8 81) 105 U.S. 24 at 3 3; Holmes, J., in the
case of The Titanic (I9I4) 233 U.S. 7I8 at 733·
89
KuHN, Comp. Com. 308.
90
27 Mich. L. Rev. (1929) 2o6.
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lex loci should be departed from merely because the case
came up in admiralty" and recalled the former leading case,
Smith v. Condry/ 1 where the lex loci was applied rather
than the lex fori. In fact, the majority of the Continental
European courts without hesitation apply that law which
in their view governs the tort claim as a whole. 92 As the
French courts observe, one could not, in fact, juridically
conceive that consequences of one sole act, the compensation
of the same damage, be appreciated according to different
laws and rules. The German Reichsgericht grants the owner
of a ship damaged on the high seas the choice between the
laws of both ships involved; he may recover the amount
of damages determined by the law stating the higher maximum limit. 93
Does it indicate a serious doubt that in a recent English
case the High Court judge reserved for judicial decision
the question whether the total loss of an Argentinian ship
in a collision in the Parana River should free the shipowner
91

(I843) 1 How. z8, II L. Ed. 35·
Belgium: Trib. com. Antwerp (June 26, I89o) 7 Revue Int. Dr. Marit.
s82; App. Bruxelles (May 26, I905) 2I Revue Int. Dr. Marit. II4 (both
speaking in general terms).
France: Unanimous. The only question raised in this respect has been whether
a foreign defendant may use the right to abandon the ship to his maritime
creditors as according to the French law of the forum. In the approved opinion
he may not, except when French law governs the collision. See Cass. (civ.)
(Nov. 4> I89I) Clunet 1892, I 53> r6Iff.; cf. FISCHER, supra n. I, 3I-33·
Germany: 29 RGZ. 93; 37 RGZ. I 82.
Italy. App. Genoa (Dec. Io, 1894) Clunet 1896, 907; Cass. Torino (April
I7, I903) Clunet I9o6, 508; BoLAFFIO, 8 c. Com. (I9Z3) 932; DtENA, 3
Dir. Com. Int. 354 n. 1.
The Netherlands: H.R. (June 24, I927) W.JI704, N.J. (I927) 129 (Swedish and German vessels colliding in Belgian territorial waters; Belgian law);
Hof s'Gravenhage (Feb. I4, I935) W. 12895 (Belgian shipowner, territorial
Dutch waters); id. (Dec. 28, I935) 35 Revue Dor. (I937) 359 (two Dutch
vessels, Argentine waters).
Norway: CHRISTIANSEN, 6 Repert. 5 82 No. I 8 5 (law of the flag).
The Scotch Court of Sessions in Kendrick v. Burnett (I897) 25 R. 82, 35
Scot. L. R. 62, adjusted the ordinary English double law rule in the absence of
a lex loci delicti to the effect that the measure of damages has to be agreeable
to the domiciliary laws of both parties.
ea r 3 8 RGZ. 242, 246.
92
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according to Argentine law, or English law should apply?

94

3. Public Policy
The requirements under which the action must agree
with the domestic law, as in England and in a certain respect
in Germany, have been applied to maritime torts. 95
4· Formal Requirements of Suit
The position of a plaintiff is difficult, if the court where
he finally is able to sue makes relief dependent on his having
complied with the prescriptions of the law of the forum demanding protests or notices and limiting the time of bringing
action. The Antwerp Congress gave him a broad option
(supra p. 339 ), while the Brussels Convention simply
abolished all formalities.
It is noteworthy that the Supreme Court of the United
States has liberally declared a foreign vessel excused from
observing the American formal provisions, 96 while various
courts in other countries have clung to their local laws. 97
94

The Madrid [I 9 3 7] P. 40, [I 9 3 7] I All E.R. 2 I 6.
See for England supra n. 57·
Germany: EG. BGB. art. I2; ScHAPS, Das Deutsche Seerecht (ed. 2) § 485,
n. 29.
96
The Scotland (I88I) I05 U.S. 24, 33·
97 France: Lex fori as to the time granted for bringing the suit: Cass. (civ.)
(March 6, I89I) S. I892.1.I93, also published in I Repert. 67, Note (Cura~ao
waters); App. Rennes (Jan. 7, Igo8) Revue I9o8, 395 (Danish waters).
Contra: in case of collision on the high seas, App. Aix (Dec. 2 3, I 857)
D.I858.2.39; and in a broad survey, LYON-CAEN, Notes, S. I89J.I.I93·
In Belgium the courts have been divided, see CRouv.Es, 1 Repert. 72 Nos.
I67, 169; likewise in the Netherlands, see VAN HASSELT 366.
95
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In this part, the following articles published in law reviews will
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Beale, "What Law Governs the Validity of a Contract," 23 Harv.
L. Rev. (19Io) 260.
Cook, Walter Wheeler, "An Unpublished Chapter of the Logical
and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws," 3 7 Ill. L. Rev. (I 94 3)
4 I 8; also published under the title, "The Logical and Legal Bases
of the Conflict of Laws, An Unpublished Chapter: In Conclusion,"
2I Can. Bar. Rev. (I943) 249·
Lorenzen, "The Validity of Wills, Deeds and Contracts as Regards Form in The Conflict of Laws," 20 Yale L. J. (1911) 427.
-id., "Validity and Effect of Contracts in the Conflict of Laws,"
30 Yale L. J. (I92I) 565,655.
---id., "The Statute of Frauds and the Conflict of Laws," 32 Yale

L.

J. (1923) 3I 1.
-id., "Uniformity between Latin America and the United States

in the Rules of Private International Law relating to Commercial
Contracts," I5 Tul. L. Rev. (194I) I65.
Nussbaum, "Conflict Theories of Contracts: Cases Versus ReGtatement," 51 Yale L. J. (1942) 893.
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Choice· of Law by the Parties
(Party Autonomy)

T

HE term, contracts, is taken hereafter in the narrow
sense, restricted to agreements creating obligations,
in which it is used at common law. This excludes
agreements disposing of family or property relations. Also,
conventions modifying or terminating existing obligations
need separate treatment. Nor are unilateral declarations
directly involved.

I.

THE PROBLEM OF AMERICAN LAW

The conflicts law concerning contracts is known as a source
of difficulties, particularly in the United States. Commonly,
the authorities are declared to be in great confusion and
full of contradictions,· and to be inconsistent in the same
court. 1 The courts are said to choose without discernible
coordination among at least four approaches, namely,
r. The law of the place where a contract is made (lex
loci contractus),
2. The law of the place where the contract is to be performed (lex loci solutionis),
3· The law intended by the parties to be applied (party
autonomy),
4· The law which upholds the validity of the contract.
The Appellate Division of New York declared in 1936
1
See with particular regard to the validity of contracts, 2 BEALE I 077;
GOODRICH § 107; STUMBERG 200-2I5; McCLINTOCK, "Conflict of Laws as to
Contracts, Minnesota Decisions," I o Minn. L. Rev. (I 926) 498, 499, 507; I I
Am. Jur. (I 937) 397, Conflict of Laws, Contracts § I I 6; I 7 C. J. S. (I 939)
Contracts § 12.
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that, in determining which law governs the validity of a
contract, the cases in that state variously regard as decisive:
the place where the contract was made, the place of performance, the intention of the parties, or the grouping of
the various elements which have gone to make up the
contract. 2 The court in the case at bar employed all four
methods, resulting in the same conclusion. Thus, not even
that important state can be classified in one of the various
alleged systems.
The leading authors have been in no greater harmony,
except in stating the uncertainty. Recently, in interpreting
the prevailing tendencies of the courts, four or more propositions have been set forth. Beale, who very vigorously
preferred the law of the place of contracting for determining
the validity of a contract, believed that his theory had become victorious. 3 Lorenzen has been a most influential supporter of an opposite opinion favorable to the law of the place
of performance and the law tending to validate the contract. 4
In Bati:ffol's view, the great majority of cases actually apply
the law of the place of performance whenever there is a
point in so doing. 5 Nussbaum is the only writer to deny
that there is confusion; he thinks that the decisions in reality
exemplify a method of individualizing the facts and selecting
the law most appropriate to the intention of the parties. 6 In
the present writer's opinion, there is a strong old school
tradition establishing as a basic or subsidiary rule, the law
of the place of contracting; a second powerful theoretical
current toward the law of the place of performance; and
2
Jones v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. (1936) 158 Misc. 466, 286 N.Y. Supp.
4; CHEATHAM, Cases 478.
3 BEALE, 23 Harv. L. Rev. (1909) 1, 8; 2 BEALE 1096, 117I.
4
LoRENZEN, 30 Yale L. J. (1921) 655, 673.
5
BATIFFOL §§ 96, 97·
6
NussBAUM, D. IPR. 223; id., 51 Yale L. J. (1942) 892, 919; id., Prin-

ciples

I

77ff.
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side by side, very many cases following mechanically one
of these scholastic approaches, and very many others thoughtfully seeking a suitable law by some method or other. No
single rule can be rested on the wealth of cases, but none
is alien to all of them.
Again, if, according to certain methods used by Beale,
the American jurisdictions were believed to be bound by
conflicts rules prevailing traditionally in the courts of individual states, the picture of interstate affairs would be illustrated by this following example.
A merchant in Massachusetts (which is said to adhere to
the rule of lex loci contractus), by intervention of a New
York agent, enters into a transaction with a resident of California (where the lex loci solutionis is prescribed by statute),
performance being due in Connecticut (a state clearly following the theory of intention of the parties). The requisites
of a valid contract are established: in the Massachusetts
courts by the law of New York;'in the courts of California
by the law of Connecticut; in the Connecticut courts according
to the circumstances of the case; and how in New York,
nobody knows.
Parties wanting to secure their transaction against the
possible legal intricacies of the unknown governing law,
would be made more helpless by the assertion popular in
the literature that they cannot escape imperative rules of the
governing law by agreeing on the applicable law.
May it be allowed, for present purposes, to abandon the
fatalistic passivity with which either the condominium of
the several rules has been taken as an existent and unavoidable
evil or one of the rules has been perforce erected as the
present law? What the desirable method should be, has
been rather well defined in the last development of the world
literature. Although none of the existing legislations in
either hemisphere has reached the visible goal and scholarly
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efforts are inchoate, we are able at least to visualize the way
to be followed and the gigantic mass of prejudices that must
be cleared away.

II.

THE THEORIES

It has earlier been submitted in this work 7 that conflicts
law may allow the parties to a contract to select the applicable
law. However, opinions are still divided into three main
groups.
1.

Theory Negating Choice of Law by the Parties

Reading the Restatement or certain Latin-American codes,
one might feel that the parties are entirely unable to influence
in any way the law governing their obligations. But the fact
that for centuries most courts throughout the world have
allowed the parties a very broad field of decision, has impelled the innumerable theoretical adversaries of "autonomy"
to conceive a more moderate view. 8 In this view, every contract rests upon one predestined municipal law called to its
function by the rule of conflicts without regard to the intention of the parties in the individual case. For instance, the
law of the place where the parties make the contract, is imposed authoritatively on them. To the extent that this law
permits the replacing of its own provisions by stipulations of
7

Vol. 1, p. 83.
The founder of this theory was BAR, see 2 BAR 4· In the United States:
MINOR 401; BoRCHARD, "Contractual Claims in International Law," 13 Col.
L. Rev. (1913) 457; LORENZEN, 30 Yale L. J. (1921) 565, 655, 658; 31 id.
(1922) 53; BEALE, 23 Harv. L. Rev. (1909) 260 and Treatise§ 332.2; GooDRICH 278. Lists of continental writers have been given by CALEB, Essai sur le
principe de l'autonomie en droit international prive (1927) who has revived
this theory; NIBOYET, "La theorie de l'autonomie de la volonte," Recuei11927,
I, 5 (the most energetic advocate); see also lists by MELCHOIR soon. 1; GuTZWILLER 1 6o6. On the adversaries of this theory, see Vol. 1 p. 85 n. 66. Adde the
able article by GERHARD MAYER, "Zur Parteiautonomie als Kollisionsnorm,"
44 Z.int.R. (1931) 103; FEDOZZI-CERETI 690 § 2; KosTERS in Conference de
la Haye, Actes de la sixieme session, 351.
8
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the parties, they may, instead of inventing new provisions,
quote or cite or copy a section of a foreign statute. By such
shorthand reference, they never do more than incorporate
the foreign provision as a term of their agreement/ which
remains controlled by the one invariably preordained law.
German and Italian writers, among whom Zitelmann has
grounded this doctrine on scientific considerations, distinguish
this reference permitted by the governing municipal law,
under the term of "contractual reception" or "materiellrechtliche V erweisungmo (reference based on the substantive
law), from the forbidden reference pertaining to conflicts
law.
Although language in not a few English and..t\merican
decisions alludes to the embodying of particular legal terms
or rules in a contract, and such a provision may be said to be
a mere stipulation rather than a reference to foreign law, 11
it would seem that a consistent distinction as in German
writings is not made by common law lawyers, and correctly
so. 12 Indeed, whatever the merits of this learned distinction
may be when the question is whether a contract must be
divided under two laws/ 3 it is unsound to treat the reference
9
CooK, Legal Bases 399, has used the same words to refute or tranquilize
"the critics of the 'intention' theory," who oppose the proposition that foreign
law as suclt should control as a consequence of the agreement. Yet, a little later
Cook seems fully to accept the intention theory in its true meaning.
J.O The first term is used by PERASSI, Rivista I 92 8, 5 I 8. The second term
seems to have been formed by ZIMMERMAN, 44 Zentralblatt (1926) at 883
and was popularized by HAUDEK, MELCHIOR, and M. WoLFF.
11
See, for instance, DICEY (ed. 3) 6x, General Principle No. VI, cancelled
in ed. 5; Judge Learned Hand in Louis-Dreyfus v. Paterson S. S. ( 19 30) 43
F. (2d) 824, 827i German Reichsgericht (Sept. 2I, 1899) 44 RGZ. 3oo, 302;
and see infra ns. I JO-IJ2.
2
J. Infra at n. 134. It was different when the Lords in I 703, Foubert v. Turst,
r Brown Par!. Cas. 3 8, 42, rP.cognized the Custom of Paris of I 5 8o, declared
applicable in the contract, "as if the custom had been distinctly specified,"
which "by no means (involved) an attempt to introduce foreign laws." Foreign
laws at that time were never applied in English courts. Cf. M. WoLFF, Prir
Int. Law 425.
3
J. See this Chapter, infra sub Ill pp. 368 ff.
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to a foreign legal rule in the same manner as when the parties
refer to former arrangements or "to a work of Bentham" (as
some writer has textually suggested). Reference to a foreign
legal rule is necessarily always based on conflicts law.
The purpose of the described theory is to demonstrate that
the parties are unable to transcend the margin of freedom
left them in the particular primary legal system. Under this
system, all stipulations except those which they may establish
in the domestic field, they are forbidden to enter into also
in the international realm. The so-called "imperative" provisions, jus cogens, of the predestined law are clamped down
on all transactions-they cannot be evaded. 14

Illustration. A citizen of New York entered in New York
into an agreement with a German domiciled in Germany,
without consideration as required by New York law. Under
German law it was a valid contract. Could the parties decide
that German law was to apply? Under§ 332 (c) of theRestatement the answer is strictly no, the same as given by the
majority of American, French, and Latin-American writers.
The German Supreme Court had no objection to the agreement.15 The Supreme Court of the United States declared
a contract under similar circumstances (without agreement
on the applicable law) valid under the Louisiana law of the
place of performance. 16
The problem is alike as respects capacity, formality, mutual consent, fraud and error, illegality, and any other vitiating factor. As a practical consequence, the allegedly inevitable
primary legislation must be ascertained in every particular
case, although this can be done authoritatively only by the
court adjudging the case when the matter becomes litigious,
a court unknown at the time of contracting and following
14 BRANDL, "Der Parteiwille in der Rechtsprechung des Reichsgerichtes,"
Leipz.Z. 1925, 816, 821; BEER, 18 Z.int.R. 358.
15
RG. (April 6, 191 1) JW. 1911, 532, 24 Z.int.R. 305.
16
Pritchard v. Norton (1882) 106 U.S. 124.
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its own laws and lights. If we believe some of these writers,
it is not even just one law from which all "imperative norms"
are to be gathered, "but the law applicable varies according
to the elements of the obligation and the transaction in question. It is precisely this variety and this multiplicity of
effective laws that makes the matter of obligations in private
international law so complex and so difficult.m 7
"Autonomy," however, endeavors to obviate the unpredictable findings of unforseeable tribunals and to consolidate
the contract under one law while negotiation is in course.
2.

Proper Law Theory

Increasingly and with few interruptions, during four
centuries from Rochus Curtius and Dumoulin to the rise of
the learned opposition in our century and ever since, unruffled by all objections, courts have followed an all-inclusive
doctrine of intention of the parties covering the entire field
of obligatory contracts. The parties may expressly declare
which law should govern their obligations; or they may
tacitly choose this law; or the judge has to ascertain the law
they may have contemplated in contracting. These three
possibilities of express, tacit, and presumed or cchypothetical"
intention are the only devices for localizing any contract,
although the courts have developed certain criteria for construing unexpressed intentions.
The purest form of this doctrine appears in England18 and
is known as the doctrine of the proper law. As last formulated by Lord Atkin:
"The legal principles which are to guide an English Court
on the question of the proper law are now well settled. It is
ARMINJON (ed, 2) 327 § I I I.
That Lord Mansfield's theory in Robinson v. Bland (q6o) 2 Burr. 1077
is directly traceable to HUBER, has been emphasized by LLEWELYN DAVIES,
"The Influence of Huber's De Confiictu Legum on English Private International Law," r8 Brit. Year Book Int. Law ( 193 7) 49, 54, 62.
1> 2

18
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the law which the parties intended to apply. Their intention
will be ascertained by the intention expressed in the contract
if any, which will be conclusive. If no intention be expressed,
the intention will be presumed by the court from the terms
of the contract and the relevant surrounding circumstances.m 9
And Lord Wright, speaking for the Judicial Committee
of the Privy Council, stated:
"It is now well settled that by English law the proper
law of the contract is the law which the parties intended to
apply. That intention is objectively ascertained, and, if not
expressed, will be presumed from the terms of the contract
and the relevant surrounding circumstances. " 20
The peculiar character of this traditional approach should
be well noted. The phases of choice of law according to the
intention of the parties are three also in the modern opinion,
but not identical with the above-mentioned traditional distinction. In the German view, for instance, the parties may
have agreed on the applicable law; the judge may try to
conform to the presumable will of the concrete parties; ~r
the judge may seek a law conforming to the empirical intention of average parties. It is entirely characteristic of the
genuine proper law theory that no such distinction is made.
From the beginning of the English doctrine, when Lord
Mansfield emphasized that the parties at bar had a view to
the laws of England, 21 the courts assumed that the parties
always contract with a certain law in mind, either "with an
express view" to it, as in Lord Mansfield's case, or tacitly.
1 9 Rex v. International Trustee for the Protection of Bondholders Aktiengesellschaft [1937] A. C. 5oo, 5z9. The most recent expression of the proper
law theory, in Duke of Marlborough v. Att. Gen. (Dec. n, 1944) C. A.
[1945] 1 All E. R. 165, 171 refers back to Lord Watson's dictum in Hamlyn
v. Talisker Distillery [1894] A. C. 2oz, 212.
20 Vita Food Products, Inc. v. Unus Shipping Co. [1939] A. C. 277, z89.
21 Robinson v. Bland (q6o) 2 Burr. ron, ro78; cf., e.g., Warrender v.
Warrender (1835) z Cl. & Fin. 488, 535: "The parties in a contract like this
must be held emphatically to enter into it with a view to their own domicile and
its laws."
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The court only discovers this view. The Swiss Federal
Tribunal, which generally applies the law of the place of
performance to the effects of all contracts, insists upon the
statement that this is done, only because and to the extent
that this law corresponds with the presumable intention of
the parties in the particular case. 22 In the very large domain
practically covered by this idea, no distinction is made among
an agreement, an existent volition, and a merely supposed
intention.
While eminent continental writers of the I 9th century
continued to accept the doctrine, 23 in more recent times the
bulk of the literature went the other way. But quite recently,
a few scholarly attempts have been made to support this
all-inclusive intention theory of the courts, 24 in straight opposition to the anti-autonomy doctrine prevailing thus far. The
most energetic theoretical foundation of the broadest concep25
tion of party autonomy has been undertaken by Batiffol.
In developing a suggestion by other writers/ 6 he teaches that
the parties never really select the law, not even when they
expressly agree on choice of law. They merely localize the
contract. The court, then, determines the law, following their
22
BG. (MJ.y 9, 1923) 49 BGE. II zzo, 225; BG. (Sept. 26, 1933) 59 BGE.
li 355, 361. Cf. ROMBERGER, Obl. Vertrage 43; NIEDERER, 59 Z. Schweiz. R.
(N.F.) 239.
23
E.g., r FoELIX § 94; 1 FIORE § 112; DESPAGNET § 2 94; ASSER-RIVIER,
Elements 71.
More recently, in Argentina, ALCORTA, z Der. Int. Priv. 240; RoMERO DEL
PRADo, 2 Manual 321.
24
MELCHIOR 50df. for German law; NUSSBAUM, D. IPR. § 34, esp. at 221;
NUSSBAUM, Principles I 61.
25
BATIFFOL § I 7 and pp. 44ff.
26
M. WoLFF, IPR. 86 par. 2, 88, and in "The Choice of Law by the Parties
in International Contracts," 49 Jurid. Rev. (I 9 3 7) I I o, explains party autonomy by the assumption that the parties may constitute one of the existent local
contacts of their contractual relationship as the decisive point of gravity. But it
appears from his recent book, Priv. Int. Law 42.2.ff., 435ff., that Wolff's own
theory is not really much different from that proposed here.
Related theories, however, have been advanced by Italian authors, such as
PERASSI, Rivista 1928, 516; BETTI, id. I930, I5i BALDONI, id. I932, J51j
FEDOZZI-CERETI 697.
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lead. The conflicts rule approves the law of the place where
the contract has its center of gravity. The parties influence the
latter by establishing locally connected obligations, or more
directly, by selecting among several local contacts that one
which in their own eyes is the closest or the most convenient.
As they must know best about this center of gravity, the conflicts rule relies on their choice. Batiffol claims by this conception to conform to many modern needs and, at the same
time, to rescue the traditional practice.
However, irrespective of results which must be reached
under any approach, such a harmonization jars with the facts
at both ends. An agreement of the parties to subject their
contract to New York law, is itself a perfectly serious contract
that cannot be degraded into a mere "localization" or disposal of the center of gravity. Why should this contract be
a simple element for the finding by a court, 27 instead of a
binding transaction legalized by the conflicts rule, as all
recognized contracts are sanctioned by law? Again, in the
unquestionably prevailing cases, the parties do not agree on
the applicable law and have no law in mind, or else each
party thinks of a different law. In all these cases, choice of
law cannot be based, as it must be in the first case, on an actual
will of the parties.
Moreover, were it true that choice of law is bound to
follow the distribution of local connections, besides fatal consequences that have been inferred to these connections respecting the pretended territorial limits of party autonomy,.28
the contract would be necessarily split into segments, each
governed by a local law, a proposition justly abhorred by
the very authors mentioned. 29
27 BATIFFOL 1 56
28
29

§ q6 and often; cf. the authors cited infra n.
See infra Chapter 29, p. 4o6 n. 56.
BATIFFOL 69 § 77•

30.
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3· Theory Permitting Agreement of Parties on the Applicable Law
Despite some resistance by writers, there is practically no
doubt that the parties to a contract have a right to determine
by agreement the law applicable to their contractual relationship. Only the limits may be controversial.
Such agreement is a true contract, 30 having all requirements of a contractual engagement, but auxiliary to the main
contract. A subtle controversy as to the law by which this
accessory stipulation itself is governed,S 1 offers more academic
than practical interest. No case is known in which the law
agreed upon would not be suitable for determining also the
validity of the additional stipulation, provided that the
forum has no specific objection.
An agreement may be declared expressly or by implication
(tacitly, by conduct) as any other informal act. Implied
agreement is closely related to, and often hardly distinguishable from, presumed intention, but in theory, at least, it is
distinctly characterized. The parties are not presumed but
positively assumed to have agreed on, not only thought of,
the legal system to be applied. For instance, when an international loan debenture, written in English, follows the
American legal terminology, appoints a bank in Manhattan
as trustee in the American fashion, expresses the money
amounts in dollars and makes the capital repayable in New
30

HAUDEK 88ff.; RAAPE, D.IPR. '-55· Contra: MELCHIOR 519 n. 3; BATIFFOL 46 § 5'-; M. WOLFF, 49 }urid. Rev. (1937) qo; RHEINSTEIN, Book Review, 37 Col. L. Rev. (1937) 330. These authors include implied intention
and therefore think of "a coinciding view of the parties" rather than of a
contract.
31
See, for various views, WAHL, 3 Z.ausl.PR. (191.9) 8oz; HAUDEK 91;
MELCHIOR 5ZO; RAAPE, D.IPR. Z70; NIEDERER, 59 z. Schweiz R. (N. F.)
'-49· Application of the law agreed upon to the problem of the conditions for
consent to the agreement, as in the text above, has also been suggested by the
special committee on conflict of laws concerning sales of goods (1931) art. z
par. 3, 7 Z.ausl.PR. (1933) 957·
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York-no one should doubt that the parties themselves have
selected the law of New York, even though they omitted to
say so in a clause. 32 Or, when it is stipulated in an American
sales contract that it should be deemed to have been made
at the domicil of the vendor,33 this means as much as to refer
directly to the law of that domicil.
Where only a "presumed" or "assumed" intention is ascertained, the applicable law is selected by the court rather than
the parties. But that courts and enactments so often have
treated all these categories on the same footing, may rest on
practical wisdom. Tacit agreement of the parties, their probable ideas, and the efforts of a judge to find the law most
appropriate to the contract made by them, are closely related and somewhat overlapping categories. To treat these
groups by essentially divergent rules, increases the difficulties
inherent in the matter.

III.

THE PRESENT SYSTEMS

r. Outside the .United States

Autonomy recognized. Most codes recognize either irt a
complete formula "the law to which the parties expressly or
tacitly intend to refer,na 4 or "the intention of the parties," 35
or establish divergent provisions, only "if nothing else ·has
been agreed upon.m 6 In British common law since Lord
32 RABEL,

IO Z.ausl.PR. (I936) 492,496.
Case of Montreal Cotton & Wool Waste Co. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of
Maryland (I927) 26I Mass. 385, I58 N. E. 795·
34
French Morocco: Decree of Aug. u, I 9 I 3, art. I 3 par. I.
Spanish Morocco: Dahir of I9I4, art. 20 par. I.
Montenegro: C. C. art. 792.
35 Greece: C. C. (I 940) art. 2 5. This was also the theory of the Supreme
Court, decision No. IJI, I932, 43 Themis 449·
36
Austria: Allg. BGB. §§ 36, 37 (hut see pp. 369£.).
Belgian Congo: Decree of Feb. 20, I 89 I, art. I I par. 2.
Brazil : C. C. art. I 3 par. I (hut see pp. 3 7 I f.) .
China: Int. Priv. Law, art. 23 par. I.
Italy: Disp. Prel. (I865) art. 9 par. 2; Disp. Prel. (I942) art. 25. But as
to the former art. 58, C. Com., see Cass. (Jan. 2I, 1928) Rivista I928, 514.
Japan: Int. Priv. Law, art. 7·
33
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37

Mansfield's famous dictum and in the great majority of the
other countries/ 8 the courts firmly hold the same view, which
also has been shared by the Mixed Arbitral Tribunals39 and
-so far as the cases required solution-by the Permanent
Court of International Justice.4{)
Austrian Civil Code. Parallel to the broad reservations
for the law of the forum which the Austrian Civil Code and
its followers in Latin America have established with respect
to the capacity of nationals, 41 they have restricted the principle
of party autonomy in favor of the law of the forum. The
Austrian Code provides:
Quebec: C. C. art. 8.
Portugal: C. Com. art. 4·
37
England: Lord Mansfield's obiter dictum in Robinson v. Bland ( 1760) z
Burr. Io77, I W. Bl. 234, cf. z BEALE I093; formally declared In re Missouri
Steamship Co. (I889) 42 Ch. D. 32I.
Australia: McClelland v. Trustees Executors and Agency Co., Ltd. (High
Court of Australia I936) '55 Commw. L. R. 483 at 493 opinion per Dixon, J.
38
Belgium: POULLET § 297·
Bulgaria: See MAKAROV, 8 Z.ausl.PR. (I934) 66o.
Egypt: SzA.szy, Droit international prive compare (I 940) 55 9·
France: Cass. (civ.) (Dec. 5, I9Io) S. I9I I.I.IZ9, Revue I9I I, 395, Clunet
I9I2, II56; Cass. (req.) (March 3, I924) S. I924.1.252; Cass. (civ.) (Jan.
27, I93I) S. I933·I.4I (tacit agreement); Cass. (Nov. z, I937) Nouv. Revue
I937, 766. On the history of the cases see BATIFFOL § 32; see also NIBOYET
799·
Germany: "In an overwhelming number of decisions," see MELCHIOR 50 I
§ 355, and for the cases from I869 to I892 see NIEMEYER, Positives Intern.
Privatrecht 92 § I 77·
Hungary: See SzA.szy, I I Z.ausl.PR. (I937) I68, I7I·
The Netherlands: H. R. (June 13, I924) W. II28I, N.J. (I924) 859; H. R.
(April 8, I927) W. u664; App. Rotterdam (Jan. 3, I9J5) N.J. (I935)
865, cited (with regret) by HIJMANS I75· The confusing view expressed by
MuLDER I64 that the decision of June I3, I924 makes an end to the principle
seems to be entirely unfounded.
Rumania: See JuvARA, Actes de la 6eme Conference de la Haye 336; PLASTARA, 7 Repert. 75 No. 248.
Spain: See TRiAs DE BEs, "Conception de droit international prive etc.,"
Recueil I93o I 657; 6 Repert. 257 No. I24.
Sweden: ALMEN, I Das Skandinavische Kaufrecht (I 922) 50.
39
Mixed Arb. Tribunals: See for cases GUTZWILLER, 3 Int. Jahrb. Schiedsgerichtswesen (I 93 I) 1 34ff.
40
Judgments in the cases of the Brazilian and the Serbian Loans, Publications
of the Permanent Court of International Justice, of July u, I 929, Series A, Nos.
zo and 2I, at 4I, Clunet I929, 977, Iooz.
41
See Vol. I, pp. I I 7-u 9·
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§ 36. If a foreigner in this country enters into a bilaterally
obligatory transaction with a national, it shall be governed
by this Code without exception; provided that he concludes
it with a foreigner, the same applies only in case it is not
proved that, in contracting, consideration was given to another
law.
§ 37· If foreigners enter into transactions abroad with
foreigners, or with subjects of this State, they are to be judged
according to the laws of the place where the transaction was
concluded; provided that in contracting another law has not
evidently been taken as a basis ....
The Austrian courts also apply whatever they consider
imperative rules of their law to any contracts made abroad
in which an Austrian participates. 42 Apparently, the principle ordained in status matters that a contract by an Austrian
national purporting to cause effects in Austria is governed
by Austrian law(§ 4), is sometimes applied to other matters,
too. 43
Latin America. In general, it does not appear that party
autonomy is entirely denied in Latin America, but according
to numerous codes, in certain cases the law of the forum prevails. The Civil Code of Chile (I 855) inaugurated this
trend by the provision that:
The effects of contracts made abroad and to be performed
in Chile are determined by the Chilean laws. 44
Appearing as the third paragraph of a section dealing with
abienes," that is, probably meaning to indicate immovables/5
situated in Chile, the provision would seem to refer exclusively to contracts concerning domestic real property, which
class of transactions is expressly excepted from party auWALKER 409 ns. 5 and 6; I EHRENZWEIG-KRAINZ § 2. 7 n. 1 o.
See 1 EHRENZWEIG-KRAINZ ibid.
Chile: C. C. art. 16 par. 3, to which provision C. Com. art. 1 13 expressly
refers.
45
On the doubts existing with respect to movables, see CLARO SoLAR, I Explicaciones de Derecho Civil Chilena ( 1 8 9 8) 1 2. 5 § 2. 1 5.
42
43
44
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46

tonomy in the Brazilian Code. Expressly under this narrower conception, the provision was adopted in the Codes of
Colombia and Ecuador. 47 However, the Codes of Honduras,
Panama, and El Salvador have reproduced the entire section
49
without modification. 48 The Supreme Court of Chile not
only refers it to all objects but extends the law of the place
of performance to the effects of all contracts. A Chilean place
of performance would imperatively call for the Chilean
law, while a contract to be performed abroad would be susceptible of an agreement in favor of a different law.
This double rule has been adopted in numerous other
Latin-American laws, notably in Argentina, Brazil, and
Mexico/" although only the Brazilian Civil Code of 1916
made it really clear that the parties may choose a law in
general, but may not do so if the place of performance is in
the country. The Argentine Code contains a maze of mysterious provisions. 51
The Brazilian Code added the prohibition of an agreement
of the parties as to "obligations entered into in a foreign
46

Brazil: Ill trod. Law (I 9 I 6) art. I 3 § unico, sub III ("transactions relating
to immovables situated in Brazil"); sub IV ("transactions referring to the Brazilian tnortgage system").
47
Colombia: C. C. art. 20 par. 3·
Ecmdor: C. C. art. I5 par. 3·
48
Honduras: C. C. art. I4 par. 3·
Panama: C. C. art. 6 par. 3.
El Salvador: C. C. art. I6 par. 3·
49
Chilean S. Ct. (June 8, I911) Hoffman v. Fisco, 9 Revista Der. Jur. y
Ciencias Soc. (I 9I4) I, 358; (Jan. 5, I 933) Artola V. de Achav. v. Compafiia
Huanchera de Bolivia, 90 id. (I933) I, 373, 384 (shares of a Bolivian company possessed in Chile).
50
Argentina: C. C. art. I 243 (I 209).
Brazil: lntrod. Law (I9I6) art. I3 § unico, sub I ("contracts made abroad
but to be performed in Brazil") ; Introd. Law (I 942) art. 9 § 1. On several
controversial questions, see 2 PONTES DE MIRANDA I87, I9I.
Mexico: C. C. (I 928) art. IJ; the former code (I 8 84, art. 17) had expressly
allowed transactions made by a foreigner abroad concerning movables to be
submitted to another law.
51 Argentina: Are art. 8 (8) and I243 (I2o9) imperative? The answer is
difficult because nobody knows which of the many sections involved includes
the main principle. See the attempt to disentangle this complex by 3 VICO I 22

§ I37·
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country by Brazilians," 52 thus achieving four extensive reservations for the lex fori. The new Brazilian law, however,
has replaced all restrictions to the agreement of the parties
by one provision in favor of Brazilian formalities for contracts
performable in the country. It would seem that thereby party
autonomy is tacitly restored in all questions of substance. The
comments, known thus far, proclaim this view, excepting,
however, the "imperative" provisions of the law of the place
of contracting. 53
Another provision in favor of the domestic law was still
more extraordinary. Peru and Guatemala seemed to allow
a party agreement exclusively in favor of their own laws; but
this may be obsolete. 54
Authoritative writers have, often enough, manifested their
5
dissatisfaction with the described nationalistic tendencies/
which, however, have never received, as a whole, the public
rejection they deserve. To the contrary, the exorbitant theory
that the state is entitled to dictate the lex obligationis to its
subjects has been seriously maintained by a reputed writer. 5 6
While certain codes omit any provision/ 7 their silence may
Brazil; c. c. art. I 3 § unico sub II.
Brazil: Introd. Law (I94Z) art. 9i EsPINOLA, z Lei Introd. s68; SERPA
LoPES, z Lei In trod. 3I6ff.; TENORIO, Lei In trod. zog-z II advocates restriction to the autonomy allowed by the lex loci contractus; contra: SERPA LoPEs,
ibid.
54 Peru; C. C. (I8sz) art. 40 sent. z, omitted in C. C. (1936) Tit. Prel.,
art. VII.
Guatemala: The provision of the Law on Foreigners, 1894, art. I6 sentence
z has been reformed and appears in the Law on Foreigners, 1 9 3 6, art. 2.4 sent.
3 restricted to external requisites in case the act or contract is to be performed
in the country. However, MATOS 453 n. 1 § 327 does not stress or even mention
this article.
55
See, among others, recently, BEVJLAQUA (I938) 368, although he seems
(365ff.) to understand the Brazilian rules as mere presumptions; FuLGENCIO, Synthesis de Direito Internacional Privado (1937) I45 § Z99· Contra: z
PONTES DE MIRANDA I9Iff.
56
PONTES DE MIRANDA, 39 Recueil ( I932.) I at 649.
57
The C6digo Bustamante is enigmatic. BusTAMANTE, La comisi6n de jurisconsultos de Rio (Habana I92.7) 1I9 § I4I declared that his draft recognized
express and tacit intentions of the parties, but his added restrictions are based
on the theory of a predestined national law or lex loci contractus.
52

53
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appear ominous to the permissibility of agreements on the
applicable law, in view of a recent discussion during the deliberation of the new text of Montevideo. The Argentine
delegate, Vico, proposed that the intention of the parties be
recognized with respect to the effects of contracts, where it
is not in contradiction to prohibitions of the law of the place
of performance; in other words, he followed the French
theory rejecting true party autonomy. To the same effect,
the present text of the Treaty was interpreted in the commission, in which, as is reported, the principle "of general
and affirmative character triumphed that denies autonomy of
intention any legitimacy for setting up a regulatory norm
of private international law." 58 The Uruguayan delegate,
Vargas Guillemette, proposed a round denial, and in fact, a
clause was inserted into the Additional Protocol of the Conference declaring that "jurisdiction and law applicable according to the respective treaties, cannot be modified by the
intention of the parties, except to the extent that this law
authorizes them so to do." 59 It seems that all these formulations amount to the rule that the law of the place of performance or the other laws prescribed in particular cases by
the treaty govern the freedom of the parties.
Other jurisdictions rejecting party autonomy. According
to a very short report, the courts of Denmark and Norway do
not recognize choice of law by the parties except within the
domestic sphere of the competent law, which, however, does
not seem defined with certainty. 60 The same is declared in a
section of the Civil Code of the Soviet Union. 61
58
Institute Buenos Aires, Segundo Congreso Sudamericano, at 285; Republica
Argentina, Segundo Congreso Sudamericano, at I 6 7.
59
Republica Argentina, Segundo Congreso Sudamericano 211.
6
Conference de Ia Haye, Actes de la sixieme session (1928) 276 (UssiNG,
Denmark) and 337 (ALTEN, Norway); BoRUM and MEYER, 6 Repert. 224 No.
8o (Denmark).
61
The question is declared controversial, see STOUPNITSKI, 7 Repert. I 14 No.
16o; but see MAKAROV, Precis 3ooff.
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United States

Until recently, the opinion dominant among the European
scholars was fully shared by the leading American writerS. 62
The most radical form of this doctrine, denying not only
desirability but existence to a choice of law by the parties,
has been adopted by Beale and is evident in the perfect silence
of the Restatement on everything connected with party autonomy.
A few, very few, cases, reflecting this principle denying
party autonomy, are best represented by Judge Learned
Hand's formulation:
"People cannot by agreement substitute the law of another
place; they may of course incorporate any provisions they
wish into their agreements-a statute like anything else-and
when they do, courts will try to make sense out of the whole,
so far as they can. But an agreement is not a contract, except
as the law says it shall be, and to try to make it one is to pull
on one's bootstraps. Some law must impose the obligation,
and the parties have nothing whatever to do with that; no
more than with whether their acts are torts or crimes." 63
Textbooks and encyclopedias, however, readily admit that
regard to the intention of the parties is one of the approaches
which an American court may use. 64 Beale himself recorded
in I9IO as in 1934 that it appeared in the second most numerous group of cases. 65 The Supreme Court of the United
States has most frequently followed this theory,S 6 starting
62
In addition to BEALE: LORENZEN, 30 Yale L. J. (1921) 655 and passim;
GoODRICH 278; previously FooTE 397; MINOR 401. See CooK, Legal Bases
389.
63 Gerli & Co., Inc. v. Cunard S. S. Co., Ltd. (C.C.A. 2d 1931) 48 F. (2d)
I I 5, 117; accord, Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Hyde (C.C.A. 2d 1936)
82 F. (zd) 174. In both cases the decision was not dependent on the dictum.
64
STUMBERG zoo, 209.
65
BEALE, 23 Harv. L. Rev. (1910) z6o; 2 BEALE 1172 still mentions 13
states, as against 21 states allegedly following the lex loci contractus, but see
infra Chapter 30, p. 451.
66
See STUMBERG 209 n. 42; LORENZEN, 30 Yale L. J. (1921) at 579;
NusSBAUM, 51 Yale L. J. (1942) at 919.
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67

from a dictum by Chief Justice Marshall in I 82 5, and has
purposefully remarked that this is the general rule "concisely and exactly stated before the Declaration of Independence by Lord Mansfield." 68 It has been said that:
"The situs of contracts is one of the troublesome problems
of private international law, but one rule stands forth clearly:
That the intention of the parties as to the law they desired
to apply will govern, if such selection be made in good faith,
and be not opposed to the public policy of the forum.' 169
The courts of New York have clearly followed the same
view. In 1935, the New York court of last resort has explicitly restated the principle:
"The intention of the parties, express or implied, generally
determines the law that governs a contract." 70
However, the courts, compelled to find their way against
the hostility of the leading scholars, have been increasingly
prone to indecision and inconsistency. The doubts whether
parties may determine their law at all, may have been augmented by Beale's influence, although they do not seem to
have taken strong roots. Also, the unreasonable belief that
parties can choose only between the law of the place of contracting and that of the place of performance, seems to have
increased as an effect of Beale's teaching. 71 The confusion of
the cases, so often deplored, would have been relieved in
part, if the courts had always been told in no uncertain words
that it is not at all in their discretion and free decision to
67
Wayman v. Southard (U. S. 1825) 10 Wheat. 11 cited in Pritchard v.
Norton (188z) 106 U. S. 124 as a precedent, cf. KuHN, Comp. Corn. 28o.
68
Mr. Justice Gray in Liverpool and Great Weste!Jl Stearn Co. v. Phenix Ins.
Co. (1888) 129 U.S. 397, 447·
69
O'Toole v. Meysenburg (C.C.A. 8th 1918) 251 Fed. 191, 194.
7
° Cornpafiia de Inversiones Internacionales v. Industrial Mortgage Bank
of Finland (1935) 269 N.Y. 22, 26, 198 N. E. 617.
71
According to LEE, "Conflict of Laws relating to Installment Sales," 41
Mich. L. Rev. ( 1942) 445 1 468, most courts share in this belief. This may be
doubted, however.
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apply a law which the parties agreed to apply. The most
recent writers have claimed the theory of intention to be
existent in all American courts. 72 It should be so in any case,
and this would give, as Cook has said, as much security as
the rules of the Restatement. 73
3· Express Agreements
Stipulations concerning the law applicable to a contract
are not so rare as some writers believe. Of course, compared
to the constant flow of millions of interstate and international
transactions, a small percentage are provided with appropriate
clauses. But world commerce, advised by trade organizations
and counsel, has been using such stipulations in ever increasing types of contracts. It is true, the trend is much less strong
in the United States, a fact obviously connected with the
prevalence of interstate commerce based on federal statutes
and a critical attitude of courts. The British standard forms
with their reference to English law and London arbitration
have aroused countermeasures in the United States as well as
in Central Europe. Also, it happens that the arbitration
clauses in their large progress are powerful competitors,
since they tend toward decisions discarding legal considerations. Arbitrators of the type of ccamiable compositeurs" or
"de facto arbitrators," have no duty to observe rules of law,
and where there is such duty, frequently no sanction is stated.
The situation is different in England, some British dominions,
and some American states, where the courts retain a considerable function, and to some extent in other countries in
which arbitrators are presumed to apply the local state law. 74
72 See (in various limitations) CooK, Legal Bases 418; BATIFFOL 31 §§
36-38; id. 58 §§ 63-68; NussBAUM, 51 Yale L. J. (r9p) 919. Cf. infra
Chapter 29 p. 403 n. 46.
73 CooK, 21 Can. Bar Rev. (1943) 249,253 No.8.
74 For all details, see the instructive article by E. CoHN, "Commercial Arbitration and the Rules of Law, A Comparative Study," 4 U. of Toronto L. J.
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But growing opposition to the arbitrariness of lawless arbitration on legally material questions ought to bring express
stipulations on the applicable law to renewed significance.
Traders of bulk merchandise have used for many decades
standard forms influenced by British habits and institutions.
Thus, in the grain trade from America to Europe, the La
Plata Grain Contract of the London Corn Trade Association
subjects the parties to London arbitration and English law.
A frequent clause providing in lengthy caution for the de- •
termination of arbitration suits, begins with the following
words:
"Buyer and seller agree that, for the purpose of proceedings, either legal or by arbitration, this contract shall be
deemed to have been made in England and to be performed
there, any correspondence in reference to the offer, the acceptance, the place of payment or otherwise notwithstanding,
and the Courts of England or Arbitrators appointed in England, as the case may be, shall, except for the purpose of
enforcing any award made in pursuance of the Arbitration
clause hereof, have exclusive jurisdiction over all disputes
which may arise under this contract. Such disputes shall be
settled according to the law of England whatever the domicile, residence, or place of business of the parties to this
contract may be or be~ome .... ms
In another, app~rently now prevailing, form, only arbitration is stipulated: ·
"All disputes from time to time arising out of this contract
shall be referred to two Arbitrators ... or to an Umpire .... "
"All Arbitrators shall be governed by the provision of the
Arbitration Act for the time being in force in England, except
so far as the same may be modified by or be inconsistent with
the foregoing provisions."
"The Arbitrators or Umpire appointed shall, in all cases,
reside in the United Kingdom, and at the time of their ap75

See for a list of German, French and Italian cases dealing with this form,
n. I.

HAUDEK 102
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pointment shall be themselves members of the London Corn
Trade Association Ltd ... ." 76
In a comparable way, brokers of any place will in certain
contracts with customers refer to the rules of the exchange
and the law of the state where the order is to be executed.
For instance:
"All orders executed in New York or any New York
Stock Exchange or Curb Exchange shall be executed in accordance with the laws of New York and the rules and
regulations of the said exchanges prohibiting fictitious and
illegal transactions, contracts and agreements, and it is understood and agreed that the validity of all transactions . . .
executed on any New York Stock Exchange or New York
Curb Exchange shall be controlled and determined solely by
the laws of New York." 77
References to English law are to be found also in the contract forms of the London Rubber Trade Association, Incorporated Oil Seed Association, London Rice Brokers Association, London Copra Association, London Cattle Food
Trade Association, Liverpool Cotton Association, and references to German law in the general conditions of such organizations as those of the German carriers78 and maritime
insurers. 79 Moreover, particular banks~ underwriters, maritime carriers, and certain large merchants have stipulated
for their own law by stereotyped cla~ses in Germany, and
8Q

16 La Plata Grain Contract, form No. 41. Parcels for Continent. Rye Terms.
(March I9J8) clause II (excerpt). In the so-called North American contracts,
certificates of inspection being declared final as to quality, the disputes subject
to arbitration are such as might arise from other causes than quality of the
shipment. See Department of Commerce, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic
Commerce, General Legal Bulletin of March 2. 8, I 9 36, 7.
77 Used by a Boston broker and declared valid in Weisberg v. Hunt (I 92.1)
2.39 Mass. I9o, I98, IJI N. E. 471, 474· See also Cisler v. Ray (I931) 82.
Cal. Dec. 396, 2. Pac. (zd) 987, annotated in 2.0 Cal. L. Rev. (I9J2.) 97: subjection "to the rules, regulations and customs of the exchange or market (and
its clearing house, if any) where executed."
78
See, e.g., Duncan, Fox & Co. v. Schremp£ & Bonke [1915] 1 K. B. 365.
79
HAUDEK 102..
80
HAUDEK 1o 1. Example: "Place of performance for both delivery and pay-
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probably in many countries. 81 Passenger tickets of British
ships, 82 bills of lading regarding vessels leaving English,
Dutch, and Belgian ports for America have been traditionally
referred to "the common law of England, to wit, general
maritime law," or to British law. 83 More recently, it seems
more usual to declare that the contract shall be governed
by the law of the flag of the ship carrying the goods.
In maritime insurance policies, reference has often been
made to the English Insurance Act of I 906 and the conditions and usages of English Lloyd policies. A clause in a
contract between two Dutch companies "as if the policy were
signed in London," has been treated as an express reference
to English law by the Appeal Court of the Hague. 84
Aircraft transport consignments regularly provide for the
national law of the carrier,85 insofar as international conventions do not yet regulate liabilities. International loans
have often contained86 but sometimes omitted a clause ascertaining the applicable law, and drafters will probably be
ment, as well as jurisdiction for both parties, is in Kiel. The contractual relations are governed by German law." (Friedrich Krupp Germaniawerft Aktiengesellschaft, Kiel-Gaarden, conditions of delivery to foreign countries, published
in MDLLEREISERT, Allgemeine Lieferungsbedingungen (1932) 109).
81
Belgium: Societe Coloniale Anversoise, contracts, see HELLAL'ER, Kaufvertrage in Warenhandel und lndustrie (1927) 189.
Japan: Ferncliff (1938) Am. Marit. Cas. 206, 219: bill of lading to be
construed in accordance with the law of Japan.
82
E.g., in Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Corcoran (1925) 9 F. (2d) 724.
83
E.g., in the Canadian cases: Mathys v. Manchester Liners (1904) 25 Que.
S. C. 426: "All disputes regarding the bill of lading to be settled according
to common English law"; Can. Sugar Refining Co. v. Furness Withy & Co.
(r9o5) 27 Que. S. C. 502: "the contract shall be governed by the common
law of England, to wit, the maritime law of England"; Vipond v. Furness (S.
C. of Canada 1916) 35 D. L. R. ( 1917) 2 78: "Any claim or dispute arising on
this bill of lading shall, in the option of the ship owner, be settled with the
agents of the Line in London according to British law, with reference to which
this contract is made to the exclusion of proceedings in any other country."
Similarly, Hart & Son v. Furness, Withy and Co. (r9o4) 37 N. S. R. 74·
84
Hof s'Gravenhage (May 17, 1923) W.rxr7r. On the decision of the Supreme Court in this cause, see infra n. 128.
85
FERNAND DE VISSCHER, in 48 Recuei! (1934) II 325·
86
See for list of judicial cases, HAUDEK r o 5 n. r.
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experienced enough, by now, not to forget one. The same
is true for agreements between banks. 87 In many American
contracts of finance corporations, insurance policies, and
other agreements,S 8 the place of the main office of the company is indicated as the place where the contract is made,
frequently with the express addition that the law of this
place shall govern. This is a tribute paid to the historical role
of the lex loci contractus. Again, to comply with the idea that
the place of performance governs the contract, in German
form blanks or general conditions, producers and sellers
almost invariably state that "place of performance and exclusive jurisdiction" are to be at their own domicil. 89 This
clause is regularly regarded, as if the law of this place were
expressly stipulated. 90 Although foreign exclusive jurisdiction is not easily conceded by American and many other courts
in suits of residents against nonresidents, agreement on a
87

See for an example, Schering Ltd. v. Stockholms Enskilda Bank Aktiebolag
(I943) [I944J Ch. D. I3.
88
E.g., oil lease, WILLISTON, 7 Contracts 579I; Montreal Cotton & Wool
Waste Co. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland (I927) 26I Mass. 385 (sale
of goods). Conditional sales contract, Rubin v. Gallagher (I94o) 294 Mich.
I24, 292 N. W. 584 (the court recognizes a subjective right created by the
clauses); Stern v. Drew (App. D. C. I922) 285 F. 925; Craig & Co., Ltd. v.
Uncas Paper Board Co. (I926) I04 Conn. 559, I33 Atl. 673, in which cases
the clause has been discarded by the court and by LEE, supra n. 7I, at 471.
89 "Smaller enterprises and firms with widespread patronage usually provide
at least for exclusive jurisdiction to be at the place of their management; in the
industry and big trade it is very common to exclude in the general conditions
state jurisdiction in favor of private arbitration." RAISER, Das Recht der allgemeinen Geschaftsbedingungen (I935) 4I. The Industry and Commerce
Chamber in Berlin, however, advised not to use any clauses modifying the legal
provisions on the place of performance and jurisdiction, see ROHL, Juristischer
Anschauungstoff, Heft I (I93I) 20.
The custom is widespread. For instance, in a contract between an American
and a Danish firm, the stipulation that the place of performance and of jurisdiction should be in London, was recognized by the Admiralty and Commercial
Tribunal in Copenhagen (Dec. 2o, I938) Ugeskrift for Retsvaesen I939> 238,
4I Bull. lnst. Int. (I939) 52 No. Io762.
90 Usage of merchants and practice of the courts are comprehensively treated
in LEONHARD, Erfiillungsort und Schuldort, I 66ff.; id. I 83ff. Of course, the
clause may intend only advantages of private and procedural law, STAUBHEINICHEN in 3 Staub 54 7, An hang zu § 3 7 2 n. 6a.
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law in the form of determining the place of making or performance should be respected on principle. Certainly, it
should also be out of question to invalidate the American
clause determining the place of contracting as fictitious, as
eminent judges have occasionally done. 91 An English court
had no difficulty in enforcing the following clause in a contract made in New York between a citizen of Ecuador, who
never had an English domicil, and a Canadian company, respecting certain mineral rights in Ecuador:
"While for convenience this agreement is signed by the
parties in the City of New York, United States, it shall be
considered and held to be one duly made and executed in
London, England." 92
American life insurance companies doing business in Europe
have been compelled to settle for the jurisdiction and law
of the country of their branch. 93
In ordinary American business agreements extending over
several states, stipulations determining the applicable law
are by far not so frequent as they should be. But remarkable
91
Especially Mr. Justice Brandeis, dissenting in New York Life Ins. Co. v.
Dodge (1918) 246 U.S. 357·
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Italy, Cass. (July 26, I929) Rivista I93I,
406.
To the contrary effect, e.g., England: British Controlled Oilfields v. Stagg
(192I) 66 Sol. J. I8.
France: Cass. (req.) (Aug. 6, I867) D. I868.1.35, S. I867.1.40o and constantly, see BATIFFOL 43 n. I.
92
British Controlled Oilfields v. Stagg (I 92 I) 66 Sol. J. I 8.
93 Thus Czarist Russia prescribed submitting of insurance policies issued in
Russia to Russian law. After the intervention of the Soviet decrees affecting the
insurance contracts, two conflicting decisions of the New York Court of Appeals
resulted, namely, Sliosberg v. New York Life Ins. Co. (I927) 244 N.Y. 482,
I 55 N. E. 749, and Dougherty v. Equitable Life Assurance Society (I934) 266
N. Y. 71> I93 N. E. 897. In the first case the court disregarded, in the second
case the majority of the court, against the vote of Judge Lehman, respected,
the stipulation of submission to the Russian law required by the Russian statute,
cf. Note, 88 U. of Pa. L. Rev. (I940) at 986. However, the problem of the
cases was the situs of the obligation rather than the applicable law; cf. RABEL,
"Situs Problems in Enemy Property Measures," I I Law and Cont. Probl.
(I945) II8, IJI.
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negative references occur, a kind of clausulae salvatoriae, to
save as much of the contract as the various statutes possibly
involved may allow. Thus, in combination with a general
reference to the law of Michigan, contracts of the Detroit
automobile industry, with its many thousands of dealers in
the world, state that any provisions contravening the laws
of any country, state, or jurisdiction shall be deemed not a
part of the agreement. In conditional sales contracts, clauses
are to be found such as follow:

"If the law of Tennessee [where the contract is made]
does not apply to and govern the contract between the parties,
their rights and remedies, then the laws of Ohio or Arkansas
apply."
"It is the express intention of the parties hereto that this
agreement and all the terms hereof shall be in conformity
with the laws of any state wherein this agreement may be
sought to be enforced, and if it should appear that any of the
terms hereof are in conflict with any rule of law or statutory
provision of any such state, then the terms hereof which may
conflict therewith shall be deemed inoperative and null and
void in so far as they may be in conflict therewith, and shall
be deemed modified to conform to such rule of law." 94
By an analogous method, an automobile policy provides
that:
"Any and all provisions of this policy which are in conflict
with the statutes of the state wherein this policy is issued are
understood, declared, and acknowledged by this company
to be amended to conform to such statutes.m 5
94
Stevenson v. Lima Locomotive Works (1943) 180 Tenn. 137, 172 S. W.
(2d) 812, recognizing these clauses and apparently inferring the intention of
the parties that the state of enforcement should furnish the applicable law; the
decision is understood to this effect also in the Note, 148 A. L. R. (1944) 375,
376.
See also HOAR, Conditional Sales (1937) App. B, Forms, p. 438.
95 Form used by Central Mutual Ins. Co. of Chicago and procured for me by
the kindness of Att. Edgar H. Ailes, Jr., Detroit. The stipulation continues to
the effect that nevertheless the liability of the company should not be increased
but the assured should reimburse the company for any loss, costs, or expenses
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and that:
"Any stipulation therein in conflict with or contrary to the
laws of the state or province (of Canada) where the liability
arises shall be considered as not written, and the law of such
forum shall apply."
and moreover:

"If any condition of this policy relating to the limitation
of time for notice of accident or for any legal proceeding is
at variance with any specific statutory provision in the State
in which the accident occurs, such specific statutory provision
shall be substituted for such condition." 96
A company appointing a branch manager usually inserts
in the employment contract a clause restraining him from
engaging in the particular trade during a certain period after
the termination of the contract. Such clause may expressly
refer for construction to the law of the place of performance,
meaning the state in which the branch is situated,97 because
the legality of the clause would presumably be judged by
the courts according to this law.
The most notable similar clause in the international field
was introduced to safeguard maritime affreightment contracts
against the danger of contravening the American Harter
98
Act. At present an analogous so-called "clause paramount"
is ordered by many enactments in connection with the Hague
Rules to be inserted in bills of lading99 and in addition often
voluntarily adopted. The clause states that the contract of
transportation shall be subject to the Convention of Brussels
of I 924 that sanctioned the Hague Rules, or to a sea carriage
exceeding the scope of the policy. A similar clause is concerned with the exigencies of the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law of the state or province
in which the policy is (eventually deemed to be) issued.
na Duncan v. Ashwander (D. C. D. La. 1936) 16 F. Supp. 829, 832..
97
Form drafted by Mr. Thomas G. Long in Detroit.
98
See infra Chapter 2. 9, p. 424 n. 135.
99
Thus in the United States: Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, of April r6,
1936, c. 229 § IJ, 49 Stat. 12.12, 46 U.S. C. A.§ 1312.
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of goods act embodying these Rules, and that any contrary
stipulation shall be null and void. The clause is "paramount"
to all other stipulations. 1M
During war times, the United States Government in contracts with firms undertaking comprehensive works, often
assumed its direct liability for the obligations undertaken
by the contractor to a subcontractor in a subcontract made
by him; to secure the subcontractor independent rights as a
beneficiary in all courts, this agreement is declared to be
governed by the laws of the District of Columbia. 101
On principle, despite Beale, there cannot be the slightest
doubt that all the mentioned agreements are held valid in
all countries, including the United States, with the possible
exception of a few Latin-American jurisdictions. The courts
recognize reference to sister states as well as to foreign countries.102 Only the limits have to be discussed.
4· Implied Agreements
Parties agree tacitly to the application of a particular
law when their behavior shows their obligations to be intentionally connected with the private law of a certain country. If they have only a law "in mind" but do not express
their intention at least by conduct, there is no case for a
tacit stipulation. But, for instance, parties having in their
former transactions agreed on the application of a certain
law, may well be supposed to intend a similar submission in
making a new contract.
10° For the interesting particulars, see the informative article in 40 Revue Dor
(1939) 169.
101
For this information, too, I am indebted to Mr. Thomas G. Long. The
situation existing without such a clause has been described by GRASKE, War
Contract Claims (WILLISTON, 9 Contracts, 1945) § tp..
102 For instance, Italian law: Mittenthal v. Mascagni (1903) 183 Mass. 19,
66 N. E. 4z5.
Canada: M.A. Kennedy v. Fiat of Turin (19z3) z4 0. W. N. 537: "all
controversies shall be referred to the Turin Law Court to be dealt with according to Italian law."
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In addition to the cases of international loans and sales,
another typical example free from doubt is a transaction at
a stock or commodity exchange. Every participant knowingly
submits himself to the regulations and usages of the exchange
as well as to the state law in force at the place. Even an order
to a broker in ZUrich, to be performed at the local exchange,
has been considered an intentional subjection to the usages
of ZUrich and to Swiss law. 103
Assuredly, the border line between tacit and presumed intention is often dubious. Where the parties by agreement
submit to the jurisdiction of a certain country, some decisions
have taken for granted that the agreement extended to the
municipal law of that country. 104 The English House of
Lords declared this inference so sure that no one could
doubt. 105 Others, more cautiously, only infer a presumable
intention to submit to this law. 106 But it seems settled that
the court or board of arbitration to which the parties have
submitted, would apply, if not its own municipal law, certainly its own conflicts rules. 107
In the English courts, also a clause of submission to English
arbitrators is regularly deemed to imply reference to
English law. 108 Analogous inferences, although with more
103
Switzerland: BG. (Oct. 21, 1942) 68 BGE. II 22o; but this is a controversial matter.
104
Germany: RG. (F<!b. 22, 1881) 4 RGZ. 242 and in constant practice;
see also IPRspr. 1926-27 No.3; 1931,63, 78; 1933, 19, 40; Bay.ObLG. (May
1 6, I934) IPRspr. 1934, 44·
105
England: N. V. Kwik Hoo Tong Handel Maatschappij v. James Finlay
& Co., Ltd. [I 927] A. C. 6o4, 6o8, 6o9 (H.L.) per Lord Dunedin and Lord
Phillimore.
106
Canada: See 3 JOHNSON 449·
Switzerland: BG. (Sept. 18, 1934) 6o BGE. II at 302 and precedents cited;
cf. 107
(June 9, 1936) 62 BGE. II 125.
See arbitration, Hamburg, Hans. RGZ. ( 1931) B 4I 9, 42 I.
108
Hamlyn v. Talisker Distillery [ 1894] A. C. 202; Spurrier v. La Cloche
[ 1902] A. C. 446 (P. C.); Sanderson & Son v. Armour & Co. (1922) 91 L. J.
(P. C.) 167 (H.L.); N. V. Kwick Hoo Tong Handel Maatschappij v. Finlay
&[ Co. [1927] A. C. 6o4 (H.L.); Vita Food Products v. Unus Shipping Co.
I939] A. C. 277.
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dependence on the circumstances, occur elsewhere. 109 Arbitration, however, in this country110 and in many others, at present
very often entails decisions without reference to any particular
private law. But such a clause has been said to influence conflicts law by excluding the ordinarily applicable law. 111
Much discussion has been devoted in Switzerland to the
case where both parties in court plead application of a certain
law to the litigious contract. Can the parties agree on choice
of law even as late as in court? Party autonomy can hardly
be pushed so far, except where there is a clear-cut new contract modifying their relation. 112 However, the Swiss Federal
Tribunal previously was inclined to consider statements of
counsel on the applicable law as a conclusive argument for
a tacit agreement in contracting. 113 At present, the Swiss
and German highest courts regard such statements only as
one among other clues for assuming a hypothetical intention.114 That the Mixed Arbitral Tribunals were only too
glad to encounter consonant declarations of the parties per109

Germany: RG. (June 19, 1906) JW. 1906, 45Zi (July 8, I913) Hans.
GZ. 1913, 282 and others.
France: See conclusions by BATIFFOL § 152.
Switzerland: BG. (May 18, I9I7) 43 BGE. II u8; Cass. Zurich (April 8,
1924) Bl.f.Ziirch.Rspr. 248, 2 Int. Jahrb. Schiedsgerichtswesen (I 92 8) 35 2.
Contra: Germany: RG. (Oct. 14, I913) Warn.Rspr. I9I4, 42; (Nov. 19,
1929) JW. 1930, 1862; (June 10, I933) IPRspr. 1933, 44·
Contra: The Netherlands: Hof s'Gravenhage (Feb. 10, I9II) W.9I6t; Rb.
Amsterdam (March 3, 1911) W.9208.
The great majority of governments, in their answers concerning the sales
of goods (Sixieme Conference de la Haye, Documents 460), denied that even
in the intention of the parties the designation of arbiters was in strict connection with the application of the national law of the arbiters.
110 WILLISTON, 6 Contracts § I 9 24; ISAACS, "Two Views of Commercial
Arbitration," 40 Harv. L. Rev. (1927) 929, 937·
111 The Netherlands: Rb. Rotterdam (May 3, 1934) N.J. (I935) 958.
112
Cf. BG. (June 9, I 936) 62 BGE. II 125, denying any force even to a
novatory agreement, if not foreseen in the contract; German OLG. Hamburg
(Oct. 21, 1901) II Z.int.R. 443 regarded the party disposition binding on the
court.
113 See 43 BGE. II 228 and for the history of the practice, FRITZSCHE, 44
Z.Schweiz.R. (N.F.) 232a; NIEDERER, 59 Z.Schweiz.R. (N.F.) 249-252.
114
49 BGE. II 225; 62 id. II 125; 63 id. II 307; RG. (April 4, I 928)
IPRspr. 1929 No. 31; RG. (April 27, 1932) 86 Seuff. Arch. 299, IPRspr.
1932 No. 32; RG. (June Io, I933) ISI RGZ. 193, 199.
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mitting them to avoid entanglement with two or more conflicts laws, 115 is well understandable. It seems that most courts
believe themselves to be entitled to accept the pleading of
both parties based on the law of the forum, without further
investigation. This may be legitimate when it conforms to
the procedural rules, which is not self-evident. Foreign law
is not really a mere fact.
In conclusion, agreements on the applicable law, made
otherwise than by words, are not very frequent, but should
by no means be overlooked in the search for the applicable
law.

5. Scope of the Agreement
(a) Problem of renvoi. All writers seem to agree that
parties stipulating for an applicable law intend to apply the
municipal law without renvoi. 116
(b) Nullity by choice of law. Some adversaries of party
autonomy have ridiculed the consequence that a contract
should be void because the law referred to by the parties
prohibits it. Savigny countered this objection by suggesting
that the reference should be construed as not meant to include the provisions that would nullify the contract. 117 However, nullity in this case is a sound and natural consequence
of the rule, as well as of the more or less considered will of
the parties concerned, and this is the victorious opinion. 118
110

E.g., Recueil trib. arb. mixtes: Vol. 4, 36o,

szo,

534, 6z7; Vol. 5,

563.
116

MELCHIOR 238.
SAVIGNY § 374•
118
England: See BENTWICH in WESTLAKE 303-304.
Germany: RG. (May 10, 1884) 12 RGZ. 34 rejected Savigny's opinion,
no presumption of submission being required; OLG. Braunschweig (Feb.
7, 19o8) IJ ROLG. 362.
France: "Less characteristic, but the possibility of annulling a contract even
in case of conflict of laws is clearly admitted," BATIFFOL 51 n. 1.
The Netherlands: Hof Haag (May 17, 1923) W.II171: marine insurance
having reference to English law; the clause that the policy should be the only
evidence of the interest, makes the contract invalid under the Life Assurance
Act, 17741 and Marine Insurance Act, 1906, s. 4 (2-b).
117
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IV.
I.

CHOICE OF SEVERAL LAWS

Special References

The economic interests of parties to a contract sometimes
require that certain phases of their relation should be governed by particular laws, as when, for instance, examination
of goods sold is subjected to the local law of the place where
the goods arrive for inspection. 119 Accordingly, it is well
settled also that the parties may refer a part of the contract
to a specific law different from that governing the rest of the
contract. 120 As choice of law is a matter of agreement, the
Supreme Court of the United States says, "the agreement
may select laws and also limit the extent of their applicability."121
Contractual provisions for a certain law, virtually different
from that intended for the contract in general, are frequent
in such matters as mode of performance and particularly
currency questions, exemption from liability of common carriers by reference to section 3 of the Harter Act or similar
laws, reference to the Antwerp York rules for general average
in maritime contracts, or clauses concerning land securities
to be subject to the lex situs.
119

Cf.

BAGGE, Recueil I 928 Vat 167.
DICEY 649; CHESHIRE 257; Adelaide Electric Supply Co. v.
Prudential Assurance Co. [1934] A. C. u2, 145, 151; Hamlyn v. Talisker,
Kwick Hoo Tong v. Finlay, see supra n. 108.
France: Cass. (civ.) (June 12, 1883) 8.1884.1.164; (Dec. 4, 1894)
D.I895·I.526; (Dec. 5, 1910) S.I911.1.129, Revue 19I1, 395, Clunet I912,

120 England:

ll56.

Germany: RG. (June 23, 1927) II8 RGZ. 370, 374; (Nov. 14, 1929)
126 RGZ. I 96, 206; obiter dictum I 22 RGZ. 3 I 6.
Italy: Cass. (Nov. 28, 1927) and (Jan. 21, 1928) Giur. Ital. I928 I 647,
Rivista 1928, 5I4, 4 Z.ausl.PR. (1930) 587.
The Netherlands: H. R. (June 13, 1924) N.J. (192,4) 859, 861.
Perm. Court of Int. Justice (July 12, 1929) Series A, Nos. 20, 21; Clunet
I 929, 977·
121
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hill (1904) 193 U. S. 551, per Mr. Justice
Brewer; literally followed in Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass'n v. Minehart
(Ark. I9o4) 83 ·s. W. JZ3·
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A series of disputes has arisen about the scope of these
references, because of the widespread indifference with which
standard contract forms used in interstate and international
commerce often contain inconsistent mixtures of old and new
clauses. Thus, American insurance policies, for instance, have
referred to the law of New York to control the contract generally and in another clause stated a waiver by the insured
of notice preliminary to forfeiture, although New York law
unconditionally prescribes the notice. In such a case, the
Supreme Court of the United States has construed the general
reference as restricted by the special clause; the law of New
York could not extend its imperative force to a contract
made in another state and subjected to this law only by stipulation.122
Similar combinations in bills of lading or affreightment
contracts have been decided in an analogous manner, when
feasible. 123 Reference to the Harter Act has been held in
Germany to be restricted by a simultaneous broad exemption
clause based on German law. 124 In a charter party made in
New York and expressly subjected to American law, the
parties inserted a clause exonerating the shipowner from
liability for negligence, contrary to the Harter Act, but valid
under French law obtaining at the port of discharge in Guadeloupe. The Court of Cassation in Paris recognized the ex1 22

Mutual Life v. Hill, supra n. I 2. r.
In Ocean Steamship Co. v. Queensland State Wheat Board [I94,] I K. B.
402., the hill of lading contained two clauses, the first referring to the Australian Sea Carriage of Goods Act, I92.4 (instead of the provisions of the
schedule only) and declaring anything inconsistent null and void, and a second
subjecting the contract to the law of England. The second clause was held
void because s. 9 of the Australian Act provided that the parties would be
deemed to have intended to contract according to the law in force at the place
of shipment and any stipulation or agreement to the contrary should be null
and void.
124
OLG. Hamburg (July 7, I905) Hans. GZ. I905, 2.2.7; (July 5, 1907)
Hans. GZ. 1907, 2.44. In another case where the "Holland clause" (referring to
Dutch Law) was inserted, it was declared compatible with the added exemption clause, OLG. Hamburg (Feb. u, 1936) Hans. RGZ. 1936 B 2.43 No. 70.
123
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emption as valid under the assumption that the parties intended to submit themselves to French law known by them
as validating the clause.125 It would have been simpler to
admit that the special stipul~tion limited the general reference.1211 This argument was used, in fact, by the Appeal Court
of Brussels when general reference to English law conflicted
with an express reference to the Canadian Water Carriage
of Goods Act, corresponding with the Harter Act. 127
It might be argued, however, that the Hague Rules, now
replacing the just-mentioned laws and adopted in the most
important countries, require a stricter application. So far
as they reach, they exclude party autonomy. Stipulations in
the bill of lading inconsistent with the Rules may be generally
understood as nullified.
A Dutch marine policy referred to the English Marine
Insurance Act, 1906, and the conditions and usages of Lloyd
policies "as if the policy had been signed in London," but
contained a clause that payment would be due without further
proof of interest than the policy itself, which clause would
have made the insurance contract void under the English
Act. The Supreme Court of the Netherlands decided that
the reference to English law was restricted by the clause,
basing this clause on Dutch law. 128
The same view has sometimes been taken with regard to
loan debentures under which amounts are due at one of
several places, at the option of the bondholder, in the money
of the place, the parties agreeing that the law of the country
selected by the bondholder should determine the amount and
method of payment. In this view, American law governing
the currency of payment in New York should be construed
125

Cass. (civ.) (Dec. 5, 1910) S.I9II.1.129, Revue 19ri, 395, Clunet

1912, IIS6.
1211 See also BATIFFOL 67 n. 3·
127 App. Bruxelles (Nov.
1922) 6t Jur. Port Anvers 66x.
128 H. R. (June 13, 1924) N. ]. (1924) 859, r VAN HASSELT zo6.

rs,
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as an exception, for example, to English law determining
other phases of the obligation. 129
2.

Nature of Special References

Courts of various countries examining the scope of special
references, often assert that they have to construe agreements
only, not laws. Lord Esher said: "the parties introduce the
words of the Harter Act which I decline to construe as an
Act but which we must construe simply as words occurring
in this bill of lading." 130 The language of American judges131
and foreign courts132 is sometimes similar. Evidently, in this
connection, there is no question of a reference to foreign law
valid only when it merely embodies words of foreign laws
in the contractual stipulations. 1313 But does this kind of expression yet acknowledge a difference between reference to
foreign law on the basis of conflicts law and a mere transformation of foreign law into ordinary stipulations? German
scholars, in fact, have stressed this alleged diff~rence and,
although recognizing both types of reference as binding, have
preferred to presume that the law generally governing a
contract extends to these stipulations, because this interpretation promotes the unity of law governing a contract. 134 Admit129
This has been contended in criticizing the House of Lords decision in Rex
v. International Trustee etc. [I937] A. C. soo, by the anonymous writer in
I 8 Brit. Year Book Int. Law (I 93 7) 220.
130
Dobell & Co. v. Rossmore S. S. Co. [I895] 2 Q. B. 408-C. A. Cf. Ocean
Steamship Co., Ltd. v. Queensland State Wheat Board [I94r] I K. B. 402 1 4I2 1
4I5.
101
See, e.g., Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass'n v. Minehart (Ark. 1904) 83
S. W. 323: reference to New York law does not.mean that the statutes of New
York are in force but only that they are a part of the contract. See also the
language of CooK, Legal Bases 399·
132
Belgium: App. Bruxelles (Feb. 4, I 936) Clunet I 936, 967: the provisions of the State of New York, by being referred to in the stipulations,
changed their character from legal to conventional.
Germany: OLG. Hamburg (March 17, I9I3) Hans. GZ. I9I3 1 HBI. I57 1
158, aff'd, RG. (Jan. 28, 19I4) Hans. GZ. 1914, HBI. 108: the Australian
Sea Carriage Act of I904 had become part of the contract.
133
Supra p. 360.
·
134
See HAUDEK 38; MELCHIOR 523 § 384; WoLFF, IPR. 88. This view
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tedly, however, average parties are not at all aware of this
subtle contrast, nor are the courts prepared to observe it. 135
They, definitely, presuppose a plurality of laws whose border
line only needs analysis. By the above language, the courts
seek to emphasize only that the scope intended by the
specially invoked law is not binding, even though it is intended to be compulsory; that the court is free to assume to
what extent the parties have referred their obligations to
that law; that the reference is to be reasonably interpreted
and restricted. 136
If the courts were to follow the suggestion mentioned they
would have to favor the more general reference at the cost
of the special clause. But the judicial inclination is just to the
contrary. Courts profess that the special clause derogates
from the general one.
In addition, a mere incorporation of a foreign rule in stipulations would have the result that, if the rule is changed subsequent to the contract, the obligation would not be affected.
This, as said earlier, is an undesirable effect.
But it may be asked, instead, whether parties are permitted, if they so intend, to limit the reference to the unchanged text of a certain legal rule. The question came up
on the occasion of the American loans in the nineteenseems to be shared by KAHN-FREUND, Annual Survey of English Law (1940)
254. For a different distinction, which I believe to be the correct one, see infra
Chapter 32, II, 3, p. 534·
135
In RG. (Nov. 24, 1928) 122 RGZ. 316 cited by MELCHIOR 522 n. 3 for
his thesis, the court expressly stated that a particular stipulation may be subject
to a separate law. This was not altered by the correct decision in the case at
bar that the litigious question of who has to bear extraordinary costs in a sea
carriage, was covered by the main reference to English law. In RG. (Nov. 14,
1929) 126 RGZ. 196, 206 (cited by MELCHIOR 522 n. 4) it was stated that
the presumptive intention of the parties, decisive according to German, not the
Austrian, conflicts law, excluded the Austrian law from the question of effects
exercised by Austrian decrees.
136
See, e.g., Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Hill, supra n. ur, at 557: "· .. the
laws of New York are controlling in any respect only because the parties have
so stipulated, and, as we have indicated, the stipulation in respect thereto is to
be harmonized with the other stipulations in the contract."
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twenties to European governments, cities, and corporations.
Interest and capital were payable in gold dollars. When by
the Joint Resolution of Congress in 1933 recovery in gold
coins as well as in gold value was prohibited, bondholders
attempted to save their claims by contending that a reference
made in the contract debenture, and possibly in the bond,
to the law of New York, was not intended to include the
unforseeable American dollar depreciation. The German
Reichsgericht replied that "one cannot select a national law
and exclude its imperative rules. Only an unrestricted submission assures that the contract be disciplined, if necessary,
against egoistic purposes of the economically stronger party
or even both parties, considering the general interests in
changing times .... m 37
There was no doubt about the correct interpretation of
the individual loan agreements. None of them could be understood otherwise than as taking the Joint Resolution in its
stride, since the alternative would have been the complete
lack of an applicable law, an impossible result. 138 In theory,
however, the problem of conditional references to a legal
rule is new and unsettled. 139
RG. (May 28, 1936) JW. 1936, 2058; cf. 1o Z.ausl.PR. (1936) 385.
RABEL, 10 Z.ausl.PR. (1936) 509, 5!3·
139
For the negative solution, see WoLFF, 49 Jurid. Rev. (1937) at 124;
for the affirmative, NussBAUM, "Comparative and International Aspects of
American Gold-Clause Abrogation," 44 Yale L. J. (1935) at 83; for reasons
of doubting, DUDEN, 9 Z.ausl.PR. (1935) 625.
137

138
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Theories Restricting Party Autonomy
ANY objections have been raised against the right
of parties to select their law. Often overlapping
and elusive, they may be distinguished according
to their main ideas.

M

I.
1.

DocTRINES oF GENERAL ScoPE

Doctrines Reserving Imperative Rules

(a) Imperative rules of a predestined law. As mentioned
before, in the majority opinion of the scholars, every contract is born into a certain law, the "imperative rules" of
which it cannot escape. That is, any rules of this law which
parties cannot modify by contracting in a purely domestic
sphere, they do not avoid by an agreement that another law
should govern. 1
Although the numerous followers of this doctrine are
categoric in asserting that imperative rules are inescapable,
they strongly disagree in determining what rules are imperative. The learned reporter of the Institute of International
Law, Baron Nolde, sternly warned against the frequent tendency of the literature 2 to reduce these norms to a small
number of secondary problems identical with what is properly
called "ordre public." These concern such classic examples
as wagering, usury, smuggling, or social protection. Im1 The arguments have been expounded with particular authority by LoRENZEN, 30 Yale L. J. (1921) s6s; NIBOYET, Recueil 1927 I, IJ, J6, 53, 6z;
PILLET, Principes § 227; AuDINET, 1 Melanges Pillet 65.
2 As a recent example, see the convincing demonstration by EsMEIN in 6
Planiol et Ripert, Traite Pratique 646 that provisions of domestic law, protecting the weaker parties or the interests of society in general or good morals,
can not simply be transposed into the international field.
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perative rules, on the contrary, according to the reporter's
energetic assertion, cover a "vast and normal domain," including formation and validity of contracts, the principle
of freedom of contracting, the clausula rebus sic stantibus,
rescission on the ground of nonperformance, the effect of
contracts on third persons, assignment, plurality of subjects
of obligations, "many" of the rules concerning discharge of
obligations, and a "very great number" of rules dispersed
in the codes including those on collective bargaining. 3 Thus,
not much remains for agreements of parties, nor is it easy
to see exactly what their sphere may be.
This entire theory has influenced a few recent legislative
texts/ but it has been opposed at least by Anzilotti 5 in the
Institute, and more recently thoroughly refuted by English,
French, and German writers.11 It has no real background in
any of the significant court practices.
Nevertheless, in a new variant, the predestined law has
taken the form of the locally "most closely connected law,"
pretending to decide whether the parties may submit to
another law. 7 Discussion may be deferred until we meet the
problem of territorial limits to autonomy (infra p. 403).
(b) Lex loci contractus necessarily governing validity.
The idea that every contract necessarily depends on the law of
the place where it is made and, hence, is in an intimate and
3

32 Annuaire (I925) 52-57.
Supra PP· 372-373.
·' 32 Annuaire (I925) 512.
6
See Vol. t, pp. 83-87. The last committee draft on the conflicts rules for
sales of goods (I 9 3 I) satisfied the opinion expressed by the great majority of
governments in extending party autonomy to the "imperative rules." Art. 2
par. I says simply: "The sales contract is governed by the internal law of the
country indicated by the parties to the contract," and par. 3 expressly includes
"the conditions relating to the consent of the parties." See 7 Z.ausl.PR. (I 9 3 3)
957; the committee report by JULLIOT DE LA MoRANDIERE has been printed
as confidential.
7
MoRRIS, "The Proper Law of a Contract in the Conflict Laws," 56 Law
Q. Rev. (I940) po, 337·
4
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inseparable conjunction with this law, is old. It goes back to
Bartolus 8 and was revived by the scholars believing in vested
rights. 9 Modern writers added their perennial fear of a circulus inextricabilis: party autonomy would determine the
law which itself permits party autonomy. 10 It is also argued
that the essential requisites of contracts are regulated by
"imperative" rules where the contracts originate/ 1 thus resuming the thesis mentioned before.
The old doctrine has undoubtedly left some vestiges. In
the nineteenth century, even in the French courts, it preceded
the revival of the principle of autonomy12 and, in its application to such contracts as transportation, seems to have retained
much vigor. 13 Remnants in this country are even more noteworthy in Beale's works,14 but they have. their securest domain
outside of conflicts law proper, in defining the power of a state
to subject contracts to its domestic law notwithstanding the
due process clause. 15
At present, Switzerland is the only important jurisdiction
following this idea in its proper meaning, that is, making the
lex loci contractus exclusively applicable without any possiBARTOL US, ad I. Cunctos Populos § I 3, infra p. 444·
See, among many others, AUDINET, I Melanges Pillet 67; RoLIN, I
Principes § 310; STRISOWER and NEUMEYER, cited by NOLDE, Revue 1926,
448; MINOR 401; BEALE, Summary§ 2 and 23 Harv. L. Rev. (I9Io) at 270.
10
E.g., NIBOYET, I Repert. 248 No. 37; Judge Learned Hand's "bootstraps" theory, supra p. 374 n. 63. Contra: see WAHL, 3 Z.ausl.PR. (1929)
791; HAUDEK 64; BATIFFOL § 386; MAYER, op. cit. (supra Chapter 28 n. 8)
III,I3I.
11
NIBOYET, I6 Recueil (1927) I 35ff. Contra: WAHL, 3 Z.ausl.PR. (1929)
8
9

8os.
12

See BATIFFOL 27-29 § 32·
Cass. (civ.) (Feb. 23, r864) 8.1864.1.385; BATIFFOL 258 § 284.
14
A decision influenced by the Restatement, Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Hyde (C. C. A. 2d I936) 82 F. (2d) 174 understands the clause of a
trust made in France that it was "to be construed and interpreted by the law
of New York" as not including the validity but only the meaning and effect
of the terms. In the argumentation of the court, the intention of the parties
is not supposed to be that they would withdraw the question of validity from
the lex loci contractus-"nor would such intention, if expressed, be controlling."
15
See Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Ind. Accident Comm. (1935) 294 U.S. 532,
and STUMBERG 6o.
13
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bility for the parties to change the rule. The Federal Tribunal in constant practice applies the law of the "place of
contracting" to all legal requisites of validity, such as offer
and acceptance, consent, permissibility, significance of error,
fraud or duress. 16 The parties may determine the law governing the "effects" of a contract, but not that concerning its
"validity."
The Restatement pronounces a similar rulet on the background, however, of a total exclusion of party choice.
(c) Illegality under lex loci contractus invalidating the
contract. One of Dicey's influential exceptions to the proper
law theory states that validity of a contract under the proper
law is of no avail if the making of the contract is unlawful
under the lex loci contractus. 18
This statement, distinguishable from its probable mother
rule, above sub (b), precariously reposes on Lord Halsbury's
well-known opinion. Although terming untenable the proposition that a prohibition by the lex loci contractus could always
prevent us from enforcing a contract/ 9 he added:
"Where a contract is void on the ground of immorality
or is contrary to such positive law as would prohibit the
making of a contract at all, then the contract would be void
all over the world and no civilized country would be called
on to enforce it."
Such a contract regarded as illegal, that is, "criminal" at the
place where it is made, would be regarded all over the world
as obnoxious to public policy and therefore void, though not
illegal. As a result, the House. of Lords in In re Missouri
minimized the force of the Massachusetts statute prohibiting
16

See BGE.: 23 I 8z:z; 32 II 415; 38 II 519; 44 II z8o; 49 II 73·
Restatement § 332, cf. § 358.
18
DICEY 655 exception (z) to Rule 16o; FooTE 402. See for criticism
MANN, "Proper Law and Illegality in Private International Law," 18 Brit.
Year Book Int. Law (1937) 97> 103; CHESHIRE 278.
19
In re Missouri Steamship Co. (1889) 42 Ch. D. 321, 336; accepted as
the law by Greer, L. J., in The Torni [193:1.] P. 78, .88.
17
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exemption from carrier's liability. Its violation, hence, was
not a case of a "criminally" or morally tainted foreign offense
that would move an English court. The distinction was made
in remembrance of a curious old contrast between mala in se
and mala prohibita, which a judge in I 822 had declared
"long since exploded.mo
More recently, Lord Wright in his turn, in the Vita Food's
case,21 has commented on Lord Halsbury's dubious dictum
in another questionable way. 22 The fact is, however, that in
all these cases and others, the judgment for validity was
based purely on English law considered as governing the contract, despite the law of the place of contracting.
Only one English case, The Torni/ 3 is apparently consistent with the alleged rule, but its well-considered reason lies
elsewhere/4 and has been rejected by the decision in the
Vita Food's case.
The conclusion had been reached even before the lastmentioned decision that invalidity under the law of the place
of contracting as such is simply immaterial in English
courts. 25 Legality is determined by the proper law, except that
enforcement may be refused also on the ground of the public
policy of the forum.
Apart from academic theses, in this country obiter dicta
may be found, such as in a supreme court decision, that
parties outside of the state of New York may make the laws
of this state controlling upon both parties,
"Provided such provisions do not conflict with the law or
26
public policy of the State where the contract is made."
20
Best, J., in Bensley v. Bignold (1822) 5 Bar. & AI. 335> 341 noted by
MANN, supra n. x8, 104 n. x; cf. WILLISTON, 6 Contracts soo6 § 1764.
21
Vita Food Products, Inc. v. Unus Shipping Co. [1939] A. C. 277, 297,

P. C.
22

'See CooK, Legal Bases 4:z.xff.
[I9JZ] P. 78.
24 Infra P· 4:1.7.
25
CHESHIRE ::.78.
26
Mr. Justice Brewer in Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hill (1904) 193 U. S.
23
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This general formula is hardly more than a tribute to school
reminiscences. In no other country is there any sizeable following of this theory. 27
(d) Prevailing rule. All versions of a predestinated law
have been abandoned by the present jurisprudence of mercantile countries. The English view is beyond any doubt.
French and German courts definitely apply the law upon
which the parties agree, with all its implications, and do not
apply another law solely because it would be applicable in the
absence of a party intention. 28

Illustration. In a case decided by the Mixed Anglo-German
Arbitral Tribunal in 1922, a contract entered into by ,correspondence between an English and a German member of the
Liverpool Cotton Association, made subject to the Rules
of this Association and thereby to the jurisdiction of the High
Court of Justice and the law of England, was held valid
under this law. It was immaterial which law would have
55 r. Similarly, a few Massachusetts decisions concerning insurance statutes,
infra n. 83.
2
' The only exception known to me is a surprising contention by NussBAUM,
D. IPR. 244 repeated in 51 Yale L. ]. (194z) 9o8, Principles 176; against
which see GUTZWILLER, 8 Z.ausl.PR. (1934) 656; MANN, supra n. x8,
at 103, and Book Review, 7 Modern L. Rev. (1944) 17z; RAAPE, D. IPR.
25 3; STAUB-HEINICHEN in 3 Staub 556 n. I I a. For the dominant view that
illegality arising out of making the contract is treated like other questions of
validity, see STUMBERG Z42 n. 33·
zs England: It suffices to refer to the opinions of the Privy Council in the
Vita Food's case, supra n. 2. 1.
Belgium: PouLLET 3 72 § 299 n. z reproaches the Belgian courts since
they do not distinguish between supplementary and imperative rules.
France: The court decisions ought to be discussed at the proper places, but
even ARMINJON, z Precis (ed. 2) 257 n. I § 79, cites only one decision, Cass.
(civ.) (Jan. 8, 1913) S.19IJ.I.243, as being reluctant to admit all consequences of party autonomy. The decision refuses to recognize that an arbitration stipulated in the contract may judge the question of fraud, because French
courts give effect only to conventions freely consented. Thus freedom of contracting is a ground for public policy overriding the conflicts rule which in
itself is not contested.
Germany: See the stringent documentation by MELCHIOR 5o6ff.
Portugal: VEILJA BEIRAO, draftsman of the C. Com., commented on art.+
to the effect that every rule may be changed by the parties, except that on
capacity. Only the subsequent doctrine introduced the "imperative" rules. See
EsPINOLA, 8 Tratado 538.
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governed without this submission and whether the contract
would have been unenforceable under the German prohibition against dealing in futures. 29
In the United States, the questions involving validity of
the contract are decided in a majority of states according to
criteria other than the law of the place of contracting, and
often according to the intention of the parties. The dogma
postulated by Beale exists nowhere.
2.

Evasion
(a) Fraudulent evasion. The French doctrine of "fraude

ala loi," although slowly vanishing, in certain cases has been
applied, under an apparently broad formula, to stipulations
in favor of a foreign law, when a contract was both made and
to be performed in France. 30 However, the nucleus of these
cases consisted in c.i.f. sales contracts on overseas grains, made
between Frenchmen in France under the standard forms of
the London Corn Trade Association and similar to those
under which the seller had bought the goods overseas. That
nullity of such agreements violated the interests of international commerce, was recognized by the Court of Cassation
itself. Moreover, it is characteristic of the crude method protecting some true or imagined domestic public interest by the
theory of fraud, that in most cases the required evidence of
"fraudulent" evasion could not be produced. 31
(b) Contracts without foreign elements. The German
Reichsgericht once nullified a stipulation of choice of law in
an isolated case. An agreement with a matrimonial agency
29 Gruning & Co. v. Gebr. Fraenkel (Feb. 6-I 7, I 922) I Recueil trib. arb.
mixtes 726. To the contrary effect, for instance, the Czechoslovakian Supreme
Court (March 2, 1934) 10 Z.ausl.PR. (1936) r68: action for the balance
arising out of a grain transaction, dismissed on domestic standards. For this application of public policy, see infra Chapter 33 pp. 568 ff.
M Cass. (civ.) (Feb. 19, 1930) and (Jan. 27, 1931) S.I9JJ.I.4I; and cases
mentioned by BATIFFOL 63 n. 4·
31 BATIFFOL § 70.
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was made and to be performed in the Kingdom of Saxony,
both parties being resident there. The contract referred to
Prussian law which, in contrast to the Saxon, considered valid
a promise of award given to a matchmaker. 82
Here, indeed, the transaction belonged, personally and
substantially, to one jurisdiction, lacking all and any foreign
elements; the parties referred to a foreign law exclusively
for the purpose of evading a prohibition intended to maintain
good morals. The case deserves to be noted in this respect
but has often given rise to exaggerated conclusions.
(c) Lex fori in imperative role. The Austrian and several
Latin-American Codes have gone so far as to make the law
of the forum imperative in large groups of cases, such as those
where the contract is performable in the country or where
nationals of the country contract abroad. 83 A similar provincialism occurs in sporadic cases throughout the world,
when a court for the protection of a resident believes itself
entitled to apply its domestic statutes without justifying a
stringent public policy of the forum.
(d) American law. The American position is not simple
to state. It appears that repeatedly stipulations of choice of
law have been disregarded, for varying reasons or sometimes
almost without justification, evidently on the ground of a
belief such as that expressed by Beale that the parties have
no right to select a law. However, these cases are a small
minority. Furthermore, they belong, with isolated exceptions,
to certain groups which we shall have to discuss hereafter
(sub II and III). Anticipating the result, we may note that
the cardinal rule, also in this country, particularly at present,
is the acknowledgement of the right of the parties to de32

RG. (Sept. zr, r899) 44 RGZ. 300.
E.g., Argentina: C. C. art. IZ43 ( rzo9).
Mexico: C. C. art. 13·
See for more details supra Chapter z8, pp. 370-372.
33
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termine the law, and all exceptions that can seriously be sustained simply :flow from public policy.
3. Requirement of Substantial Connection
In a current of dicta, English and American authorities
have required as a matter of course, that the intention of the
parties to select a law must be confined within certain limits.
American courts have said that an agreement of the parties to
34
choose a law should be "made with a bona fide intention,"
36
5
not "fictitious,na based on "a normal relation" or a "natural
and vital connection." 37 ~nglish decisions have declared that
the chosen law ought to have "a real connection with the contract,ms or that the intention expressed should be "bona fide
and legal." 39 Also, the German Supreme Court has sometimes
mentioned that the parties may stipulate a law in material
connection with the obligation, 40 and similar views are likely
to occur in other courts.41 Some theoretical backbone was
sought for all these propositions in the doctrine of Westlake:
"That the law by which to determine the intrinsic validity
and effects of a contract will be selected in England on substantial considerations, the preference being given to the
34 2 WHARTON 1210 § szo (o) is cited for this requirement in Seeman v.
Philadelphia Warehouse (I928) 274 U. S. 403, 408.
35
Crawford v. Seattle etc. R. Co. (I9IS) 86 Wash. 628, I50 Pac. 1155·
36
Seeman v. Philadelphia Warehouse (r928) 274 U.S. 403, 408; Brierley v.
Commercial Credit Co. (D. C. E. D. Pa. I929) 43 F. (2d) 724, aff'd, id. 730.
37
2 WHARTON 12IO § sro (o); Green v. Northwestern Trust Co. (I9I4)
128 Minn. 30, ISO N. W. 229 (usury).
38 South African Breweries v. King [I899] 2 Ch. 173, aff'd [I9oo] I Ch.
273·
39
Lord Wright in Vita Food Products, Inc. v. Unus Shipping Co. [I939]
A. C. 277 at 290.
40
RG. (Julys, I91o) 74 RGZ. I7I, I73i (July 8, I9Io) Recht I9IO No.
3358; (April 4, I928) IPRspr. I929 No. 3I; (May .z8, 1936) JW. I936,
2871.
41
France: App. Rennes (July 26, I926) Clunet I927, 659, Revue 1927,
s23, reversed by Cass. (civ.) (Feb. I9, I93o) Clunet I93I, 9o, Revue I930,
282.
Switzerland: BG. (July I6, I898) 24 BGE. II at 544, cf. ROMBERGER, Obl.
Vertrage 45·
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country with which the transaction has the most real con42
nection, and not the law of the place of contract as such."
It should be noted that this famous passage in an excellent
formulation advocates an objective construction of the applicable law, in criticism of the traditional mechanical application
of the law of the place of contracting. Whether the idea was
latent in Westlake that a law to be selected by the parties
43
must have some connection with the contract, is not clear.
Certainly, he did not pretend that the parties have to choose
just that law which a judge would think to be in the closest
connection-as recent English writers propose. 44
In fact, other writers/ 5 with whom Cook apparently associated himself, 46 conclude that choice by parties is limited to
those countries with which the contract has a "substantial"
connection. Hence, in the cases of multiple local connections,
the parties may select any one of these contacts, if it is not
merely accidental; they are not bound to select the one contact which a judge would assume to be the most vital. Otherwise, the axiom would indeed abolish autonomy altogether.
But even so, we notice at once that this establishes a broad
theory against evasion which nevertheless does not prevent
the parties from choosing a foreign law having some "substantial" connection with the contract but rejects claims of
the forum grounded on a much closer connection. Such a
42

WESTLAKE 2. I 2..
WESTLAKE 2.87 and the note by BENTWICH in WESTLAKE 289; cf.
DICEY 965.
44
MoRRIS, 56 Law Q. Rev. (I 940) po, 3 3 7, CHESHIRE being cosigner
of the article.
45
HAUDEK 39; MELCHIOR so6 j ScHLEGELBERGER, Die Entwicklung des
Deutschen Recht in den letzten fiinfzehn Jahren (I930) 133, see 4 Z.ausl.PR.
4I7i M. WOLFF, IPR. 86, id. in 49 Jurid. Rev. (1937) 119, 121, and in Priv.
Int. Law 42.4 (where he contends that this is the prevailing continental opinion;
I doubt this contention); BATIFFOL 52§ 57·
46
CooK, Legal Bases 42. 3, unaware of the continental discussion, developed
his views very cautiously and rather ambiguously; he expounded them more
firmly, however, in his last article, 2.1 Can. Bar Rev. (1943) 249, 2.53·
4
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theory is unable to replace that of public policy. What, then,
is its value? And why can the forum not tolerate a foreign law not "connected" at all with the contract, when not
harmful to its public policy? With these questions in mind,
we shall register what further information can be gained.
The Polish Law on private international law has preferred
another approach. It enumerates the law open to choice as
follows:
The parties may submit an obligation to the law of the
national state, the law of domicil, the law of the place of
making the transaction, the law of the place of performance,
or the law of the place of situs. 47
In Beale's system the question is nonexistent, but the places
of contracting and performance are the only ones he recognizes at all as contacts. 48
Feeling that the familiar formulas include much obscurity,
Lord Wright, speaking for the Judicial Committee of the
Privy Council in the much discussed Vita Food's case, has had
the merit of attempting clarification. On the rule that the
ascertained intention of the parties is conclusive, he observes:
"It is objected that this is too broadly stated and that
some qualifications are necessary.... But where the English
rule that intention is the test applies, and where there is
an express statement by the parties of their intention to select
the law of the contract, it is difficult to see what qualifications
are possible, provided the intention expressed is bona fide
and legal, and provided there is no reason for avoiding the
choice on the ground of public policy." 49
Again, this comment needs supercomment. What does
"bona fide" and "legal" mean? 50 Had the court in mind
47
48

Art. 7· See against this attempt of regulation, HAUDEK 44·
2 BEALE 1127 n. 8, 1159 n. 4, II66 n. 6. Contra: see BATIFFOL 53 n. 3

and 4·
49
[1939] A. C. 277 at 290.
50
See Note, 55 Law Q. Rev. (1939) Jl3, Jl5·
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evasion under qualifying circumstances? Yet Lord Wright
was prepared to give effect to a most obvious escape from
Newfoundland to English law, in a case of an affreightment
beginning in Newfoundland, "even where the parties are
not English and the transactions are carried on completely
outside England."
As mentioned earlier, a citizen of Ecuador who had no
ties with England and a Canadian corporation contracting in
New York could validly submit to English law in the eyes of
an English court. 61
There is more reason for wonderment. Apart from frequent references in the American usury cases, which are a
special matter, when courts mention the requirement in question/2 they quite regularly do so in order to state that in the
case at bar the contract does have a sufficient connection with
the chosen law. This is true for most American as well as for
all English and German decisions, 53 and this is only natural.
In regular commerce, parties never select a law having "no"
relation to their obligations. 54
The Supreme Court of Rhode Island, however, in the
case of an employment contract, once made serious use of the
alleged rule that questions of validity and construction cannot
be referred by the parties to the law of a state in which the
contract is not made nor to be performed. 55 For some reason
51
British Controlled Oilfields ~- Stagg (I 9:z I) 66 Sol. J. I 8, supra p. 3 8 I
n. 91.
52
Out of I 8 cases considered in the note, "Validity and effect of stipulation
in contract etc.," I I :z A. L. R. I :z4 to I 30 (left), only three are not concerned
with usury. One trust case is without significance. On the two others, namely,
Gerli v. Cunard S. S. Co., involving bills of lading, see supra p. 3 74 n. 63,
and on the principal case, Owens v. Hagenbeck, see below n. 55·
53
For the American cases see BATIFFOL 4I n. 1. In England, the decision
in "The Torni'' is no counter-instance and its main argument has been challenged in the Vita Food's case. The German decisions cited supra n. 40 have in
each case approved of the stipulation.
54
See MELCHIOR, 3 Z.ausl.PR. (I9Z9) I79·
55
0wens v. Hagenbeck-Wallace Shows Co. (R.I. I937) 192 Atl. I58,
aff'd, 464, I I :z A. L. R. 1 I 3·
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unfortunately not revealed in the case, the employing circus
enterprise, whose permanent address was Chicago, localized
the contract in Sarasota County, Florida. Counsel for the firm
adduced dubious evidence for his plea that under the Florida
decisions the plaintiff could be dismissed practically at the
defendant's pleasure. The court, quite evidently moved by a
strong feeling of social equity, rejected the plea by refusing
the express reference to Florida law, allegedly not substantially connected with the contract, and simultaneously eliminated as not proved, the law of Indiana where the contract
in fact was executed. Massachusetts, where the defendant
gave written notice and where the circus was held until the
expiration of the term for dismissal, was not further mentioned. Thus, the Rhode Island court seized of the suit during
a brief performance in Providence, believed itself entitled
to apply the law of its own state, which had no connection
whatever with the contract. This happened in the name of the
requirement of close connection. An arbitrary use of conflicts
rules, once more, had to lead, on an easy though incorrect
way, to an equitable decision.
Of course, there is a practical question involved. Originally,
the writers seem to have believed that choice by the parties
is geographically limited,S 6 and the Polish list of permitted
contacts reaches the same result. In international relations,
however, there are many cases in which a contract ought to
follow the legal fate of another agreement. When a grain
shipment under a form of the London Corn Trade Association, arriving from Argentina to Bordeaux, is resold by the
French buyer to another Frenchman in France, this is a
"contra! de suite." The middleman in this frequent situation
is in dire straits if he is liable to his successor on warranties
~ 6 Clearly so, HAUDEK 39, rejecting (4o n. 3) my opinion (infra n. 57) with
the contention: when goods sold do not touch English territory, the interest of
the parties in English law which they select, is not based on the international
structure of the contract but is only personal to the seller.
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not covered by his rights of recourse against the Argentine
vendor. 57 As early as 1909, a German appeal court expressly denied the existence of a public policy precluding two
German merchants in grain from submitting to London arbitration and English law. 58 French courts, haunted by their
fear of "fraude ala loi," could not satisfy this need, but their
mistakes will probably not be repeated anywhere else. 59 Normal economic interests of those engaged in international trade
must be as well safeguarded as trade within a territory.
Other examples of "entailed contracts," which should conveniently be adjusted to the law that governs another contract, have been adduced, such as a bond for a foreign debt, 60
reinsurance, and subsequent insurance for merchandise in
transitu on a vessel. 61 Analogous reasoning would quell
doubts, when a debt guaranteed by mortgage in one state,
is expressly subjected to the law of the situs, even though no
other contact with it existed. 62
A reference to English law will not be rejected by English
or German courts whenever a certain type of contract is internationalJy unified according to English commercial customs, irrespective of the individual parties to the contract. 63
International commerce, indeed, must escape the narrow
margins of any formula binding the parties to one or the
other of their domiciliary laws and look for unified usages
and stipulations.
7
'
RABEL, 4 Z.ausl.PR. (1930) 417 followed by WoLFF, IPR. 87; RABEL,
Recht des Warenkaufs 53; BATIFFOL 54 § 59·
8
' OLG. Rostock (Feb. zz, I 909) 65 Seuff. Arch. No. I, zo Z.int.R. 92.
"' Sttpra p. 400.
<hl BATIFFOL 56; M. WoLFF, IPR. 87 and in 49 Jurid. Rev. (I9J7) I2o.
01
Cases brought to attention by HAUDEK 41.
2
" In American Freehold Land & Mortgage Co. v. Jefferson (18gz) 69
Miss. 770 the parties stipulated for the law of Mississippi where the land
security was. The court held the stipulation to be void (infra n. 73) whereas the
case is suitable to demonstrate the need of a clear recognition of such agreements.
63
See CLAUGHTON ScoTT, Conference de la Haye, Actes de la Sixieme Session
zg6; M. WOLFF, 49 Jurid. Rev. (I9J7) I20 and Priv. Int. Law 428 § 4oz.
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It has been conceded, moreover, that parties may select a
law for the reason that they know it well or because it is
competently elaborated. 64 For this reason, English courts
seem always to recognize the reference to English law. Why
should they not? Why, indeed, should an American court not
allow residents of the Philippines and Australia to agree in
a contract on the application of the law of California?
Finally, as is well known, English courts are inclined to
accept submissions to English law without any qualification.
This has recently been advocated in generalized form as a
privilege for the lex fori of all countries.'65 But in a reasonable
international private law, it should not be so significant which
forum is seized of the case.
It seems after all that the alleged general rule limiting
the choice of law by the parties to a determined number of
legislations, does not and should not exist. Its possibly more
serious purpose is sufficiently defined through the old concept
of evasion of some law; but this purpose must be pursued on
the basis of its own merits-which are very small.

II.

SPECIAL AMERICAN DocTRINES

The following topics cannot be treated without anticipating
in some respects the conflicts rules existing in case the parties
have not determined the applicable law, but such discussion
is needed for a final judgment on the limits of party autonomy.
1.

Usury Statutes66

In regulating the rate of interest in loan contracts, the
various jurisdictions employ different methods and permit
varying amounts. With respect to a contract fixing interest
64 Such a situation evidently occasioned the party agreement in British Controlled Oilfields v. Stagg (1921) 66 Sol. J. 18; BATIFFOL 55§ 6o.
65
M. WoLFF, Priv. Int. Law 428 § 403.
66 No comparable doctrine exists abroad.
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without an additional stipulation for the applicable law,
former divergent conceptions have been finally superseded
by a habit of maintaining the stipulated rate, provided that
it is agreeable to some law connected with the contract, such
as the law of domicil of either party, or that of the place of
payment, or sometimes that of the situs of a land seeurity. 87
Thus, if a loan is made by a Pennsylvania corporation to a
resident of New York, who even pledges certain property
in New York as security, the Supreme Court of the United
States has declared the agreement lawful, although it would
have been void under New York law. Mr. Justice Stone said:
" . . . We think it immaterial whether the contract was
entered into in New York or Philadelphia.... Respondent,
a Philadelphia corporation having its place of business in
Philadelphia, could legitimately lend funds outside the
state and stipulate for repayment in Philadelphia in accordance with its laws and at the rate of interest there lawful,
even though the agreement for the loan were entered into
in another state where a different law and a different rate of
interest prevailed." 68
In this group of cases, we find in fact a combination of two
tendencies that have been generalized in the literature. One
idea is that several state laws are connected with the contract
and the judge may choose among these but no other laws.t~
The other impulse is given to favor the law upholding the
stipulation. Thus, this entire doctrine does not serve as a
limitation but as a favor to the contract.
As a third feature of the cases, however, the connection
has to be "real," not "fictitious." The North Carolina court,
finding that payment under a contract was arranged to be
made in another state solely for the purpose of avoiding the
9

67
See STUMBERG zu; GoODRICH § I o8; 2 BEALE § 34 7·4; cf. also 6 Banks
and Banking (Michie I9JI) I99 and Supp. (I945).
68
Seeman v. Philadelphia Warehouse Co. ( I927) 274 U. S. 403.
69
Arnold v. Potter (I 867) 22 Iowa I 94·
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usury statute of North Carolina, applied the latter. 70 In this
sense, the stipulation of interest must be covered by the law
of one of the places bona fide involved in the case. Bona fide
seems to mean that the place should not be intentionally selected for the purpose of evasion.
Stipulation for a law. It is in this light that we must regard
the approximately twenty-six decisions dealing with stipulations on the applicable law. 71
Of fourteen usury cases holding such stipulation void,
eleven invalidate it because it refers to a foreign law conflicting with that of the forum. 72 Only one old Mississippi case
protests against the advantage taken of its own usury statute
in a contract made in either New York or Tennessee; it is
a singular case also in the respect that the situs of the mortgage
in the state, for most courts one of the most vital contacts,
is disregarded. 73 Another case, in a lower court, disregarding
the reference to Virginia law because the contract has more
relation to the District of Columbia, concerns a loan corporation chartered in Virginia but operating in fact in Washington,
D. C. The judge observes that if the payment had been stipulated to be in Virginia, the stipulation would have been
proper. 74
70
Meroney v. Atlanta National Building and Loan Ass'n (1893) II2 N.C.
842, I7 S. E. 637; Ripple v. Mortgage and Acceptance Corp. (I927) I93
N.C. 422, I37 S. E. I56. See also infra ns. 74 and 75·
71
I am much indebted to Mrs. Oberst, formerly Elizabeth Durfee of Ann
Arbor, for her excellent contribution in establishing the list of these cases and
the conclusions to be inferred from them.
72
Falls v. U.S. Savings, Loan and Bldg. Co. (1893) 97 Ala. 4I7; Meroney
v. Atlanta Building and Loan Ass'n (I895) II6 N.C. 882; U.S. Savings &
Loan Co. v. Scott (I 896) 98 Ky. 695, 34 S. W. 235; Locknane v. U. S. Savings
& Loan Co., (I 898) IOJ Ky. 265; Fidelity Savings Ass'n v. Shea (I 899) 6 Ida.
405; Bldg. & Loan Ass'n of Dakota v. Bilan (1899) 59 Neb. 458; Snyder v.
Fidelity Savings Ass'n (1901) 23 Utah 29I; Floyd v. National Loan &
Investment Co. (I 90I) 49 W. Va. 327; United Divers Supply Co. v.
Commercial Credit Co. (C. C. A. 5th I923) 289 Fed. JI6; Brierley v.
Commercial Credit Co. (C. C. A. 3d I93o) 43 F. (2d) 730, cert. denied, 282
U.S. 897; Bundy v. Commercial Credit Co. (193I) 200 N.C. 5II.
73
American Freehold Land & Mortgage Co. v. Jefferson (I 892) 69 Miss.
770, supra n. 62.
74
Stoddard v. Thomas (1915) 6o Pa. Super. Ct. I77, 18I.
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It is impressive that nine of these fourteen cases were prior
to I 902. In the few others, the principle that any law having
a substantial connection with the contract suffices, is expressly
adopted. In the four last cases (of 1923, 1930, and 1931),
the place of incorporation of the lending Delaware company,
different from its principal place of business, is discarded,
but the rate stipulated in the contract is nevertheless saved
by judicial choice of another law validating the contract. 75
Twelve decisions, from 1865 to 1937, agree in applying
the stipulated law, which in half of the number was that of
the borrower and in the rest that of the lender. 76 A Kansas
decision holding a stipulation for Colorado law valid, since
many elements of the contract related to Colorado, refuted
the contrary opinion, as. follows:
"The position assumed by some courts in reference to
this matter, when considering building and loan association
cases, can scarcely be regarded as anything less than the
result of a tour de force." 71
Thus, the courts in this matter are not satisfied with the
mere fact that the parties have signed the agreement. They
analyze the facts in order to see whether enough elements
support the stipulated localization, with the alternative that
the parties are deemed to have intentionally evaded the usury
laws of some other state.
75
See the last three citations, supra n. 72, and Manufacturers Finance Co. v.
B. L. Johnson & Co. (1931) 15 Tenn. App. 236.
76
Townsend v. Riley (1865) 46 N. H. 30o; Dugan v. Lewis (1891) 79
Tex. 246; Smith v. Parsons (1893) 55 Minn. szo; Lanier v. Union Mortgage,
Banking & Trust Co. (1897) 64 Ark. 39; Ashurst v. Ashurst (1898) 119
Ala. 219; Midland Savings & Loan Co. v. Solomon (1905) 71 Kan. 185;
Steinman v. Midland Savings & Loan Co. (1908) 78 Kan. 479; Goode v.
Colorado Investment Loan Co. (1911) r6 N. M. 461, 117 Pac. 856; LeSueur
v. Manufacturers' Finance Co. (C. C. A. 6th 1922) 285 Fed. 490; Castleman v.
Canal Bank & Trust Co. (1934) 171 Miss. 291; Merchants' & Manufacturers'
Securities Co. v. Johnson (C. C. A. 8th 1934) 69 F. (2d) 940, cert. denied 293
U. S. 569; Armstrong v. AlLiance Trust Co. (C. C. A. sth 1937) 88 F. (2d)
449·
77
Midland Savings & Loan Co. v. Solomon (1905) 71 Kan. 185, 191, 79
Pac. 1077.
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In summary, although it remains not quite certain which
combination of elements will satisfy a court/ 8 it seems that
the stipulation is likely to be accepted when it refers to the
law of a state in which one of the parties is effectively domiciled and in which at the same time either the contract is
deemed to be made, or to be performed, or the land security
is situated, or payment is to be made.
Hence, the usury doctrine of the American courts, also in
its extension to express agreements on the applicable law, is
a remarkable specialty, suggestive of ideas, but by no means
susceptible of simple generalizations. It rather demonstrates
the usefulness of an elaborate approach to individual problems.
2.

Insurance Statutes

In "a few instances," 79 courts of this country have disregarded express contract stipulations determining the place of
the contract and thereby the applicable law. 80 It seems that
all these decisions were rendered in Massachusetts and Missouri. The latter state has waged a long and gallant legislative
78
In U. S. Building & Loan Ass'n v. Lanzarotti (I929) 47 Ida. 287, 274
Pac. 63o, 632, with no express reference to a law, the agreement that the note
should be paid in Montana at the domicil of the lending corporation, was rejected as not supported by innocent intent. If facts of the case were better known.
the true motive of the court would be clearer.
79
CoucH, I Cycl. of Insurance Law (I929) 441. These cases, it seems to
me, have impressed BATIFFOL 6o n. I by far too much; but, it is true, CARNAHAN, Conflict of Laws and Life Insurance Contracts (I942) 95, 562 also
voices the impression that choice of the law of the home office of the insurer
is ineffectual. Regrettably, he does not substantiate this thesis.
80 Massachusetts: Albro v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co. (I 902) I I 9 Fed. 629,
aff'd (I904) I27 Fed. 281; Dolan v. Mutual Res. Fund Life Ass'n (I899)
I 73 Mass. I 97, 53 N. E. 398.
Missouri: Cravens v. New York Life Ins. Co. (1899) I48 Mo. 583,50 S. W.
5I9, aff'd (I9oo) 178 U.S. 389; Horton v. New York Life Ins. Co. (1899)
I5I Mo. 6o4, 52 S. W. 356; Haven v. Home Insurance Co. (1910) I49 Mo.
App. 29I, IJO 'S. W. 73; Saunders v. Union Central Life Ins. Co. (Mo. App.
I923) 253 S. W. I77; Hoffman v. North American Union (Mo. App. 1933)
56 S. W. (zd) 599; Ragsdale v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen (Mo. App.
I 934) So S. W. (2d) 272.
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battle, with repeated reverses in the Supreme Court of the
United States, to protect its residents against forfeiture clauses
and other contractual deteriorations of their insurance in
New York companies. 81 Certainly, if an insurance contract
has all the characteristics of a Missouri contract, stipulations
inserted in the policy providing, for example, for a different
rule of computation from that prescribed by the statute or
for waiver of surrender value, forbidden by the statute,
would be recognized as ineffectual at present as it was in I 89 I
with the approval of the Supreme Court of the United
States. 82 If in such a case of an insurance contract belonging
to the law of one state, the law of another state is stipulated
for, it is a question of public policy whether the statutory prohibition should be maintained nevertheless. A court, then,
may qualify the agreement as an ineffectual attempt at evasion
within the sphere of the prohibition. This, indeed, seems to
be the view taken for a long period in Massachusetts in certain
cases of violations. 83 The agreement, however, ought not to
be considered void as a whole. The Missouri court exaggerated by asserting that the interpretation and effect of the
terms of insurance are governed by Missouri law when the
contract is deemed to have been made there, despite a clause
referring to New York law. 84
However, the vastly prevailing doctrine respecting insurance contracts is summarized in the leading encyclopedia to
81

Instructive: Missouri Annotations to the Restatement 14-2 § 332·
Equitable Life Assurance Society v. Clements (1891) qo U. S. 226. I
cannot agree with the conclusion by LORENZEN, 30 Yale L. J. (I 92 I) at
5 79 n. 7 3 from this decision that the intention of the parties is not permitted
to violate the statutes of the lex loci contractus.
83
Dolan v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass'n (I899) I73 Mass. I97, 53
N. E. 398; Millard v. Brayton (1901) 177 Mass. 533, 537; 59 N. E. 4-36.
84
Pietri v. Seguenot (1902) 69 S. W. 1055, 1057. Kerner, J., in New
England Mutual Life Ins. Co. of Boston, Mass. v. Olin (C. C. A. 7th 194-o)
114- F. (zd) IJI, 137, despite his similar sweeping dictum in an otherwise
correct opinion, certainly wanted to say only that the contract and the agreement involved were made in fact in Indiana, and therefore the nonforfeiture
statute of Indiana prevailed over the stipulation for Massachusetts law.
82
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the effect that, "if the policy or certificate does expressly provide that a specific state shall be the place of contract, the law
of the state agreed upon as governing controls the nature,
validity, interpretation, and effect of the contract, whether
the specified state be the state wherein the contract was made,
or a foreign state or country and notwithstanding the insured
resides, or the property is located, in another state." 85
This being the settled rule, all justifiable exceptions are
fully explained by the operation of a specific public policy,
a viewpoint needing separate discussion.
The constitutional limits of public policy to be exercised
by a state, have been illustrated in New York Life Insurance
Company v. Dodge. By a contract undoubtedly made in Missouri, a resident of that state was insured in a New York
company. The insured concluded a collateral agreement with
the company under the stipulation that the agreement should
be deemed to have been made in New York, although most
elements of its conclusion pointed to Missouri. The Supreme
Court of the United States denied the state of Missouri the
constitutional power to enforce its prohibitions against this
agreement, thus rejecting the argument sustained by Mr.
Justice Brandeis in a dissenting vote that the individual's
right created under the Missouri contract was not susceptible
of being disposed of by contracting anywhere. 86 However, on
85
CoucH, 1 Cycl. of Insurance Law 440 § 199; see also Note, 112 A.L.R.
qo and 44 C. J. S. (1945) 516 § 54 n. 86. Cf. Trexler,]., in Stoddard v.
Thomas ( 1915) 6o Pa. Super, Ct. 1 7 7 at 1 81 where a stipulation for the law
of the domicil of a finance company was invalidated, supra n. 74: "No one
questions the right of a corporation, such as an insurance company for example,
to provide that its policies although issued to a person in another state, shall
be governed by the Ia ws of the state of its residence."
It is agreed that where the law of the insurer's domicil is more favorable to
the claimant, express provisions in its favor are readily recognized. See, for
instance, CARNAHAN, supra n. 79, 252 n. 85.
86
New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge (1918) 246 U. S. 357, 375 (opinion
of the court); 377, 382 "(dissenting vote) among other arguments probably
not equally prominent in Mr. Justice Brandeis' mind.
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this question there is a long line of federal as well as state
decisions which it is difficult to reduce to a summary. 81
In addition, courts have approved the claim of states to
govern insurance policies issued to residents by foreign companies licensed to do business in the state. 88 In the case of insurance, indeed, states are entitled to the exercise of greater
control, unless new restrictions are to follow from extending
the Interstate Commerce Clause of the Constitution to insurance business.

III.

EXEMPTIONS

FROM

LIABILITY

89

Municipal laws and unifications. While no debtor can
effectively stipulate that he should not be responsible for his
own fraudulent conduct, 90 gross negligence is treated on the
same footing only in part of the legislations. Moreover, many
courts traditionally view stipulations lessening the extent of
liability with disfavor and construe them punctiliously, although at present in most commercial cases insurance may
replace such liability. 91 Finally, in certain cases, liability for
lack of ordinary care (negligence, culpa levis), either of the
debtor himself or also of his agents, may not be contracted
out under modern views, the strictest of which are to be
found in this country. Thus, in contrast to British and German
laws, the Supreme Court of the United States has proclaimed
that common carriers by land and sea could not exempt themselves from liability for loss or damage arising from negligence of their servants, "and that any stipulation for such
s 7 See CARNAHAN, supra n. 79, 7I:ff., 554, 574-586, 589:ff.
New York Life Ins. Co. v. Cravens (I9oo) I78 U.S. 389; Great Southern
Life v. Burwell (I926) u F. (2d) 244, cert. denied 27I U.S. 683; Owen v.
Bankers' Life Ins. Co. (rgog) 84 S.C. 253,255, 66 S. E. 290.
89
Cf. HoLLANDER, 3 Rechtsvergl. Handworterbuch 534·
90
PAULUS in Just. Dig. 2, 14, 27, 3: Illud nulla pactione effici potest, ne
dolus praestetur.
"'See a similar observation by GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, 7 Modern L. Rev.
(I 944) 75, I 54 commenting on a new English decision.
88
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exemption was void as against public policy." 92 The declared
reasons for supporting this thesis were the economic preponderance of big enterprises, not giving customers fair opportunity to bargain for conditions, and the educational purpose
of severe rules of behavior. 93 Later, stipulations for foreign
laws favorable to the carriers were disregarded, because frequently the party submitting thereto has no actual intention
to do so and there is no freedom of contracting. 94 The federal
legislation regulating interstate communication and carriage
by land and sea was inspired by these views. With respect to
maritime affreightment-which has created the outstanding
international problem in this field-the Harter Act of I 893
and subsequent congressional acts 95 have established liability
of the shipowner for certain occurrences without possibility
of exemption, while no liability exists in other cases. Canada,
Australia and New Zealand have enacted laws following this
model. 96 A variant of the same method was pursued in the
Hague Rules of I 92 I 97 and, on their basis, by the Brussels
Convention of I 924, ratified by many states, 98 which has
also been incorporated into English and, recently, American
92
Mr. Justice Gray in Knott v. Botany Mills (1900) 179 U. 'S. 69 at 71;
Clark v. Southern R. Co. ( 1918) 69 Ind. App. 697, 119 N. E. 53 9·
93
New York Central R. Co. v. Lockwood (1873) 17 Wall. 357> 379·
94
0ceanic Stearn Navigation Co. v. Corcoran (1925) 9 F. (2d) 724, 727:
"The customer cannot afford to higgle or stand out"; Phillips v. The Energia
(1893) 56 Fed. 124; Note, 54 Harv. L. Rev. (1941) at 668.
95
Act of Feb. 13> 1893> c. 105, 27 Stat. 445> 46 u.s. c. A.§§ 190•192;
Law of Sept. 7, 1916, 39 Stat. 728.
96
Australia: Sea Carriage of Goods Act, 1904.
Canada: Water Carriage of Goods Act, 1910 (9 & 10 Edw. 7> c. 61).
New Zealand: Sea Carriage of Goods Act, 1908.
97
Hague Rules of the International Law Association, 1921, see 3oth Report
(1922) 2, 260.
98 Convention on the Unification of certain Rules relating to Bills of Lading
for the Carriage of Goods by Sea, Brussels, August 25, 1924, HUDSON, 2 Int.
Legislation 1344, U. S. Treaty Series No. 931, 51 U.S. Stat. 233, 120 L. of
N. Treaty Series 155, 157, 183, ratified by Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France,
Great Britain and many British dominions and dependencies, Hungary, Italy,
Monaco, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Rumania, Spain, Sweden,
United States. For a full list see KNAUTH, Ocean Bills of Lading (ed. 2, 1941)
75-8o.
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99

1aws. France and Italy diverge only in certain significant
particulars. 100
Land transportation rules of civil law countries have been
largely unified by the conventions of Bern on the carriage
of goods, 101 and a similar convention on carriage of passengers has been signed. 102 The latest endeavors have been
devoted to air transportation, in which field regard for the
weak position of private customers has seemed to be counterbalanced by the desire of many states to develop a young
and costly industry. Nevertheless, in conventions, 103 numerous laws/ 04 and cases/05 comparative severity has prevailed,
although the standard of liability maintained in this country
against maritime carriers considerably surpasses the risks imposed on air carriers under the Warsaw Convention.106
More isolated legislation in particular countries has dealt
with restrictions on liability in employment contracts, agreements of attorneys and notaries, and others. Differences,
however, still exist in all fields, some of considerable weight.
99
E.g., England: Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 1924.
United States: Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, of April r6, 1936, 49 Stat.
1207-IZIJ, 46 u.s. c. A.§§ IJOO-IJI5·
Canada: Water Carriage of Goods (Hague Rules) Act, 1936.
Australia: Sea Carriage of Goods Act, 1924.
Also the maritime part (Book II) of the Netherlands' Commercial Code,
revised in r 924 and r 926, is strongly influenced by the Convention.
German HGB., amended by Law of August ro, 1937, RGBl. I 89r.
10
° France: See DEMOGUE, 5 Obligations 462-501; JossERAND, Les transports (ed. 2) 6o9 § 627ff.; ESMEIN in Planiol et Ripert, 6 Traite Pratique 560
§ 4ooff.; DAN JON, 2 Droit Marit. § 845ff.; RIPERT, 2 Droit Marit. § r 7 3 7ff.
Italy: The principles concerning maritime affreightment have been summarized in Cass. (Feb. 27, 1936) Foro !tal. 1936.I.297• 35 Revue Dor (1937)
291.
101
Convention on the Transport of Goods by Rail, of Oct. 23, 1924, arts.
2.6-39, MARTENS, Receuil, XIX, 3d Series, 476.
102
Convention on the Transport of Passengers and Luggage, of Oct. 2.3,
1924, arts. 28-39, id. 558.
103
Convention of Warsaw for the Unification of Certain Rules regarding International Air Transport, of Oct. 12, 1929, HuDSON, 5 Int. Legislation roo.
104
ALLEN, "Limitation of Liability to Passengers by Air Carriers," z Journal
of Air Law (1931) 325·
105
For the United States, see Note, 54 Harv. L. Rev. ( r 941) at 666.
106
ROBINSON, Admiralty 560.
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To appreciate the varieties and the merit of the unifications
obtained, the background of policy must be remembered. The
variety of maritime liability has now largely been ended by
successful unification, but forms a memorable chapter of
history. Shipping in England and Germany and marine insurance in England have had an eminent function in the
public economy; it was often thought a national interest to
maintain their power of competition at low rates, whereas
affreighters and passengers were supposed to cover their
risks by insurance. In the authoritative French opinion, efficient prohibitions on exemption clauses have always been
believed impossible except by international convention, lest
French shipping be sacrificed to foreign competition. 107 Also,
the various rules of liability and nonliability combined by the
Harter Act, though largely influenced by the desire to protect
American cargo shipping which at that time was mostly
carried on foreign lines, were also designed to facilitate the
carrying trade in order to aid incipient American shipping
competition with foreign rivals. Certain liabilities of the
general maritime law were considerably lessened and the
bargaining position of the American companies was improved by imposing the same conditions on foreign vessels
leaving, or even headed for, American ports. These circumstances influenced a series of conflicts cases, which have remained the leading cases on the entire matter in discussion,
although the domain of possible conflicts of laws in sea
carriage of goods is greatly narrowed at present. We must
therefore concentrate on this classic topic.
Conflicts law. 108 There is no doubt about the principle that
the law governing a contract also determines the permissibility of agreements releasing or restricting the obligor's
107

See RIPERT, 1. Droit Marit. 761, 773·
On the American interstate conflicts remaining since the federal enactments, see Note, "Limitations of Carriers' Liability and the Conflict of Laws,"
54 Harv. L. Rev. (1941) 663.
108
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liability, even though this law may be called for by another
stipulation. 109 With regard to carriage of goods by sea, this
has been recognized not only in the English, 110 German,111
and Italian courts,112 but also in the United States. 113 Where
an English vessel takes on a cargo in Liverpool for transportation to Cuba, both the stipulations referring to English law
and exempting the shipowner from liability for negligence
of the mate, have been held valid. 114
Conflicts arise, of course, when a vessel sails from Liverpool to Baltimore; the English courts definitely claim that
its contracts of transportation are determined by English
law, 115 while the American courts since the Harter Act subject
it to American law. 116 Other conflicts are caused by the abstention of the Brussels Convention from regulating transportations agreed upon without issuing a bill of lading and from
including the periods of time before the goods are loaded
on and after they are discharged from the ship (art. I b and
e); and particular divergences arise out of the unregulated
methods of implementing the Convention, which may be
10
n Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R. Co. v. Smith (1913) 38 Okla. 157,
13 2 Pac. 494 should not be excepted; the decision validates a waiver of liability
printed on the back of a free railway pass, in application of the law of the
forum deemed to be the law of the place of performance, although favor for
the law more favorable to the stipulation (i.e., the waiver) is also expressed.
110
In re Missouri Steamship Co. (1889) 42 Ch. D. J21.
111
RG. (May 25 1 1889) zs RGZ. 104 1 107; (Jan. :z, 191I) 75 RGZ. 95·
11
" Italy: App. Venezia (March 11 1935) Schiaffino v. Capano, 112 Foro
Ital. Rep. 1935, 1363 ns. 43-46; Giur. Ital. Rep. 1935, 6o1 ns. 4-7, applying
English Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 19241 manifestly upon reference to English law.
1
11. Liverpool and Great Western Steam Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co. (1889) 12.9
U. S. 397 (American law applied on the ground of presumed intention);
The Oranmore (D. C. D. Md. 1885) 24 Fed. 922 1 aff'd, 92 Fed. 396 (stipulations of English law and exemption valid).
114
The Miguel di Larrinaga (D. C. S.D. N.Y. 1914) ::.17 Fed. 678 (English law stipulated, English vessel from Liverpool to Cuba); and see Note, 35
Yale L. J. (1926) 997·
115
In re Missouri Steamship Co. (1889) 4:7. Ch. D. 3:u, 330, cf. DICEY 65o

n. (m).
116
Liverpool and Great Western Steam Co. v. Phoenix Ins. Co. (1889) u9
U.S. 397; Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 1936, § 13·
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done by ratifying and sanctioning it as a whole, or by ratifying
it and reproducing it more or less exactly in separate laws
(Protocol of Signature, par. 2), or else by adopting a part of
it in an independent law.:r17
The only problem, however, presenting itself at this juncture, concerns the nonapplication of an exemption clause
stipulated under a law selected by the parties. Decisions denying effect to such clauses must be regarded as exceptions to
the rule and need justification by strong public policy on the
ground of a sufficiently close relation of the case with the territory of this policy. In fact, the laws and courts are far from
giving an exclusive role to the lex loci contractus.
Dealing with the Harter Act, the American courts have
interpreted the Act as including, in all its provisions, foreign
vessels118 leaving or arriving119 in American ports. In all
these cases, a clause of exemption contrary to the Act is invalid, although it may be valid under the law of the place
where the contract is made or the law agreed upon. 120 This
has been laid down very distinctly in section I 3 of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 1936. Dutch law prescribes, likewise, that reference to foreign law is not generally able to
restrict liability of shipowners, but recognizes stipulations
if valid by the law of the place where the goods are loaded/'2 1
at least in the case of foreign vessels. 122 Argentina, Brazil,
117
This fact has been deplored by Bateson, J., in The St. Joseph [1933] P.
119, 134. The divergences of the French Law of April z, 1936 from the
Brussels Convention (ratified by France according to the Law of April 9>
1936 by Decree of the President of March zs, 1937) are reviewed in the
Note, S.1936.s.I65ff.
18
l
The Silvia (I898) I7I U.S. 462; The Chattahoochee (I899) I73 U.S.
540> sso.
119
Knott v. Botany Mills (I 900) 179 U. S. 69.
To an analogous effect, Belgium: C. Com. art. 9 I as amended by Law of
Nov. z8, I928, art. I, discussed in The St. Joseph [I933] P. I19, 121.
12
Knott v. Botany, supra n. I 19·
121
The Netherlands: C. Com. (I838) arts. 470, 47oa, 517d, cf. szot.
122
Rh. Rotterdam (June 15, 1938) W. 1939, 6I7 restricts art. 517d to
foreign vessels.
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and Chile, as well as the former Italian Commercial Code
according to a certain interpretation, have declared imperative
the force of their rules concerning affreightment upon foreign
vessels if (or insofar as) the contract is to be performed in
the country. 123 These are outstanding examples of the most
extended policy which evidently governs the exception to
the conflicts rule on affreightment and not the rule itself.
The American courts have never doubted, before and after
the Harter Act came into being, that they applied it compulsorily on the ground of public policy, not on account of some
obscure dogma. The acts declaring exemptions from liability
to passengers invalid expressly impose the prohibition as
public policy. Of course, the Supreme Court has construed
an affreightment made in the United States on an English
vessel for a journey from an American port to England as an
American contract so as to apply the Harter Act as a part of
the governing law rather than to restrict the governing
English law by an exception of American public policy. But
this was expressly done, "unless the parties (to the contract)
at the time of making it have some other law in view."m The
principle, until recently, appeared well settled that there
had to be a particular interest of the United States, if American public policy should be invoked against a foreign law
governing the contract. 125
A divergent conception, however, was developed in matters
123
Argentina: C. Com. art. I 09 I.
Brazil: C. Com. art. 6z8 (these both speaking of contracts wherever stipulated but performable in the country).
Chile: C. Com. art. 975 par. z (speaking of the part of the contract concerning discharge of the vessel or other act to be made in the country).
Italy: Cass. (Oct. IS, 1929) Riv. Dir. Com. 1930 II SZ9; SCERNI 223 n. z;
but the intention of the parties has been considered in App. Venezia (Jan. zz,
193I), The "Stylianos," cited and criticized by SCERNI ZI7.
124
Liverpool and Great Western Steam Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co. (I889) 12.9
U. S. 397, 458ff.
125
Distinctly to this effect, The Fri (C. C. A. zd 1907) 154 Fed. 333:
exemption clause under the stipulated law of Colombia for transportation from
Carthagena to Cienfuegos valid.
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not covered by the Harter Act in the New York federal and
state courts. It started in a case 26 where the British White
Star Line contracted with American excursionists who were
represented by a tourist agency in Boston for passage from
Montreal to Liverpool. The contract expressly referred to
English law and required the passengers in case of injury to
give notice to the company within three days after landing.
On the journey to England, a school teacher from Indiana
was grievously hurt by inexcusable negligence of a steward
and, after landing, was brought from the ship's hospital to a
hospital in Liverpool where she had to stay for months. To
the claim for £so,ooo damages, the line defended on the
ground of omission of notice. The New York court, comparing the American law which would grant a reasonable
time for giving such notice 27 with English law allowing a
shorter time to be fixed, found the former applicable by public
policy against the expressed intention of the parties. The
argument, in the words of Judge Rogers was that "the contract of exemption, being made in the United States, was void
by the law of the place where it was made." Hence, even a
Canadian travelling from Canada to England, would be protected by American law, if he contracts through an American
agency. This extension of public policy, in the clothes of lex
loci contractus, has been authoritatively criticized as extravagant.128 Evidently, reasons of fairness prompted the result
which the court seemingly felt unable to sustain otherwise,
viz., by a restrictive construction of the clause. It would make
126
Oceanic 'Steam Navigation Co. v. Corcoran (C. C. A. 2d 1925) 9 F.
(2d) 724.
127
The Kensington (1901) 183 U.S. 263.
128
CooK, Legal Bases 4o8; see also Notes, 35 Yale L. J. (1926) 997; 10
Minn. L. Rev. (1926) 530. To the contrary, RoBINSON, Admiralty 559 asserts
that the contract would be void under the federal statute of June 5, 1936,
c. 521 § 2, 46 U. S. C. § 183 c; but since this statute is also limited to vessels from and to ports of the United States, I cannot see the basis of this assertion.
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sense to dispense with formal notice of claim to the ship company in the case of a passenger treated by the ship's physician
and brought ashore on a stretcher to a hospital by the crew.
But also the recent federal legislation maintains formality in
this respect.
However, the New York Court of Appeals has continued
its way. In 1930 Judge Learned Hand in a dictum confirmed
that the lex loci contractus governs a contract of carriage even
though the parties expressly stipulate for another law. 129 In
another case130 dealing with no personal injury at all, but involving a cargo of silk, the shipowner was declared liable for
loss from theft, despite a stipulation to the contrary and submission to British law in the bill of Jading, and although the
bill was issued in Shanghai, British Crown Colony, for carriage to Vancouver, British Columbia, and the theft in question occurred on this stage of the voyage. The only contacts
with the forum were the facts that the bill of lading covered
also the railroad transportation from Vancouver to New York
and that the destination was a firm in New York. The court
knew that no federal policy applied; it developed state policy
of an intransigent character. Further, the exemption clause in
a passenger transportation by airplane was invalidated under
New York law because of booking and beginning of the transport at the airport of Albany, New York. 131 A federal district
court in New York has finally concluded that release of a
common carrier from liability for his own negligence is held
illegal and void in New York, evidently under all circumstances.132 In this case, indeed, the passenger's ticket was is12
n Louis-Dreyfus et al. v. Paterson Steamships, Ltd. (I93o) 43 F. (zd) 82.4,
826.
13 F. A. Straus & Co., Inc. v. Canadian Pacific R. Co. (I93o) 254- N.Y. 4-07,
173 N. E. 564; criticized in Notes, 31 Col. L. Rev. (I93x) 495; 79 U. of Pa. L.
Rev. (193I) 635.
131 Conklin v. Canadian-Colonial Airways, Inc. (I 935) z66 N. Y. 244-, I 94N. E. 692.
132 Barndt v. Det Bergenske Dampskibsselskab, The Venus (1938) 28 F.
Supp. 815, 1939 Am. Marit. Cas. 1564.
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sued in the state, but the journey was to be made between
Bergen, Norway, and Newcastle, England, and Norwegian
law was stipulated. That the court, in addition, resorted to
admiralty law, supposedly overruling the stipulation for another law, is another ground for astonishment.
It is difficult to reconcile this chain of cases with otherwise
established rules. It approaches rather closely such fighting
radicalism as is shown in the Italian Aviation Law, of August
20, 1923, declaring all clauses of exemption void irrespective
of the law governing the contract. Opposing doctrines prevail. For instance, the Dutch Supreme Court has recognized
an exemption clause regarding an air flight of a Dutchman
from the airport in Bangkok on a plane of the Royal Dutch
33
Aviation, valid under Siamese law but contrary to Dutch/
the Canadian courts conceive that prohibitions of waiver of
liability by the Railway Act of Canada are inapplicable so
soon as the transport leaves the Canadian border, 134 and so
forth.
Extraterritorial effect. The Harter Act has been regularly
applied abroad, if the contract of affreightment was considered governed by American law or when reference to it
was inserted by the very wide use of an appropriated clause. 135
In the latter case only, restrictions to its application may re133 The Netherlands: H. R. (March IS, I938) W. I939 No. 69 with a
critical note by Meyers approving of the decision on other grounds.
134 Ontario: McDonald v. Grand Trunk R. Co. ( 1896) 3 I 0. R. 663.
135
England: Dobell & Co. v. Rossmore S. S. Co. [I 895] 2 Q. B. 408 (C. A.) ;
Rowson v. Atlantic Transport Co. [1903] 2 K. B. 666 (C. A.).
Canada: Jas. Richardson & Sons v. The Burlington [1931] S. C. R. 76:
American ship from American port to Canadian port, with a clause of exemption held to be visibly inspired by the Harter Act.
Argentina: Pratt y Cia. v. Munson Steamship Line (Cam. Fed., Oct. zo,
I922) 9 Jur. Arg. 523 and other decisions, cited and criticized because of
wrong application of the Act, by DE LAS VEGAS, Note, 75 Jur. Arg. (1941)
233> 2J4.
France: App. Rouen (July 31, I895) Clunet 1895, Io88; Cass. (civ.)
(Dec. 5, 191o) S.19I I.I.I29, Clunet I912, 1156, Revue I9I I, 395 (express
stipulation for American law recognized although with restriction by exemption clause); Cass. (req.) (Nov. 12, r9I8) S.I920.1.29 with note listing many
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sult from added clauses. of exemptions, earlier discussed. 136
The same treatment has been given to the Australian Act
of I904 137 and the Dutch Maritime Law. 138
International needs. In such important international matters as the Hague Rules, a normal international situation
would be guaranteed, if the peculiar public policy of each
state were limited to certain cases. For example, in the
majority of countries prohibitions on exemptions in
maritime affreightment are imperatively imposed only on
vessels loading the goods in a port of the prohibiting country,
or, as it is usually put, issuing the bill of lading in such a
port. Economically or politically justifiable extensions such
as the American application of the domestic law to vessels
arriving in American ports, are at least neat enough to be
taken account of in contracts. A vessel travelling from Pernambuco to New York may adjust its bills of lading to both
laws. But such practice as that of the New York courts is
exorbitant when it insists on protecting all residents, or all
persons booking in the state, wherever the journey begins
other cases. See also on the clause: "weight unknown," RIPERT, 2 Droit Marit.
735 § 1782.
Germany: OLG. Hamburg in 20 Hans. GZ. (1899) HBI. 122; 26 id.
(r9o5) HBI. 227, 27o; 28 id. (1907) HBI. 244; cf. RG. (Sept. 24, 193o)
Hans. RGZ. 1930 B 707.
The contract being considered governed by German law, the Harter Act was
rejected: RG. (May 25, 1889) 25 RGZ. 104, 107.
Egypt: App. Mixte Alexandria (Jan. 25, 1939) 40 Revue Dor (1939) 231
(goods shipped from San Francisco; insurance clause invalid under Harter
Act).
136
Supra pp. 3 8 8 ff.
137
Germany: OLG. Hamburg (March 17, 1913) 24 Hans. GZ. (1913)
HB!. 157 No. 74, aff'd, RG. (Jan. 28, 1914) Hans. GZ. (1914) HBI. 108
No. 52.
The Netherlands: Rb. Rotterdam (Dec. 15, 1926) W. 12048, 21 Revue Dar
447 (Australian Act of 1904 declared to have been agreed upon with force
against the special clauses for exemption!).
138
England: The Roberta [1937] 58 Ll. L. Rep. 159; [1938] 6o id. 84
(implicitly).
Germany: OLG. Hamburg (Feb. u, 1936) Hans. RGZ. (1936) B 243
No. 76.
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and ends. If other countries were to reciprocate this claim,
there would be chaos again. On the other hand, the English courts are generally believed to be too much inclined
to accept a reference to English law, irrespective of geography. The Vita Food's case has given new force to this reputation inasmuch as an exemption under English law prevailed in the court, although the vessel departed from Newfoundland to the United States. However, in this case the
material point was simply whether the omission of the
"clause paramount" nullified the bill of lading-which question was negatived primarily under English and, more cautiously, under Newfoundland law-whereas the exemption
clause itself was as good under the Hague Rules adopted in
Newfoundland as under those adopted in England. Hence,
at least, the Privy Council did not detract from the internationally acquired ground of the Hague Rules. These are
the painfully won result of long negotiations among shipowners, a:ffreighters, maritime agents, exporters, and insurers of the greater part of the world. The compromise
was so delicate that the legal experts at the Brussels Conference did not dare to reform the naYve drafting, and that
opposition is still flaring in some quarters. It would be
irresponsible for any court even of countries not participating in the Convention to jeopardize its operation by a
unilateral public policy applied to vessels on foreign voyages. The more so should courts of member states recognize
the prohibitions prevailing at the place where the bill of
lading is issued irrespective of the distinction whether the
Hague Rules are adopted at this place by ratification or
only by independent enactment.139
Similar considerations may come to the rescue of the much
criticised decision of the English Court of Appeals in The
139 Such a distinction is made, however, by KNAUTH, The American Law of
Ocean Bills of Lading (ed. 2, 1941) r2o probably on the ground of a literal
interpretation of art. r o of the Brussels Convention.
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T orni. The vessel carried oranges from Jaffa in Palestine
to Hull in England. The Palestine Ordinance, which had
adopted the Hague Rules was concerned with bills of lading issued in Palestine, while the analogous British statute
was confined to bills of lading issued in Britain. By stipulating for English law, the bill of lading issued in Palestine
consequently would have allowed clauses of exemption prohibited by the Hague Rules, despite both laws adopting
them. The court acted wisely in depriving this stipulation of
such force. The technical arguments of the judges, it is
true, are easily challenged. The presumptive intention of
the parties was a weak support; general recognition of any
illegality provided by the lex loci contractus is untenable;
and a bill of lading is not void, without an express and inadvisable legal sanction, solely because the "paramount"
clause is omitted. But regard for the law of a friendly nation may very well prevail precisely in this subject.

IV.

CoNCLUSIONS

Contrary to many assertions, the leading conflicts laws
do not recognize any imperative rules governing a priori
(supra I, r). Equally, the often repeated general postulate
that the parties can select a law only if it has a substantial
connection with the contract, has proved a fallacious idea
(supra I, 3). It is true, the use of this idea in more recent
American usury cases has produced a unique and specially
elaborated compromise among the regulations of interest on
loans in the various sister states (supra II, I). This may well
serve as a model to solve other particular conflicts, restricting rather than freely allowing the public policy of the forum
in its opposition to a stipulated foreign law. However, a
general rule confining the choice of law by the parties to a
certain number of legislations is impracticable; the transfer
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of the American interstate policy in usury cases into the field
of international commerce would be disastrous.
In a somewhat different manner, also the American cases
concerned with insurance contracts testify to a struggle between the clauses for application of foreign law and public
policy of the forum. Here, outstanding local interests in protecting citizens and supervising intrastate business have found
a basis in the constitutional decisions of the Supreme Court
(supra II, 2). The last word has not been spoken, however,
and general inferences drawn from this delicate subject would
be highly adventurous.
The important topic of exemptions from liability shows
another similar strife (supra III). If it is borne in mind
that any resort to domestic prohibitions must be justified by
stringent public policy claiming to dominate the contract,
courts will refrain from imposing the policy of their states
upon prevailingly foreign relations. On the other hand, international commerce should be restricted as well as protected by common compromise rather than one-sided dictates.
Excluding the dubious exception of public policy> there
is only one tangible leading idea emerging from the manifold confused attempts to restrict party autonomy. This is
the desire to obviate evasion of law. But we have found
merely one situation in which in the universal opinion a
law is not permitted to be avoided, that is, when a contract
by all (not only by some) substantial connections belongs
to one sole jurisdiction and, thus, is devoid of all considerable foreign elements. The claim of any state exclusively to
govern contracts entirely radicated in its territory is well
enough founded to justify its recognition by all other states.
While in the case just mentioned the parties are precluded from selecting a foreign law against imperative domestic rules on an objective basis, the theory of fraus legi
facta disapproves always and only the evident purpose of
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evasion in an agreement. The French and also some American courts are inclined to favor this idea. It is well known
how difficult is the proof that the main purpose of an obligatory agreement was intentionally to avoid the application of
a law. On the other hand, what may be regarded as evasion
from the angle of one country, may be recognized elsewhere
as legitimate resort to another law, particularly in the state
whose law is adopted. If a contract has more than one territorial connection, there is no reasonable background for its
compulsory attribution to one state just because this state is
hostile to the contract and the parties feared frustration by its
law.
The entire problem, therefore, reduces itself to two questions involving contracts with multiple local connections.
First, what is the public policy on the ground of which
courts may react against the choice of a foreign law?
Second, under what conditions should the overriding
policy of one state be recognized by the others?
While public policy as a unilateral means of barring the
play of conflicts rules is an old subject of discussion, the
mutual respect for internationally significant policies is in
its very first development.
Deferring both questions to the following chapters, we
may conclude by urging that party autonomy should not be
wantonly discarded for the sake of local policies. A minimum
requirement for any court should be a solicitous analysis of
the extraterritorial value of state policy in relation to interstate and international needs. Never should it be forgotten
that party autonomy is the least dangerous method of bringing certainty into the agitated problems of international
private law, and thus, helps to produce that "swift and
certain rule" 141 so important to merchants.
141 Celebrated words, see the citations by HIRAM THOMAS, "The Federal Sales
Bill etc.," in z6 Va. L. Rev. (1940) 542.
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Rules 1n Absence of Party Agreement
A.

JuDICIAL CHOICE oF LAw

I. INDIVIDUALIZED CHOICE OF LAW

1.

Presumed Intention of the Parties

ACCORDlNG to their basic proper law theory, English

fi

courts, in the absence of an agreement of the parties,
will analyze the stipulations and circumstances of a
contract, to ascertain the law the parties had "in mind," "in
view," "in contemplation," "upon which they acted." This
method taken at its face value presupposes that there was a
certain law in the background of the negotiations, although
the parties did not even tacitly adopt it. Such things happen.
When, for instance, an irrevocable power of attorney was
declared to be granted in a document executed in New Y ark,
by a resident to another resident, for the purpose of cashing
the debt of a German debtor, the natural assumption was
that New York law should determine whether the power
could be revoked, although as a rule authority of an agent is
governed by the law of the place where he acts. 1 The intention presumed here is implied rather than merely supposed
and may be closely associated to the cases of agreement by
conduct. 2
Usually, however, the parties do not even realize that
there may be a question of the applicable law. In this vast
majority of cases, the task of the courts is more adequately
defined by the question which law the parties probably would
1 German RG. (Oct. 24, 1892) 30 RGZ. 122; see RABEL, 7 Z.ausl.PR.

(I 934) 807.
2

Cf. loan debentures of New York banks, see
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have chosen if they had been conscious of the conflicts problem-their so-called ((hypothetical intention," formulated
as:
"The intention which would have been formed by sensible
persons in the position of X and A if their attention had been
directed to contingencies which escaped their notice" (Dicey) ; 3
"What the parties would have determined in reasonable
and fair consideration of all circumstances" (the German
Reichsgericht); 4
"The law which the parties reasonably could and should
have expected to be applied"; 5 or "the law which the parties
would have declared applicable if they had thought at all
of stipulating on the question" (the Swiss Federal Tribunal) ; 6
The law upon which the parties "might be supposed instinctively to rely," the variant of a judge of the High Court
of Australia, aptly explaining the net result of the English
rule. 7
This has been the usual approach of all European courts
during the last century, and in part until today.
The inquiry of the court, thus postulated, is essentially
concerned with each individual contract. The choice of law
is "a matter of construction of the contract itself, as read by
the light of the subject matter and of the surrounding
circumstances."8 It is true that certain types of circumstances
have acquired traditional weight. The writers have dedi'DICEY 666.
4
RG. (Dec. q, 1929) 126 RGZ. 196, 2o6.
Similarly, the Dutch courts, looking for the law agreeable to the supposed fair intention of the parties, see VAN HASSELT 175.
5
BG. (Sept. 18, 1934) 6o BGE. II 294, 300; see also (Dec. q, l9JZ) 58
BGE. II at 435 citing previous cases; (June 19, 1935) 61 BGE. II at 182.
6
BG. (March 2, 1937) 63 BGE. II 42, 43; (May 26, 1936) 62 BGE. II
140, 142 and cited precedents.
7
McClelland v. Trustees Executors and Agency Co., Ltd. (1936) per Dixon,
J., 55 Commw. L. R. 483, 493; 42 The Argus Law Reports 405, 409.
8
Bowen, ]., in Jacobs, Marcus & Co. v. The Credit Lyonnais (x884) u
Q. B. D. 589, 6oo.
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cated great care to gathering and analyzing these "indicia" of
the supposed will, and to classifying their significance. Most
elaborate is the list recently given by Batiffol with regard to
the United States, England, France, and Germany. 9 The
criteria include domicil and, in Europe, the nationality of any
party; the situation of an immovable or enterprise; the currency of a money debt; use of a standard form or a public office; the language; reference to a law or terms of a legal
system; the domicil of the party w-ho had the contract or
form drafted; the situation of collateral guarantees; submission to arbitration or jurisdiction (where this is not considered equivalent to an express agreement); the conduct of
the parties after contracting and in pleading. None of these
single instances is conclusive by itself/ 0 and there is in reality no effective difference of rank among them; any one
may prove decisive.
Instead of going into the debatable details of the list, we
may illustrate the method by the arguments of outstanding
courts in a few cases representing what has been called accumulation of contact points.n
The Supreme Court of the United States in a case deemed
to be fundamental, considered the facts of a carrier's contract
as follows: "The bill of lading for the bacon and hams was
made and dated at New York, and signed by the ship's agent
there. It acknowledges that the goods have been shipped 'in
and upon the steamship called Montana, now lying in the
port of New York and bound for the port of Liverpool,' and
are to be delivered at Liverpool. It contains no indication
that the owners of the steamship are English, or that their
principal place of business is in England, rather than in this
country. On the contrary, the only description of the line
of steamships, or of the place of business of their owners,
is in a memorandum in the margin, as follows: 'Guion Line.
9 BATIFFOL 69-154.
DICEY 648 n. (f).
11 HARPER and T AI NTOR,

10

Cases r 7 5.
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United States Mail Steamers. New York: 29 Broadway.
Liverpool: I I Rumford St.' No distinction is made between
the places of business at New York and at Liverpool, except
that the former is named first. The reservation of liberty,
in case of an interruption of the voyage, 'to tranship the goods
by any other steamer,' would permit transhipment into a
vessel of any other line, English or American. And general
average is to be computed, not by any local law or usage,
but 'according to Y ark-Antwerp rules,' which are the rules
drawn up in I864 at York in England, and adopted in I877
at Antwerp in Belgium, at international conferences of representatives of the more important mercantile associations of
the United States, as well as of the maritime countries of
Europe. Lowndes on General Average (3d ed.) Appendix Q.
"The contract being made at New York, the ship-owner
having a place of business there, and the shipper being an
American, both parties must be presumed to have submitted
themselves to the law there prevailing, and to have agreed
to its action upon their contract. The contract is a single one,
and its principal object, the transportation of the goods, is
one continuous act, to begin in the port of New York, to be
chiefly performed on the high seas, and to end at the port
of Liverpool. The facts that the goods are to be delivered
at Liverpool, and the freight and primage, therefore, payable
there in sterling currency, do not make the contract an
English contract, or refer to the English law the question
of the liability of the carrier for the negligence of the master
and crew in the course of the voyage.m 2
High Court, Chancery Division, South African Breweries,
Ltd. v. King [I899] 2 Ch. I73, rn, per Kekewich, J. The
contract of employment was executed and intended, though
not exclusively, to be performed in the South African Republic. "That, however, is not all. Many other considerations
require attention." The defendant, an Englishman, had been
and was residing in Johannesburg, and intended it to be his
place of business, and therefore of residence. The successive
12
Liverpool and Great Western Steam Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co. (t888) 129
U.S. 397, 458; see also Pritchard v. Norton (t88z) 106 U.S. 124; Grand v.
Livingston (1896) 38 N. Y. Supp. 490, aff'd (1899) 158 N. Y. 688, 53
N. E. I 125.
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employers of the defendant were English companies, resident
in England. Nevertheless, "it is not according to sound ideas
of business, convenience, or sense to say that a company
having a registered office with directors and secretary in
England, not, however, otherwise carrying on business here,
but carrying on business in South Africa, must be treated
as resident in England for the purpose of ascertaining whether
a contract entered into by them respecting their business in
South Africa was intended to be governed by English law or
the local law of that part of South Africa .... The stipulation
in question (restricting the defendant's business engagements
on the termination of the contract) has reference to South
Africa and not to England, where the defendant is free to
carry on business as he pleases. . . . This contract was not
intended to be governed and is not governed by English
law." Affirmed (I900] I Ch. 273, 275, per Lindley, M.R.:
It is doubtful whether the defendant had to act as brewer
and conduct his business in Natal or elsewhere in South
Africa besides Johannesburg. "However, be that as it may,
Johannesburg is the primary place to which this contract
refers .... That being so, and having regard to the fact that
the defendant was settled there at the time and that this
contract was entered into between him at Johannesburg and
the company's representative at Johannesburg, I think that
clause 8 (the stipulation in question) cannot possibly be
independent of the Transvaal Law."
German Supreme Court (October 29, I 92 7) I I 8 RGZ.
282, IPRspr. I928 No. 6o. The author of a play, the composer of the music and the writer of the stage direction,
all conveyed their copyrights to an editor in Stuttgart, Germany. All three at the time of the contract clearly were
domiciled in Vienna, where they had also to perform their
own contractual obligations according to the purpose and
nature of the latter, and all arising legal disputes had to be
decided by the Viennese court. But the documents of the
contract showed only Stuttgart as the place of making, which
was also the domicil of the publisher, and the only place
of his performance. The royalties due to the authors are
all expressed in German currency. It is of particular weight
that in the present lawsuit both parties from the outset,
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without expressing any doubt, invoked German law and
presently discussed the provisions of the German law on
literary property. Pondering these grounds of doubt results
in the assumption that the application of German law agrees
with the presumable intention of the parties to the contract;
it would be, in addition, the appropriate choice of law, if
the arguments pro and contra completely balanced each
other. 13
Swiss Federal Tribunal (September 23, 1941) 67 BGE.
II 215. By an agreement with a New York bank, heading
a New York syndicate, the defendant Hungarian bank guaranteed that a certain credit granted by the syndicate to a
firm in Budapest would be repaid. The Federal Tribunal
declared the law of New York to be exclusively applicable,
on the following argument. As the Hungarian bank received
a commission, no emphasis is to be placed on the domicil
of the promisor as would be done in case of a surety. By
assuming a share in the risk of the transaction, the defendant
entered into close association with the New York syndicate.
The presumption is strong that the parties, and particularly
the bank leading the syndicate, intended to subject all internal relations to one uniform law rather than to the different
laws of the various domicils of the participant firms. Such
a consideration must have seemed only natural to the defendant, an expert participant in international credit business.
Furthermore, the contract of guaranty is written in English.
The place of performance for the defendant's obligation
is New York, since the debtor had to pay in New York,
and so had the guarantor. Finally the money sums, throughout the transaction, are expressed in United States dollars. 14
Courts in most other countries use the same method. 15
13
See also e.g., 68 RGZ. 205; 73 id. 388; 120 id. 72; 126 id. 206. The
individual decision in I I 8 RGZ. 282 has been criticized by 2 FRANKENSTEIN
I 76 n. I 79, and BATIFFOL I 8 3 n. 2.
14
See also 6I BGE. II I 82.
15
See for Belgium: App. Liege (June 21, I9o5) S.I9o7·4.2I, 23.
France: Cass. (civ.) (Dec. 5, 19IO) S.I9II.I.I29> Clunet I9I2> II56;
(May 3I, I9J2) D.1933·I.169; (May I5, 1935) Nouv. Revue I935> 34I;
Cass. (req.) (Nov. 2, 1937) Nouv. Revue I937, 766.
The Netherlands: Kg. Amsterdam (Oct. I9, I9I5) W. 9937; Hof den Haag
(Dec. Io, I92o) N.J. (I92I) 1089.
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2.

"Objective" Theory

In most contracts, there is no agreement of the parties on
choice of law. Insofar, in fact, "intention is a misnomer.))1'6
As the Supreme Court of Minnesota, which has repeatedly
professed its inclination to follow the law intended by the
parties/ 7 has stated:
"In a search for the actual intent of the parties when
none is expressed, there is an element of legal jugglery.
Usually parties to transactions ... , referable to one state
or another, or in part to one state and in part to another,
have no unexpressed but actual intent as to the law which
shall control. The question of what law governs does not
suggest itself to them.ms
What courts in reality look for, is a suitable local connection of the contract with a country. Presumed intention is no
actual intention. Westlake has contributed much to this view
by advocating that a contract should be governed by the law
with which it has the most real connection. 19 However, the
contrast between this objective and the subjective method
should not be exaggerated. Also, the inquiry required by both
opinions follows strikingly similar methods, though the objective approach does not purport to read the minds of the
parties on "contingencies which escaped their notice," 20 but
seeks the law suitable to their stipulations. The above examples of reasoning may be read without any substantial
change also in this sense.
The German Reichsgericht has sometimes consciously
lent the "objective" approach its proper color by using the
16

STUMBERG 2 I I n. 49·
Thomson-Houston Electric Co. v. Palmer (I893) 52 Minn. 174, 53 N.
W. I1J7; cf. McCLINTOCK, 10 Minn. L. Rev. (1926) 498 at 503.
18
Green v. Northwestern Trust Co. (I9I4) Iz8 Minn. 30, 36, I 5o N. W.
229, 2JI.
17

19 WESTLAKE § 2 I 2.
20 DICEY 666.
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term familiar to German jurisprudence, "suppletive construction" of the contract, which is approximately the same
as the method of implying stipulations. 21 While pure "interpretation" attempts to discover the true meaning of an
existing declaration, constructive analysis may add by implication to an incomplete declaration what the parties would
or should have agreed, being honest and prudent people, or
what an ordinarily prudent man would have declared upon
reasonable and fair consideration of all circumstances.
3· Rationale
Although at present the literature seems to prefer the
"objective" approach, a distinguished author22 defends the
subjective formulation because of its suggestive power; it.
reminds the judge that he should distinctly envisage the two
concrete persons at the time of contracting. No doubt also
American courts by visualizing the parties and their situation, are aided in the effort to overcome stereotyped rules
such as that of the lex loci contractus. Other writers, however,
have pointed to the danger of judges disregarding, in a
strained search for individual mentalities, the type of the
contract so important in the eyes of businessmen.23
We may set aside such imponderables and also disregard
positive legal complications, such as those occurring when in
Germany the Supreme Court reviews a statement by the
lower court of an objective rule but not of a presumed intention because the latter is a mere fact. 24
What it means that the parties "contemplated" a certain
law in making the contract, should not be difficult to under21
RG. (July 5, 1910) 74 RGZ. 171, 174. Suppletive construction of a contract should serve to fill a gap in the contract, not to enlarge the scope of the
contract, 87 RGZ. 2 r r; 136 id. 176, 185; r6o id. 187.
22 M. WOLFF, IPR. 89. See also HAUDEK ro6.
23 RAAPE, D. IPR. 258.
24 RG. {Jan. 27, 1928) 120

RGZ. 71, 73;
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stand, as parallels are numerous. Anglo-American common
law makes the seller of goods liable for "special" damage
caused by his failure to perform, to the extent that the parties
"contemplated" or could foresee the circumstances causing
the damage. The seller has to compensate the buyer's loss of
gain by resale, if resale was contemplated in contracting, that
is, if both parties would have affirmed this liability, had they
been asked during negotiations. The pertinent question in
such a case is whether, at the time of the making of the contract, it must have been in the contemplation of the parties
that the goods contracted for might be25 resold by the buyer.
To this method of inquiry, it has been objected that parties
making a contract think of performance rather than of breach
of contract. To this the celebrated author of the British Sales
of Goods Act replied:
"But the answer is this. The liability to pay damages for
breach of contract is an obligation annexed by law independently of the volition of the parties, and the criterion
is necessarily an objective one. What the parties themselves
may have contemplated is immaterial. The question is what
a reasonable man with their common knowledge would
contemplate as a probable consequence of the breach if he
applied his mind to it. The same result will be arrived
at if the supposed contemplation of the parties be wholly
eliminated. " 26
This is practically identical with the provision in the Restatement of the Law of Contracts:
"In awarding damages, compensation is given for only
those injuries that the defendant had reason to foresee as a
probable result of his breach when the contract is made .... " 27
Indeed, the Restaters, very accurately, have pointed out
25 Hall, Ltd. v. Pim Jr. and Co., Ltd. (1927) 33 Com. Cas. 324-H. L.
2
~ CHALMERs, The Sale of Goods Act, 1893, s. 54·
27
§ 330. See Mr. Justice Holmes in Globe Refining Co. v. Landa Cotton
Oil Co. (1902) 190 U. 'S. 54o, 543·
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that the requirement of foreseeability does not really depend on a previous consideration of a possible violation of
contract, or on a tacit promise of compensation for it, but on
the construction of the contract. 28 In this purified form, the
common law principle is able to become the basis of a satisfactory general theory deriving the obligations of the parties
from the purpose of the contract. 29
In the same manner, the judicial standard for selecting
the law is that of a man of average intelligence and knowledge such as is required in the profession or commerce of
either party, who weighs the relative importance of all surrounding circumstances and the stipulations adopted.
The usual formula may mislead a judge into substituting
the purpose of one party for the purpose of the contract. Or
the inquiry into the probable inten'tion of the parties may
fail because each party is supposed to have differently conceived of the legal background. Frequently, in our day, one
party prevails and drafts the contract or dictates the use of a
blank. The Continental doctrine realistically concludes that
the law at the domicil of this dominant contractant may be
deemed to be chosen. Courts in this country are instinctively
reluctant to increase his predominance by favoring his law.
The latter view rests on considerations of public policy alien
to our present problem; but, similarly, if a court applies the
law of a carrier, bank, or mail-order house rather than that
of the customer, this choice of law does not depend on any
contemplation of the individual parties, but on the social and
economic circumstances.
Another dubious feature in the traditional approach is
the emphasis laid on too many "criteria" or "indicia." The
judge is induced to consider a mass of irrelevant detailswhat bearing, after all, has the use of English language in
28

29

Restatement, Law of Contracts§ 510.
RABEL, 1 Das Recht des Warenkaufs 484, 495:ff.
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a contract written in New York? He is beset by unnecessary
doubts and tempted to weigh mechanically the various elements, rather than to ascertain the most characteristic local
contact.
Conclusion. In conclusion, the task of the court is this: it
has, in the absence of an agreement, first, to state whether
the individual facts of the contract are colored by a certain
law; if not, second, whether the contract belongs to a class
typically centering in a certain country. This inquiry has to
be done in full consideration of the circumstances personal
and economical, but without inferring judicial or state polictes.
II. GENERAL RULES

Prima Facie Rules

1.

The English proper law theory has developed certain
presumptions or prima facie rules, ordinarily in former times
in favor of the lex loci contractus, and in specific types of
cases in favor of the lex loci solutionis, or the law of the flag,
or the "most effective" law. 80 Similar methods prevail on
the Continent in case investigation into the circumstances
fails to reveal a presumable intention. In France and many
other countries, the presumption for the law of the place
where the contract is made, continues stronger than in England. In Germany and numerous other jurisdictions, following Savigny, the parties are presumed to have in view the
law of the place of performance. In some countries, the fact
that the parties have a common nationality or domicil constitutes a presumption prevailing over all others. 31
The "presumption" in all these cases is meant as a guide
for the judge, as a starting point and a subsidiary help. The

° CHESHIRE 259-269.

3

31

Poland: Int. Priv. Law, art. 9 (common domicil).
C6digo Bustamante, art. I 86.
Costa Rica: C. C. art. 7 par. I (common nationality).
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court may or may not resort to it. The Wisconsin Supreme
Court has once, facing an inflexible conception of lex loci
solutionis, declared that the presumption is rebuttable
through clear, though not necessarily direct, evidence to the
contrary. 32 But the danger is great that the easy way of the
presumption may be followed in neglect of the purpose of
the individual contract. As a matter of fact, in many jurisdictions the presumption has slowly turned into a rigid,
though merely subsidiary, rule.
It is wise, therefore, always to remember how artificial
all these presumptions are. As Lord Wright has recalled for
English law:
"English law in deciding these mattet:s has refused to treat
as conclusive rigid or arbitrary criteria such as lex loci contractus or lex loci solutionis and has treated the matter as
depending on the intention of the parties to be ascertained
in each case on a consideration of the terms of the contract,
the situation of the parties and generally on all the surrounding facts.m 3
2.

Rigid General Rules

Rigid general rules have developed, as by transformation
from original presumptions, also in the absence of an ascertainable intention, or when party autonomy was entirely repudiated. The most pronounced instance of all-inclusive general rules without any regard to party intentions appears in
the Restatement. 34 The same system may also be regarded as
dominant in the Scandinavian countries35 and most LatinAmerican jurisdictions.36
32
D. Canale & Co. v. Pauly & Pauly Cheese Co. (1914) 155 Wis. 54'' 544,
'45 N. W. 372., 373·
33
Mount Albert Borough Council v. Australasian Temperance and General
Mutual Life Assurance Society, Ltd. [I 9 3 8] A. C. 2.2.4, 2.40.
34
35

§§ 332., 333·

Sweden; 7 Repert. 136 No. 105.
Norway; 6 Repert. 578 No. 147·
36
See supra pp. 3 7off.

442

CONTRACTS IN GENERAL

Such rigidity deprives the courts of the flexibility enjoyed
by American courts under the proper law theory, when they
want to escape an inherited lex loci contractus, and by German courts, when feeling the need of a corrective to the
lex loci solutionis.
3· "No Rule"
In opposition to the mechanical working of conflicts rules
purporting to include all obligatory contracts, a few writers
have proclaimed that no fixed principle should govern contracts in general. 37 It has been replied that this proposal itself contains a general principle/ 8 viz., that of an individualized choice of law. 39 This principle comes near in effect to the
English doctrine of proper law, which avoids tying a court
"down to any rigid presumption." 40
4· The Most Characteristic Connection
Looking back on the tortuous development of doctrine, we
see distinctly that Savigny's main principle, in the form given
to it by Westlake and modernized again in our times, has
gained supremacy. The Swiss Federal Tribunal, improving
its older formulas, has formally declared that the effects of
contracts should be governed by the law having the closest
local relation with the contract. 41 In the frequent case of several substantial or even vital local connections of a contract,
the degree of proximity may be hard to analyze. But it should
always be possible to discover the most characteristic connection of an individual contract and, certainly, that of the usual
types of business contracts.
37 See Draft, RocuiN, Actes de la 3eme Conference de la Haye ( 19oo) 62
art. 5 par. 3; JrrrA, 2. La substance des obligations (1907) 509, 515.
38
NOLDE, 32 Annuaire (1925) n9.
39 See among others, 2 BAR 23; RoLIN, 32 Annuaire (1925) 96, 117, 513;
LEWALD 197 No. 257; NussBAUM, D. IPR. 221, 226; BATIFFOL 73 § So;
RAAPE, D. IPR. 263.
40
Words of DICEY 962.
41 BGE.: 6o II 3oo; 63 II 385; 67 II 179, 181 ("constant practice").
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This, in the opinion of the writer, is the direction in which
all efforts ought to be concentrated.
We are now prepared to survey the main contacts selected either on the strength of a presumption or in virtue of
a specific rule. That their importance as general devices is
entirely questionable, is a foregone conclusion from the preceding discussion. The particulars, however, are significant.

B.

CoNTACTS

I. HISTORICAL NOTE

The statutists, in the manner of their time, exploited a
few fragments of Justinianus' Digest. The "lex contraxisse''
was the text most frequently cited:D. 44, 7, 2r, Julianus I. III. ad Minicium. Contraxisse
unus quisque in eo loco intellegitur, in quo ut solveret se
obligavit. This is commonly understood as meaning: every
one is deemed to have contracted at the place where he
should perform according to his promise (and not: where
he promised the performance).
The jurist did not speak of the applicable law but probably,
as other passages do, of jurisdiction in the case of bankruptcy
proceedings which were alternatively at the domicil of the
debtor or at the place where he had failed to satisfy the
creditor. 42 Whether generally a creditor was entitled to sue in
contract at the forum solutionis, as is commonly believed/3
seems not certain.
Another basic text of the statutists, the "lex si fundus,' 144
42
See LENEL, Palingenesia Juris Romani, sub: J ulianus 8 62; Dig. 42, 5,
and 3 (Gaius 23 ad ed. prov.); Gaius Inst. 3, 79· Other texts are mentioned
by SAVIGNY 211 § 370 n. (c); LENEL, 27 Zeitschrift der Savigny Stiftung,
Romanistische Abteilung (19o6) 74·
43
BETHMANN-HOLLWEG, 2 Zivilprozess (1865) n6ff.; L. WENGER, lnstitutionen des Romischen Zivilprozesses (1925) (Engl. trans!. (1940) Institutes
of the Roman Law of Civil Procedure) § 4 n. 6o.
"Dig. 21, 2, 6 (Gaius 10 ad ed. prov.); cf. Dig. so, 17, 34 (Ulpianus 45
ad Sabin urn).

r
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refers exclusively to the interpretation of a sale of land, and
states that the obligation of warranty is that customary in
the region.
It is interesting to note that the Romans in reality did not
consider the problem and that the confusion clouding the
matter was started by the earlier statutists. 45 Bartolus himself knew of the two kinds of "locus contractus," ever since
in the mind of writers, and understood both fragments mentioned as referring to the place where the promisor has obligated himself, that is, where the contract is made, locus ubi
est celebratus contractus, while locus in quem collata est
solutio, the place of performance, figures in a rule which
he deduced from other passages. To harmonize these conflicting rules, he distinguished the rights deriving from the
contract at its origin (quae oriuntur secundum ipsius contractus naturam tempore contractus), from the effects of subsequent events, such as the consequences of nonperformance
or default (quae oriuntur ex postfacto propter neglegentiam
et moram).
The first were to be governed by the law of the place where
the contract was celebrated; the second by the law of the specific place of performance, because the default occurred there;
or if this place were not specified, by the law of the forum. In
the fifteenth century, Paulus de Castro 46 added a basic argument for the law of the place of contracting:

Quia talis contractus dicitur ibi nasci ubi nascitur, et, sicut
persona ratione originis ligatur a statutis loci originis, ita
et actus.
The law under which a contract is created, is its natural
statute, quite as a person is bound by the law of the place of
his origin!
45 BARTOLus, 1. I C. deS. Trinitate I.I, §§ IJ-I8;
Civ. Prax. (184-2) 4-2; I LAINE 135.
4
" Paul. de Castro ad 1. Si fundus, Dig. 21, 2, 6.

cf.

WAECHTER,

2.5 Arch.

RULES IN ABSENCE OF PARTY AGREEMENT 445
These conceptions were maintained, developed, and modified by subsequent generations of jurists and reappear astonishingly well preserved in the doctrines of Beale.
II. LAW OF THE PLACE OF CONTRACTING
I.

To Govern the Entire Contract

By logical necessity. Canonists as early as about 1200
A.D., and statutists from the fifteenth century, have regarded the law of the place where a contract is "celebrated"
as naturally governing. 47 The variants of this school became
numerous, and Anglo-American conflicts law has experienced
the tenacity of that radical branch of opinion conceiving a
contract "born" in and created by the sovereign of the territory where the parties agree. It is well known that in the
Virginia Convention, when a member asked which state determines a contract, Marshall replied that this was decided
according to the laws of the state where the contract was
made, and those laws only/8 In a celebrated English case of
9
I 86 5/ the rule of lex loci contractus was still based on the
thesis that domiciled persons are subjects of the territorial
compulsory power of the sovereign and temporary residents
also owe him allegiance. For a long time writers of international law have invoked Ulric Huber's deduction from
the principle of territorialism, that the lex loci contractus is
endowed with extraterritorial authority. 50 The axioms of
Dicey and Beale stemmed from the same roots.
47
NEUMEYER, 2 Gemeinrechtliche Entwicklung 84, 135ff.; WAECHTER, 25
Arch. Civ. Prax. ( 1842) 42.
48 ELLIOT, 3 Debates on the Federal Constitution (ed. 2 Philadelphia r866)

ss6.49

Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Co. v. Shand (r86s) 3 Moo.
P. C. Cas. (N. S.) 272, 290.
50
HUBER, De conflictu legum XV, cf. v (in SAVJGNY, tr. Guthrie, srs,
510); see WHEATON, International Law (ed. Carnegie Endowment 1936) us
§ 90; TAYLOR, International Public Law (r9ol) § 170.

CONTRACTS IN GENERAL

By presumed intention. Although, in the doctrine of Dumoulin, Boullenois, and Bouhier, the law of the place of
contracting lost its leading role which was taken by the intention of the parties, the same result still obtained in the
absence of contrary evidence by general presumption.51
At present, the lex loci contractus, as a general rule by
virtue of a rebuttable presumption de facto, continues to apply
in France/2 Belgium,S3 Argentina/ 4 Spain/ 5 and other countries, 58 while the Dutch courts5 7 are as much divided as the
American. It is also sometimes claimed that it remains the primary contact in England, where no other law is intended
or presumed, and this seems true in the Dominions.58 But
it may be doubted whether the law of the place of perform51

See DICEY 885; 2 BEALE I09o:ff.; BATIFFOL 22, 35·
Cass. (civ.) (Dec. 5, I9Io) S.I9I1.I.I29.
53 Trib. com. Anvers (Dec. I5, I904) Revue I907, 97o; Trib. civ. Anvers
(May I4 1 1926) Jur. Port Anvers I926, 132 1 136; PouLLET 372 § 299·
M Argentina: C. C. art. 1205 (1239) regarded as representing the principle,
see 3 VICO 122 § 137; ROMERO DEL PRADO, 2 Manual 343 notes that the
codifier has followed STORY §§ 242 1 28o.
55 Spain: TRiAs DEBEs, 6 Repert. 257 No. 124 par. 2.
56 Denmark: As a limited rule, see BoRUM and MEYER, 6 Repert. 224.
Italy: For civil contracts on the basis of Disp. Pre!. I865, art. 9 § 2: App.
Trieste (Jan. 71 1937) Riv. Dir. Com. 1937 II 547; Disp. Pre!. I942, art.
25, which are probably to be understood to apply a factual presumption.
C6digo Bustamente, art. I86, at least nominally speaks of lex loci contractus,
if the parties are of different nationalities, as a presumption; it seems, however,
that no counterproof is allowed, see art. 184 par. 2, which substitutes the criteria
of art. I 86 for the tacit intention of the parties.
57 The Netherlands: 'See for the cases, VAN HASSELT 176 and Supplement 45·
The attempt by KOSTERS 774 to base the lex loci contractus rule on art. 1382
of the Civil Code prescribing construction of contracts according to the local
customs, has been abandoned by the author himself in Themis I926 1 48o; cf.
E. M. MEIJERS, Note inN.]. (1927) 323·
58 England: CHESHIRE 26I principally alleges Peninsular and Oriental Steam
Navigation Co. v. Shand (I865) 3 Moo. P. C. Cas. (N. S.) per Turner, L. J.,
272, 290 and another case, both of which, however, deal with transportation.
Canada: The principle is confirmed in Bondholders Securities Corp. v. Manville (Sask.) [1933] 4 D. L. R. 699; Comm. Corp. Securities, Ltd. v. Nichols
(Sask.) [1933] 3 D. L. R. 56 (bills and notes); see also 3 JOHNSON 457 n. I
and the Digests.
South Africa: De Wet v. Browning (I930) S. A. L. R. Transvaal Prov.
Div. 409 (sale of land, laesio enormis).
52
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ance has not in fact won precedence in the favor of the English courts. 69
By fixed conflicts rule. On this historical background in
many countries the lex loci contractus has become the law
generally applicable to contracts, either as a subsidiary rule
in the absence of contrary intention of the parties or even
with higher pretensions. The list of codes thus providing is
long.60
That this favor has been so tenaciously granted to a device
of very difficult application, must have been aided by the universal acceptance of the same law to control the formalities
of contracts. In Lorenzen's opinion, the American law has
never adopted that distinction between form and substance in
contracts, by which in the Continental doctrine the old adage,
locus regit actum, was confined to formalities. 61 A modern
59

See RABEL and RAISER, 3 Z.ausl.PR. (I929) 66; BATIFFOL 90 § 99·
Georgia: C. Ann. (I937) § Io2-I08 (8) first sentence.
Austria: C. C.§§ 36, 37 with exceptions.
Belgian Congo: C. C. art. I I par. 2.
Brazil: C. Com. art. 424, replaced by Law No. 2044, of Dec. 3I, I9o8, art.
47; fur bills of exchange, generalized by the doctrine, see BEVILAQUA (ed.
3) 365; C. C. Introd. (I9I6) art. I3 par. I; while Introd. Law (I942) art. 9
is silent, the rule is considered maintained, see EsPINOLA, 8-C Tratado I 8 I I
§§ I48, ISO.
Bulgaria: See MAKAROV, 8 Z.ausl.PR. (I934) 66o.
China: Int. Priv. Law, art. 23 par. x.
Costa Rica: C. C. art. 7 par. x.
French Morocco: Int. Priv. Law, art. I 3 par. 2.
Guatemala: Law of Foreigners of I936, art. 24 sent. x.
Italy: Disp. Pre!. (I86s) art. 9 par. 2; (I942) art. 25; former C. Com.
art. 58.
Japan: Int. Priv. Law, art. 7 par. 2.
Panama: C. Com. art. 6 (I) not altered by C6digo Bustamente in relation to
the United States, see EDER, I5 Tul. L. Rev. (I94I) p i at 524 n. 283.
Peru: C. C. (I936) art. VII.
Poland: Int. Priv. Law, art. 9 Nos. I, 2.
Portugal: C. Com. art. 4 § I.
Quebec: C. C. art. 8.
Soviet Russia: Codes of Civil Procedure, art. 7, cf. STOUPNITSKI, 7 Repert.
I I4 Nos. I 56, I 57; RASHBA, "Settlement of Disputes in Commercial Dealings
with the Soviet Union," 45 Col. L. Rev. (I945) 530, 552.
Spanish Morocco: Int. Priv. Law, art. 20.
61
LoRENZEN, 30 Yale L. J. (1921) 655 at 664.
60
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writer has directly accused the rule prescribing the law of the
place of contracting for all contracts as arising out of a confusion between form and content. 62
The Soviet codes of civil procedure prescribe with very
cautious words that the court should "consider" the law of the
place in a foreign country where contracts and documents
have been made. The more recent Ukranian version is more
categoric on this point. But writers have seen in this hint
not a conflicts rule but an advice that Soviet law is controlling
in every single case. 63
To Govern the Making of Contracts

2.

The old doctrine expressed by Bartolus has produced various theories, splitting the problems of contracts into origin
and subsequent events.64 Story65 and Savigny,S 6 however,
repudiated these efforts by adopting an all-inclusive law of
the contract and in this respect were followed by the great
majority of scholars. Nevertheless, some writers in the nineteenth century returned to the method of dividing contracts
into two parts.67 The formulas were varying, but none was
in precise terms. The leading idea seemed to be that the
local law of the place of contracting should govern the legal
62

RocurN, Actes de la 3eme Conference de la Haye {I goo) 62.
KELMANN, Int. Jahrb. Schiedsger. Wesen (I928) 84 n. 34; MAKAROV,
Precis 299 (slightly more optimistic in assuming resemblance to a conflicts
rule).
64
BuRGUNDUS, Tractatus 4 Nos. 7, Io, 29; BouLLENOIS, Traite de la
personnalite et de la realite des loix (I 766) Vol. II, 45 I; CASAREGIS, Discursus
legales de commercia, Disc. I 79 §§ 56ff. P. VoET, De statutis eorumque
concursu, sect. 9 cap. II No. 12 (SAVIGNY, tr. Guthrie, 490); Prussian Allgemeines Landrecht I, 5 § 256ff.
For refutation: WAECHTER, 25 Arch. Civ. Prax. (1842) 4I; GuTZWILLER
1610.
65
STORY § 28o, as he thought, in conformity with the Roman law.
66
SAVIGNY § 372, tr. Guthrie 225, although his method of treating the Roman
sources is not approved at present.
67
I FOELI:X § 109; VALERY 987 § 685; I FIORE§§ II9, I2I and in 2o
Annuaire (I904) I76; in Spain: MANRESA, I Comentarios Cod. Civ. Esp., art.
II §IX; VALVERDE, I Trat. Der. Civ. (ed. 3) 129; FOELIX's doctrine has
impressed PHILLIMORE, 4 International Law §§ 709ff.
63
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effects naturally arising from, and inherent in, the contract,
or believed to be positively intended by the parties. This reasoning still clung to the belief that these "effects" necessarily
grow out of the local law. These are contrasted with ''suites"
of the contract, i. e., the influence of more remote or unforeseen events, such as acts of God, new legislation, insolvency, illness, impossibility, or any cause of nonperformance,
including the problems of fault, default, and damages as well
as the ratification of a void contract. These ulterior influences on the contract are deemed subject to the law of the
places either where performance was due, or where the
eve'nts occur. Again, this theory has been decisively criticized.
"Consequences, effects, suites: these three words appear
synonymous to us."es But strong remnants of the old bisection are to be found in court decisions and in the teachings
of Minor and Beale. 69 The Restatement, unfortunately, has
solemnly proclaimed this very approach (§ 332).
While American courts, however, pay no more than lip
service to this theory, in Switzerland the original idea has
been fully received by the Federal Tribunal. This court
subjects, by imperative rule, all problems connected with
the creation of contracts to the law of the place where they
are made. 70 The "effects" of the contract are left to the intention of the parties and subsidiarily to the law of the place
of performance. The Swiss literature is divided on this question.71
68
AssER-COHN 46; AssER-RIVIER 8 I § 37 (sometimes erroneously cited as
follower of FOELIX); SURVILLE 355, 357; HARBURGER, I 9 Annuaire (I 902)
137; ROGUIN, id. (I904) 77; ROLIN, id. (I9o6) I99; DESPAGNET 897 § 303;
NOLDE, Revue I 926, 448.
69
MINOR 401; 2 Beale I 199 § 346.1. Contra: see BATIFFOL 69 § 77·
70
Supra pp. 396-397. For the purpose of the special case concerning the
extent of authority of an agent making the contract, the Federal Tribunal
expresses the rule in the form that the conflicts rule of the place of contracting
determines whether the contract is perfected. BG. (Dec. 14, I92o) 4 6 BGE.
II 490, 494·
71
FRITZSCHE, 44 Z. Schweiz. R. (N. F.) (I925) 229a, 245a, 257a;
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Illustration. Where a dye firm in Milan sent an agent
to ZUrich to buy dyes, the Federal Tribunal determined
under Swiss law the question whether the firm or the agent
was the party to the contract, and under Italian law whether
the buyer was entitled to reject the merchandise. 72
It is true that the Supreme Court of the United States once
also, in I 875, pronounced the rule that the formation and
validity of contracts follow the lex loci contractus while matters regarding performance are subject to the lex loci solutionis.73 This leading case has had some following but has
been regularly disregarded by the Supreme Court itself. The
German Reichsgericht has occasionally used arguments of
this kind in case of a mistake made in applications for insurance.74
Impracticability of the division. While the various approaches resulting in bisecting the development of the contract produce somewhat different disadvantages, their common idea is inadequate. A conflicts rule concerned with
validity or formation must include the extent of the obligation created, as Beale has conceded. But there is no consistent dividing line possible between the extent of a contractual obligation and its performance. Both together form
the purpose of the contract and are its very core. Whether an
event making performance impossible or onerous frees the
debtor from his entire duty, or only from paying damages,
or not at all, is determined by the distribution of effort and
risk implied in the contract. 75
SAUSER-HALL, id. 298a, 319a; 0SER-SCHOENENBERGER, Allg. Einleitung LIV

§ 51; SCHNITZER (ed. 2) 522 (strongly disapproving); HANS-WERNER
WIDMER, Die Bestimmung des massgeblichen Rechts irn int. Vertragsrecht
(Zurcher Studien zurn Int. Recht, Heft 9) ( 1944) 102 (disapproving).
72
BG. (March s, 1923) 49 BGE. II 70. See also the proposals by LAPAJNE,
4 Bl. IPR. (1 9 2 9 ) 65.
73
Scudder v. Union National Bank (1875) 91 U.S. 406.
74
RG. (Dec. 4, 1926) JW. 1927, 693; (Dec. 23, 1931) IPRspr. 1932,
61 No. 30.
75
For consequences, see infro pp. 531, 537, 542, 576-577·
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This is true of the civil law systems, in which specific performance is the object not only of the obligation but also of
the judgment in case of breach. It is equally true in common
law, although merely the duty to pay damages for nonperformance is enforced. For it is always the contractual
promise that creates the primary object of the obligation. 76
3. American Law
Surveys covering cases in the United States are unanimous
in stating that validity of contracts is tested in the courts by
varying criteria. 77 In Beale's own statistics of I9IO, only a
minority of six states professed to follow the place of contracting rule. 78 In I 934, he claimed that under the influence
of the Restatement drafts the number of these states had increased to eleven certain and eleven other dubious states/ 9
but these statements have been criticized in several respects. 80
On the basis of recent observations, we ought to be aware of
the fact that the cases in which courts have resorted to this
rule, pertain to at least four groups.
(i) In the majority of the cases, no problem is presented,
particularly when the place of contracting and that of performance, or the former and the domicil of the parties are
situated in the same jurisdiction, and no other connection
competes in significance.81
(ii) In other cases the contract is made in a jurisdiction
where also some other element considered determinative
7
~ See BucKLAND, "The Nature of Contractual Obligation," 8 Cambr. L. J.
(I 944) 24 7, against Holmes.
77
See 2 BEALE I 077; GOODRICH § 107; STUMBERG 2.00-215; RoBERTSON,
Characterization 176; IS C. J. S. Conflict of Laws (1939) §II; I I Am.
Jur. (1937) 397 § xx6.
78
BEALE, 2.3 Harv. L. Rev. (r9ro) 194 at 2.07.
79
2 BEALE I 172. and I I 73 with respect to a doubtful presumption for this
law in New York.
80
See in particular BATIFFOL 87 § 96; NussBAUM,
Yale L. ]. (I942.)
892., 901ff.
81 MUJ;;LLllR, 8 Z.ausl.PR. (1934) 888. ·
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occurs, although performance and domicil of one, or even
of both parties may be elsewhere. For instance, contracts of
carriers are ordinarily subjected to the law of the place where
the contract is made and the transport begins. 82
(iii) Not infrequently, lip service is paid to the place of
83
making rule, while in fact a quite different law is applied.
(iv) The rule is mechanically applied without appreciable discernment in a considerable number of cases. Moreover, it is not the habit of the courts when they apply the
law of the place of contracting to a problem of validity, to
decide whether the same law would apply also to other
contractual problems. And conflicts respecting validity are
in an overwhelming majority in this country, a phenomenon
obviously caused by the differences of statutes in such matters as statute of frauds, usury, exemption from liability, or
Sunday laws, in contrast to the uniformity of the common law
rules on performance.
All this warns strongly against Beale's statistical estimates.
Not only is the exclusive force of his validity rule inconsistent with the existing law but its significance for the development of the practice is greatly overestimated. Scholars
of such intimate knowledge of the decisions as Lorenzen and
Bati:ffol conclude that, wherever the choice between contracting and performance has become material, the latter has
been emphasized by the courts. 84
4· Determination of the Place of Contracting
Where is the place of contracting? Which law has to govern this question? We do not share the opinion of an old
Canadian case that "the question as to what country is the
82 BATIFFOL

239

§ 267.

83

Cf., e.g., infra pp. 45 8£., 461.
LORENZEN, JO Yale L. J. (1921) s6s at 578;
have to make our own remarks at a later juncture.
84

BATIFFOL

§

96. We shall

RULES IN ABSENCE OF PARTY AGREEMENT 453

locus contractus in each particular case is not a question of
foreign law, it is a question of fact." 85 Without exhausting
the much debated matter, we ought to mention a few delicate points.
Contracts between absent persons. The present municipal
laws are notoriously in disagreement on the question at
which moment a contract in the making by correspondence86
emerges from preliminary negotiations. At common law, a
contract is considered executed as soon as the addressee of
an offer dispatches his acceptance (theory of expedition, mail-box-theory, 0 bermittlungs-T heorie). Civil law countries are
divided in their adherence to the following views: that acceptance must only be declared (theory of declaration, A eusserungs-Theorie); or must arrive at the offeror's address
(theory of arrival, Zugangs-T heorie); or must be received
by him (theory of reception, Empfangs-Theorie); or must
come to his knowledge (theory of information, V ernehmungs- T heorie). It is by no means settled that all these views
of the time when negotiations arrive at the stage of binding
force, justify conclusions on the question at what place a contract is made. But generally this seems to be taken for
granted. If so, it is important which law is decisive to answer
the question where "the place of contracting" is. (There
arises, of course, the other problem whether a contract is
created at all, but this will be discussed later.)
Illustration. In I9I3, when Trieste was Austrian, an insurance company domiciled in that city concluded contracts
by a general representative in Tunis, on the basis of "gold
francs." In r 934, after the various currency depreciations,
Italian courts having to decide on the amount of the insurance

u_ c. c_ P. zz, 31·
For comparative law, see RABEL, 1 Recht des Warenkaufs 69-108; Institut
International de Rome pour !'Unification du Droit Prive, De la formation des
contrats entre absents_ Etude Preliminaire (mimeographed) S- d. N.-U. D. p_
1935, Etude XVL
So Cloyes v. Chapman (1876) 27

86
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claim, followed the conflicts rule of the Austrian Civil Code
(§§ 36, 37) which refers to the law of the place of contracting. Although the construction of these provisions is
doubtful, it was assumed that a contract is concluded under
Austrian civil law by information to the offeror and under
Austrian commercial law sometimes by information and
in other cases by expedition of the acceptance, while it was
believed that under French law applicable in Tunisia, declaration of acceptance was decisive (which is doubtful, too).
The Italian courts, for the purpose of applying the Austrian
place of making rule, attempted to ascertain the location of
this place under the lex fori, which meant in this case the
Austrian Commercial Code and, consequently, held the contract to have been perfected by delivery of the policy through
the agent in Tunis. Therefore, French municipal law was
to govern the money problem.87
The method, hence, is the same as that used in ascertaining
jurisdiction. Supposing a court has jurisdiction to judge a
breach of contract only if the breach occurs in its district, an
ordinary simple case is decided as follows:
Plaintiff resided in Ontario but carried on business in
Montreal. He sold this business to the defendant; the
agreement was executed by plaintiff in Toronto, sent to
defendant in Montreal, and signed by him there. The
Ontario court held that the execution in Montreal completed
the contract, hence the Quebec law applied to the effect that
the place of payment was at the domicil of the debtor. Therefore, the breach of contract took place in Quebec, and the
Ontario court had no jurisdiction.88
This astonishing game of lawyer's niceties may, in this
case, rest on the unexpressed background that an Ontario
court does not want unnecessarily to interfere with the sale
of a business in Quebec. This, in fact, would furnish a wise
87 App. Trieste (Jan. 25, 1934) 2 Recueil general relative au droit international (ed. Lapradelle) 1935·3·101.
88 Phillips v. Malone (1901) 3 0. L. R. 47, af/'d (1902) 3 0. L. R. 492

(D. C.).
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rule. But embarrassment is the daily characteristic of the
prevailing approach.
Every court using this method applies its own domestic
theory. An English court will stress the place where the
letter of acceptance is posted. 89 A Canadian will do likewise,
provided that this letter reaches the o:fferor. 90 It is true that
a merely casual mailing on a voyage need not necessarily be
accepted as decisive. 91 The conflicts laws of Japan and China
provide for the same solution. 92 Belgian, Italian, and Swiss
courts employ their own theories of reception 93 or information/4 and the French courts, being divided in the municipal
domain, follow each its usual view. 95
89
Benaim and Co. v. Debono [I924] A. C. 5I4, 5I9; Muller & Co. v.
Inland Revenue Commissioners [I927] I K. B. 78o, aff'd [Ig:t8] A. ('.
40-H. L.; WESTLAKE § 224.
90 Magann v. Auger (I9oi) 3I S.C. R. I86 applied to these problems, see
cases in 3 JOHNSON 670 n. I; Charlebois v. Baril [I 927] 3 D. L. R. 762.
91
CHESHIRE 263; 3 JOHNSON 473; MANN, I8 Brit. Year Book Int. Law
(I 9 3 7) (supra p. 3 9 7 n. I 8) at I 04. CooK, Legal Bases 42 5 regards casual
places of mailing ruled out by the real meaning of the place of contracting,
which he does not explain, however. French courts resort to interpretation of the
intention of the parties; see, for instance, Trib. civ. Seine (Julys, I939) Revue
Crit. I939, 450, Note, id. 456: agreement between three German refugees in
a hotel room in New York, German law common to all applied. Compare
the refusal to apply the lex loci contractus in the case of a Sunday contract made
in a hotel room of New York, Brown v. Gates (I904) I2o Wis. 349, 97
N. W. 221, infra Chapter 33, p. 564 n. 36.
Switzerland: BG. (July 12, I938) 64 BGE.II 46.
92
Japan: Int. Priv. Law, art. 9·
China: Int. Priv. Law, art. 23.
93
Belgium: App. Bruxelles (March 14, I924) Jur. Com. Brux. I924, I46;
Trib. com. Liege (Nov. 19, I926) Pasicrisie I927 III 69; Trib. com. Bruxelles (Dec. I7, I936) Jur. Com. Brux. 1937, 93; noted Clunet 1938, 359·
Italy: (C. Com. art. 36): App. Milano (Dec. II, I888) Clunet I892, 512;
(Disp. Prel (I865) art. 9): Trib. Trento (June Io, I926) Monitore I926,
62o, and with respect to taking jurisdiction at the place where obligations
originate, Cass. (Aug. 3, I935) Rivista 1935, 372, 374 (place where the
offeror acquires knowledge of the acceptance). Where no answer is requested, the
place of acceptance is decisive, App. Genova (Nov. 27, I9o6) Clunet I907,
II99; Cass. Napoli (Sept. r8, I9I4) Clunet I9I5, 703. The new Civil Code,
art. I 32 6 par. r requires knowledge of the acceptance.
Switzerland: HaMBERGER, Obl. Vertrage 53; ScHNITZER 282; NIEDERER,
59 Z. Schweiz. R. (N. F.) 247·
94
KosTERS 763, 766.
95
SURVILLE 340 n. 2, 34I; BACCARA, 5 Repert. 223 No. 26 (distinguishing
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If the internal systems involved agree, some writers presume an implied agreement of the parties in favor of the law
thus indicated. 96
Proposals flowing from awareness of the international
purpose of conflicts law have either radically discarded the
role of "contracting" in case of correspondence,97 or have
pointed rather to the place from which the first offer is sent,
the offer deserving preference over the acceptance as the
initial step and the basis of the contract. 98
United States. Characterization according to the lex fori
has recently been advocated also in this country. 99 However,
thanks to the fairly uniform doctrine of contracting in the
United States, the problem does not present itself with the
same acuteness. The Restatement had no difficulty in providing on principle that the place of contracting is the state from
which the acceptance is sent (§ 326, b), parallel, though not
in necessary conjunction, with the principle that a contract
is made at the time when the last act contributing to the
consent is done, as formulated in the Restatement of Contracts, § 64. But it is not clear whether this proposition, which
is specifically American, applies to a contract made by corfour systems); App. Rennes (Dec. IS, I89I) Clunet I892, 912 (theory of
declaration of the acceptance); App. Colmar (March II, I925) Clunet I926,
4II (arrival of the letter of acceptance; possibly following the German view).
116 KOSTERS 7 6 8.
97 See the authors cited supra n. 3 7.
98 To this effect the old writers cited by WAECHTER, supra n. 64, at 45;
in modern times, SURVILLE, in Clunet I89I, 36I, cf. I028; DIENA, I Dir.
Com. Int. 478; LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIERE 449 § 360; WALKER in I Klang's
Kommentar 3I8 and authors cited; Institute of Int. Law, resolutions of I9o8,
art. 4, 22 Annuaire (I9o8) 99, 285, 291.
Poland: Int. Priv. Law, art. 9 No. I sent. 3: where the offeror receives the
acceptance of the offer.
TreatyofMontevideoonint.CivilLaw (I889) art. 37; (I94o) art42.:law
of the place of dispatching the offer.
Brazil: In trod. Law (I 942) art. 9 § 2: law of the place of residence of the
offeror; EsPINOLA, 8-C Tratado I8II § I48 Note (p), wonders why the
domiciliary test, ordinarily basic for the new law, is discarded.
99 2 BEALE I 046 § 3 II.2; Restatement § 3 I I ; House v. Lefebvre (I 942.)
303 Mich. 207, 6 N. W. (zd) 487.
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respondence between persons in San Francisco and Mexico
City, 100 or New Y ark and Paris. If so, the lex fori doctrine of
the other countries is followed with the identical disastrous
effect, that different places of contracting will be stated in
the courts concerned, and thus different results are produced
under the same conflicts rule.
Binding force of offers. An analogous problem arises out
of the diverse effects of offers.

Illustration. Renfrew Flour Mills in Ottawa, Ontario,
offered to Sanschagrin, limitee in Trois-Rivieres, Quebec,
40,000 bags of flour with the proviso that "the contract must
be entered into within eight weeks, otherwise this offer is to
be withdrawn." Before the end of the time, however, the
offer was retracted. Under Quebec law, the offer, strangely
termed a cccontrat unilateral," was considered binding.
Ontario law does not recognize a transaction without consideration. The court applied Ontario law without squarely
facing the problem. 101
Various cases treated in the Restatement. The Restatement devotes twenty-one sections to the determination of the
place of contracting. Some of these provisions are highly
questionable. For instance:
"A, in state X, writes to the M company, a mail-order
house in state Y, ordering a stove from M's catalog and
offering to pay the catalog price. M in response to the letter
procures the shipment of the stove from its factory in state
Z. The contract to pay for the stove is made in Z." (§ 323,
illustration 5 ).
This type of contract, termed in the Restatement an "informal unilateral contract," at common law has not been
absorbed into the ordinary concept of sales contracts. A's
promise of payment is made under the condition that B send
100
Mexico: C. C. art. r8o7 requires reception of the acceptance by the
offeror.
Hll Renfrew Flour Mills v. Sanschagrin, limitee ( r 92 8) 45 Que. K. B. 2 9·
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the stove. 102 Therefore, obviously the Restatement draws an
analogy between mailing a letter of acceptance and expedition of the stove. But it forgets that business letters concluding a sale are usually posted at some place of management
and not sent from a mere manufacturing plant situated in
another state. Reasonably, the place of shipment may determine the applicable law, if an individual stove is bought and
the buyer knows of its location in Z, or if the catalog states
that delivery shall be made at the factory or warehouse in
Z. In the given example the solution is inadequat~.
If the Restatement localizes rights arising from tort at the
place where the last act completing an injury is done, this is
a tolerable solution because the lex delicti commissi is closely
connected with territorialism. But the two questions when
and where a contract is concluded, ought not to be indiscriminately identified. The time of completion is of great importance for many problems of substantive law in which the
place is of none. 104 Again, in private international law, localization should be subordinated to foreseeability by the
parties and other considerations of convenience.
Another striking illustration to the same section ventures
the following bizarre solution:
103

A father in state X promises his son $ r o,ooo if he marries
M. The son marries M in state Y. The contract for payment of the money is made in Y.
The mistake of confusing the making of a conditional
promise with the fulfillment of the condition underlies also
§ 3 r2 stating that: "when a formal contract becomes effective
on delivery, the place of contracting is where the delivery is
made." This rule would mean that not the place of making
102

Restatement of the Law of Contracts §§ u, 55·
CooK, Legal Bases 3 84, observes that the cases are directly contrary to the
illustration given in the Restatement.
104
RABEL, 1 Recht des Warenkaufs 93·
103
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but that of performance governs. The same is true if a
guarantee for future credits is localized at the place "where
105
the credit is given in reliance upon the guarantee" (§ 324).
Whether these rules are sound in themselves, is another
matter.
Discretionary assumptions. This survey would be incomplete without noticing that the uncertainty included in the
principle of lex loci contractus is sometimes welcomed by
the courts. When a proposal is sent from one state to another,
or an agent intervenes in transmitting an order, an application, an insurance policy, a note, prepared here and sent there
for approval and signature and then forwarded again to a
third state-a court may sometimes manage an equitable decision concerning the capacity of a married woman or the violation of a usury statute, by purposefully locating the place of
contracting in the desirable jurisdiction. It is a process similar to the stating of an individual's domicil so as to reach a
final judgment seeming sound, both tricks that may appear
satisfactory so long as the conflicts rules are not.
Contracting in another state. Finally, the lex fori theory
encounters another obstacle. As will be remembered, it has
been urged that a court should not assume domicil (like nationality), to exist in another state, contrary to what is assumed in that state itself. It is not less strange that states X
and Y should each locate an individual contract in the territory of the other, and in this way obtain opposite results as
to validity or effect. Such a negative conflict of conflicts rules
is particularly queer in view of the traditional support of lex
loci contractus by the idea that the contract is dominated by
the state of its origin. The truth of the matter is that the le:(
loci contractus is a fallacious device wherever the making of
a contract is substantially connected with two states.
105

This section has been already criticized by

NussBAUM,

Principles

171.

460

CONTRACTS IN GENERAL

5· Rationale
Critical appraisal of the lex loci contractus has been so
frequent and thorough that only a short resume is called for.
Once, the law of the place of contracting was deduced from
some idea of sovereign power over the persons doing acts in
the territory, and simple facts were faced such as a sale in
an open market, or a deed solemnly executed in an official's
room, the latter a case still enjoying a privileged place in
some otherwise poor conflicts codifications. Of all the theories
of sovereignty, territorialism, and vested rights, none has
survived criticism. Lex loci contractus is no logical necessity
for any problem. This much has become a commonplace
despite Beale and the Swiss courts.
Respecting arguments of convenience, the place of contracting has lost its obviousness in all those modern situations in which either there is no one such place or the place
of creating the contract has no significance for the purpose of
the contract.
Followers of this inherited approach, it is true, never grow
tired of assuring us that it is the most certain place, best known
to the parties who therefore can easily ascertain the applicable law. Hence, the rule should at least serve well as a general subsidiary precept. 106 The adversaries, from Savigny to
Wharton, Dicey, Lorenzen, and innumerable Continental
writers, point to the accidental nature of this place in our
epoch of travel, the indifference of most parties to the local
law, or for that matter, to any law, and the difficulties inherent in contracts by correspondence. 107 All international
draft proposals have rejected the lex loci contractus/ 08
106
Most recently, CAVERs, Book Review, 56 Harv. L. Rev. (1943) at 1173,
claims usefulness of the Restatement rule, because it provides ready answers.
107
LoRENZEN, 30 Yale L. J. (1921) 565, 655; id., 31 Yale L.]. (1921) 53·
108
See RocuiN, Actes de la 3eme Conference de la Haye ( x 900) 62; DE
VrssCHER, 48 Recueil (1934) II 354-356; NoLDE, 32 Annuaire (1925) 62-64;
STUMBERG zo6; BATIFFOL §§ 83-85.
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The solution ought to depend on the facts. When a contract is concluded in a state where both parties live, or in an
international market, or in a cash and carry operation between
a resident and a transient, all practicable theories agree on
the law of this state as a subsidiary rule. But the real problems begin beyond this circuit. The rule is a device insufficient
in itself, because it needs supplementary facts to operate, and
is inadequate in many cases. It defies common sense every
time when it makes the fate of a contract dependent on the
legalistic finesses determining at what place the deal was
completed in the juristic sense.
Under this angle, it is regrettable that even some advocates of the law of the place of performance take refuge in
the law of the place of contracting as such, when the former is
uncertain or insignificant. 109 This seems rather to prove the
defective nature of all schematic rules for contracts in
general.
Courts adhering to this venerable but unreliable tradition,
have often turned the tables on it. Sometimes the old quid
pro quo of the Pandectists has been used, calling the law of
the place of performance the lex loci contractus,110 or confusing lex loci contractus, that is, the law in force at the place
where the contract is made, and lex contractus, that is, the
law governing the contract as a whole. 111 These artifices have
been censured. 112 Again, as early as I 892, lex loci contractus
has been referred by a sensible American court "to the place
of the seat of the contract as distinguished from the place
109

87.
Dig. 44, 7, 21, supra n. 42; DICEY, Appendix Note 5 p. 885; Pritchard v.
Norton (1882) 1o6 U. S. 124, per Matthews, J.; Johnson County Savings Bank v. Walker (r9o8) So Conn. 509, 69 Atl. 15; Blandi v. Pellegrini
( 1915) 6o Pa. Super. Ct. 552.
111
See 15 C. J. S. 88o. French writers often use lex loci contractus in this
sense and term the law of the place of contracting lex loci actus, a misleading
terminology.
112
See NIEMEYER, Das IPR. des BGB. 113 against Clunet 1891, roz6.
110

BATIFFOL
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where it may casually happen to have been signed." 113 Finally, the rule very often has been rendered meaningless by
asserting the lex loci contractus to be the general rule and, in
the same breath adding that when performance is due in another state, the law of the latter state governs. lH Th.1s
amounts to a pure recognition of the lex loci solutionis.
III. LAW OF THE PLACE OF PERFORMANCE

I.

Historical Note

Savigny and his school115 substituted the law of the place
where the contract is to be fulfilled for that where it is
concluded. They believed that the Roman jurists agreed with
their view, and argued that in contrast with the accidental
nature of the locality of contracting, the parties carefully determine the details of performance. It is true, indeed, that
business stipulations, in connection with usage, make it ordinarily clear where goods or services are to be delivered and
received. This place, the authors emphasize, is of paramount
importance for the structure of the contractual relationship,
and foremost in the interest and "expectation of the parties."
Story had paved the way to this consideration. Although
he upheld the tradition that "the validity of a contract is to
be decided by the law of the place where it is made(§ 242),
which proposition he based on the presumed intention of the
parties, he added:
"But where the contract is either expressly or tacitly to
be performed in any other place, there the general rule is,
113

Thomson-Houston Electric Co. v. Palmer (I893) 52 Minn. I74, I79> 53

N. W. II37> II38, quoted by McCLINTOCK, IO Minn. L. Rev. (1926) 498,
50 I.
l'14 STORY§ 28o; cf. LORENZEN, 30 Yale L. J. (I92I) 667; infra this page.
115
'SAVIGNY § 370; z BAR 9; UNGER, I System I79i DERNBURG, I Pandekten
I o 5 j REGELSBERGER, Pandekten I 7 3 ; Saxony C. C. (I 8 6 3) § I I j report by
ENNECCERUS and resolution, 24 Deutscher Juristentag, 4 Verhandlungen 83,
nz, I27.
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in conformity to the presumed intention of the parties, that
the contract, as to its validity, nature, obligation and interpretation is to be governed by the law of the place of performance." (§ 280).
2.

Countries

Under these influences the lex loci solutionis has become
the firmly established subsidiary test of all contractual obligations in Germany, 116 and certain American and other jurisdictions.117 Sometimes it is the test only for the "effects" of
contracts, 118 and in some countries, it is imperative when
contracts are to be performed within the forum. 119
In British courts, this law is not an exclusive but a favorite
device. 120
In the countries applying the law of the place of contract116
RG., 6th Civil Chamber, in 6r RGZ. 343; 6z RGZ. 379 under ZITELMANN's influence applied the domiciliary law of the debtor; overruled by RG.
(Sept. 25, 1919) 96 RGZ. 262, (Sept. 2.9, 1919) id. 270. The fifth chamber left
the question open in RG. (Dec. r8, 1920) ror RGZ. 141, but agreed with the
law of the place of performance (Dec. 7, 192.1) in 103 RGZ. 259; (June :z.,
1923) 107 RGZ. 44; (Oct. 3, 192.3) 108 RGZ. 2.41. The subsequent decisions
are collected by LEWALD 2.24 No. 28rff.; MELCHIOR, }W. 1925, 1574 n. 38.
117
California: C. C. § I 646.
Montana: C. C. (1895) art. :uii, Rev. C. (1935) vol. 3 c. 108 § 7537·
Chile: C. C. art. 15 § r (if this :place is in Chile).
Greece: Formerly, C. C. (1856) art. 6.
Liechtenstein: Sachenrecht of Dec. 31, 1922, art. 17 par. r.
Nicaragua: C. C. art. VI, 14.
Spain: CoRDOVA, "El Derecho Interregional," 107 Revista Gen. Legis!. y
Jur. ( 1905) at 20; CASTAN ToBENAS, r Derecho Civil Espafiol, Comun y Foral
(ed. 6, 1943) roo.
Montevideo Treaty on Int. Civil Law (r889) arts. 32, 33; ( 1940) arts. 36, 37·
Saxony: Formerly, C. C. § II.
Czarist-Russian law, see 14 Z.int.R. 31, 35·
118
Louisiana: C. C. (in all editions) art. 10 par. 2.
Switzerland: (As to the "effects") BGE.: 32 II 268; 341I 648; 36II 6; 37
II 6o1; "constant practice" recognized in 47 II 541; 49 II 22.5; 59 II 361;
cf. ROMBERGER, Obi. Vertrage 41; NIEDERER, 6o Z. Schweiz. R. (N. F.)
(1941) 275a.
119
Brazil: Sup. Trib. Fed. (July 23, 1930) 16 Arch. Jud. s, 99 Revista Dir.
287, based on C. Com. art. 628. On the literature, see 2 PoNTES DE MIRANDA
192ff.
Argentina, Chile, Mexico and others, see supra Chapter 28 n. 43 and Chapter
29 n. 33·
120
WESTLAKE 300 § 2.II; DICEY 673; BATIFFOL § 99·
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ing on the basis of a presumption, such as France and Italy,
counterevidence is allowed to prove that the intention of the
parties veered to the law of the place of performance.
United States. In striking contrast to the Restatement,
Lorenzen has concluded from the cases that "most of them
apply the law of the place of performance when it differs from
that of the place of contracting, without reference to the
other surrounding circumstances.m 21 In a recent inquiry the
French scholar, Batiffol, confirms this view. He thinks the
American courts have given Story's text an adequate and
successful interpretation by adopting the lex loci solutionis,
if at the time of the contract the place of fulfillment was
already determined in the mind of the parties. 122 Such statements, of course, provide us merely with a starting point in a
complicated inquiry.
3· Mode of Fulfillment
Irrespective of the law applying to the rest of the contract, the law of the place of performance is firmly entrenched
as governing the "mode and incidents,m 23 or "modalities"
of payment or other performance, if no contrary intention
is proved. 124 This universal rule includes the application of
the lex situs to the transfer of real or personal property as
object of an obligation, and of the local law to the precise
place, time, and manner of tender and delivery. Judge
121

LORENZEN, 30 Yale L. }. (1921) 565, 578.
BATIFFOL 89.
123
Jacobs, Marcus & Co. v. The Credit Lyonnais (I884) 12 Q. B. D. 589,
604 per Bowen, L. J.; Lord Wright in Adelaide Electric Supply Co., Ltd. v.
Prudential Assurance Co., Ltd. [I 9 34] A. C. I 2 2, I 5 1 ; Auckland City Council
v. Alliance Assurance Co., Ltd. [I937] A. C. 587, 6o6.
124
BoULLENOIS, 2 Traite de Ia personnalite et de Ia realite des loix (I 766)
500; I FoELIX 233; 2 BAR 2I, 88; WEISS, 4 Traite 387; FooTE 399> 477;
and all other writers with the only exception of PILLET, 2 Traite 18I § 486.
Austrian Allg. BGB. § 905: "With regard to measure, weight and kind of
money, the place of delivery is determinative." Former Italian C. Com. art. 58,
as commonly construed, see, e.g., Cass. (June 8, I933) Foro Ita!. I933.I.938.
1 2
"
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Learned Hand once 25 took opportunity to enumerate American cases applying this rule with respect to a moratorium,126
payment upon a forged endorsement,127 delivery of a note
as payment/ 28 payment in one currency or another/ 29 the
question who is the proper payeeao or consignee,131 and time
of grace on commercial papers. 132 The international literature
and practice agree in subordinating to this law: the tender of
goods and services, the duty of the creditor to deliver a receipt, the currency in which a money debtor may be compelled to pay the amount due, for example what "franc" or
"pound" means if it is also a money unit at the place of performance, 133 and like questions of weights, measures, working
days, and business hours. 134

Illustration. Two merchant firms in Capetown arranged
with a bank of the same city credits for buying flour in the
United States. The bank promised to honor the seller's
draft upon them at its New York branch, provided that the
bills of exchange were accompanied in one case "by bill
of lading and insurance policy," and in the other "by full
set of shipping documents including marine and war risk
125 Louis-Dreyfus et al. v. Paterson Steamships, Ltd. (I93o) 43 F. (:zd)
824, 827. The following citations have been adduced by Judge Hand himself.
126
Rouquette v. Overmann (1875) to L. R. Q. B. 525·
1
n Kessler L Armstrong Cork Co. (C. C. A. 2d I907) I58 Fed. 744; Belestin
v. First Nat'l Bank (I9I4) I77 Mo. App. 300, I64 S. W. I6o.
128
Tarbox v. Childs (I896) I65 Mass. 408, 43 N. E. I24; Gilman v.
Stevens (I 896) 63 N.H. 342, I Atl. 202.
129 Anonymous (I784) I Brown Ch. C. 376; Benners v. Clemens (I868) 58
Pa. 24.
130 Graham v. First Nat'l Bank of Norfolk (I88I) 84 N.Y. 393, 38 Am.
Rep. 528.
131 Yokohama Specie Bank, Ltd. v. U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. (I 92 3)
I23 Wash. 387, 212 Pac. 564; rehearing, 2I6 Pac. 851.
132 Bowen v. Newell (I855) I3 N.Y. 290, 64 Am. Dec. 550.
133 See Mount Albert Borough Council v. Australasian Temperance and
General Mutual Life Assurance Society, Ltd. [I938] A. C. 224-P. C., per
Lord Wright, and in case of a stipulation to the contrary effect, De Bueger v.
Ballantyne & Co. [I938] A. C. 452-P. C.
134 In Germany the Ia w of the place of performance is applied to these questions as incident to its general scope, see 6 RGZ. IJ2; 96 id. at 272; I o6 id. at
6I; RG. (April 22, I922) Warn. Rspr. I922, No. 57·

CONTRACTS IN GENERAL
policies for merchandise shipped to Capetown." The South
African court presumed that the parties intended to have
American law govern the question what documents the
bank was obliged to tender with the drafts in performance
of the contract. 135
The exact scope of this minimum application of the lex
loci solutionis, however, will need investigation by detailed
discussion. It is a mistake to extend the lex loci solutionis
when it is not the law governing the entire contract to the
currency problems determining the quantity of money to be
paid. 1 u This is a part of the substance of the contractual obligation, and the same should be recognized as to the persons
by whom or to whom performance shall be made, sufficiency
of tender, and excuses for nonperformance. The Restatement ( § 3 58) assigning these problems to the law of the place
of performance, although it forcibly subjects the nature and
extent of the duty for the performance and the time of
performance to the lex loci contractus, has established a
unique and untenable proposition.
4· Several Places of Performance
Savigny conceived that a contract may embrace several
duties each to be fulfilled at a separate place. He meant to
apply the law of each place respectively. 131 Windscheid138 and
Bar139 formed their own variants of this theory which has
since been consistently observed by the German Supreme
Court. 140 In particular, where bilateral contracts are not by
135

Standard Bank of South Africa, Ltd. v. Efroiken and Newman (1924)

s. A.
L. R. App. D. I7I, 176, 178, 196.
136

See for the present, z ZITELMANN 396; LEONHARD, Erfiillungsort und
Schuldort 9z; MELCHIOR § 19z; MANN, The Legal Aspects of Money ( 1938)

zso.
137
138
139
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SAVIGNY zoo, 202, § 369.
WINDSCHEID, x Pandekten § 35 No. 3·
2 BAR 15·
Cases collected by LEWALD 246-z56.
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intention assigned to some unitary law, the obligation of either
party is determined by the law of the place where he is
obliged to perform. A part of the writers have been resigned
to this splitting of the contract/ 41 The Swiss Federal Tribunal espoused the theory, 142 and Dicey extended his advocacy of the lex loci solutionis to this application of two substantive laws. 143
To exemplify the effect of this "splitting theory" or "two
laws system" on the most important contract, sales of goods,
in the absence of a presumed intention of the parties, the obligations of seller and buyer are to be distinguished, as well
as their several duties. A separate place of performance may
exist, and hence a different law apply to the seller's duties
to deliver the goods, to be liable for warranties and conditions/44 or default,145 and to replace defective merchandise. 146
Again, the existence and effect of the various duties of the
buyer depend on the laws at the places where he has to pay
the price and accept the goods,147 accept a substitute,148 examine the goods, and give notice. 149 But also the remedies
141
See LEWALD 246. Also the writers advocating the law of the nationality
or domicil of the debtor are satisfied with a similar bisection, see infra n. r 75·
Switzerland: BECKER, 5 Gmiir 294 § 312. V n. 20; 304 §§ 319-362 II n. 2.
142
BG. (Oct. 31, 1908) 34 BGE. II at 648; (Oct. 22, 1915) 41 BGE. II
at 594; RoMBERGER, Obi. Vertrage 48; Reports to the Swiss Lawyers' Ass'n,
bv NIEDERER, "Die Spaltung des Vertrages," and KNAPP, "La division des
effets du contrat," etc., 6o Z. Schweiz. R. (N. F.) (1941) 22ra-354a.
143
DICEY 675.
144
RG. (Oct. 21, r899) JW. 1899, 751; OLG. Hamburg (April 14, 1905)
12. ROLG. 58, 16 Z.int.R. 322.
145
RG. (Jan. 21, 1908) Leipz. Z. 1908, 308; (Apr. x, 1930) 84 Seuff.
Arch. 252; OLG. Hamburg (Oct. 24, 1912.) Hans. GZ. 1913, HB!. No. 2o;
(Jan. 4, 1918) JW. 1918, 380.
146
(April 19, 191o) 73 RGZ. 379, Revue 1911, 403.
147 RG.
RG. (Nov. r8, 1899) JW. 1900, 12. No.5; OLG. Jena (Dec. 31, 1917)
JW. 1918, 380 No.5, stressing the local connection of each litigious obligation;
cf. 55 RGZ. 423; 65 id. 332.· Similarly, as to the portions to which each of
several buyers is obligated, OLG. Jena (June 30, 1897) 8 Z.int.R. 335, Clunet
r 899, 6o8.
148
(Oct. 13, 1894) 34RGZ. 191.
149 RG.
RG. (April 28, 19oo) 46 RGZ. 193, 195; (April 19, 191o) 73 RGZ.
379; (Feb. 4, 1913) 8r RGZ. 273, 275; for details, see LEWALD 254 ff. Accord-

CONTRACTS IN GENERAL
a buyer has on the ground of defects 150 and nondelivery,151
have been subordinated to the law determinative of the obligation to pay.
These and other scholastic and unsound results have been
harmful to the reputation of lex loci solutionis. 152
German courts themselve; have become uneasy of this
artificial play and admittedly try hard to avoid it in particular
cases by presuming an intention of the parties in favor of an
all-inclusive law. 153 The Swiss Supreme Court seems to deny
to the adopted principle almost any practical influence. 154
In fact, this principle is based on the mistaken conception
that a bilateral contract can be reasonably partitioned into two
unilateral obligations. This conception may be excused in
earlier stages of Roman and English jurisprudence; it was
largely superseded by the late Roman law, and has been entirely abandoned in modern law. The very nature of a synallagma is ignored when a sales contract is torn up into halves
belonging to different legislations. No wonder that recent
criticism has discovered a number of contradictions and inconveniences, and has stated that rescission of a contrace 55 and
risk for fortuitous loss of the goods 156 cannot be classified
properly, and that in truth the alleged law of one party was
applied to both. 157
ing to OLG. Miinchen (Feb. r6, 19:z.8) IPRspr. 192.8 No. 33, the duty of
notice is subject to the law of the domicil of the buyer.
1.so RG. (June r6, 1903) 55 RGZ. 105; (April 26, 1907) 66 RGZ. 73;
(May 25, 1932.) IPRspr. 1932. No. 33·
151
RG. (May :z.7, 1924) IPRspr. 19:z.6/:z.7 No. 43·
152 See citations infra n. r 69. See also FIORE § 12.0; PILLET, 2 Traite 263
(against Savigny's emphasis on the place where jurisdiction will be taken);
ALCORTA, 2 Der. Int. Priv. 314; MATOS 457 § 330. For other difficulties, see
LEWALD § 284.
153
RG. (April 4, 1908) 68 RGZ. 2o3, 207; (Jan. z7, 192.8) 120 RGZ. 72..
154
NIEDERER, 6o Z. Schweiz. R. (N. F.) (1941) :z.6oa-265a; see also
GUTZWILLER, id. 415a; adde BG (Oct. 21, 1942) 68 BGE. II :z.2o, 223.
155
To this effect already ROHG. (Dec. 9, 1875) 19 ROHGE. 132.
156
See NEuNER, :z. Z.ausl.PR. (1928) 12.1; LEWALD 249 No. 309; RABELRAISER, 3 Z.ausl.PR. (192.9) 77·
157
NEUNER, id. 12.3.
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The Anglo-American courts seem never to have thought
of such consequences of the place of performance theory, and
with the exception of Dicey/ 58 no writer has entirely followed the German example.
If, however, we become aware that not the several duties
but the whole contract is to be connected with the law of
some state, it must also be realized that by making the "place
of performance" the determinative concept, we are far from
meaning the domestic concept bearing the same name. Indeed, in progressive suggestions the whole of the contract
has been localized at the place where the typically 159 prevailing, or principal,'60 contractual duty should be discharged. 161
It has also been suggested that a new uniform concept of
place of performance should be established for the entire
contract rather than for the duties created by it. 162 But even
this may turn out to be too narrow a formula. Another step
farther, Strisower has advocated that the place of performance should be deemed to be found, not at the place where
performance ought to be made in fact but the place where,
according to the nature of the obligation, the "social sphere
is centered in which the obligation is to be discharged." 163
More simply we should say that the center of the obligation
rather than the place of its discharge is the adequate contact
for choice of law.
To take an example, it is an excellent rule that employment contracts should be governed by the law of the place
where the employee is expected to do his work. This rule is
158
159
I

See supra n. 143·
ROMBERGER, Obl. Vertrage 49. so; BG. (Oct. :u, 1941) 67 BGE. II

8 I.

160
NOLDE, 32 Annuaire (1925) 504; LEWALD 248; for other literature, see
BATIFFOL 83 and infra p. 472 n. 169.
161
In the opinion of BATIFFOL 87, this is the existent rule in the United
States.
162
NEUNER, 2 Z.ausl.PR. (1928) 130; followed by NIEDERER, 6o Z.
Schweiz. R. (N. F.) 242 a; OsER-SCHOENENBERGER p. LVII No. 57·
163
'STRISOWER, 32 Annuaire (1925) 507.
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amenable to the theory emphasizing the place of performance of the outstanding obligation established in such a contract. But whoever would be satisfied with this aspect of the
rule must be embarrassed by the case of a traveling salesman visiting a dozen states according to the varying instructions of his employer. Again, there is prevailing agreement
that in this latter case the law of the employer's domicil
governs. In both cases, however, the selected localizations
are convenient for determining the center of the particular
type of contract.

5. Lack of a Certain Place of Performance
It does not often happen in normal commercial sales,
loans, or bailments that the parties are unable to ascertain at
the time of contracting at what place the duties are performable. When, however, insurance payments or life rents are
made payable at the domicil of the creditor, his changes
of domicil are decisive. Bonds may be payable in any of several countries at the option of the bondholder. Goods may be
shipped to a destination to be declared during the carriage.
Or a vessel, plying on the ocean, is bought with the stipulation that it should be conveyed to the purchaser at its next
port of call. 164 As mentioned before, in such cases it has been
suggested that as a measure of despair, the lex loci contractus
may be applied. Resorting to a more logical method, courts
regarding the lex loci contractus as starting point, sometimes
will say that where there is no one place of performance, the
court cannot do better than fall back on the general rule that
lex loci contractus governs. 165 The I 940 draft of Montevideo
(art. 40), expressly provides that if the parties cannot, at the
164

Case referred to by 2 BAR xo n. 9·
See for instance, Morgan v. New Orleans M. & T. R. Co. (1876) 2
Woods 244, 17 Fed. Cas. 754 No. 9804; Oakes v. Chicago Fire Brick Co.
(1941) 388 Ill. 447, 58 N. E. (zd) 46o. The main advocate of this rule at
present is BATIFFOL 85 § 94·
165
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time of contracting, determine the place of fulfillment, the
contract is governed by the law of the place of contracting.
All these are makeshift constructions.
6. Characterization
Courts have been taught to determine the place of performance according to their lex fori. The German Reichsgericht strictly observing this method, considers neatly two
successive phases, first inquiring where the German municipal law166 locates performance, in order to find the applicable law; and when this law is found, inquiring where performance is due under this law, in order to decide the
claim. 167

Illustration. D in Zurich, Switzerland, owes money to
C in Berlin. Under the German Civil Code, § 270, the
debtor has to send the money at his own cost and risk to
the creditor, but nevertheless ZUrich is his "place of performance." This means that if the mail is delayed en route,
he is not in default ( 78 RGZ. r 40). But applied to the
conflicts matter, it means that Swiss law governs the debt.
Consultation of the Swiss Code of Obligations will result
in finding that the place of performance is with the creditor
in Berlin. Therefore, by delayed mail the debtor is in default
after all, therefore liable for interest and in certain cases
for rescission, although not for other damage. (C. Obl. art.
74 (I), I 06 ff.)
The Swiss Federal Court, professing the same method, if
consistent, must reach the opposite result in favor of German
law. 168 This is a wonderful example to demonstrate Bartin's
166
BGB. §§ 269, 270. Many German writers following LEONHARD, Erfiillungsort und Schuldort ( 1907), however, refer these sections directly to conflicts
law. MELCHIOR 171 virtually concludes from this view that the courts have
no choice other than to apply them.
167
ROHG. (x875) 17 ROHGE 292; (1877) 22 iJ, 296; RG. (March 11,
1919) 95 RGZ. 164, and constant practice, see MELCHIOR 172 n. x, 173 n. 2.
168
The Swiss Fed. Trib., in fact, resorting to lex fori for defining the place
of performance in its decision (Oct. II, 1918) 44 BGE. II 416, •1-17 applied the
law of the creditor's Swiss domicil, but applied the domiciliary law of the
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thesis that harmony is impossible. But more and more, we
may wonder whether any "place of performance" can fulfill
its pretended function.
7. Rationale
The opinion is well-reasoned that performance has in many
cases more significance in the eyes of parties to a contract
than the locality where they declare their consent, if such a
common locality exists. However, the former enthusiasm for
this variant of the old doctrine has not stood up against
accumulated criticism. 1119 The place of performance may happen to be as accidental or insignificant for choice of law as any
other place involved; as when an English and an American
merchant engage in a transaction to ship meat from Argentina to Egypt; or Americans agree with one another for sea
carriage to Venezuela; or when a traveling salesman is
hired to go to distant countries.
Such fruits of the theory of place of fulfillment resulting
in bisection of bilateral contracts are particularly objectionable. They cannot be removed by a fictional pretension that
a contract producing two main obligations of different location, has only one place of performance. The relations between creditor and debtor are often necessarily localized at
more than two places. Conflicts law cannot schematically
rely on such a device. 110
Lex loci solutionis without more qualification, ts as Illsufficient a test as the lex loci contractus.
debtor, being again Swiss law in BG. (July 3, I9o9) 35 BGE. II 473, 476,
20 Z.int.R. I02. Thereby it managed both times to apply the law of the forum.
169 See 2 BAR I I; 2 MElLI 8; 2 ZITELMANN 3 72; RocuiN, Actes de la
3eme Conference de la Haye (I 900) 62; ALMEN, 1 Skandinav. Kaufrecht 5 z;
LEWALD 226, 1.27.
17
F. LEONHARD, Erfiillungsort und Schuldort I23 has very well noted this
point.

°

RULES IN ABSENCE OF PARTY AGREEMENT 473
IV. LAW OF THE DEBTOR'S DOMICIL

A subsidiary rule based on the nationality of the debtor,
postulated on a priori axioms/ 11 has been commonly rejected.172 But the law of the domicil of the debtor functioning
173
as a general rule, has found increasing favor with writers.
The principal arguments are that a debtor cannot be presumed to have promised more than his habitual law makes
him liable for, and that his domicil is the place where he may
be sued and his assets are legally concentrated, according
to the most fundamental principles of jurisdiction and enforcement. That in most cases he is in fact sued at that forum
and the domiciliary law then coincides with lex fori, is
claimed to be another advantage.
Adversaries174 object that the domicil of the debtor has
no title to govern acts of performance in another country, and
that there is no reason why the domicil of the debtor should
be of more significance than that of the creditor. The dismemberment of a bilateral contract seems even more difficult to avoid with this than with the doctrine of the place of
performance; the advocates of the personal law realize this
and approve of the splitting. 175 Where a buyer refused payment, while another buyer paid the price in advance, and
both rescind, there develop curious differences between the
applicable laws, because the second purchaser has changed
171

2 ZITELMANN 372; 2 FRANKENSTEIN 126.
RG. (March l l , I9I9) 95 RGZ. 164; (Oct. 3, 1923) to8 RGZ. 243; E.
Is ..w, 14 Z. f. Volkerrecht (r928) 254.
173
2 BAR r 2; REGELSBERGER, Pandekten § 44 n. 4; HARBURGER in 22
Annuaire (r9o8) 114; NEUMEYER in 32 Annuaire (I925) 99 No.3;
STR!SOWER in id. 9I, cf. 135; GUTZWILLER 1608 n. I; LEWALD 230 No. 287;
FRITZSCHE, 44 Z. Schweiz. R. (N. F.) 254a; RAAPE, D. IPR. 263 (regarding
this theory as probably dominant in the German literature); ALMEN, I
Skandinav. Kaufrecht 54 n. 68 citing other Swedish followers.
174
See LoRENZEN, 30 Yale L. J. (1921) at 667; BATIFFOL Ioo.
175
It has been adopted by 2 ZITELMANN 405; MITTEis, 4 Verhandlungen
des 24. Deutsch en Juristentages 98; 2 FRANKENSTEIN I 90, 295ff.; NEUMEYER,
IPR. (1929) 27; BAGGE, Conference de la Haye, Actes de la sixieme session,
at 2.89.
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his position from debtor to creditor. 176
In legislation177 and courts, 178 this approach has not had
much following. Lacking the historical background of the
leges loci contractus and loci solutionis, it has no better rational justification than these for dominating by itself all
contracts.
It is another matter that the domicil of a party, being the
basis of his status, has been said to furnish a last resort, if
the requirements of all other conflicts rules fail. In this respect, we shall discuss 179 cases such as that of a merchant who
sends out a catalog intending, under his domiciliary law, to
invite customers to make offers, while at the places of receipt the catalog is regarded as an offer; or cases concerning
the different appreciation of silence as acceptance or denial
of an offer.
V. THE LAW MOST FAVORABLE TO THE CONTRACT

Inspired by earlier theories, the Austrian Code of I 8 I I
has a special rule referring to the personal law of a foreigner making a gift within the country, if the gift is valid
under such law rather than under the otherwise applicable
lex fori. 180 Argentina 181 and Nicaragua182 conversely provide
for application of their own laws, when they are more fa176
ALMEN, I Skandinav. Kaufrecht 5 s, vainly tries to justify this difference.

177
Poland: Int. Priv. Law, art. 9 (as to unilateral contracts); applied to
loans, Polish S. Ct. (Nov. I8, 1936) 4 Z.osteurop. R. (N. F.) (1937-38) 380.
178
German-Rumanian Mixed Arb. Trib., Negreanu v. Meyer (June I6,
I925) 5 Recueil trib. arb. mixtes (1927) zoo, 2I3; Anglo-German Mixed
Arb. Trib., Biisse v. Brit. Mfg. Stationary Co. ( 192 7) 7 Recueil trib. arb.
mixtes (1928) 345, JW. 1928, 2047; cf. RABEL-RAISER, 3 Z.ausl.PR. (I929)
62.
,
Denmark: Supreme Court, Norsk Retstidende 1928, 646 and 8z6, id. 1934,
I52; see 7 Z.ausl.PR. (1930) 946, 942; IO id. 632; see also BORUM-MEYER, 6
Repert. 224 Nos. 78, 79·
Norway: CHRISTIANSEN, 6 Repert. 578 No. I46.
Sweden: MALMAR, 7 Repert. IJ6 No. IOS.
179
See infra Chapter 3 z, p. 52 2 n. I 9·
180
AUg. BGB. § 35; cf. Prussian Allgemeines Landrecht I 5 § II 3 (applied
by RG. (March 15, I9oo) 46 RGZ. 230 to the form of a gratuitous discharge).
181
Argentina: C. C. art. 14 ( 4).
182
Nicaragua: C. C. art. VIII No. 4·
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vorable to the validity of transactions than the foreign laws
called for by the conflict rules. In England and America,
Lord Phillimore's words have often been repeated that "the
parties cannot be presumed to have contemplated a law which
would defeat their engagements"-an application of the
maxim, ut res magis valeat quam pereat. 183 Mr. Justice Matthews speaking for the Supreme Court of the United States
appropriated this consideration as
" ... a circumstance highly persuasive in its character of the
presumed intention of the parties and entitled to prevail
unless controlled by more express and positive proofs of
a contrary intent.m 84
The illustrative English cases using this argument involve
an arbitration clause, valid under English law at the place
of making, invalid under the Scotch law of the place of performance, 1185 and clauses exempting a ship company from
liability. 186 Similar stipulations of carriets187 and of some insurance companies188 have been treated to the same effect in
this country. The Supreme Court of the United States has
applied it to a bond void for lack of consideration where
made but valid where to be performed.189 One case concerns the capacity of a married woman, 190 two others, oral
183

4 PHJLLIMORE § 654; followed by WHARTON§ 429; obiter dictum in
South African Breweries, Ltd. v. King [r899] :z. Ch. 173, r8r.
184
Pritchard v. Norton (r88z) ro6 U.S. 124,137.
185
Hamlyn & Co. v. Talisker Distillery [r894] A. C. :z.o:z.; 6 R. r88-H. L.
186
Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Co. v. Shand (r865) 3 Moo.
P. C. Cas. (N. S.) 272., 290; In re Missouri Steamship Co. (r889) 42 Ch. D.
J:Z. I.
187

Hazel v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul R. Co. (1891) 8:z. Iowa 477, 48
N.W. 9:z.6; W. A. Ryan & Co. v. Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. (r885) 65 Tex.
13 (citing numerous precedents); Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R. Co. v.
Smith (1913) 38 Okla. 157, 132 Pac. 494·
188
Coffin v. London & Edinburgh Ins. Co. (192.8) 2.7 F. (zd) 616. Arkansas cases, cited by Lefl.ar, Arkansas Conflict of Laws 213 n. 48.
189
Pritchard v. Norton (1882) 1o6 U.S. r:z.4.
190
Greenlee v. Hardin (1930) 157 Miss. 229, 127 So. 777, 71 A.L.R. 741;
as a most subsidiary argument in Hauck Clothing v. Sophie Sharpe (1899) 83
Mo. App. 385.
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191

transactions. The argument has more often been used in
usury cases, 192 although even there in less than twenty-five
per cent of the cases/ 93 and occasionally with respect to other
causes of illegality. 194 A few instances of analogous reasoning
exist in decisions of other countries. 195
On the other hand, neither in England1'96 nor in this
country197 can any consistent judicial doctrine be stated in
this sense. Often the argument was unnecessary and served
to support the escape from lex loci contractus 198 or lex loci
solutionis. 199 In the cases concerning capacity, favor of validity would seem adequate but has hardly ever been openly
and decisively granted.
Nevertheless, it provokes thought that the preference of
the more favorable law has found considerable support in
the literature, particularly in this country. 200 What can thea191
Hubbard v. Exchange Bank (C.C.A. :z.d 1896) 72. Fed. 2.34, cert. denied
'63 U. S. 69o (verbal acceptance of a bill of exchange); D. Canale & Co. v.
Pauly and Pauly Cheese Co. (1914) 155 Wis. 541, 145 N. W. 372.·
192 Supra p. 409·
193
This has been stated by BATIFFOL , 98 § zzz; see (n. , ) his revision of cases
cited by 2 BEALE 1157 n. 2.
1 4
~ Exemption of liability of railway: Atchison, Topeka & Santa FeR. Co. v.
Smith (1913) 38 Okla. 157, 132 Pac. 494, but the argument is unnecessary,
supra p. 4 r 9· Intention of the parties is the main reason, as in Coffin v.
London & Edinburgh Ins. Co. (D.C.N.D. Ga. 192.8) 2.7 F. (2d) 6r6 (insurance).
195
E.g., RG. (March 13, 1928) IPRspr. 1928 No. 1.
196
CHESHIRE 269 cites Maritime Assurance Co. v. Assecuranz-Union von
r865 (1935) 52. Ll. L. Rep. r6.
197
BATIFFOL 139 §§ 157, 158. [Adde the thoughtful observations by PAUL
A. FREUND, "Chief Justice Stone and the Conflict of Laws," 59 Harv. L. Rev.
(1946) 12.Io, 12.12.-12.18.]
198
E.g., Hubbard v. Exchange Bank, supra n. r 91; Brierley v. Commercial
Credit Co. (1929) 43 F. (zd) 724.
199
E.g., Canale v. Pauly, supra n. 191.
200
LORENZEN, 31 Yale L. J. (192.1) 53: the contract is valid if the law
of any state with which the contract has substantial connection is complied
with and execution is not prohibited by some stringent policy of the place of
contracting and performance is legal at place of performance. (On these three
provisos see supra Ch. 29); STUMBERG 212., 2.14: "To apply the law which
will uphold the contract, if the contract has some bona fide substantial connection with the place of that law, would, it is believed, in carrying out the
purpose which the parties had in view in their negotiations, better serve business
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retically justify such a view? How could it be formulated?
In its nature, distinctly emphasized by the English writers,
the selection of the validating law has been dependent upon
the assumed intention of the parties. Indeed, the argument:
demands not only a so-called presumptive intention but a real,
though tacit, agreement of the parties; by stipulating as they
did, they wanted to adopt the law under which the stipulation
would be valid. But this reasoning is frustrated by the doubtless correct thesis that where the parties agree on a certain
law, this law applies even though it nullifies the contract. 201
Batiffol, who seems to refer the doctrine in question to the
hypothetical intention of the parties, is only prepared to
regard it legitimate, where, at the time of the contract or
at least before one of them invokes nullity, the parties knew
that one law annuls and the other validates their stipulation,
and expressed their knowledge by their conduct. 202 But the
cases state at most that the parties may be supposed to have
known the law. Cheshire has abandoned the whole idea.203
If the proper law theory is rejected, what should be the
idea, or the content, of the rule? We have seen that no rule
exists prescribing that a contract is void, if it is contrary to
any one of several laws "substantially" connected with it.
On the other hand, could a rule be really acceptable, which
says that whenever a contract is connected with several jurisdictions, we cannot hold it void except when its nullity is
assured by all of them? Certainly not.
In reality, the casual popularity of the law upholding the
contract in the American courts is very closely related to
their unprincipled conflicts practice. On the one hand, rules
are allegedly traditional and fixed; a court believes to a
convenience by making their acts legally that which they purport to be; i.e.,
an enforceable promise."
201
Infra Chapter 32·
202
BATIFFOL q8 § 156.
2<1s CHESHIRE 269, as compared with ed. r, r96.
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certain extent in the lex loci contractus or in another device.
On the other hand, nothing is really certain; the courts experiment; they are benevolent to a party who appears to
deserve protection; they do not want, in particular, to allow
a right to be frustrated by a local statute, either outmoded
or having no reasonable claim to govern exclusively an interstate transaction. Very clearly, the courts in general do not
favor the peculiarities of state provisions on Sunday contracts,
statute of frauds, usury, or the formalities of insurance
policies. The Wisconsin Supreme Court, speaking of a sale
made in its own territory without a memorandum in writing,
discards the law of the place of contracting and its rule of
unenforceability, stating there is "nothing inherently bad
about such convention, despite our statute of frauds," and
the contract is declared valid under the foreign law of the
place of performance.204 The usury cases, a very particular
phenomenon, are inspired by mutual tolerance as there are
many ways to solve the problem. The courts desire to free
legitimate business from dispensable local impositions. A
finance corporation has carried on its loan business for fifteen
years, has used the same type of stipulations as other companies, for customers in all jurisdictions. Why should such
a usual and standard form be stigmatized as fraudulently
evading the law of the debtor's domicil or the law of the
forum? 20:; The courts manifestly think that one system of
regulating the rates of interest is as good as another. They
weigh and compare the needs and policies. Their final choice
is not so much meant to favor the validity of the contract
as to encourage the reliance of trade and commerce on interstate protection. The solution would be strictly contrary, if a
prohibition were violated comprising a basic requirement
in a state to which the contract should exclusively belong.
204
205

Z36.

Canale v. Pauly, supra n. I 91.
Manufacturers Finance Co. v. B. L. Johnson & Co.

(1931)

15 Tenn. App.
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These considerations include several particular circumstances, which do not often occur in international transactions
and even in the relations among the American sister states
strongly restrict the application of the principle in question.
Equivalence and comparative unimportance of local policies
is one of these considerations. Another is the equivalence of
various conflicts rules to be used at pleasure. A third is the
neglect of party choice by both courts and parties, and a
fourth the replacement of one determined applicable law
by a number of laws among which any one may be selected.
This orbit of legal systems is circumscribed by the fortuitous
connections the parties establish. But to prevent the parties
from too much arbitrariness, it is required that they observe
some limits which, in general, are not defined more closely.
Only one limit has been settled in the usury cases: the law
of the charter state of the lending corporation is excluded,
if the actual place of business is elsewhere. Hence, if a court
should find that the system of differentiated rates of interest
in the charter state is superior to the statutes of the debtor's
domicil as well as to those of the actual business place and
the situs of a mortage, it still would not be allowed to apply
that law even though the parties may have expressly stipulated for it.
After all, it is not incidental that the principle of the upholding law has not seriously been applied to the bulk of
the American contracts cases, not to speak of the international
practice.
In the opinion of the writer, the advocates of this principle
seem to feel quite correctly that something is needed, in
the chaos of uncertain and unsatisfactory conflicts rules, to
obviate the sacrifice of honest commerce. The spontaneous
inclination of courts to safeguard contracts from local prohibitions serves as an excellent emergency device, and as such
is to be recommended. If every type of contract were to be
endowed with a stable subsidiary conflict rule adequate to
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the nature of the contract, and if the parties were plainly
permitted and encouraged to select the governing law, with
assurance that it will be applied, neither the parties nor the
courts would be in need of such subterfuges; and the legislatures would not have to tolerate them.
VI. RENVOI

If a court presumes that the parties have had a certain
law "in view," it is reasonable to think that this law is a
substantive, municipal, law. 206 But also if judges are supposed
to choose a law amenable to the character of the contract, it
seems a useless detour to select a conflicts law instead of
a municipal law. 207 Only in case a mechanical rule points
to the law of a certain place whereas the court of this place
would instead apply a third law, does renvoi have its usual
significance. This is the reason why German courts have
repeatedly resorted to references from the law of the place
of performance to another law/ 08 or in suits for carriage by
sea, from the law of the port of discharge to the law applied
at this port. 209 In a case where two Austrian nationals living
in Turkey entered into a contract of employment, the Italian
Supreme Court applied their common national law and, by
transmissive renvoi from the Austrian conflicts rule, the
law of Turkey. 210
VII. CONCLUSIONS

1.

Specialized Rules

The negative result reached by some modern authors is
unimpeachable. No one conflicts rule can serve for all obliga20

e MELCHIOR 239, citing OLG. Kolmar (May 19, 1893) 4 Z.int.R. 151.
See MELCHIOR, }W. 1925, 1571 and HAUDEK 94 against LEWALD 206.
208
RG. (Jan. 23, 1897) 38 RGZ. 140, 146; (Oct. 11, 1907) 19 Z.int.R.
22.2, 2.2.4, and others, see MELCHIOR 2.39 n. 2..
209
RG. (April 4, 1908) 68 RGZ. 203, 210 (incidentally).
21
Cass. (Dec. 29, 1937) 9 Rivista Dir. Priv. (1937) 228, see Vol. 1
p. 8o ns. 38 and 39·
207
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tory contracts. A wrong method had developed when writers,
enactments, and judicial decisions tried to apply either always
the law of the place of contracting, or always the law of the
place of performance, or always the personal law common
to the parties, or that of the debtor, or always to connect the
making of the contract with one place and its effects or
performance with another place. All these doctrines have
thoroughly failed.
A more attractive method is that of carefully investigating
and following up the presumable intention of the parties.
But where a real, though tacit, agreement of the parties is
lacking, such quest turns into a search for the most appropriate
connection between the dispositions of the parties and a
territory. Clues hinting at the law the parties might have
had in mind, are certainly not negligible; yet they have to
be integrated into the entire circumstances.
What, however, is the positive gain of this dispute? If all
mechanical rules are repudiated, does this mean that the
circumstances of every single contract should be examined
to find the most closely connected law? Some authors, led
by their regard for the hypothetical intention of the parties,
come near to such a view. Others want to recognize every
substantial territorial contact. In the United States, a place
has been sought where the law is most favorable to the validity of any obligation. Each of these suggestions contains
valuable material. But at the same time, the viewpoint of
the practical lawyer has been recently stressed by Griswold's
opposition to Cook's apparently unlimited dissolution of
fixed conflicts rules211 and Cavers' doubt whether the negative
criticism on Beale's rigidly dogmatic rules does not leave
judges helpless. 212
211 See the reply by W. W. CooK, 21 Can. Bar. Rev. (1943) 249 and in
37 Ill. L. Rev. (1943) 418.
212
CAVERS, supra n. 106.
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This reaction is sound, not implying a reproach to the
necessary clarification, but a suggestion for future policy.
If we could do no better than refer the courts to their own
estimates of what is in every single case the most closely
connected law, or what is appropriate to the case at bar, the
judges would soon fall back on their formulas.
A margin of judicial discretion, of course, must remain
so as to do justice to peculiar forms of contracts and individual
mentalities of parties. But roughly speaking, we need a
developed system of conflicts rules on contracts, rather than
just one or two rules, and we have to build it not on rules
so vague as to abandon the judge regularly to his worry
or fancy, nor on specifications so tight as to omit important
kinds of agreements. This program requires comparative
research in the municipal laws and in commercial practice
with respect to each single type of contract, a work so far
only partially started. Experience, however, seems to show
that commerce is served by a number of standard forms,
with newly devised clauses rapidly imitated throughout the
world. In the vast domain of sales of goods, differences in
stipulations are caused much more often by the natural
differences of merchandise sold than by local or national
predilection. Insurance, banking, carriage of goods contracts
may be distinguished in analogous groups under rational
rather than local criteria. For this and other reasons, it may
be less difficult than appears at first sight to resolve the local
attachments most characteristic of the individual groups of
contracts.
However, that not inconspicuous pains must be taken, can
be seen in the quick defeat of the proposed special rules for
various contract types, in the Institute for International Law.
Divergences of opinion were declared too profound, and,
indeed, many members were devoted to the principle of
nationality and hostile to party autonomy, prejudices which
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in themselves could wreck any international enterprise. In
addition the Institute stated that the matter was immature
and deferred discussion for an indefinite time. 213 Lists as
sketched in the reports to the Institute, in the Polish law,
or in the Montevideo Treaty are the unconvincing product
of divination rather than inquiry. Comparison of the actual
choice of law decisions in the Anglo-American, French, and
German courts, meritoriously begun by Bati:ffol, gives some
very valuable suggestions but no comprehensive certainty.
On the other hand, the successive drafts of conflicts rules
determining sales of goods elaborated in the International
Law Association and committees of the Sixth Hague Conference/14 show remarkable progress. The work to be done
is indeed vast. The present writer, in fact, does not believe
himself able, in a lonely study, to do more than to point out
a few examples and to suggest some methods of research.
2.

The Law of the Contract

The task ahead will be to aim at ascertainment, in case the
parties do not themselves choose their law, of what the main
local connection is under given conditions, or to express it
shortly:
In what jurisdiction a certain type of contract is centered.
If the elements of the contract in question allow it, its
connection with one law is very desirable. Almost all modern
writers are agreed on this point. To split the incidents in
the manner of the Restatement and the Swiss Federal Tribunal, or in that of the German Supreme Court, is a grievous
mistake, as was shown and will appear again later. That
various obstacles that have been raised in the literature to
the application of a unique law to this or that incidental
problem are unfounded, will be discussed in Chapter 32.
213
214

33 Annuaire (r9z7) III 224ff.
See the last draft in 7 Z.ausl.PR. (1933) 957·

CONTRACTS IN GENERAL
Formalities, it is true, should be treated with some liberality
(Chapter 3 r), while capacity should not be distinguished.
In the conviction that "depefage," division, is bad and unity
of contract is precious, we have been confirmed by a powerful
Jesson received from comparative research. The various legal
systems operate with different terminologies and techniques,
but in the hands of fair judges they usually work out all
right and to strikingly similar ends. To maintain such satisfactory machinery, however, we have to leave to one system
the entire living situation. Mixing several municipal provisions is quite likely to jeopardize justice.m
Of course, there are certain types of contracts, such as, for
instance, international loans with separate issues of "tranches"
in several countries and "payable" at several places, with
respect to which it would be a forced method to ignore the
several laws involved. There are also certain incidents such
as the examination of goods sold and delivered, or the time
and manner of payments, which are conveniently governed
by special laws.2J,6 Hence, it is generally the lex contractus,
or as we shall term it, the law of the contract, that must be
found. By exception we have to recognize either more than
one law of the contract, or in addition to this law, a special
law.
215
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See Ed. WAHL, 3 Z.ausl.PR. (1929) 782.
In continental Europe called statut special, Nebenstatut.
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Form of Contracts1
I.
I.

THE RuLES

Lex loci contractus

HE original doctrines of the statutists included in
the validity of a contract form as well as substance.
Hence, the law of the place of contracting, whether
considered as governing the entire contract or at least its
validity, covered the formalities for completing a valid
agreement, and it may be inferred that this very application
has always given the principle of lex loci contractus its most
convincing aspect. This ancient doctrine has retained its full
vigor in the basic American conflicts rule which, to believe
Beale, still prevails. According to the Restatement (§ 331,
b), the law of the place of contracting determines the validity
of a promise, as in other regards, also with respect to "the
necessary form, if any, required to make a promise binding."

T

2.

Locus regit actum

In the main development of the statutist doctrine, the
significance of the maxim, locus regit actum, from the sixteenth century on was reduced to the problems of form. 2 The
idea that an obligation originates in the territory of a sov1
(The form of negotiable instruments will not be included in the following
chapter, except by occasional mention, since this topic warrants a separate discussion.)
EDOUARD SILZ, Du domaine d'application de la regie "locus regit actum"
(Paris 19 3 3) ; RHEINSTEIN, 4 Rechtsvergl. Handworterbuch 3 6o-3 71 ; L. I.
BARMAT, De regel "locus regit actum" in het internationaal privaatrecht
(Amsterdam 1936).
2
On the history of the rules concerning formalities, see WAECHTER, 2 5 Arch.
Civ. Prax. (1842.) 368, 405; SAV!GNY § 382.; 1 BAR 337; NEUMEYER, 2.
Gemeinrechtliche Entwicklung 84, 87, 135; E. M. MEIJERS, Bijdrage tot de
geschiedenis van bet int. privaat- en strafrecht (1914) passim.
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ereign and therefore depends on the conditions imposed
there, retained greater force inapplication to the exterior conditions of contracting than for the capacity of the parties.
Others deduced the maxim from voluntary submission of the
parties, or from a general customary law. But finally, writers
have emphasized reasons of convenience, viz., that parties are
in the best position to learn what formalities the local law prescribes and can readily adjust themselves to these; that they
are not interested in other forms for their own sake; and may
well be uncertain with which law they should otherwise
comply. 3
(a) Compulsory rule. The theory that a contract is "born"
in a territory drew with it the logical necessity that the local
prescriptions govern the form. Hence, locus regit actum
acquired compulsory force. Whatever law may govern the
contract in other respects, the law of the place where it is
made always determines whether any formalities are obligatory, and if so, which are required. In this shape as imperative,
the rule was recognized for a long time in England/ and
appears in a number of countries. 6 The French courts, until
3

See LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIERE 273 § 243; BATIFFOL 363ff. §§ 424, 425.
Alves v. Hodgson (1797) 7 T. R. 241; Republica de Guatemala v. Nunez
[1927] 1 K. B. 66g, 691, both leading cases concerning the want of a stamp
locally required at a foreign place; WESTLAKE 281 § 209; DICEY 641 Rule
I59(2); FooTE 388.
Canada: Former Quebec practice: Furniss v. Larocque (r886) 2 Montreal
L. R. S. C. 405 (erroneously cited by DICEY 642 n. 2 as existing law).
5 Argentina: C. C. art. 12 and art. 916 (new 95o), cf. 2 VIco 280-285,
§§ 346-348, and cases collected by 2 Romero del Prado 306-31 o.
Bolivia: C. C. art. 3 6.
Brazil: In trod. Law ( 1916) art. I I; but see infra n. 1o.
Chile: C. C. art. 17.
Colombia: C. C. art. 2 1.
Cuba: C. Com. arts. 5 I, 52.
Guatemala: Law on Foreigners, 1936, art. 24 sentence 2.
Honduras: C. C. art. 16.
The Netherlands: Allg. Bepalingen (x829) art. ro according to the dominant opinion criticized by ]ITTA 138; KosTERS 185; OFFERHAUS, "The Private
International Law of the Netherlands," 30 Yale L. ]. ( 1920) I x6, but
historically grounded, see BARMAT, supra n. 1, I57· The Supreme Court, H.
R. (Dec. 6, I928) N. ]. (192.9) 465 avoided a direct answer.
4

FORM OF CONTRACTS

909, were divided on the question.<a
Transactions before consuls in foreign countries, of course,
follow the forms provided by the domestic law of the consul's
state.
(b) Optional rule. In a part of the old literature/ however, and in the course of the nineteenth century under
Savigny's influence/ the rule was more and more regarded
merely as a favor to the parties, as a permission to use the
local formalities or formlessness.
In a first variant expressing the rule, the lex loci contractus
was still given first place. The contract, as was said, should
be valid also if complying with the law governing the contract
as a whole. 9 Later, this order was reversed. The German
Introductory Law in I 896 formulated the rule thereafter
prevalent:
I

Art. I I (I ) The form of a transaction is determined by
the laws governing the legal relation that constitutes the
subject of the transaction. It is sufficient, however, to observe
the laws of the place where the transaction is made.
( 2) The provision of paragraph I, sentence 2, shall not
Peru: C. Com. art. 52.
Portugal: C. C. art. 24; C. Com. art. 4 (3) (doubtful).
Puerto Rico: C. C. art. I I ; C. Com. art. 83 n. z.
Rumania: Some decisions, see PLASTARA, 7 Repert. 77 No. 255.
Spain: C. C. art. 11 par. 1 (for public acts) generalized in the literature, see
TRiAs DE BEs, 6 Repert. 245 No. 65 and Revue I927, 23, 27 who recognizes
only certain exceptions. Accord, CASTAN ToBENAS, 1 Derecho Civil Espana!
(I943) IOI.
Switzerland: All problems of validity are governed by the lex loci contractus,
see supra p. 397 n. I6.
On the scope of some of these provisions, see infra n. 35·
6
For imperative character: Cour Paris (May 25, 1852) S. I852.2.289,
aff'd, Cass. (req.) (March 9, I853) S. I853.1.274, D. I853.I.216 and
others, cited by NIBOYET 676 § 553·
In Belgium: App. Bruxelles (Feb. 13, r889) Pasicrisie 1889.2.170.
7
See the learned report by the Procureur General Baudouin, in the case,
Gesling v. Viditz, infra n. ro, Clunet I 909, 1097, r I 13; cf, STORY§ 262, notes.
8
SAVIGNY § 381 note (p) with references to older authors.
9
Saxony: C. C. (I863) § 9·
Italy: C. C. (I86s) Disp. Prel. art. 9·
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apply to a transaction by which a real right 1s created or
disposed of.
In other words, the "lex causae'' is considered as governing in the first instance; but if its formal requirements are not
fulfilled, validity is saved by compliance with the local law.
This optional or permissive function of locus regit actum
has been adopted in the vast majority of modern doctrines
and enactments. 10 It has also been claimed to be the existing
law in England. 11
If we say that the parties are permitted to use the local
form, this does not necessarily require that they actually
know the differences of formal prescriptions or intentionally

°

1
Canada, Quebec: C. C. arts. 7, 776, as construed by the Supreme Court of
Canada, Ross v. Ross (1893) zs Can. Sup. Ct. 307.
Austria: OGH. (Nov. zo, I894) GIU. No. I5JOI; I EHRENSWEIG-KRAINZ
I09i WALKER 233·
Brazil: Former In trod. Law (I 9 I 6) : prevailing interpretation. See C.
BEVILAQUA, I C. C. Com. 133, obs. 1; BEVILAQUA 258; 1 PONTES DE MIRANDA
528; EsPINOLA, 8 Tratado 584ff.; CARVALHO SANTOS, I c. c. Interpret. I54
and others (against a small minority of writers); and the great majority of
court decisions, see more recently, App. Fed. Distr. (Sept. I4, I933) 28 Arch.
Jud. 473; App. Sao Paulo (Jan. I6, 1941) 130 Rev. Trib. Sao Paulo 655·
lntrod. Law (I942) art. 9 § I, as commented upon by EsPINOLA, 2 Lei
Introd. 586; SERPA LOPES, 2 Lei Introd. 347· Contra: TENORIO, Lei Introd.
2I9·
China: Int. Priv. Law, art. 1.6.
Costa Rica: C. C. art. 8.
France: Cass. (civ.) (July 2o, 1909) Gesling v. Viditz, D. 19II.I.I85, S.
I915.I.I65, Clunet I9o9, 1097, Revue I9o9, 9oo, recognizing validity of a will
under the testator's national law, but this is extended in the literature to all
contracts (NIBOYET 677 § 553, LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIERE 277 § 246) and to
every lex causae (BATIFFOL 366-367 § 429 against other writers); App. Alger
(May 26, I9I9) Revue I92I, II7, Clunet I9zo, 24I (will); Trib. civ. Seine
(Feb. 23, I92I) Revue I922, 621..
Germany: EG. BGB. art. I I; similarly, the former German common law:
App. Rostock (Nov. u, I866) 24 Senff. Arch. No. I85; RG. (April 27, r88l)
37 Senff. Arch. No. I; RG. (July 7, I883) I4 RGZ. I83.
Hungary: See ScHWARTZ, 40 Z.int.R. (I9z9) I99·
Italy: Disp. Pre!. (I942) art. 25.
Japan: Int. Priv. Law, art. 8.
Norway: See CHRISTIANSEN, 6 Repert. 571 No. 85.
Poland: Int. Priv. Law, art. 5·
Soviet Union: Probably, MAKAROV, Precis 25 3·
Sweden : See MALMAR, 7 Repert. I 35 § roo.
11
CHESHIRE 247, 248 terms it a fair conclusion.
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prefer the usages at the place where they happen to be. Although there were statutist writers who explained the rule,
locus regit actum, by self-subjection of the parties to the
consuetudo loci,12 it is well settled everywhere, excepting
a recent ill-advised English decision/ 3 that the rule in any
version operates independently of the intention of the
parties. 14
In either variant, at present, the scope usually is extended
to all transactions of private law with definite exceptions.
Thus, the German provisions except transactions modifying
the title to property, subjecting them to the lex situs. However, agreements to convey property, including immovables,
in modern law generally follow the rule, locus regit actum/ 5
But the Polish law and the Swiss doctrine and others also
refer to the lex situs obligations entered into to transfer or
to constitute rights in immovables situated in the forum.
These are rather regrettable rules, inviting conflicts to the
detriment of the parties acting in good faith.
Most codes, moreover, contain special rules for marriage,
adoption, wills, negotiable instruments, and other acts, which
are not included in the discussion here.

Illustration. Rhea agreed orally in South Dakota, for a
consideration of ten dollars, to convey his land situated in
Iowa to Meylink. The statute of frauds in South Dakota
"struck," as the Iowa Court expressed it, at the contract itself
and did not admit an exception in case of partial payment.
Under the Iowa statute, only the question whether the
contract was provable depended on a written document and
the payment of the ten dollars made the sales agreement
12

z

See, for instance, PAUL VOET, De statutis eorumque concursu, Sect. IX Cap.

§ 9 (to be found in SAVIGNY 4-88, tr. Guthrie) refuted by STORY § z6x.
13
In re Priest, Belfield v. Duncan [194-4-] I All E. R. p, per Bennett,].,

criticized by KAHN-FREUND, 7 Modern L. Rev. (Nov. I 94-4-) z 3 8.
14
Nice peripheral questions arising when parties temporarily dwell in a
foreign country have been treated by RAAPE 186.
15
This is also the well-known rule of English law, see DICEY 588, CHESHIRE
542.
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enforceable. The Supreme Court of Iowa applied this, its
own, law on the ground that lex situs governed the entire
contractual relation. 16
As we are not concerned now with the transfer of real
property, we shall set aside this construction and consider
the configurations arising if the obligatory contract to sell
an immovable is sharply separated and construed on its own
merits, as Mr. Justice Holmes once did,11 and many laws
do, following the advanced Roman system.
(i) Lex causae imperative. If the court had thus separated
the problems of obligation from those of title, it could have
nevertheless reached the same result, by application of the
Iowa law either as lex loci solutionis or as the law presumably
intended by the parties, assuming it to govern the entire
contractual relation. 18
(ii) Lex causae optional. German courts recognize an
agreement orally made in Germany by persons of any nationality, creating the obligation to transfer ownership, for
instance, of an Italian immovable, according to Italian law/ 9
although the German Civil Code, § 313, requires that an
agreement to transfer land be embodied in an instrument
drawn up by a court or notary. 20 (EG. BGB., art. I r, paragraph r, sentence r, supra p. 487)
(iii) Lex loci contractus optional. Conversely, where two
Germans in Austria agreed by simple written contract on
16 Meylink v. Rhea (I904) I23 Iowa Jio, JII, 98 N. W. 779> 78o. The
case is taken as an illustration only. We shall discuss sales contracts with respect to immovables in a special chapter in Volume III.
17
Polson v. Stewart (I897) I67 Mass. 2II, 2IJ, 45 N. E. 737, 738.
ts See Note, "Conflicts of laws as to contracts in relation to real property,"
L. R. A. I9I6A, IOII, I02.Iff.
19 Written form is sometimes claimed to be required by Italian C. C. art.
IJI4 (new IJ5o), also for the obligatory contract; but see FEDOZZI 251.
20 RG. (March 3, I 9o6) 63 RGZ. I 8 states the rule. Accordingly, OLG.
Miinchen (Feb. 7, I912.) 2.6 ROLG. 2.46: formless promise in Germany of a
trousseau valid although the governing Austrian law required notarial form,
see Law of July 2.5, I87I, RGB!. No. 76.
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the sale of a German immovable, the Austrian law of the
place of contracting sufficed to validate the act even before a
German court. 21 (EG. BGB., art. I I, paragraph I, sentence
2, supra p. 487)
(iv) Lex loci contractus obligatory. Under the doctrine
as it was formerly settled in England, compliance with the
formalities of lex loci contractus was necessary, hence all
solutions discussed above, except sub (iii), would be excluded.
The contracts in South Dakota and Germany would be unenforceable. It is very significant that, in the case of an agreement to sell land, an exception was recognized in England.
In this case, formal validity is said to be sufficiently supported
by the proper law of the contract, which in general, though
not necessarily, is the lex situs. 22
These few examples demonstrate the great interest parties
unaware of foreign law have in the rule and particularly
in its optional form.

3· Lex Causae
United States. Exactly what is the present rule in this
country? Story seemed favorable to the imperative lex loci
contractus with special reference to formalities. 23 Wharton
stated a practical concurrence of English and American jurists
in acknowledging the rule, locus regit actum, and only
doubted whether the rule was imperative or optional. 24 He
was followed by Mr. Justice Hunt, speaking for the
Supreme Court, who stated that "obligations in respect to
the mode of their solemnization are subject to the rule locus
regit actum.m 5 To some writers, reviewing the situation
21 KG. (March 19, 1925) 44 ROLG. 152 expressly denying the objection of
public policy; RG. (May 16, 1928) 121 RGZ. 154, 157 (Czechoslovakian
immovable).
22
DICEY 644 exception I to Rule 159; CHESHIRE 543-545·
28
STORY§ 260 cj. § 242a.
24
2. WHARTON 1436, 1438 §§ 676, 679.
25
Scudder v. Union Nat'l Bank (18 75) 91 U.S. 406, 41 I.
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from the angle of European doctrine, the cases appear
practically, though not by definition, to agree with the optional rule. 216 This, however, as a description of the existing
law, is certainly inaccurate.
With good reason, Lorenzen has always maintained that,
as in former times, form, unseparated from substance, is
governed by the general law of the contract, which need not
by any means be that of the place of contracting. 27 No modern
case has been found distinctly applying the law of the place
of making solely because formal validity was in question.
The decisions mostly involve the statute of frauds, immovables, insurance policies, conditional sales, and negotiable
instruments. We shall have to deal with each of these subjects later on. 28
Other countries. The Treaty of Montevideo applies its
principle of lex loci solutionis also to the problems of formal
validity, with the exception only that "the forms of public
instruments are governed by the law of the place in which
they are executed." 29 This exception has been criticized as
inconsistent with the principle and in the revision has been
reduced to the execution of the public forms prescribed by
the applicable law. 30 That obligations referring to immovables, though independent contracts, as remarked before,
are compulsorily subject to the lex situs, is provided in the
Polish law. 31
26 BATIFFOL 372 § 435; NUSSBAUM, 51 Yale L. }. (19tz) 893, 9o6if. and
Principles 148 § 15; HINRICHSEN, Die lex loci contractus im amerikanischen
Internationalprivatrecht (Heidelberg 19 3 3) 6.
27
LoRENZEN, 2o Yale L. J. (19II) at 427; 6 Repert. 317 No. 174; 15 Tul.
L. Rev. (1941) 165 at 173; Book Review, 57 Harv. L. Rev. (1944) IZ3;
see also GOODRICH 270 § 106.
28
On the Statute of Frauds, see infra II 2.
29 Treaty of Montevideo on Int. Civil Law (r889) art. 39 cf. p, following
the doctrine of Gonzalo Ramirez. See ALFREDO AROCENA, Los Actos Jurfdicos en
el Derecho lnternacional Privado ( 1896, reprint Montevideo 1941).
30
2 V1co 288 § 351; VIco, Report on the Revision of the Treaty, Republica
Argentina, Segundo Congreso Sudamericano (1940) 165; SALAZAR id. 207.
31
Poland: Int. Priv. Law, art. 6.
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4· Exceptional Rules
(a) National law. Some codifications, with the earlier
prevalence of the local law in mind, have offered as an
alternative only that the form agree with the common national law of all parties. 32 Diverse codes derive therefrom
a triple option: the form may comply with any of three
laws, that governing the whole transaction, or that of the
place of making, or the national law of all parties. 33
(b) Cumulated tests. The C6digo Bustamante declares
that "the law of the place of contracting and that of performance shall be applied simultaneously to the necessity of executing a public indenture or document for the purpose of giving effect to certain agreements and to that of reducing them
to writing." This seems to mean that, instead of favoring the
contract by an alternative, the requirements are cumulated. 84
This definitely is a cumbersome solution.
(c) Law of the forum. Using a method of reserving application of the lex fori, described earlier, several Latin-American enactments, headed by the Chilean Code, which followed
an Austrian suggestion, impose their internal formalities on
contracts "destined to have effect" in the state, a formula
which would seem to presuppose a place of performance
at the forum, but sometimes appears to require no more
32
Belgian Congo: C. C. art. 11 par. r.
Greece: Formerly C. C. (I856) art. 7 for Greeks abroad.
Italy: Formerly Disp. Prel. (I86s) art. 9 par. I, c. Com. art. s8.
Spanish Morocco: Int. Priv. Law. art. I9, and Tanger: Int. Priv. Law, art.
1 o for transactions of foreigners in the zones.
33
Greece: C. C. (I 940) art. 1 1.
Italy: Disp. Prel. (I 942) art. 25.
French Morocco: Int. Priv. Law, art. 1 o knows even four possibilities for
validity, viz., the laws of nationality of the parties, those of France, those of the
Protectorate, and the laws and customs of Morocco.
34
Codigo Bustamante, art. 1 8o. DE BusTAMANTE, Manual 281 § I 14 gives
no reason. Probably to the same effect, the new Brazilian In trod. Law (I 942)
prescribing Brazilian forms, infra n. 35, nevertheless requires observation of
the law of the place of contracting.
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than a law suit for enforcement at the forum.s.s This is also
provided in Georgia.36 An illustration has been given by a
Chilean writer: a contract of partnership, executed in France
by private instrument, is without value in Chile where solemn
execution is required. 37
On the other hand, we may recall those codes that uphold
the validity of contracts agreeing with the law of the forum. 58
Sometimes these code provisions have been understood to
cover only formal requirements. 39
The Civil Code of Mexico gives an option between the
law of the place of contracting and the national law of the
forum to be exercised only when persons domiciled in the
35
Brazil: Introd. Law (I942) art. 9 § r, a most confusing provision, seems
to envisage contracts performable in Brazil and to provide that they must
follow the formalities compulsorily prescribed in Brazil (forma essencidl). See
TENORIO, Lei Introd. 2r8; SERPA LOPEs, 2 Lei Introd. 347; probably also
ESPINOLA, 2 Lei Introd. 603. But Dr. Frazao orally advises caution, because
forma essencidl might be reasonably understood as referring to the necessity of
a public instrument only and, hence, might be applicable exclusively to contracts for the transfer or constitution of rights in immovables, under C. C. art.
I

34 II.

Costa Rica: C. C. art. 8 par. I .
Guatamala: Law on Foreigners of 1936, art. 24 sent. 2.
Nicaragua: C. C. VI (I4) par. x.
Panama: C. C. art. 7.
Venezuela: C. C. ( 1942) art. 11 par. 1.
With special regard to public documents:
Chile: C. C. art. I 8.
Ecuador: C. C. art. 1 7.
El Salvador: C. C. art. r6.
Honduras: C. C. art. I 6.
Uruguay: See GUILLOT, 1 C. C. 123.
Perhaps also VALERY 1223 § 873 and his Note, Clunet I922, 990 has been
influential on some of these laws.
Colombia: C. C. art. 22 replaces the reference to be found in the Chilean
Code to "proofs which shall have effect in Chile," by reserving "matters of national competence"; 2 RESTREPO HERNANDEZ 45-47 § 1031 asserts that this
reduced role of the lex fori is justified, but is it clear?
36
Georgia: Code Ann. (1933) § 102-108.
37 G. PALMA RoGERS, I Derecho Comercial (I 940) 312.
38
Austria: All g. BGB. §§ 35-3 7·
Argentina: C. C. art. 14 (4).
39 See, e.g., 1 EHRENZWEIG-KRAINZ I I o § 30 in reference to § 35 of the
Austrian AUg. BGB.

FORM OF CONTRACTS

495

forum contract abroad for performance within the forum.~
This awkward legislation causes many doubts.
(d) Preponderance of lex causae. A few European writers
have postulated a general subordination of the local law to
the lex causae. 41 French authors, in particular, have been
preoccupied by the formalities of marriage, conceiving lex
causae and national law as identical, and have requested that
solemnities should always be prescribed by the lex causae;
the lex loci contractus should intervene only for determining
the acts by which or the manner in which a solemnity can be
executed. 42 Following this current, the Institute of International Law in r927 adopted a set of rules by which the
law governing the substance of a transaction not only may
dispense it from solemnities required by the local lawwhich does not go beyond the optional meaning of locus regit
actum---but also may "expressly," though not by mere
construction, impose an "authentic," i.e., public, act not required locally. 43 Of course, the C6digo Bustamante, art. I 8o,
goes beyond this restriction upon the local law, providing
quite generally that both the law of the place of contracting
and that of its "ejecuci6n"-which probably 111eans performance-shall be applied simultaneously to the necessity
of properly executing a public indenture or document.
In the field of obligatory contracts, such theses seldom
have been put into actual practice. At most, there are instances
like the following. The German Reichsgericht has reasonably
argued that parties selecting the applicable law are supposed
to leave to this law, which is the lex causae, the decision
0

40

Mexico: C. C. (I928) art. IS.
In particular for the protection of the national law, I FRANKENSTEIN 522;
DEVos, I6 Revue Inst. Beige (1930) 133 at ISS and writers cited therein.
42
z ARMINJON 135 § 59 with references. Contra: especially LEREBOURSPIGEONNIERE 367 § 3I5 who observes that the parties cannot know which law
will govern.
43 Annuaire I927 III 185, 317, 335 {art. VI). To a similar effect, Belgian
revised draft, art. IO, NEUMANN, IPR. 20I.
41
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whether it recognizes the maxim, locus regit actum. 44 Another
case has aroused much attention. Membership in a German
private limited company ( Gesellschaft mit beschrankter H aftung) cannot be transferred except by a public instrument.
At a time when this type of corporation had not yet been
adopted in Switzerland, a transfer of such a membership
was made there by simple written contract, under the general
Swiss rule that contracts need no form. A German court
invalidated the contract on the ground of German public
policy discarding the rule, locus regit actum. 45 Others attained
the same result by the argument that the Swiss law of the
time had no provision at all for this specific type of contract. 46
The local law, thus, would only be applicable, if it recognizes
the same kind of contract. This proposition, however, is
strikingly inconsistent with the assumption that parties may
evade the most solemn formalities of the lex causae by
using less or no formality under the law of the place where
they are. In fact, the decision should have been justified
on a third basis. The formal and substantive requirements
of transfer of membership do not pertain to the scope of
obligatory contracts but are a part of the personal law of
the corporation. German law, hence, determined imperatively
the formal conditions of a change in the membership; and
contrary to the Reichsgericht, it should not make any difference what formality is prescribed by the present Swiss
law in the case of Swiss private limited companies.
II. ScoPE oF THE RuLEs
I.

Concept of Formal Requirements

There is practically no doubt that the concept of form
includes the problems whether oral conclusion suffices or
44
45

RG. (Feb. 27, I9I3) Warn.Rspr. I913, No. 302..
0LG. Karlsruhe (July n, I90I) 3 ROLG. z63, II Z.int.R. 458; NIEMEYER, Das. IPR. des BGB. I I 6. Contra: RAAPE I 89.
46
RG. (March :u, 1939) 160 RGZ. 225, zz8, evidently following the views
of I FRANKENSTEIN 201 n. 156; LEWALD 69 No. 91.
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there is required written documentation, use of certain words,
signature with one's own hand, seal; co-operation of a public
official, such as authentication of signatures and minutes of
declarations of consent, taking oaths, or entry in a public
register; presence of witnesses; service of declaration by
registered mail, or by a sheriff or marshal, et cetera. On
the other hand, it is also certain that formality has nothing
to do with capacity to contract / 7 with agency; with the questions whether an obligation is created by a unilateral declaration, and whether declarations must reach the addressee in
order to be effective; with the rules of evidence; and with
the consent of third parties, called in certain countries "forme
habilitante." It is obvious that formal in contrast with substantive requirements are concerned with the exterior of
contractual declarations, the means of expressing consent.
However, the border lines between form and substance are
not free from uncertainty in all laws, and this gives the
dominant theory one more opportunity to entrust to the
domestic law of the forum the power to decide what should
be form in the meaning of the conflicts rule/ 8 The opposite
theory of characterization, according to the law referred to,
results in applying the municipal provisions of the law at the
place of making to those problems which are considered problems of form at this place. 49 In the writer's opinion, the precise domain of form must be defined, for the purpose of
conflicts law, according to the common denominator of what
is regarded as form in the various municipal systems: Form is
47
It is true, there is a theory of a few French writers that such a provision as
that requiring promises of gift to be in writing (French C. C. art. 9 3 I ; German
BGB. § 5 I 8 and many other codes) involves the capacity of the donor rather
than form and hence are subject to his national law. See 2 LAURENT 433ff.
§§ 24off., 6 id. 693 § 4I 7; LEON DuGUIT, Des conflicts de legislations relatifs
a la forme des actes civils (Paris I 882) I I 3 (unavailable); PoULLET § 289;
ROLIN, Annuaire I925, 228; NIBOYET 66o-66I § 537· This has been generally
recognized as an error. See e.g., PILLET, 2 Traite 459 § 623; WEISS, 3 Traite
I I I; KosTERS I 90; ARMIN JON, 2 Precis§ 59·
48
NIEMEYER, Das IPR. I I I; LEWALD 65; MELCHIOR I43 § 98; NussBAUM,
D. IPR. 89; RAAPE I74 and D. IPR. I3I (with uncertain restrictions).
4
~ M. WOLFF, IPR. 78.
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the external side of the making of the contract, the expression
as opposed to the content of legal declarations. A separate rule
for "form" as contrasted with "substance" of the contract
is only justified, if at all, by the relatively minor importance
of the manners of expression. If the Dutch Code provides-to
use the most celebrated example, although it deals with
wills and not with contracts-that a Dutchman should not
make a testament in a foreign country by private document,
this regards form. To characterize this provision as one restricting capacity to make a will, as many French writers
have done, is a plain artifice, which no Dutch lawyer employs.50 In reality, the Dutch conflicts rule permitting local
foreign forms is discarded in this case. Other countries may
or may not give effect to this prohibition by adjusting their
conflicts rules, as a matter of international policy. But it is
difficult to see why they should yield to this exorbitant Dutch
pretension. All countries have a stake in the security of
transactions, not to be disturbed by willful national claims.
Still less, are singular national "characterizations" entitled
to extraterritorial recognition. It is a perfect parallel to the
controversial character of compulsory religious marriage. 51
Hence, if the law of the place of contracting, that governing
the contract, or that of the forum should have developed some
extraordinary method of tracing the border line between
form and capacity or other substantive incidents, this is immaterial for the scope of the conflicts rule relating to form.
2.

Form and Procedure52

(a) Statute of Frauds. The variants in which the old
Statute of Frauds (I 677) 53 reappears in British and American
50

See MELCHIOR 143 § 98.
See citations Vol. 1 pp. 2 I 4-2 I 6.
52 It is not intended to deal here with those contracts made for procedural
purposes previous to or during a lawsuit, such as submission to arbitration or
to a state court, confession, release, waiver of remedies. They involve particular
conflicts problems not thoroughly investigated thus far.
53
29 Car. z, c. 3, s. 4·
51
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4

statutes/ all contain formal requirements, if judged according to the normal conceptions of a modern lawyer, and
therefore have to be taken as subject to the conflicts rules
concerning form. It does not matter how a statute of frauds
is treated for particular purposes of municipal law in the
positive practice of courts. This, indeed, agrees with the conclusion of recent English and American writers, 55 strengthened by the French parallels to be discussed hereafter, as
well as with the prevailing attitude of American cases. 56 In this
country, Leroux v. Brown57 and the American cases following
this ill-famed precedent or other mistaken theories 58 should
no longer continue to be held as authority. 59 The arguments
underlying the better modern approach have been vigorously
expounded in Lorenzen's excellent papers 60 and more recently
summarized by the Delaware Superior Court: 61 ( r) It assures
more security for the inhabitants of a state to know that all
contracts made in such state either must be written or may
54
On the maximum amounts for oral agreements in the various jurisdictions
of the British Commonwealth and the United States, see RABEL, I Recht des
Warenkaufs I I o-I I z. For a summary of American cases, see PARMELE, "Statute
of Frauds and conflict of laws," I05 A. L. R. (I936) 6sz-68I; DOBBINS,
"Conflict of Laws-Statute of Frauds as Defense to Enforcement of Contract
Executed in One State and Sued on in Another State. [Illinois]," 3 Wash. and
Lee L. Rev. (I 94 I) I 03; BRIDGFORTH, "The Mississippi Statute of Frauds
in the Conflict of Laws," I4 Miss. L. J. (I942) zs6; Note, 6 Md. L. Rev.
(r94z) z62.
55
BECKETT, CHESHIRE, LORENZEN, CHEATHAM, BEALE, GOODRICH cited
Vol. I p. so. This was also STORY's well-known position (ed. x, 1834)
§ z6z, and that of z WHARTON § 690 and THAYER, Preliminary Treatise on
Evidence 39off.
56
Cochran v. Ward (189z) 5 Ind. App. 89, z9 N. E. 795; Franklin Sugar
Refining Co. v. Lipowicz (I9z8) Z47 N.Y. 465, I6o N. E. 9I6 with ample
references; Oakes v. Chicago Fire Brick Co. (I941) 311 Ill. App. III, 35 N. E.
( zd) 5 22 following "the weight of authority."
57
(r8sz) 12 C. B. Sox.
58
LORENZEN, "The Statute of Frauds and the Conflict of Laws," 32 Yale
L. J. (r9z3) JII, 315-318; STUMBERG 137-141.
59
Because of uncertain arguments in a few cases, noted in 3 Wash. and Lee
L. Rev. (194I) IOJ; 14 Miss. L. J. (194Z) Z56; 6 Md. L. Rev. (I94Z) z6z,
some annotators have assumed a continued grave division of opinion.
60
LORENZEN, supra n. 58.
<ll Lams et ux. v. Smith Co. (r935) 36 Del. 477, 178 Atl. 651; the importance of this decision has been noted 105 A. L. R. (I936) 646; Clunet 1937,
873 with Note by Barbey; BARBEY, Le Conflit 94> 97·
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be oral, respectively; (z) while England has one statute
of frauds, there are as many as there are jurisdictions in
this country; and (3) the fate of a contract ought not to
depend on selecting a court before which to bring the suit.
As the significance of this classification has been treated on
an earlier occasion,S 2 it remains only to illustrate the practical
e:ffects by a few cases.

(i) Goods of more than fro value were sold in England
without a memorandum in writing. Although English courts
may regard the unenforceability of an action on the contract
as lack of a remedy, foreign courts have to apply section 4
of the English Sale of Goods Act as a part of English law,
deemed to govern the form. 63
(ii) An oral agreement was entered into in Tennessee,
to sell a quantity of cheese free on board cars in Wisconsin.
The amount involved exceeded the permitted scope of an
executory oral contract under Wisconsin law. The Wisconsin
court held the contract governed by the law of Tennessee
because it was so intended by the parties, and therefore valid. 64
(iii) Even though the forum were to characterize its own
statute of frauds as "procedural," it will confine this characterization to the purposes of domestic private and procedural law. It will not apply this statute to contracts the
form of which is regarded as governed by foreign law.
That courts in this field would tend to uphold the contract
by the means of choice of law cannot fairly be stated. Most
cases have been of such nature as to justify in the opinion
of the courts the application of the law of the place of contracting, often identical with the law of the forum. 65 Other
62

63

Vol.

I,

so-s2.

32 Yale L. J. (1923) 311 at 315.
D. Canale & Co. v. Pauly & Pauly Cheese Co. (1914) 155 Wis. 541, I45
N. W. 372.
65
Resulting in validity: Hunt v. Jones (I879) I2 R.I. 265, 34 Am. Rep.
635; Perry v. Mount Hope Iron Co. (I886) IS R. I. 38o, 2 Am. St. Rep.
902; J. H. Ellis and Cap Baker v. The Eagle-Picher Lead Co. (I924) II6
Kan. I44> 225 Pac. 1072; Straesser-Arnold Co. v. Franklin Sugar Refining
64

LoRENZEN,
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decisions favor the law of the place of performance over the
lex loci contractus for various reasons. 66
(b) Exclusion of nonwritten evidence. The French Civil
Code (art. 1341) provides that any transaction exceeding
the value of (originally) one hundred fifty francs must be
executed before a notary or by private writing, and that no
proof by witnesses is accepted. This provision has been widely
imitated, with many variants in civil and commercial laws.
Testimony may be entirely excluded, as under the former
Russian law; or some mention of the agreement in a letter
suffices as a "commencement" of proof which may be completed by testimony; or the agreement is enforceable, if the
other party admits its making. Also in France witnesses may
be admitted to testify to a commercial agreement in the discretion of the court. 67
In the French tradition, stemming from the fourteenth
century, all these provisions belong to the group of decisoria
litis, contrasted with ordinatoria: they are not merely destined
to regulate the course of proceeding but also to decide the
substance of the suit. In this conception repeatedly pronounced by the French Supreme Court and shared by the
overwhelming majority of the Latin countries, legal presumptions, judicial confession, and certain kinds of party
oaths terminating litigation, also are substantive matters and
governed by the lex causae, at least to the extent that none
Co. (1925) 8 F. (zd) 6o1; and particularly Lams et ux. v. Smith Co. (1935)
supra n. 61.
Resulting in unenforceability: Dacosta and Davis v. Davis and Hatch (1854)
24 N.J. Law (4 Zab.) 319; Cochran v. Ward (1892) 29 N. E. 795; Osborne
v. Dannatt (1914) 167 Iowa 615, 149 N. W. 913 (Nebraska law).
66
See for a list PARMELE, supra n. 54, 105 A. L. R. (1936) 675-677.
Garnes v. Frazier & Foster (Ky. 1909) 118 S. W. 998 rejects the action on
the basis of the law of the forum which was also that of the place of performance as against the lex loci contractus of West Virginia. The court seems
to construe the defense as a remedy depriving the plaintiff of a cause of action.
61
See the survey in RABEL, 1 Recht des Warenkaufs 108-110.
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of these procedural means is admissible unless it is permitted
by the law governing the substance.68
This theory of "preconstituted proofs" certainly extends
the domain of substantive law further and restricts that of
procedure more than the common law or the laws of Northern
and Central Europe can concede. A French writer, on the
background of comparative research, suggests in fact the
elimination of such institutions as confession and oath from
the doctrine.69
But, notwithstanding some doubts in past times 70 and
isolated opposition by modern writers/ 1 the rules restricting
testimony by witnesses in favor of written documentation
generally enjoy classification as pertaining to formalities in
the meaning of conflicts law. 72 This is a very interesting fact.
It is quite true that the idea of legislators drafting such
provisions centers in the procedural situation of a suit on
the contract; originally they attempted to obviate perjury
68
Cass. (civ.) (February 23, 1864) D. 1864.1.166, s. 1864.1.385; and
many other decisions, particularly Cass. (civ.) (June 14, 1899) Abdy v. Abdy,
S. 1900.1.22.5, Clunet 1899, 8o4 followed in the same cause by Cass. (civ.)
(Feb. 6, 1905) D. 1905.1.481, S. 1907.1.393, Clunet 1906, 4IZ. Cf. PILLET,
Note, S. 1900.1.225; SURVILLE 667 n. 3; NIBOYET 678 § 557; LEREBOURSPIGEONNJERE 3 70 § 318; BATIFFOL 3 76 § 442. And see for the application of
the Ordonnance de Mou:\ns, xs66, art. 54> precursor of c. c. art. 1341, DANTY,
Traite de la preuve par te;noins (ed. 6, 1769) 49 No. 11.
69
BATIFFOL 377 § 444·
70
Obertribunal Stuttgart (Sept. 25, 1858) 13 Seuff. Arch. No. 182, cited
by LORENZEN, 32 Yale L. J. (1923) at 319 n. 31 and 334 n. 8r is not representative of the German doctrine.
71
FRANKENSTEIN 364-370 and in JW. 1929, 3506; RAAPE 175, later abandoned, D. IPR. 132.
72
'See the long list of writers, collected by LORENZEN, 32 Yale L. J. (1923)
at 329 n. 66.
Germany: 2 BAR 377 § 39H KG. (Oct. 25, 1927) JW. 1929, 448, IPRspr.
1929 No. 7 (oral agreement in Russia exceeding value of soo gold rubles;
Soviet Code of Civil Procedure applied); RABEL, 5 Z.ausl.PR. (1931) 280
and authors cited; NussBAUM, D. IPR. 90; RAAPE, D. IPR. r p, 2.
Greece: App. Athens (3r8/r934) cited by FRAGISTAS, 10 Z.ausl.PR. (1936)
644.
Poland: S. Ct. (Nov. 18, 1936) 4 Z.osteurop.R. (1938) 380.
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by bribed witnesses. But, as the French Advocate General
in a learned report of I 8 So remarked, in the eyes of the
parties making a contract, the problem is whether they must
reduce it to writing. 73 This, however, is enough of a form
problem for the purposes of conflicts law, despite the fact
that admission of a witness is certainly a judicial act.
Lorenzen has correctly co-ordinated this indirect compulsion to writing with the statutes of frauds, both to
be treated under the conflicts rule concerning formalities.
Johnson, too, writing in Quebec, has seen the analogy of
the two institutions (which in reality rests upon a close
historical connection), and, after hesitating between Leroux
v. Brown and the French doctrine, wisely preferred the
latter. 74
(c) Parol evidence. In England and the United States,
the rules excluding parol evidence controverting the text
of written contracts have sometimes been construed as remedial, 75 but the great weight of authority classifies them as
substantive for the purpose of conflicts law. 76 This sound view
agrees with the Continental theory. 77
3· Form and Revenue Law
A vivid discussion went on for a time between followers
of the idea that the revenue laws of a foreign state are not
73
Proc. Gen. Desjardin in the case Benton v. Horeau, Cass. (civ.) (August
24, 188o) D. 188o.1.447, Clunet 188o, 48o.
74
3 JOHNSON 704-724. Historical analysis, as I may add, joins the English
and French legislation in an unsuspected relationship. The Statute, in fact, was
inspired by the French Ordonnance de Moulins of A. D. 1566, art. 54, predecessor of arts. IJ+Iff., C. C., and both to a large extent had the very purpose of
prescribing formalities. See RABEL, "The Statute of Frauds and Comparative
Legal History," 63 Law Q. Rev. (1947) 174·
75
Downer v. Chesebrough (1869) 36 Conn. 39,4 Am. Rep. 29.
76
Dunn v. Welsh (1879) 62 Ga. 241; Baxter Nat'l Bank v. Peter S. J.
Talbot (1891) 154 Mass. 213, 28 N. E. 163; Restatement§ 599; THAYER,
Preliminary Treatise on Evidence (1898) 390; WIGMORE, 5 Evidence (ed.
z, 1923) § 24oo; GooDRICH 209 § 86; STUMBERG q6.
77
See French C. C. art. I 341 and its literature cited above.
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to be enforced/ 8 and the advocates of locus regit actum. The
former denied/ 9 the latter recommended80 the rejection of
contracts that are declared void for want of a stamp at the
place of making. Older English decisions have recognized
the invalidity imposed by the law of the place of contracting. 81 But in the field of bills of exchange where the question
is more important, the British Bills of Exchange Act of I 8 82
departed from this view,S 2 and the Geneva Convention of
1930 concerning stamp laws, adopted by many countries,S 3
pronounced that the validity or the exercise of the rights
flowing from such instrument shall not be subordinated to
the observance of the provisions concerning the stamp.
It seems high time to generalize this sound principle, in
agreement with the American cases. Since one of the two
conflicting views must yield, it stands to reason that laws
clinging to fiscal sanctions against the security of contracts
should be internationally ignored.
78
In re Visser, H. M. The Queen of Holland v. Drukker [1928] Ch. 877;
Moore v. Mitchell ( 1929) 30 F. (2d) 6oo, note opinion of Learned Hand, J.,
reproduced by 3 BEALE 1637.
79
United States: Ann. Cas. I 9 I 5 B 844, Ludlow v. Van Rensselaer ( r8o6)
I Johns. Cas. (N.Y.) 94; Skinner v. Tinker (N.Y. r86r) 34 Barb. S.C. 333·
Italy: App. Napoli (Dec. 29, I926) I9 Rivista (1927) 268.
80
NusSBAUM, D. IPR. 89 n. 2, 319 n. 5 cites and approves a few Continental
cases; FEDOZZI 255 and GooDRICH 271 approve the older English view.
81
Alves v. Hodgson (I 797) 7 T. R. 241 at 243 by Kenyon, C. J. "Then
it is said that we cannot take notice of the revenue laws of a foreign country;
but I think we must resort to the laws of the country in which the note was
made, and unless it be good there it is not obligatory in a court of law here."
Clegg v. Levy (r8r2) 3 Camp. r66; Bristow v. Sequeville (r85o) 5 Ex. D.
275; Republica de Guatemala v. Nuiiez [1927] r K. B. 669. In case the
foreign law declares only that an unstamped contract is inadmissible as proof,
the English courts applied their procedural theory of disregarding the foreign
rule of evidence, James v. Catherwood (r823) 3 D. & R. I9o; In re Visser,
H. M. The Queen of Holland v. Drukker [1928] Ch. 877. See DICEY 704
note (9); CHESHIRE 245·
82
45 & 46 Viet., British Bills of Exchange Act, 18 82, c. 6I, s. 72 ( 1) (a)·
Canada: An Act relating to Bills of Exchange, Cheques and Promissory
Notes, Rev. Stat. I927, c. I6 s. I6o (a).
83 Convention concerning Stamp Laws in connection with Bills of Exchange
and Promissory Notes, Geneva, June 7> 1930; HUDSON, 5 Int. Legislation 560
No. 26o; see literature cited Vol. 1 p. 34·
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4· Determination of the Place of Contracting
The question where to locate the place of contracting
again arises, with all its grave difficulties.
(a) Contract by correspondence. On the ground of the
usual characterization "according to the lex fori," a contract
is considered made at the place where the final act necessary
under the law of the forum for completing the consent is
done. 84 We have discussed this approach before. 85 It may
suffice to remember that under this method a German court
should ascertain a place of contracting in the United States
by consulting the German Civil Code. By another approach,
out of sheer dogmatism, cumulative application of the consent
requirements in both domiciliary laws has been advocated. 86
Continued discussion of the problem has fostered more
proposals and a more complex situation. 87 A unilateral act,
however, such as giving notice to a debtor or making a binding
offer, though usually becoming legally significant only upon
its reception, is generally held in conflicts law to have occurred at the place where it is sent. 88
This confusion is incurable. The maxim, locus regit actum,
was not invented for contracts or acts by correspondence, any
more than was the lex loci contractu.>. If it is to be practicable
in our time, it ought to be appropriately modified.
84

United States: Stevenson v. Lima Locomotive Works (Tenn. 1943) 172
S. W. (zd) 812; 2 BEALE 1o69ff. §§ 325.1, 326.r.
Germany: RG. (Feb. u, 19o6) 62 RGZ. 379, 381 (where the acceptance
is declared in the case of§ I5I BGB., cf. LEWALD 7off.); RG. (Jan. 29, I9oi)
1 2 Z.int.R. 113 (where the formal act is completed) ; GEILER in I DiiringerHachenburg 55 n. 20.
5
R Contra: RAAPE 178; supra Chapter 30 pp. 452ff.; in this special field the
theory of Bartin was theoretically attacked by MARCEL VAUTHIER, Sens et
applications de Ja regie locus regit actum (Bruxelles 1926) Iorff.
86
1 BAR 361; NIEDNER, EG. BGB. art. rr; 2 ZITELMANN I64; RAAPE, D.
IPR. IJo; also OLG. Celle (Nov. 7, I879) 35 Seuff. Arch. No. 89. Contra:
NEUMEYER, 22 Z.int.R. (r9rz) 519.
87
See the hard task faced by RAAPE I 78-181.
88
HABICHT 89; WALKER 229; NEUMEYER, lPR. 14; FRANKENSTEIN 545;
RAAPE 177 and D. IPR. qo.
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(b) Determination by the parties. If the parties agree
that their contract should be deemed to be made at a certain
place, while they make the contract at another place, the
local law of the place indicated is not able to prevail over
both the law of the real place of contracting and that governing the contract. But it may, and generally will, be itself
the lex causae, by virtue of the party agreement. This is a
controversial consideration, however, with respect to signatures on negotiable instruments, if they need the indication of a place of issuance and name an agreed location. 89

III.

OPERATION oF THE RuLEs

r. Solemnities Prescribed by Lex Causae
Even though a court may follow exclusively the formal
requirements of the law governing the entire contract-as
American courts do-it has to account for local differences
in particulars. Therefore the following rule of the Restatement is true beyond its intended scope:

"§ 335· The law of the place of contracting determines
whether an instrument alleged to be a contract under
seal is effectively sealed; whether it is duly executed and
delivered...."
This rule is meant pleonastically to explain the principle
that formal validity is altogether determined by the law of
the place of contracting. However, it must apply also to
some effect when, contrary to the Restatement, another law
governs validity and requires an instrument under seal.
On the other hand, contracts governed by the law of the
forum and thereby needing some publicity, may be executed
outside the state in an analogous but not identical manner.
89
Germany: RG. {Jan. 15, 1894) 32 RGZ. IIS, 117. On the controversy
and the position of the Geneva Convention of 1930, see BRACCO, La Legge
Uniforme sulla cambiale (1935) 27; SCHNITZER, Handelsr. 383.
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This, in fact, seems to be the meaning of the elaborate provisions commonly found in American statutes, declaring what
officers may take acknowledgments outside the state in the
United States and without the United States. 90 New York
has a long list of such foreign officers, qualified according
to different countries. 91 Only in Ohio is it expressed that
"any instrument in conformity with the law of the foreign
country is valid," 92 but if Oregon declares it unnecessary
for the instrument to state that "it is executed according to
the laws of the country where made,m 3 the idea evidently
is prevalent that a deed acknowledged before a consul of the
United States, a French notary, or a German court is sufficient
at the forum, if the officer conforms to his own law. The main
importance of these provisions concerns their application to deeds disposing of real estate in the state, but is not
confined to them.
The same is true in civil law countries, at least to the
extent that, if in one country notarial form is prescribed, a
notarial document of another is satisfactory despite differences
of officers, recitals, witnesses, signatures, and recording. 94
Even under a conflicts rule such as that of Venezuela requiring public instruments or private documentation according
to its own Civil Code/ 5 it may be presumed that these writings can be drawn up according to the local style. The new
text of the Montevideo Treaty expressly provides that the
90

See CARL LOUIS MEIER, Anderson's Manual for Notaries Public (Cincin1 940) §§ 1 6zff.
91
New York: Book 49, Real Property Law (McKinney 1936) § 301, Book
49, Real Property Law (McKinney 1944) §§ 301, 301a.
92
Ohio: Gen. Code Ann. (Page 1938) § 8516, Rev. Stat.§ 4111.
93
Oregon: 5 Compiled Laws Ann. (1940) § 70-116, Code (1930) § 63-114,
L. 1907, c. 169 § I p. 325·
94
Universal doctrine, evidently meant to be expressed in the Brazilian Introductory Law (1942) art. 9 § 1. See, e.g., 2 BAR 379 § 397; NIBOYET 66o
§§ 535> 536; HABICHT 87.
95
Venezuela: C. C. ( 1942) art. 1 r par. z.
Costa Rica: C. C. art. 8. par. 2.
nati
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formalities pertaining to the class or "quality" of instruments
required by the governing law (which is always the lex loci
solutionis) is determined by the law of the place of contracting (art. 36).
Very cautious provisions looking in the same direction
are contained in the Protocol on Uniformity of Powers of
Attorney, sponsored by the Pan-American Union, of which
the United States is a member.96
It is regrettable that numerous European writers have confused these obvious rules by talking of the "imperative
character" of locus regit actum, because a notary has necessarily to follow the procedure prescribed by his own law. 97
In reality, the principal function of locus regit actum is not
even in question, but, on the one hand, internal rules are
construed so as to permit authentication by foreign officials/ 8
and, on the other hand, the foreign official obeys the regulations of his own state by virtue of administrative rather than
conflicts law. 99
An important doubt has been raised, however, concerning
the equivalence of the institutions for securing evidence. In
France, from Roman times, and in many other countries
by old, if less venerable, tradition, notaries form a veritable
profession of accepted standing with proper education, organization, and discipline. Their intervention in the drawing
of minutes and records implies a certain investigation into
the physical and mental state of the parties appearing and
affords certain guarantees beyond the identification of persons. The question is whether notaries public or other officers
96
56 Stat. I376, arts. V, IX, X, 36 Am. J. Int. Law (I94z) Supp. at I95>
I 96. See supra p. I 96 n. I IS·
97
2 LAINE 409 § 226; DESPAGNET 663ff. § 2 I 7; Institute of International
Law, Draft I9Z7, Annuaire I927 III 335 art. 4·
98
NEUMEYER, Annuaire I 927 Ill 169, 171; NussBAUM, D. IPR. 94; BARMAT, supra n. I, 358.
99
NEUMEYER, Annuaire I927 III I70i BARMAT, supra n. I, 133, 359·
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in the Anglo-American countries, in Denmark, Sweden, and
others, can replace a French notary or a German notary or
court not only in authenticating signatures, which is unchallenged, but also in establishing a French ccacte authentique''
or a German "offentliche Beurkundung eines Rechtsgeschafts.moo
In the United States, acknowledgments may be taken in
all jurisdictions, before notaries or similar officers, in procedures analogous to the two elements of a European notarial
document, viz., the certification by the public officer entitled
to full faith, and the party's declaration, the object of the
certification, which may be refuted by ordinary evidence. 101
The party may produce an instrument and acknowledge
having signed it; by the reference in the certification and
inclusion in the official record, the requirements for German notarial minutes, for instance, are literally fulfilled. 102
Of course, proceedings and background for such authentications vary. Also, a contract under seal is generally perfected
by delivery of the instrument, whereas a civil law contract
requires acceptance of the promise. Nevertheless, the European courts have generally not hesitated to accept American
certifications, even in matters not permitting the use of a
foreign local form, such as articles of association for a German limited partnership or a conveyance of real estate.
A special situation exists in New York. An opinion of a
New York Attorney General has encouraged the notaries to
adjust their declarations and attestations completely to the
requirements for proper recordation in any foreign state. 103
The notary does not assume responsibility for the validity
100

The problem has been noted with the request of inquiry by 1 FRANKENSTEIN 536; RAAPE 165; M. WoLFF, IPR. 78. Cf. Clunet 1910, 478.
101
GLASSON et TISSIER, 2 Traite de procedure civile (ed. 3, 1926) 679 §
6o3; DALLOZ, 9 Repert. Pratique 392ff. §§ 14off.
102
Germany: Law on Voluntary Jurisdiction§ 176.
103
State of New York, Annual Report of the Attorney General (1941) 458.
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of his act, nor would the county clerk attest to more than
the genuineness of the notary's signature and his qualification
to act as notary in the state. Nevertheless, the act may come
fairly close to foreign models. It is surprising, though, and
may stir doubts abroad, that the legal basis of this practice,
notable in itself, should be found in a clause of the New
York notary law dealing only with bills of exchange and
promissory notes. 104 It may be timely to suggest that these
provisions be expressed in a separate clause when a future
law is drafted.
Form Agreeable to Lex Loci Contractus

2.

The proper meaning of the rule, locus regit actum, goes
farther than the mere substitution of a foreign solemnity for
the domestic formality. Limitations upon such replacement
often have been attempted, but provoked such unanswerable
questions as whether an English will of a Frenchman attested
by two witnesses, or a holographic will of a Frenchman made
in Louisiana in the presence of his wife, may be recognized
in France as an "acte authentique,mos or, after all, what
"acte'' is "authentique'' and what is not/o'a As the rule has
come to be interpreted, in the common opinion, no other
solemnity is needed than that required at the locus, and
none, if the transaction takes place in a jurisdiction where
104

Executive Law, Consolidated Laws of New York 1909, Vol. z, c. IS §
(I) (Book IS, Executive Law, McKinney I916): "A notary public has
authority: 1. Anywhere within the state to demand acceptance and payment of
foreign and inland bills of exchange and of promissory notes, and may protest
for the non-acceptance or non-payment thereof, to exercise such powers and
duties as by the law of nations and according to commercial usage, or by the
laws of any other government, state or country, may be performed by notaries."
Only the following subsection (z), Consolidated Laws of New York I909 1 Vol.
z, c. I8 § I05 (z) (Book I8, Executive Law, McKinney I9I6) and Laws
I943> c. 333, concerns the power to take affidavits and to certify the acknowledgment and proof of deeds and other written instruments.
105 Long ago the courts answered wisely in the affirmative; Cass. (civ.) (Feb.
6, I843) S. I843.1.2o9; Cass. (req.) (July 3, I854) S. I854·I-4I7·
106 On this dispute, especially among Dutch authors, see BARMAT, supra n. I,
35zff.
I05
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no formality is necessary.
Thus, under the Civil Code of Quebec, a promise to make
a gift needs notarial form, and the original is to be kept
of record; but the same section of the Code expressly recognizes execution validly made outside the province without
notarial form. 107
Public policy. But does public policy of the law governing
the contract not react unfavorably, especially if it happens
also to be the law of the forum? Can a law requiring certain
acts to be clothed in writing and especially ordaining recording by public instrument, in order to secure serious deliberation before the deal and reliable evidence after it, simply
be avoided by the parties going abroad? The objection has
been voiced in various ways by Paul Voet and later authors,
refuted by Waechter and Savigny, and repeated again by
modern writers up to Niboyet and Frankenstein. 108 Several
Latin-American codes, mentioned earlier, have been inspired
by similar ideas. 109 To this, the reply has always been110
that opportunities to obtain consular authentication, though
useful, are insufficient, that the old customary rule precisely
intends to give the parties the right to conclude their transaction under any sovereign, and that the privilege given to the
parties serves international business and security. It may
be admitted that the doubt has some foundation in such
107
Quebec: C. C. art. 776. Even a petitory action was maintained on a deed
of sale of Quebec land made under private signature in Chicago, Brosseau v.
Bergevin (I905) 27 Que. s. c. sro; 3 JOHNSON 332·
108
See P. VoET, op. cit. supra n. 12; FoELIX ( ed. I, I 843) 96 § 58, ( ed. 3)
§ 82, I and IV with citations; 2 LAURENT§§ 240 ff., 6 id. §§ 4I7ff.; NEuBECKER 79; NIBOYET 66I § 537; I FRANKENSTEIN 520ff.; ECONOMOPOULOS in
2 Acta, International Academy of Comparative Law (I935) Part 21 522.
Ioo Supra n. 35; see for instance, BEVILAQUA 259ff. commenting on Brazilian
law. The dominant liberal rule, however, is adopted, for instance, in Argentina,
seeS. Ct., 2I Fallos 251, 23 id. sz6; 32 id. 118.
110
WAECHTER 1 25 Arch. Civ. Prax. (I842) 4IH SAVIGNY § 38I, GUTHRIE
in his translation 324 note (n) discussing English law; 2 WHARTON 1463 §
695; I BAR 350; SURVILLE 30I Nos. I9off.; WALKER 224; 2 ARMINJON I34 §
59; FEDOZZI 250. For wills in particular, see WEISS, 4 Traite 647ff.; FEDOZZI
2J3·
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vital matters as recognition of children and perhaps also
marriage contracts. But the tutorial concern of legislation
for persons engaging in a surety agreement, a promise to
make a gift or an obligation to convey land must not extend
over the entire world. Even though parties could temporarily
go abroad for the sole purpose of obtaining an easier mode
of contracting, the establishment of an exception for the
repression of such evasionm would open the door to inquisitions harmful to the great task of "locus regit actum."
The French Court of Cassation, indeed, although always
particularly wary of the observance of French law by French
nationals, has not hesitated to recognize in two leading cases a
marriage contract made in Constantinople and a donation
made in Canada, both formally valid according to the respective local laws but not in compliance with the French Code;
ordinary obligatory contracts are included by an obvious
argumentum a fortiori. 112
Also in the United States, although a few courts have not
been certain how to treat their domestic statutes of frauds,
if such a court should decide to construe its statute as nonprocedural, it would hesitate to enforce it as an expressiOn
of public policy. 113
111 Recently, 2 ARMINJON I 6I ff. § 68; RAAPE I 89 and D. IPR. I 29. The
contrary dominant opinion is approved in Norwegian law by GJELSVIK, Das
internationale Privatrecht in Norwegen (Leipzig I 935) I 25.
112
Cass. (req.) (April I8, I865) S. I865.1.3I7; Cass. (civ.) (June 29,
I922) D. I922.1.127, S. 1923.1.249; NIBOYET 678ff. § 557; LEREBOURSPIGEONNIERE 368 § 315; 2 ARMINJON 134ff. §59·
113 One of the few cases regarded as adopting this view, following WHARTON
1442 § 69o is Barbour v. Campbell (1917) 101 Kan. 616, 168 Pac. 879. See
also the obiter dictum in Farley v. Fair et ux. (1927) I44 Wash. 10I, 256
Pac. 1031. An analogous suggestion in Franklin Sugar Refining Co. v. William
D. Mullen Co. (D. C. D. Del. I925) 7 F. (2d) 470, 473 was reversed (C. C. A.
3d 1926) 12 F. (2d) 885. Contra: See Halloran v. Jacob Schmidt Brewing
Co. (1917) 137 Minn. 141, 148, I62 N. W. Io82, 1085; Canale & Co. v.
Pauly & Pauly Cheese Co. (19I4) 155 Wis. 541, I45 N. W. 372 (supra p.
soo); Henning v. Hill (I923) 8o Ind. App. 363, I4I N. E. 66; and see
LORENZEN, 32 Yale L. J. (I923) at 334ff., 105 A. L. R. (I936) 652, 669ff.
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3· Renvoi
As usual, renvoi may serve to relax a too rigid conflicts
rule. Argentina decrees an imperative lex loci contractus for
formal validity. Whether renvoi is admitted in Argentina,
is an unsettled question, but it has been hypothetically resorted to in several cases. 114 In fact, if we suppose a contract
made in Quebec, void there under the domestic law but
valid under the law of New York where it is to be performed,
and the parties have stipulated for New York law, a Quebec
court would have to apply the lex causae under the optional
rule locus regit actum. An Argentine court ought to decide
in the same way by use of transmittance. But any American
court should judge likewise, independently of its theories
of either formal validity or renvoi. In the case where the
two foreign laws involved agree in the result, foes of renvoi
have perforce conceded its necessity.
4· Defective Form
Where parties have failed to comply exactly with both
the forms of the lex casuae and the lex loci actus, the effects
of nonobservance may be very different in the two laws.
Accordingly, in the traditional meaning of locus regit actum,
a party may avail himself of that law which more nearly approaches giving effect to the act. 115 An adverse opinion, however, mentioned earlier in connection with formally defective
marriages, urges the supremacy of the lex causae.u6
An agreement to sell land, for instance, violating the
statute of frauds of both states, may be considered void in
114

z Vrco 285. The problem discussed in the text has been recognized by
supra n. Ill, at I 2 7 and has been treated more often with respect to

GJELSVI K,

the form of wills.
115
Cases, Vol. 1, 229 n. 121.
6
n NIEMEYER, Das. IPR. des BGB.

114; RAAPE 186, 255

No.4; MANNL, 1 I Z.ausl.PR. (1937) 786-8o6;

cf.

Vol.

1,

and D. IPR.

230.
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one and merely unenforceable in the other; or void under
the lex loci contractus because of violation of the statute of
frauds and under the lex situs merely lacking proper evidence
and curable by various events; or void at both places but
creating an obligation to pay damages for reliance in one
jurisdiction. Only the dominant theory is logical and practical. Why should, for instance, curing of a formal defect under
the law of the place of contracting not have its full effect?
If the theory of locus regit actum is sound in itself, its
stature should not be reduced by half.
On the other hand, the dominant opinion may run into
some practical difficulties in particular cases, which, however, thus far have not been experienced or discussed.

IV.

CoNCLUSION

Of all the ordinary and exceptional rules stated above,
only two are susceptible of serious competition: The American
application of the lex causae and the optional rule, locus
regit actum, prevailing in the rest of the world. The compulsory rule in England is antiquated, 117 and the nationalistic
Latin-American experiments deserve sharp rejection. The
proposals of the Institute of International Law have attempted a compromise between governing law and local law,
envisaging national prerogatives over family and inheritance
law rather than the needs occurring in contracts.
The rule, locus regit actum, shares the fate of many older
principles; it has been widely accepted but justified by conflicting theories. Sovereignty, international law, regionality
of public policy, customary law, voluntary submission of the
parties, vested rights, convenience of the parties, expediency
for international business-each one singly and all these
motives in co-operation-have been advanced as the true
basis of the rules. The draftsmen of the German codification
117

Cf. recently, M. WOLFF, Priv. Int. Law 454·
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considered only reasons of practical convenience, us and at
present this is the dominant conception. The attribution of
exclusive force to the lex causae is opposed as a source of
iniquity.
In fact, the American courts have in many cases escaped
unt.enable results by shutting their eyes to the consequences
their rulings would have on questions other than those of
form. A court may be satisfied with the justice of treating
an oral contract under the law of the place where it is
made. But, if it operates in conjunction with a general rule
that validity, or validity and effect, is governed by lex loci
contractus, this law would have to apply also to the necessity
of consideration, the capacity of a married woman to contract,
the influence of misrepresentations made by an agent, the
validity of a clause exempting a party from liability, and
so forth. Such incidents, in their turn, have been judged in
individual cases by other criteria. The Supreme Court in
Pritchard v. Norton (supra p. 3 62) took the question of
consideration away from the law of New York, the place of
contracting, to Louisiana, the place of performance. Certainly,
it is by no means desirable to divide the contract into fragments, instead of subjecting it to the one law of characteristic
significance. But formal validity, if guaranteed by the law
of the place of making as an added opportunity to grant
validity under the over-all law, leaves the latter intact
and satisfies practical needs. With respect to wills, the Uniform Wills Act, Foreign Executed, adopted by twelve states,
has created a special rule for formalities and permits a will to
be executed in the mode prescribed by the law either of the
place where executed or of the testator's domicil. 119 Cases
118 2 ZITELMANN 143ff.; 6 Protokolle Zweiter Lesung des Entwurfs des
BGB. 32-37; MELCHIOR§ 155; GEILER in I Diiringer-Hachenburg 56 n. 21.
119
See for comment, WALTER W. LAND, Trusts in the Conflict of Laws
(New York 1940) 24, 54 §§ 8, 16 and see his observation, p. 45, regardingtang-ible property on the alternative reference rule of most ~tatutes,
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concerning bills and notes before the Negotiable Instruments
Act could best be harmonized by a permissive locus regit
actum, as suggested by Lorenzen, 120 who has proposed this
rule also for a Pan-American unification of conflicts law. 121
If the rule were adopted by the American courts, an irritating
source of disturbance would disappear. The courts would gain
more freedom to choose the proper law for the substance of
the contract.
We have, however, realized the necessity of developing
the rule so as to take care of the really typical modern cases.
Whenever the laws of two or more territories are involved
in the formation of a contract, to give exclusive preference to
one of them is quite as wrong as to cumulate their requirements. Rather, compliance with one of the two local laws
should suffice. The problem is different from the inquiries
for determining the place of contracting for the purpose of
finding the governing law or the law deciding whether or
not the contract has been formed. The customary privilege
for upholding formal validity is sound; hence it ought to be
extended rather than curtailed. Consequently, in the case of
contracting by correspondence, the law of the place where the
offer is dispatched should suffice for determining validity of
the contract, as well as the law of the place whence the acceptance is sent.
An even broader possibility has been suggested by Laine
to the effect that the law of the forum, and any other law
indicated by an interest of the parties, also should be able to
validate the form of a contract. 122 In this country, the idea
of giving the law of the forum a favorable influence on validity was revived by Lorenzen with respect to the statute of
120 LORENZEN, The Conflict of Laws Relating to Bills and Notes (New
Haven, London 1919) 89; cf. KuHN, Comp. Com. 267.
121 LORENZEN, 15 Tul. L. Rev. ( 1941) at 167.
122 LAINE, Clunet 19o8, 674, 681-685, 692-693·
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frauds at a time when the statute of frauds was widely regarded as procedural. 123 The very success of Lorenzen's
construction of the statute of frauds as substantive in conflicts
law seems to obviate this emergency solution.
The law of the forum as such, indeed, should not compete
with the others in the field of obligatory contracts, either for
the sake of a permissive policy or for that of rejecting foreign
transactions.
Domestic policy should not be opposed, in particular, to
the free use of foreign instruments, as it is done in numerous
Latin-American codes, when the solemnities required at the
forum for similar transactions are lacking. Respect for foreign
law should also be maintained in carrying into practice the
universally recognized rule that solemnities prescribed by
the governing law are replaceable by compliance with analogous local formalities. An apparent exception to this minor
function of the rule locus regit actum exists in the United
States to the extent tha.t the statutes indicate what persons are
empowered to take acknowledgments outside the state. This
is probably intended to be a facilitation rather than an imposition. Usually the enumeration of the designated legal officers
is extensive. Nevertheless, it would be preferable to leave
their selection to the respective foreign systems and to make it
clear that, as a rule, obligatory agreements do not need to
comply with the domestic formalities when they are executed
abroad.
12
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YaleL.J. (19z3) at 333-334·
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Scope of the Law of the Contract

W

HEN the law governing a contract, or a group of
contracts, has been ascertained, what problems
does it cover? In principle, notwithstanding the
theories that would split the contract into segments, it should
embrace all incidents of the contractual relationship. 1 Special
rules regarding form 2 and those concerning the application
of a personal law to capacity to contract/ have been treated
earlier in this work.
This chapter, however, will discuss doubts and objections
that have been raised to the rule of a unitary law for the
problems arising on a contract. This ~iscussion cannot be exhaustive, since questions of classification originate with the
consideration of each special type of contract. Moreover,
such topics as acts of parties modifying the obligation or
transferring rights or duties, and the whole doctrine respecting limitation of actions and termination of contractual rights,
cannot be expounded at this juncture.
While American conflicts literature is accustomed to ask
whether lex loci contractus, or lex loci solutionis, or lex fori
applies to a problem, we have here to speak in terms of the
law of the contract, of a second law applicable to special problems, and of public policy opposing foreign law. This divergency of method causes some difficulties in the effort of comparing the solutions.
1

See particularly the comparative survey as of I 9I 7 by KosTERS 773-779·

2

Supra Chapter 3 r.

3

Vol.

I

Chapter 4·
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I.
I.

FoRMATION oF THE CoNTRACT

Consent in Form

The problem. The municipal laws provide diverse solutions for questions such as whether an offer binds the offeror
and, if so, for what length of time; whether acceptance must
be declared, dispatched, arrive, or be perceived, to conclude.
the consent, and whether perfection of the contract has
retroactive effect. Many particulars, too, vary. 4
What law to apply to these questions, is a matter of both
practical and theoretical interest. 5
Illustrations: (i) Binding force of offer. Lorenzen 6 has
presented the following example: A resident of New York
having made an ordinary offer, without time limit or other
qualification, by letter to a German in Germany, revokes it
by cable a few hours after the letter is received. The addressee, knowing that under German law the telegraphic
withdrawal is inoperative, at once accepts the offer. Under
New York law, the offer is revocable until dispatch of acceptance and the contract fails to come into existence. If,
according to Lorenzen's suggestion, the lex fori were to
apply, the parties would be held to the contract in any
German court but not in any American court.
(ii) Acceptance by silence. A seller in New York offers
merchandise to a firm in Liverpool with which he frequently
has business relations and which had declared a desire for
these particular goods. The addressee does not answer. Courts
in the United States, and decidedly many Continental courts,
are more inclined than English courts to imply acceptance
by silence. In an analogous case, a Swiss seller and a French
4
For comparative law see RABEL, r Recht des Warenkaufs 69-ro8; International Institute for the Unification of Private Law, De la formation des
rontrats entre absents, Etude Preliminaire (mimeographed) S. d. N.-U. D. P.
r 935, Etude XVI.
5
EDUARD WAHL, 3 Z.ausl.PR. (r929) 775; ACHENBACH, Der briefliche und
telegraphische Vertrag im vergleichenden und intermitionalen Privatrecht
(Hamburg r 9 34).
6 LORENZEN, 31 Yale L. J. (1921) at 53·
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buyer had negotiated through the seller's agent in Paris;
the agent had no authority to conclude the bargain, and
the seller failed to give an express confirmation. The Swiss
Federal Tribunal nevertheless held the contract to have been
completed under Swiss law as the lex loci contractus. 1
(iii) Loss of letter of acceptance. A merchant in Paris
by letter to a firm in New York offers to buy certain goods;
the letter of acceptance is lost in the mail. The New York
seller sues on the basis of a contract perfect under New York
law. The French party denies the contract according to
French law.
(iv) Delayed answer. In a Norwegian case, 8 A in New
York, owning land in Norway, by a letter to B in Norway,
offered to sell the land but limited the time for acceptance.
B answered affirmatively in time, but his letter was delayed
in the mail and reached the offeror when the time limit,
and let us suppose, a reasonable time for receiving an answer,
had expired. A failed to make any reply. The majority of
the Supreme Court in Oslo granted B's action against A,
by application of Norwegian law, because A should have
notified B of the delay or otherwise should have complied
with the contract. The minority dissented on the ground
that New York law as the law of A's domicil applied.

Conflicts rules. Many approaches have been tried. Beale,
as well as the Swiss Federal Tribunal, according to his
usual method, applies the lex loci contractus/ which, however, in relation to foreign countries leads nowhere. 1° Continental writers have proposed to resort to the national law of
2
the offeror, 11 or the law of his domicil in several variants.'
7

BG. (Sept. 28, 1912) 38 BGE. II 516,519.
Norwegian'S, Ct. (1924) 2. Z.ausl.PR. (192.8) 873 No. 51; HAUDEK 67
approves the majority vote and RAAPE, D. IPR. z68 No . .3 the dissident vote.
9
2 BEALE rr74-1I76; Restatement§ 332 (c).
Swiss BG. (June 9, r9o6) 32 BGE. II 415; (Sept. 28, r9u) 38 BGE. II
516, 519·
10
Supra Chapter 30, p. 456.
11
BARTIN, 2. Principes 89.
12 German RG. (Nov. 20, 1902) 53 RGZ. 59 (isolated); NussBAUM,
D. IPR. 239; BATIFFOL 345 § 393 and n. 2 suggesting that a prolonged
sojourn may replace domicil.
8
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Another doctrine, following the usual way out of embarrassment, cumulates the requirements of both laws involved. 13
But more often the true emergency solution, lex fori, has
been suggested. 14
Only the German courts have been 'in position to face the
problem squarely. 15 They apply the same law that would
govern the contract if it were valid. 16 Where the automatic
force of the law of the place of contracting is eliminated, this
is the natural solution, approved by those modern writers
who are not afraid of an alleged vicious circle, nor of the
existence of a contract which may be denied by the domiciliary law of one party. 17
Illustration: ( v) It is litigious whether a contract has
been effectively agreed upon between S, operating a sawmill in A, State X, and P, a manufacturer of furniture in B,
State Y, to sell four carloads of lumber, deliverable at a
certain date on the side tracks of the railway depot in A.
Because of this determination of the place of delivery, as will
be submitted in the third volume of this work, the law of
State X governs the contract. This includes all questions
of consent in form as well as in fact. There is no inquiry
into such questions as which party has first made an offer
or where acceptance has been signed or mailed or received.
A similar result is perhaps viewed in Brazil by C. C. art. I o8 7: the contract
is made where the offer has been made, and Introd. Law (I 942) art. 9 § 2:
where the offeror resides.
13
LEWALD No. 295; PACCHIONI 329 § 10; for cumulation modified by favor
to validity ACHENBACH, supra n. 5, criticized by WAHL, Book Review, IO
Z.ausl.PR. (I936) I07o.
14
LORENZEN, 31 Yale L. J. (1921) at 53; PILLET, 2 Traite I8o-181;
DIENA, 2 Prine. 256; HAUDEK 91. Contra: PACCHIONI 328 § IO,
15
Statement by BATIFFOL 346 § 394 bis and n. x.
16
This is the law intended by the parties or the law of the place of performance. See RG. (Jan. 3, 191 1) 55 Gruchot's Beitrage 888; (May IS,
I917) Warn. Rspr. 19I7, 267; (Jan. I6, I925) 34 Z.int.R. 427; (March 13,
1928) IPRspr. 1928 No. I j (May u, 1928) Leipz.
I928, 1550j (Feb. 3>
1933) IPRspr. 1933, 19 No. 10.
The lex loci solutionis has been also advocated in Argentina by ZEBALLOS
in z Weiss-Zeballos 295 n. (a).
17 WAHL, 3 Z.ausl.PR. (I 92 9) 78 8-8oo; RABEL, id. 753.
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Writers following this theory have been preoccupied, it
is true, with hardships resulting, for instance, if an American
party, contrary to his own law, should be declared bound by
an offer, as in the above example (i) under German law, or
an English party bound by his silence as in the above example
(ii). One proposal is that the court of such a party's domicil
might free him on the ground of public policy. 18 This, however, would not help, if the case were to be tried in the other
court, and would defy the purpose of the rule. A more attractive suggestion has been to consult the domiciliary law of
each party, not for all, but for the single question, whether
his conduct presents any declaration that might be a subject
matter for legal construction. 19 The underlying argument of
equity, however, is doubtful in view of the interest of the
other party, which, supposedly, would be protected by his
own law. In addition, English and American courts cannot
be expected to follow a personal law.
Indeed, the apparent hardship disappears, if the modern
principles of interpretation are duly transferred into the field
of international business transactions. A German court under
German law cannot treat a proposal to contract as a binding
offer, if the offeror must be presumed to have intended the
contrary. 20 An offer by a New York firm, in the absence of
particular circumstances, can not be understood as would an
offer of a German to another German. Nor should an offer
by a New Yorker to a Norwegian, under express limitation
of time, be construed as embodying the conception that he
must repudiate a belated acceptance. Under any law whatever, informal declarations ought to be construed according
BATIFFOL 346 § 394; RAAPE, D. IPR. 266 v.
M. WOLFF, IPR. 75; WAHL, 3 Z.ausl.PR. (1929) 8oo; RABEL, id. 754;
K. Th. KIPP, in Fischer-Henle-Titze Biirgerliches Gesetzbuch (1932) 11o9 II
I; RAAPE, D. IPR. 267.
20
See also WAHL, 3 Z.ausl.PR. (1929) 8o1. For an analogous appraisal of
the question whether a proposal is meant as an offer, RAAPE, D. IPR. 2.69
No.5·
18

19
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to the principles of good faith, considering the laws and
usages of the place where the declarant lives. Certainly, if a
declaration is sent out into the world, the sender is not entitled to expect that the effect will always be the same as
under the law of his domicil. But this does not affect our
cases. Wise judges are careful not to subject foreign promises
to domestic standards, unless submission to them appears to
be required by usage.
2.

Consent in Fact

The problem. Error, fraud, duress, and simulation are
everywhere grounds for nullity or voidability, yet circumstances vary. 21 Error, in particular, may be either more or
less liberally allowed to vitiate the consent. The most important difference of laws resides in the question whether
error must be caused by misrepresentations of the other party
or at least the latter must have been unaware of the error.
In addition, the various shades of invalidity are divergently
regulated, and so is the liability of the party avoiding a contract on the ground of his own mistake. The following examples may illustrate the ensuing conflicts problem:
(i) A, a resident of British Columbia, acquired what in
his opinion were treasury bonds of a corporation in the state
of Washington, but were actually common stock shares, the
holder of which was liable under the corporate charter for
certain payments.
The Canadian court refused to apply the law of the
charter, using the argument that, because of the seller's
misrepresentation, A had never become a shareholder under
the law of British Columbia. 22 The report of the case does
21
For comparative municipal law see YEHJA TAG-ELDINE, Le dol francais
et Ia misrepresentation anglaise, contribution a !'etude de la theorie du consentement et de ses vices. (Vol. XVI Bibliothique de l'Institut de Droit Compare
de Lyon, 1926).
22 American Seamless Tube Corp. et al. v. Goward [1930] 3 D. L. R. 870
(B.C. S.C.); fortunately, the court adds that the contract would have been
voidable under California law, too.
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not state why this law applied, but probably it was taken for
granted that the contract was made there and that the lex
loci contractus governed the entire contract. A comparable
case came recently before the Supreme Court of the United
States. 23 A mutual insurance company, chartered in New
York, became insolvent. Assessments were adjudged in proceedings in New York against the policy holders regarded
as members under New York law, and suit for enforcement
was brought against residents of Georgia at their domicil.
The Georgia Supreme Court refused enforcement on the
ground that the policy was a contract made in Georgia and
therefore governed by Georgia law. 24 Under the New York
statutory law, the policy holders were liable to the assessment,
but according to the law of Georgia they were deemed not
to have become members of the company, a clause on the
back of the policy being insufficient to produce this effect.
Although in this case protection of residents was conspicuous,
the reasoning was simply based on the law governing the
contract.
(ii) In I897, a German reinsurance company in the Rhineland, the Aachener Riickversicherungs A.G., consented to a
reinsurance contract for three-fifths of a fire risk in Japan
with an insurance company of Hamburg, through an agreement made in Japan by the agents of both parties. The company in Aachen contested the validity of the agreement
because its agent had not been made aware of the unusual
fact that the other two-fifths of the risk had been covered
previously by another reinsurance. The Reichsgericht applied articles I I ro and I I I 7 of the French Civil Code, in
force in the Rhineland at the time of contracting, as the law of
the domicil of the debtor. 25

Conflicts rules. Aprioristic theory, again, has postulated
that the personal law of the party whose assent is concerned,
should govern, 26 or that the lex loci contractus must neces23

Pink v. A. A. A. Highway Express, Inc. (1941) 314 U.S. 2or.
Pink v. A. A. A. Highway Express, Inc. (1941) 191 Ga. 502, 13 S. W.
(2d) 337·
25
RG. (Dec. s, 1902) 53 RGZ. 138.
26
For the national law among others: 8 LAURENT 228-229 § 158; PILLET,
24
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sarily determine this problem of validity,.27 but courts in
England/ 8 the United States, and Germany have instinctively applied the same law that would govern the contract
if it were valid. In the United States, this has been, as usual,
either the law of the place of contracting,29 that of the place
of performance/ 0 or the law intended by the parties. 31 In
Germany, the Supreme Court and other courts in the last
decade have firmly upheld the law of the contract,S 2 and
finally this attitude has found the deserved theoretical recognition. 33 Frail French authorities at present are understood
as aiming at the same effect. 34
The last international draft on conflicts rules concerning
sales of goods has adopted this view in applying even the law
stipulated by the parties to the consent problems. 35 OccasionPrincipes 448 § 238; BARTIN, I Principes I75> I77, 2 id. 6o; AUDINET, I
Melanges Pillet 78; I FRANKENSTEIN 572. For the domiciliary law, PILLET,
2 Traite 289 § 537; LEWALD 239 No. 296. Contra: WEISS, 4 Traite 392 n. 4;
KOSTERS 774; and decisively EATIFFOL 336if. §§ 38I-384.
27
FOOTE 402; 2 BEALE I225; ROLIN, I Principes 48I § 29Ij 2 ARMINJON
234 II§ 97·
Switzerland: BG. (April Io, I8g6) 22 BGE. 47I, 483; 32 id. II 4I6; 38 id.
II 5'9; Trib. com. Zurich (Feb. I4, I937) Bl. f. Ziirch. Rspr. I937> I64 No.
85, cited I2 Z.ausl.PR. (I939) 594·
The German Reichsgericht argued similarly in two or three isolated cases.
28
SeeM. WOLFF, Priv. Int. Law 445 § 42I; BATIFFOL 34I § 387.
29
Cases: z BEALE I225 § 347.I but in Elbro Knitting Mills v. Schwartz
( 1929) 30 F. (2d) Io, the "Michigan contract" was not questioned.
3
'
Cases: 2 BEALE 1226 § 347.I ns. I-6.
31
Union Central Life Ins. Co. v. Pollard ( I896) 94 Va. I46, 26 S. E. 42 r.
The Netherlands: Rb. Haag (June 6, I935) W. I9J6, 402.
2
'
RG. (Dec. 5, I9II) 7 8 RGZ. 55 : sale of membership in a limited private
company, error on the money paid in; OLG. Hamburg (Sept. 27, I9I8( Hans.
GZ. I9I8 HBl. No. 92, aff'd, RG. (March II, I9I9) 95 RGZ. I64: sale of
nuts, the price payable in Vienna, Austrian law applied to the excusable
ignorance by the German buyer of a German war decree; RG. (Oct. 30, I926)
39 Z.int.R. 276, 28I, Revue I928, 523 (duress); (June I3, I933) IPRspr.
I933, 3I (fraud); and many older cases, see the list established by LEWALD
240 No. 297.
33
WAHL, 3 Z.ausl.PR. (I929) 782; NussBAUM, D. IPR. 237; BATIFFOL 340
§ 386; see also NussBAUM, Principles I78, and ARMINJON, 3 Travaux du
comite fran~ais de droit international prive ( I93 7) at 94·
4
'
BATIFFOL 343 § 389.
'"See 7 Z.ausl.PR. (I933) 957 art. 2 (3).

°
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ally courts have resorted to the law of the forum. This happened in England, when the foreign law did not seem to
guarantee annulment of a contract made under duress, 36 in
a case of the German Reichsgericht disregarding the Turkish
law on employment/ 7 and in one or two American insurance
cases involving misrepresentation of the insured. 38 The most
characteristic of these decisions is that by the English Court
of Appeals in Kaufman v. Gerson. The defendant, a woman,
had promised the plaintiff, her husband's creditor, to pay
the debt in consideration of his promise not to prosecute her
husband criminally. Under English law, the contract would
have been bad because its object was to stifle a prosecution
and it was obtained by coercion. However, the places of contracting and of performance made it a French contract, and
under French laws, supposedly, the promise was valid. The
court argued, however, that enforcement in England would
violate the rule that the plaintiff must come into court with
clean hands. The decision deserves the severe criticism it has
suffered, 39 since opinions are and may well be divided on the
existence of unlawful coercion when a creditor attempts to
obtain satisfaction of his valid claim by threatening legal
sanctions.
36
Kaufman v. Gerson [I904] I K. B. 59'• Clunet I9o5, Io63; Societe des
Hotels Reunis, Societe Anonyme v. Hawker [I9I3] 29 T. L. R. 578. See also
Hope v. Hope (I857) 8 De G. M. & G. 73I (agreement illegal according to
English law).
37
RG. (Oct. 30, I926) 39 Z.int.R. 276, Revue I928, 523·
38
Fidelity Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Miazza (I9o8) 93 Miss. I8 at 36 and
422 at 435, 46 So. 8I7 at 8I8 and 48 So. IOI7 at Ioi8. In John Hancock
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Yates (I935) so Ga. App. 7I3, I79 S. E. 239, the
court operates on the assumption that the materiality of representations made by
the insured in his application affects the remedy only and therefore is to be
decided under the law of the forum.
39 DICEY, Appendix, Note 3, 882; FALCONBRIDGE, The Law of Banks and
Banking (ed. 5, I935) 902; 3 BEALE I647 § 6!2.I; GooDRICH 26o n. 9;
Notes, 79 U. of Pa. L. Rev. (I93I) 635; 33 Col. L. Rev. (I933) so8. On
the problems in substantive American law, see the remarks of DAWSON, "Economic Duress and the Fair Exchange in French and German Law," II Tul.
L. Rev. (I937) 345, 359·
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3· Want of Consideration
The common law requirement of consideration has a
parallel in the much-debated requirement of the French
Civil Code (arts. II08, I I 3 I) by which an obligation must
have une cause licite: "An obligation without cause or on a
false cause or on an illicit cause can not have any e:ffect." 40
To believe a considerable part of the French doctrine/ 1 this
provision includes the rules that in onerous contracts a
promise must have an actual counterpart in a promise or in a
giving or doing by the other party, and that on principle,
with exceptions, obligations ought not to be separated from
their economic background. Central European systems, however, use other forms of thinking that do not need this general requirement.
Any law governing the contract will naturally determine
the requirement of consideration.
The Supreme Court of the United States in Pritchard v.
Nor ton applied the law of the place of performance, according to the presumed intention of the parties, thus preventing
the contract from being held invalid for want of consideration
under the lex loci contractus. 42 There are parallels to this
decision in England 43 and France. 44 The American cases re-

°

4
For comparative municipal law, see LORENZEN, "Causa and Consideration in the Law of Contracts," 28 Yale L. J. (1919) 62r at 623. On the
peculiar combination of both in Louisiana, see SNELLINGS, "Cause and Consideration in Louisiana," 8 Tul. L. Rev. (1934) 178.
41
See on the vast controversies, ESMEIN in Planiol et Ripert, 6 Traite
Pratique, in particular his own thesis at 350 § 252.
42
(r882) ro6 U. 'S. 124.
43
British Controlled Oilfields v. Stagg (1921) 66 Sol. J. 18 (applying English law expressly stipulated for in the contract) ; In re Bonacina Le Brasseur
v. Bonacina [1912] 2 Ch. 68, 73 (validity under Italian law conceded although
the action is dismissed on other grounds).
44
App. Paris (Feb. 28, 1935) Revue Crit. 1935, 748 applying French law
as lex loci solutionis to a German-created bill of exchange, see comment by
BATIFFOL, Revue Crit. 1937, 434· The Court of Cassation (req.) has affirmed
the decision, (Dec. 14, 1937) Nouv. Revue 1938, 131, on the basis of German
lex loci contractus, in a laconic reasoning, well explained in the note ibid.:
under German law the bill was valid but the action could be refuted by pleading that the plaintiff would be enriched without cause.
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ferring the question to the lex loci contractus seem to consider this law as governing the entire contract. 45 For German
courts, the application of the law of the contract follows as
a matter of course. 46
Recently, the Tribunal de la Seine dealt with several
strange agreements made in New York by German refugees,
whereby a man promised huge sums to his wife and daughter,
without any visible motive and as was supposed, with no
intention of making a gift. The court thought it probable
that the promise was void under the German law, applicable
as presumably intended by the parties, but added that, if
approved by German law, the agreement would be void
under French imperative public policy. 47 This is one of the
easy ways of dealing with obscure facts; the case could have
been conveniently solved under the German Civil Code.

II.

NATURE AND EFFECTS

r. The Nature of the Contract
The law applicable to an obligatory contract should determine what kind of a contract is made.

Illustration. Before the German Civil Code came into
force, a promise to deliver goods to be manufactured with
materials owned by the promisor was considered in the courts
following common (Roman) law as a sales contract, whereas
the Prussian Landrecht assumed that a contract for work
and labor entitled the customer to cancel his order. In several
cases one party was domiciled in the territory of the common
law and the other in that of the Landrecht.
Instead of treating each party as debtor according to his
own law, as was done in other cases, the German Supreme
45

BATIFFOL 353 § 408 n. 5·
Bay. ObLG. (July 6, 1904) 5 Bay. ObLGZ. 357 (force of an I. 0. U. not
indicating the ground of obligation); OLG. Miinchen (April 13, 1929)
Zeitschrift fiir Rechtspflege in Bayern (1929) 365 cited by LEWALD 244 No.
302 (consideration required by English law). See also supra p. 362 n. 15.
47
Trib. civ. Seine (July 5, 1939) Revue Crit. 1939,450.
46
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Court subjected the entire contract to the law of the promisor.48 No one thought of resorting to the law of the forum.
A deterrent example of a contrary reasoning may be found
in a case of the Swiss Federal Tribunal, influenced by the two
unnatural theories which recommend splitting the contract
49
and characterizing its nature according to the lex fori.

A resident Swiss, having executed by letter an acknowledgment of a loan of £3250, to an English woman domiciled
in Paris, demurs to an action for recovery, brought by an
assignee, because he has not received the money. What law
determines his plea? In this case, suitable for an elementary
law class, the Federal Tribunal argued as follows: First,
it is considered that the making of a loan contract, under
French law, requires as in Roman law the transfer of the
money to the borrower as an essential prerequisite; that
under Swiss law the mutual consent of the parties suffices to
create contractual rights of the borrower to receive and of the
lender to recover the money; and that English law is still
different, the court using an unusual term probably meaning
that English law does not make a promise to lend or borrow
specifically enforceable. The court considers, further, that
under the French approach no contract has been made, unless
the money was given, hence, the question would be one of
formation, governed in Swiss conflicts law by the lex loci
contractus. If, however, under the Swiss construction, the
contract originated independently of delivery, the issue would
be merely one of the requisites for recovery, pertaining to the
"effects" and determined by the law chosen by the parties
or, subsidiarily, by that of the place where repayment is due.
In this dilemma, remembering .that a court characterizes
problems according to its own domestic law and citing
Nussbaum, the Federal Tribunal resorts to the Swiss construction of a loan as a consensual contract and reaches the
law of the place of performance which is-the French law.
Thus, because under the Swiss Code of Obligations a loan
48 RG. (May 13, r89r) z Z.int.R. 587. For other German cases, see LEW.ALD
248 No. 306.
19

BG. (Nov. 7, 1933) 59 BGE. 397·
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may originate by mere consent, the French Civil Code is
applied, under which it may not! Even the harmful division
between validity and the effects of contract can be worked
out in a more suitable way than by the domestic construction.
It was the task of the court candidly to interpret its own
dubious conflicts rule and to state, once and for all, whether
the problem is attributable to "validity" or to "effects." The
Restatement, at least, does not fail to explain that any requirement for making a promise binding is determined by the
law of the place of contracting (§ 332,d).
The law of the contract, no doubt, should include all requisites for validity as well as the legal category of the transaction and, therefore, its legal effects.
2. Intended and Legal Effects
Most courts do not hesitate to include interpretation of a
contract in the law which governs the whole of the contract.
They also apply this law to the questions, who obtains rights
through the contract, and what is the object of these rights.
For it is plainly not feasible to consult two different laws for
determining the extent of the contractual duties, the one
when they are to be inferred from construction of the parties'
intention, implied in fact, and the other when they flow from
legal rules completing an agreement, implied in law.
In the narrower domain of interpretation, the natural conception was adopted in this country over a century ago by
the Supreme Court of the United States. When two sureties
in New Orleans signed a bond payable in Washington, D.C.,
the court held that, in the absence of a stipulation to the
contrary, their liability was joint, according to the common
law of the District rather than divided in half under Lousiana law. 50 Nobody then doubted that the bond was subject as

°

5 Cox and Dick v. U.S. (1832) 31 U.S. (6 Pet. S.C.) 172.
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a whole to the law of the place of performance, a rule also
applied by the Supreme Court in Pritchard v. Norton. 51
Analogous results may be found in many decisions relating
to legal effects of contracts.
Nevertheless, the Restatement, influenced by a few cases,
has confused the matter. It determines "the nature and extent of the duty for the performance" by the lex loci contractus (§ 332, f), but declares "the duty for the performance" to be "discharged by compliance with the law of the
place of performance." (§ 358). It is instructive to see how
hard Stumberg tries to apply these contradictory tests. 52 He
deals with an Oklahoma case 53 where a contract granting an
automobile agency was made in Michigan with the Ford
Company and the agency was to be maintained in Columbus,
Ohio. The plaintiff in obtaining the contract acted for the
benefit of a company in which he took an altruistic interest
and invested money to help manage the agency. The court
applied Michigan law as the lex loci contractus to the "execution, interpretation, and validity." Hence, the breach of the
contract by the Ford Company was found not to entitle the
third beneficiary to sue for damages, nor the promisee who
sued as assignee. The decision, as Stumberg recognizes, might
have been otherwise, if the center of the contract had been
sought in Ohio without clinging to the mechanical use of the
lex loci contractus, although perhaps the facts relevant for
equity were not fully published. However, Stumberg wonders
whether this problem would fall under the "extent of the
duty" or the "compliance with the duty," especially the determination of "the person to whom performance shall be
rendered" (§ 366), and asks: "Is it practically possible to
draw a line sharply dividing the extent of the obligation of
51

Supra n.

42.

52 STUMBERG 2 z o
53

n. 74 continued on p. 2. 2. r.
Brown v. Ford Motor Co. (C. C. A. xoth 1931) 48 F. (zd) 732.
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the contract from its performance?" Our answer has been
given before and is strictly: No. 5 4
3· Interpretation of Terms

Rules of interpretation. It is a settled principle that rules
of interpretation contained in the law governing the contract
must be applied to the exclusion of those of the lex fori. ~
But doubts have long been raised against this principle.w In
fact, if the contract is mechanically governed by the law of the
place of contracting, there is no consideration provided for
the circumstances under which parties envisage performance
in another country. Moreover, we might hold this principle
to be objectless to the extent that the various rules of interpretation are superseded by the proposition recognized in national laws as well as in the international practice as a "general principle," that we must always look for the real and
harmonious intention of the parties when they bound themselves.57 On this basis, the court of any country must pay
5

54
Supra p. 450; and see the vain efforts in the Restatement itself, § 332 comment c, to solve the "difficult problem" of separation of duty and performance.
For another consequence see hereafter p. 537·
55 STORY§§ 272, 280.
California: C. C. § I 646, cf. Monarch Brewing Co. v. George J. Meyer
Mfg. Co. (C. C. A. 9th I942) I3o F. (2d) 582. The courts adhering to the
lex loci contractus commonly enumerate construction and interpretation as well
as validity as subject to this law.
England: In re Societe Intercommunale Beige d'Electricite, Feist v. The
Company [I933] Ch. 684, 690; St. Pierre v. South American Stores Ltd.
[I937] 3 All E. R. 349> 351, 355·
France: Lex loci contractus, Cour Paris (April 5, I905) Clunet I9o6,
17o; Trib. civ. Seine (March 12, I9o8) Clunet I9o8, II32; WEISS, 4 Traite
348, 364; ROLIN, I Principes 429 § 23I, 547 § 344,550 § 346.
Germany: RG. (March IS, I892) JW. I892, 220 No. 27; (April 6, I9Il)
24 Z.int.R. 305.
C6digo Bustamante, art. I 84 with exceptions.
In principle, though with exceptions, the law governing the contract also
includes the force allowed to commercial usage, see I Recht des Warenkaufs
62; this problem will be studied with particular reference to sales contracts.
56 See 2 BAR 34; 7 LAURENT 582 §§ 479-482; DESPAGNET 896 § 302; SuRVILLE 332 § 2I9i VALERY 978 §§ 678ff.; all inspired by BouLLENOIS.
57 Permanent Court of Arbitration, decision between the Netherlands and
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natural and necessary regard to the foreign origin of an
instrument.
Ascertainment of true meaning. Thus, in a leading English
case, a Brazilian in Brazil executed in the Portuguese language a power of attorney, granting authority to a London
broker to buy and sell shares. The Court of Appeals, before
deciding what law determined the extent of the authority,
held that the exact meaning of the declaration ought to be
ascertained through interpreters and experts according to the
language and the habits at the place of transaction. 58 A charter party between two German corporations contained clauses
usual in English maritime trade, including an exception
clause, a cessor of liability clause, and an indemnity clause. 59
In another case, a vessel was insured, both parties being German corporations doing business in New Guinea, with the
general conditions attached in English. (Institute Time
Clauses) .'6o In both cases, the German Supreme Court stated
the meaning of the English original, although the contract
was governed by German law. Indeed, in all cases of party
statements and agreements, the true meaning must be discovered under full observation of all circumstances. This may
be supposed to be provided for in practically all municipal
laws 61 and does not touch conflicts problems.
Reference to local conceptions. Neither is conflicts law affected, when it appears that parties expressly or probably rePortugal in the Island of Timor case, The Hague (June z5, 1914), in The
Hague Court Reports (ed. J. B. Scott 1916) 354, 365, 38::.
58
Chatenay v. Brazilian Submarine Telegraph Co., Ltd. [1891] r Q. B.
79, 82 per Lord Esher, M. R., 85 per Lindley, L. J.
59
RG. (May 22 1 1897) 39 RGZ. 65.
60
RG. (November 7, 1928) rz2 RGZ. 233.
1
" M. WoLFF, Priv. Int. Law 458 § 432 calls attention to the English rule
of construction that words of an instrument must be interpreted from the context, or understood in their plain and literal meaning, and requires that this
rule be not applied in interpreting a contract governed by French, German, or
Swiss law. This is correct; but the same is true and recognized by the English
courts when the instrument is executed abroad, irrespective of the applicable
law.
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ferred to the conceptions of a place other than that of contracting. It has been held that in a fire insurance policy an
indication of time was to be computed according to the law of
the place where the property covered was burned,112 and with
respect to a contract of accident insurance prescribing that
packing should be done in the presence of an adult, that who
was an adult ought to be determined by the law of the place
where the packing was supposed to be done.' 63 To explain
such decisions as though they referred to the law of the place
of performance,S 4 is inaccurate. The packing firm had nothing
to "perform," nor had the insurance company to "perform"
at either of the two places mentioned. Also, it could well
have been that a commercial usage might have interpreted
time or adult quality differently from the general law of the
contract, and the former would have prevailed.
It follows, at the same time, that German courts are wrong
when they purport to apply English law as an exception
to German law governing the entire contract, whilst they
simply ascertain the significance of certain clauses inserted
in a bill of lading or an insurance policy according to English usage. 65
It is a definitely distinguishable phenomenon that the
parties or conflicts rules may subject a part of the contractual
relationship to special applicable laws. What is to be done in
interpreting foreign expressions has been well said to be
really a question of fact. 66
The rule of the law of the contract in itself, however, is
perfectly sound.
62 Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins. Co. of New York v. David Moffat Co. (1913)
154 Fed. 13.

63 Banco de Sonora v. Bankers' Mutuality Casualty Co. ( 1904) 12.4 Iowa

576, 1oo N. W. 532.
64
2 BEALE 1261 ns. 2 and 3; STUMBERG 237 n. 18,219 n. 73·
65 See the cases supra n. 55 and Bay.ObLG. (Oct. 14/28, 1912) Recht 1913

No. 7o, cited by NussBAUM, D. IPR. 242 who seems to approve of it in principle.
66
Note, 23 Harv. L. Rev. (1910) 563.
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III.

LEGALITY

In the Anglo-American conflicts literature, the doctrine of
"illegality" has been singularly inflated and confused by
sweeping English dicta relied upon by Beale. We have to
state the correct opinion to this effect:
(a) The pertinent question is not whether the "making"
or the "performance" of a contract is prohibited, but whether
or not the contract is valid and enforceable by the applicable
law, which is the law governing the contract as a whole. This
observation needs no proof, although it seems to be widely
neglected.
(b) The law of the place of contracting (if it does not
govern the contract) is immaterial, and its prohibitions without any importance, as expounded earlier. 67
(c) The law of the place of performance as such is of no
greater significance.
(d) The rules of private law of the forum likewise should
not obstruct the application of foreign law, except in extraordinary cases.
The two last contentions will be developed here and in
the next chapter, respectively.
One of Dicey's rules reproduces the assertion of English
judges that a contract valid under its proper law is nevertheless void if prohibited by the law of the place of performance. 68
Repeatedly, renowned judges have connected this alleged
rule with the broader proposition that English courts should
not sanction the breach of the laws of other independent
states. 69 The principal thesis, alone contemplated here, re67

Supra Chapter 29, pp. 397-400.
DICEY 657 exception 3 (n) to Rule 159.
69 Scrutton, L. J., in Ralli Brothers v. Compaiifa Naviera Sota y Aznar
[192o] 2 K. B. 287, 30.4. The principle was called"· .• too well established
now to require further discussion" by Lord Wright, M. R., in International
Trustee for the Protection of Bondholders Aktiengesellschaft v. Rex. [1936]
3 All E. R. 407, 429.
68
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curs in the municipal English law of obligations and, according to critics, belongs only to that branch of law; 70 in fact,
it has been used in no case where a law other than English
law or the law of the place of performance itself governed
the contract. 71 The Restatement of the Law of Conflicts, however, has elaborated on this rule:

"If performance of a contract is illegal by the law of the
place of performance, there is no obligation to perform so
long as the illegality continues.m 2
The comment assumes that a local prohibition at the place
of the intended fulfillment makes the contract unenforceable
at any place, although this law does not govern the contract
(or in Beale's theory, its validity). 73 Again, the rule reappears in the American Restatement of contracts law. But Williston at least indicates how uneasy he feels about this unreasonable dogma; and in a somewhat forced argument, he
leads the discussion to the result that illegality under any
nongoverning law does not itself kill or paralyze an obligation.74
The mistake, indeed, is of a double nature. Neither ( r)
has the place of performance in conflicts law the absolutely
dominant role which Dicey and Beale believed; nor ( 2) does
70
MANN, "Proper Law and Illegality in Private International Law," 18 Brit.
Year Book Int. Law (1937) 97 at 107-u3; MEZGER, Nouv. Revue 1937,
51·7 at 5311!.; CHESHIRE 1.77 n. 5 seems to agree, except for the recognition of
the broader rule by the courts. See also NussBAUM, 51 Yale L. J. (1941.) 893
at 917.
71
MANN, id. at III.
72
Restatement § 3 6o.
73
Restatement§ 360 comments band f.
Also the Polish Int. Priv. Law, art. 1o has a similar provision: "The parties
are bound by the specific legal prohibitions annulling transactions contrary to
law, provided that they are in force in the states (sic) in which the debtor is
domiciled and the obligation is performable by him." This obscure provision
does not appear in the Czechoslovakian drafts.
74 Restatement of the Law of Contracts§ 458 comment b; WILLISTON, 6 Contracts 5093 § 1791.; note the embarrassment of }ENKS, 1 Digest of English
Civil Law (ed. 3> 1938) 131. § 307.
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a prohibition of the contractual performance absolutely eliminate the contractual duty in the law of obligations.
In the first place, we are carried back to the unfortunate
attempts to bisect the contract so that it may be governed by
different laws. The defects of this method appear patent
here. If payment in gold coins, traffic in narcotics, prices exceeding a ceiling, are forbidden in any country, this does
not mean that the contract is blameless while performance
is reproved. The "great difficulty" admitted by Beale is in
distinguishing what is illegality of contracting and what is
illegality of performance, subject to different law; this
difficulty must be immense, since the only material case is
that where the contract itself is vitiated because of a prohibition of performance.
In the second place, we may contend, as a result of investigations that cannot be repeated here, that under all
modern laws controlling obligations, although with some
variety and occasional uncertainties, a debtor will be excused
from his duty of specific performance (where this duty is
recognized) by impossibility or frustration; and that his duty
to pay damages for nonperformance is released, if impossibility or frustration is not included in the risk to be borne
by the debtor according to the individual contract or suppletive legal rules. 75
As a simple result, we have to look to the governing law,
none other, to ascertain whether any obstacle laid in the path
of performance, frees the debtor from his duty of specific
performance, if any exists, and from damages. English courts
are certainly not more ready than others to excuse the debtor
in any venture. Let us contemplate the leading case principal75

See Blackburn Bobbin Co. v. T. W. Allen & Sons, Ltd. [I9I8] I K. B.
2. K. B. 467; Romer, L. J., in Walton Harvey, Ltd. v. Walker and
Homfrays, Ltd. [I 93 I] I Ch. 2.74, 2.85; RABEL, I Recht des Warenkaufs 2.77,
540; [I918]

343> 357·
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ly claimed to support the thesis of Dicey and Beale and many
more prudent assertions in the English and American literature.
The Ralli case7'6 was decided under English law to the
effect that an English firm was held not bound to pay a certain
freight difference. The firm had sold jute to a Spaniard in
Barcelona and, in a charter party made in London with a
Spanish shipping company, agreed to a freight rate for carrying the jute from Calcutta to Barcelona. Half of the freight
was to be paid by the buyer upon arrival as part of the
purchase price. The Spanish law having established a maximum freight for jute, the buyer refused to pay more. Did
the court really hold English law to be that, because of a
Spanish prohibition, the Englishman did not owe the freight
promised by him? This would cover the usual proposition, but
the court would certainly not have agreed to such an untenable ruling. If a German firm had bought cotton in New
York at the market price, to be paid on sound arrival in
Hamburg and the German state had decreed a ceiling price
for cotton, it is not very probable that any American court
would hold the contractual right to the price unenforceable.
What characterized the case was the fact that the freight in
question, half of the contractual amount, should have been
paid by the Spanish buyer to the Spanish company in Spain.
Although one of the judges remarked that he did not look
beyond the immediate issue, it seems evident that the English
seller, if bound to pay the difference, would have lost his recourse against the buyer in a Spanish court, and that this was
the reason why it seemed equitable to send the Spanish company back to the law of its own country.
Whether such equitable considerations, not quite unfamiliar to English and other courts, are sound in municipal
law is of little interest here. The really decisive consideration, pointing to the distribution of risks, a consideration
76

Supra n. 69.
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grounded in a model English tradition, 77 was admirably fol78
lowed by the Privy Council a few weeks after the Ralli case,
and very neatly formulated in the following American decision.79
The Tweedie Corporation of New Jersey, owner of the
vessel "Catania," let the ship on hire to the McDonald Corporation of West Virginia by a written contract in New York,
where both companies entertained offices. The vessel was to
transport laborers on four trips from Barbados, an English
colony, to Colon. New York law evidently governed. After
two trips had been made, the British government prohibited
any export of workers from Barbados. The performance, thus,
was not impossible but illicit in Barbados. Did this prohibition of performance by the law of the place of performance
excuse the hiring company from payment or even invalidate
the contract? The court, somewhat perturbed by the confused authorities, nevertheless penetrated to the decisive consideration. In the spirit of the contract, as the court assumed,
the McDonald Corporation had to carry the risk of the
change of laws of a foreign government at the place of performance. This rigor may be approved or disapproved, but
the solution is sought in the correct field of excuses for nonperformance according to the governing law of New York,
and the risks contemplated by the parties directed this deCISIOn.

IV.

NoNPERFORMANCE OF THE CoNTRACT

In General

I.

Apart from the questionable theories establishing a separate law applicable to performance,S0 in principle the law
77

See Jacobs, Marcus & Co. v. The Credit Lyonnais (r884)

12.

Q. B. D.

589.
78

Trinidad Shipping & Trading Co., Ltd. v. G. R. Alston and Co. [1920]
A. C. 888.
79
Tweedie Trading Co. v. James P. McDonald Co. (1902) 114 Fed. 985;
other cases are discussed by 2 BEALE 1263 § 360.2.
80
Especially BEALE us&, 1267, 1274; in France, VALERY 987 § 685;
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governing the contract determines all its effects, including
the requisites of default, excuses for nonperformance, and the
effects of unexcused failure to perform. 81
The English Law Reform Act of 1943, in modernizing the
rules of restitution in various cases of failure of consideration, expressly.presupposes that the contract is governed by
English law. 82 The Act is understood thereby to subject the
right of restitution to the law of the contract and has been
criticized on this ground83 because this right should be governed by the law of the place where enrichment was obtained.84 But while undue enrichment in general may have to
follow extracontractual lines in both substantive and conflicts law, consideration or an advance payment given on the
ground of a contract is to be recovered under contractual
rules. Even though, in the part concerning contracts, a code
may refer to its rules relating to undue enrichment, as the
German Code does, it is well settled that the relation created
by the contract extends to the duty of restitution. 85 Hence,
German courts apply the law governing the contract, and a
Judge Learned Hand in Louis-Dreyfus et al. v. Paterson Steamships, Ltd.
(I93o) 43 F. (2d) 824 recognizes that liability and excuses for nonperformance must follow the same law, but nevertheless, following the Restatement,
excuses the debtor under Canadian law from the fulfillment of a Minnesota
contract. Cj. NussBAUM, 51 Yale L. J. (I942) at 9I7 n. 149; BATIFFOL, 26I
n. I, 407 n. 2.
81 United States: BATIFFOL 407-408 n. 2 recalls the constant practice in the
cases concerning insurance and transportation.
England: Jacobs, Marcus & Co. v. The Credit Lyonnaise (I884) I2 Q. B. D.
589; Blackburn Bobbin Co. v. T. W. Allen & Sons, Ltd., supra n. 75·
Austria: OGH. (Oct. 24, I928) 10 SZ. 6o9.
France: NIBOYET, 16 Recueil (I927) I 83; LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIERE 437
§ J58.
.
Germany: RG. (June 26, I912) Leipz. Z. I912, 762; Bay. ObLG. (Oct. IS,
I93o) 30 Bay. ObLGZ. 354, 368; LEWALD No. 303.
Switzerland: BG. (June 28, I9I8) 44 BGE. II 280 (intention of the
parties).
82 The Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act, I 943, 6 & 7 Geo. 6, c.
40.
83 G. L. WILLIAMS, 7 Modern L. Rev. (I944) 66, 69.
84 Williams follows GUTTER!DGE and LIPSTEIN, "Conflicts of Law in
Matters of Unjustifiable Enrichment," 7 Cambr. L. J. (I939) 8o.
85
See BGB. §§ 323 par. 3, 325 par. 1 sent. 3; §§ 346, 347, 348 make clear
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similar rule has probably been adopted in the draft of the
Montevideo Treaty in 1940.86

Illustration. The English Act repeals the rule in the
Fibrosa case87 that a party who prepaid money under certain
accidental circumstances may recover all the money paid,
and the payee is not allowed to deduct his own damage and
expense. Suppose that an English firm has paid a sum under
an English contract to a party in a British jurisdiction in
which the Reform Act has not yet been adopted, why should
the payee not profit from the new and unquestionably just
law governing the contract rather than depend on the place
where by a casual circumstance the money was paid? 88
The Restatement, it is true, applies its section concerned
with the quasi..:contractual obligation of restitution in an illustration, to an agreement whereby A promises to build a
house for B on B's land. The promisor starts on the building
but does not complete it. When he sues B to recover the
amount by which A's labor and materials have benefited B,
the law of the place where the land is, allegedly applies. But
in the illustration, fortunately, it is this law that allows the
that restitution on the ground of rescission is not identical with recovery of
undue enrichment.
86
Germany: Under the common law: RG. (June 18, 1887) 4 Bolze No. z6;
Bay. ObLG. (Nov. 16, 188z) 38 Seuff. Arch. z6o, still regarded as leading
cases by NusSBAUM, D. IPR. 295 n. z. Under the actual practice, the courts
apply the law of the place of performance of each party with respect to his
obligation. If a buyer has paid the price in advance, he may recover after rescission, under the law of the place where he had to pay under the contract. For the
cases see LEWALD zp. No. 311 sub (z). RAAPE, D. IPR. 296ff. adds support
by examining the practical results.
Montevideo Treaty, draft of 1940, art. 43 says that the obligations arising
without contract are governed by the law of the place where the act is done
from which they derive "and, in the proper case (en su caso) by the law
governing the legal relations to which they correspond." This obscure text
seems best construed as above.
87
Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v. Fairbairn Lawson Combe Barbour, Ltd. [1943]
A. C. 32.
88
Exactly to the same effect, FALCONBRIDGE, "Frustrated Contracts: The
Need for Law Reform," 23 Can. Bar Rev. (1945) 43 at 6o with reference
to Ontario. And see, more recently, MoRRIS, "The Choice of Law in Statutes,"
62 Law Q. Rev. (1946) 170, 181; FALCONBRIDGE, Conflict of Laws (1947)
365.
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89

recovery. Otherwise, it would have been difficult to defend
the nonapplication of the law decisive for all of the contract.
Sanctions of Nonperformance

2.

The unity of the contract must naturally be preserved also
with respect to the several sanctions of nonperformance. 90
Rescission. Whether a party is entitled to cancel a contract
and what restitution is due in this case by either party, is determined by the law of the contract. 91 Beale, who would have
preferred the law of the place of performance, explains the
cases by the theory of the courts that the right of rescission
flows from a sort of implied contract. 92 But this, indeed, is
the correct theory, inasmuch as it acknowledges a right inherent in the contract.
Damages. The old conception that damages exclusively
pertain to the procedural law of the forum, has maintained
as little force with respect to breach of contract as with respect to tort. 93 The right to recover and the measure of
89

Restatement§ 452 illustration 3·
E.g., German Reichsgericht (Jan. I o, I 9 I I) Warn. Rspr. I 9 I I, No. I I I :
the right to exercise a lien is governed by the law of the contract rather than
that of the place where the right is exercised.
91
United States: Sokoloff v. Nat'l City Bank of New York (I924) 239 N.Y.
I58, I45 N. E. 9I7, aff'd (1928) 250 N.Y. 69, 164 N. E. 745; American
Union Bank v. Swiss Bank Corp. (I93o) 40 F. (2d) 446; (both cases recognized by 2 BEALE 1275, as authorities contrary to his own theory). For insurance, see New York Life Ins. Co. v. Cravens (I9oo) 178 U.S. 389; Mutual
Life Ins. Co. of New York v. Johnson, Administrator (1934) 293 U.S. 335;
and for other types of contracts, Pratt v. Dittmer (I 92 I) 5 I Cal. App. 512,
I97 Pac. 365; James N. True v. Northern Pacific R. Co. (I9I4) I26 Minn.
72, 147 N. W. 948.
As an example of application of the foreign law stipulated by the parties, see
Rubin v. Gallagher (I 940) 294 Mich. I 24, 292 N. W. 5 84 (partial recovery
of paid installments in a title-retaining sale).
England: Benaim and Co. v. Debono [I924] A. C. 5I4.
France: Cass. (civ.) (May u, I93o) S.I93I.1.129, Clunet 193I, I64ff.;
BATIFFOL 405 § 490.
Germany: RG. (Oct. 30, I926) 39 Z.int.R. 276; Reichsarbeitsgericht (Dec.
2I, I932) IPRspr. I933, 23.
92
2 BEALE I275 § 373.I.
93 The procedural theory was maintained in Massachusetts as a hangover from
90
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damages in a violated contract are determined by the law
governing the contract. 94 This law also extends to the question
whether damages may be obtained in addition to rescission. 95
Occasionally, as in tort, it happens in this country that a court
wrongly denies the right to damages because of a different
construction in the domestic law. The Michigan Supreme
Court in Mount Ida School v. Rood/'6 refused to enforce the
right of a school to a contractual fee under an agreement
recognized to be governed by Massachusetts law, because the
plaintiff asked for the full amount allowable in Massachusetts, instead of deducting at once in his own complaint the
costs he would have incurred in case of performance, as prescribed in Michigan. The court, to avoid the "illogical and
unjust result" of Massachusetts law, resorted to the public
policy of the forum and has been justly criticized therefor. 97
the past: Grimshaw v. Bender and Dana (r8o9) 6 Mass. 157; Ayer v. Tilden
(r86o) 15 Gray (8r Mass.) 178; Ives v. The Farmers' Bank (r86r) 2 Allen
(84 Mass.) 236.
94
United States: Restatement § 413 (law of the place of performance);
Walker v. Lovitt (r9rl) 250 Ill. 543, 95 N. E. 631; Amos v. Kelley Co.
(1927) 240 Mich. 257, 215 N. W. 397; Riddle v. Hudson (1917) 68 Okla.
173, 172 Pac. 921, 926; Wynne v. McCarthy (C. C. A. 10th 1938) 97 F.
(zd) 964; Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Klaxon Co. (1940) II5 F. (:z.d)
z68, 275; Smyth Sales Inc. v. Petroleum Heat & Power Co. (1942.) 12.8 F.
(zd) 697, 702 {the last two dicta by Goodrich, J.).
Canada: Supreme Court of Canada, Livesley v. Horst & Co. [ 1924] S. C. R.
6os, [1925] 1 D. L. R. 159.
Ontario: Schrader, Mitchell & Weir v. Robson Leather Co. [1912] 3D. L. R.
83 8 (lex loci contractus) .
Quebec: See 3 Johnson 394 n. 2.
Germany: RG. (March 27, 1903) JW. 1903, 184; (Jan. 21, 1908) Leipz.
Z. 19o8, 3o8, and many subsequent cases; RG. (March 2.4, 1933) IPRspr. 1933
No. 14.
Italy: Cass. (June 2o, 1938) Sett. Cass. 1938, 131, 7 Giur. Comp. DIP. 324
No. 173.
95
Cass. (civ.) (May u, 1930) supra n. 91.
96
Walton School of Commerce v. 5troud (1929) 248 Mich. 85, 226 N. W.
883, Wiest, J., dissenting; Mount Ida School v. Rood (1931) 253 Mich. 482,
235 N. W. 227, 74 A. L. R. 1JZ5·
97
Notes, 14 Minn. L. Rev. (1930) 665, 67o; 78 U. of Pa. L. Rev. (1930)
64o; So U. of Pa. L. Rev. (1931) 126; AILES, "Substance and Procedure in
the Conflict of Laws," 39 Mich. L. Rev. (1941) 392, 411, 417. But the federal
Circuit Court of Appeals has regretfully accepted the rule that the law of the
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Penalties. The same law may be expected to apply to the
various types of penalties stipulated in contracts. This has
been constantly recognized by the German courts resorting to
the law governing an obligation in order to determine the
validity of a penalty promised in case of nonperformance or
delay, 98 the concurrence of the right of penalty with the right
of damages, 99 and the question of waiver. 100
The same is probably true in this country, 101 with one restriction. The purpose in agreeing on a penalty may be either
to fix a lump amount of damages or to punish the defaulting
debtor irrespective of damage, both valuable stipulations when
the evidence of actual damage is difficult to obtain, the latter
method also being useful to secure promises lacking any
pecuniary estimation. Nevertheless, some American courts
persist in believing that all liquidated damages are punishments and that they are 1:1nenforceable despite the fact that
their purpose is not "to punish an offense against the public
justice of the state" but to grant a civil right to a private
person. 102 These courts are said to be supposed to refuse enforcement to a promise that they regard as a penalty, although it is valid under the law considered by these courts
themselves as governing/03
An analogous public policy was once announced in a German decision which reduced an agreed sum by application of
forum applies as settled by these cases, Transit Bus Sales v. Kalamazoo Coaches
lnc.(1944) 145F.(2d) 8o4,807.
ns RG. (March 15, 1892) 2 Z.int.R. 477; RG. (Dec. 1, 1911) 22 Z.int.R.
3 1 1 ; and other cases.
99
RG. (Jan. 5, 1887) 19 RGZ. 33 (penalty clause under English law).
100
ROHG. (Feb. 1, 1875) 16 ROHGE. 14; OLG. Dresden (July 10, 1891)
2 Sachsisches Archiv fur burgerliches Recht 6so, cited by LEWALD No. 375a.
101
Restatement § 422 ( 1).
102
Words of Mr. Justice Gray in defining statutory penalties with respect
to judgments not falling under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, Huntington
v. Attrill (1892) 146 U.S. 657,673-4.
103
Restatement§ 422 (2); BEALE 1340 § 422.1 cites only two cases of 1889
and r893, respectively.
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the domestic provision contained in the Civil Code that the
judge should mitigate an exaggerated penalty according to
his discretion. It has been correctly objected that such reduction cannot be essential, since the German Commercial Code
allows no such judicial mitigation. 104
Moratory interest allowed as damages. Finally there is
no reason why, on principle, damages for delay in a money
payment fixed by law at some percentage of the principal
sum, should not be governed by the law of the contract/05
The contrary decisions of the French Court of Cassation are
obsolete. 106 But in the United States, it is said that the law
of the place of performance applies. 107 Since the cases alleged
for support mostly refer to negotiable instruments, which, in
fact, are in a special category, we shall reserve the question
for a later opportunity.
3· Burden of Proof
We may repeat the statement made in the discussion of
torts that, in the prevailing theory, except in English courts,
burden of proof is controlled by the law governing the substantive rights. :~cos
104 Germany: BGB. § 343; OLG. Hamburg (Dec. 23, 1902) 59 Seuff. Arch.
63, I.j. Z.int.R. 79• Contra: see 2 FRANKENSTEIN 232; LEWALD 257·
Similarly, Switzerland: BG. (Feb. 2S, 1915) 41 BGE. II 138.
On the other hand, in Brazil, 2 PONTES DE MIRANDA 21 o states that a
Brazilian court may exercise a German-created right of mitigating a penalty,
art. 927 of the Brazilian C. C. not being based on public policy.
105 Germany: RG. (Feb. 20, I88o) I RGZ. 59, 61; (Jan. 8, 1930) Hans.
RGZ. 1930 B 2u, 214.
106 BATIFFOL 413 § so3 has only alleged correct decisions of lower courts,
but the decision Cass. (civ.) (May IS, I935) S.I93S·I.244 clearly recognizes
the law of the place of contracting as that intended by the parties, cf. ESMEIN,
10 Z.ausl.PR. (1936) 884.
107 2 BEALE 1335 § 418.2; STUMBERG 240 fl. 28.
108 LoRENZEN, 32 Yale L. J. (I923) at 332 n. 74; supra pp. 283-286.
Germany: RG. (April 17, 1882) 6 RGZ. 412; (Oct. 29, 1925) 79 Seuff.
Arch. 353 No. :us; (May 19, 1928) 82 id. 289 No. 164.
The application of the lex fori in England has been reaffirmed by an
Admiralty Court judge and the Court of Appeals in The Roberta [1937] 58
Ll. L. Rep. 159, 177; [1938] 6o id. 84, 85.
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v. CHANGE OF LAW
The prevailing view seems to be that in any law suit the
law governing a contract applies in the form in which it is
in force at the time of the final decision. 109 Rules of law
repealed after the making of the contract are inapplicable
and replaced by the current rules. This opinion is in conformity with the view set forth in this work that all references
to a foreign law·as applicable to a certain question are directed
to the whole law of the foreign state, to the body of its system
susceptible of alterations, and not to a few selected rules.
Occasionally, in this country, a contrary idea has been
advanced, as if the applicable law were that existing at the
time when the contract was made. The New York Court of
Appeals thought it necessary to excuse a deviation from this
alleged principle, when it applied the Joint Resolution of
Congress abrogating the effect of gold clauses to bonds issued
previously in New York, the new law being constitutional and
representing the public policy of the forum. 110 Evidently,
such opinions are stimulated by the doctrine prohibiting retroactive laws from impairing vested rights. But our subject
should not be confused with constitutional problems.
At any rate, the New York Court argued on the presumption of an intention of the parties to submit to the laws of
109 England: In re Chesterman's Trusts [1923] 2 Ch. 466, 478.
France: BATIFFOL, Revue Crit. 1935, 615 at 618; HAMEL, Nouv. Revue
1937, 4Q9 at 509; BATIFFOL 68 § 74·
Germany: RG. (Jan. 27, 1927) and (March 22, 1927) IPRspr. 1926/27
No. 42 with more documentation; RG. (May 26, 1936) JW. 1936, 2058.
11 Compafiia de Inversiones Internacionales v. Industrial Mortgage Bank of
Finland (1935) 269 N.Y. 22, 26, 198 N. E. 617.
It is entirely distinguishable that under the Georgia Code (1895) § z88o,
(1933) § 57-106 "every contract bears interest according to the law of the
place of the contract at the time of the contract," and therefore a defendant's
plea that the contract was usurious according to a certain Alabama law, was
dismissed, because the defendant had not proved the existence of that Ia w at the
time of the contract; see Thomas v. Clarkson (1906) 125 Ga. 72, 54 S. E.
77; and for subsequent cases, Jones v. Lawman (1937) 56 Ga. App. 764, 770,
194 S. E. 416, 420. This regards a cause of initial defect in the contract.
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New York. There are cases, in fact, in which the parties may
well be supposed to have tacitly agreed on a reference to a
law merely as it was at the time. However, as seen earlier, it
is controversial whether the parties are allowed to do so.111
As a rule, no such temporary limit should be understood to
inhere in either an agreement or an intention of the parties;
too many difficulties would be raised in ascertaining a substituted law. In fact, the Joint Resolution of 1933 has been
applied in a great number of decisions in various countries as
a subsequently enacted part of New York law governing bond
debentures. 112
Similarly, the main part of the German Law of Revalorization of r 92 5, prescribing that certain debts expressed in
"Mark" currency should be due in the amount of a percentage
in new "Reichsmark," was regarded without hesitation as an
alteration of the German law.
Only the peculiar provision of this law was much contested
whereby a debtor having redeemed a mortgage with heavily
depreciated money was bound to add some supplementary
payment. While some courts of other countries repudiated
this retroactive law under the point of view of public policy, 118
a Dutch court argued that a Dutchman, having bought a
house in Germany, paid the mortgage. effectively under the
law then existing, and resold the house before the new law
went into force, had no connection with Germany and could
not be affected by German legislation. 114 The court, thus, denied the continued effect of the governing law rather than its
retroactivity, a view of great force.
Finally, obligations entered into under the Czarist Russian
legislation before the 7th of November, 1917, were prohibited by Soviet legislation from being brought before the
111

Sup1·a Chapter 28 1 p. 393·
See the surveys in Z.ausl.PR. Vols. 9-1 I.
118
See the cases infra Chapter 33, p. 567 n. 46.
114
Rb. Rotterdam (June q, 1930) W. 12266.
112
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courts. In agreement with the prevailing opinion, a Swiss
court held that as a consequence Soviet law replacing the
former law made the obligations in question unenforceable
also in Switzerland. 116 While the objection of public policy to
the legislative impairment in this case was expressly denied,
it might be granted under circumstances where the contract
has sufficiently close connection with the forum, as when the
debtor resides in the forum at the time of the decree. 117 But
even so, obligations expressed in Czarist roubles are without
object.ll8 Cases seem to be rare in which it may be reasonably
argued that an old Russian contract survives under some
substituted law. 119
In conclusion, we may state the principle that changes in
the applicable law must be observed, except where a contrary
agreement of the parties is ascertainable and permitted by the
law of the forum.
115

Art. 2 of the Introductory Decree of Oct. 3 I, I 922, to the Civil Code.
App. Ziirich (Dec. I9, I928) 3 Z. f. Ostrecht (I929) I403 with approving note by FREUND.
117
In the case of Nazi-German expropriations, Weber v. Johnson (I939)
15 N.Y. Supp. (2d) 77o; Anninger v. Hohenberg (I939) I72 Misc. 1046, I8
N. Y. Supp. (2d) 499·
118
Lehman, J., in Dougherty v. Equitable Life Assurance Society (I 9 34)
z66 N.Y. 71, Io5, 193 N. E. 897, 9Io.
119
M. WOLFF, Priv. Int. Law 43 I § 406 makes the interesting suggestion
that a revolutionary overthrow of the existing law and its replacement by
something new is not included in a choice of law by the parties. In my opinion,
this is a question of interpretation, as also with respect to less exorbitant changes
of law, such as the Joint Resolution on gold clauses. The difficulties, however,
of a new choice of law made necessary by the suggestion, may be great.
116
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Public Policy 1
I.

THE

LAw

oF THE FoRUM

A. THE PRESENT SITUATION

HE manifold objections raised against a free choice
of law by the parties have proved without foundation
except as justified by resort to the public policy of the
forum. 2 Equally, it has been indicated, despite various assertions, that neither the law of the place of contracting nor
that of the place of performance has a paramount role in
regulating the legality of transactions, but the forum may
have a word to say. 3 At the same time, it has appeared that

T

1
For the United States, see BEACH, "Uniform Interstate Enforcement of
Vested Rights," 27 Yale L. J. (1918) 656; GooDRICH, "Public Policy in the
Law of Conflicts," 36 W.Va. L. Q. (1930) 156; id., "Foreign Facts and Local
Fancies," 25 Va. L. Rev. (1938) 26; 3 BEALE§ 6r2.r; STUMBERG, "Conflict
of Laws-Validity of Contracts-Texas Cases," ro Tex. L. Rev. (1932) r63,
18 z; also STUMBERG r 78-r 79; HussERL, "Public Policy and Ordre Public,"
25 Va. L. Rev. (1938) 37· Note, "The Public Policy Concept in the Conflict
of Laws," 33 Col. L. Rev. (1933) 508.
In the continental literature, every writer on conflicts law has discussed the
problem. Basic: KAHN, "Die Lehre vom Ordre Public (Prohibitivgesetze) ,"
first in 39 Jherings Jahrb. (r898) 1-I12, 1 Abh. 161-254. Bibliographies by
NIBOYET, 10 Repert. 92, 1 STREIT-VALLINDAS 315-317. MARTI, "Der Vorbehalt des eigenen Rechtes im internationalen Privatrecht der Schweiz,"
(Abhandlungen zum Schweizer. Recht, ed. Gmiir-Guhl, No. 176, 1940).
More recent articles by LoUis-LucAs, "Remarques sur l'ordre public," Revue
1933, 393, and VALERY, "Examen critique des remarques sur l'ordre public
de M. Pierre Louis-Luca~," 6r Revue Dr. Int. (Bruxelles 1934) 194, continue the French dispute on the elements of which ordre public consists. Are
there one (NIBOYET, Manuel 547 § 443); or two, namely, (a) in the prevailing distinction ordre public interne and international (WEISS, 3 Traite
94) or (b) rather relative and absolute (LAINE, Annuaire 1908, 4 7) ; or three
(LoUIS-LUCAS); or four (VALERY) elements?
For a complete survey on the German practice until 1932, see MELCHIOR

324ff.
2
3

Supra pp. 427-429.
Supra p. 5 35·
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resort to the public policy of the forum is a delicate and very
rarely justifiable measure.
Under these circumstances, some observations on the influence of public policy are indispensable in the present connection, although we have not attempted any such generalizations in the field of family law. In fact, while the common
habit of treating public policy in conflicts Jaw in comprehensive terms is quite unsound, the controversy on this much debated subject has a special meaning for obligations. The need
for security of transactions involving family or inheritance
may well mean that the state of domicil or nationality should
be privileged to regulate the individual's marriage, adoption
or will. The social policy of such state and its conception of
family interests have some claim to be preferred over the
legal systems of places where parties merely happen to meet.
Where personal law and contracts law clash, however, as in
the question of the capacity of married women to undertake
obligations by contract, the solution is controversial; American courts are divided in recognizing the policy of the domicil
or that of the state of contracting as predominant. We have
supported the English intermediary proposition that for business contracts the law governing the contract should apply
to the exclusion of domiciliary policy. 4 Special considerations
apply also with respect to transfer of possession or title; any
influence of contracts on personalty or realty may be excepted
from this chapter.
Uncertainty. Interstate and international contracts not concerned with family or inheritance rights and not directly
affecting possession or title, are secure only if they are removed as completely as possible from the play of local policies
and predilections alien to the purpose of the contract. Nevertheless, time and again, though but sporadically, courts have
4

See Vol.

1

p. 195.
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measured contracts with the yardstick of their local conceptions, whether because one party was a resident of the forum
-a regrettable approach sometimes shared by New York
judges; or because the agreement was completed by a "final"
act within the forum-a view sanctioned by the Restatement's
exaggerated formalism; or on the ground of the parties' national connection-as frequently but unjustly claimed by
French and Latin-American jurisdictions. In a number of
cases, contracts have been subjected to the "public interest"
of the forum without any connection with its territory.
The various general formulas used in enactments referring
to the exception of public policy, 5 though sometimes worthy
of attention, have been of no practical help. The C6digo
Bustamante establishes special rules for obligations but recognizes "international public order" on an extremely vast
scale.6 A recent law of Guatemala characteristically deprives
foreign law of all effect if it is "contrary to the national
sovereignty, the laws and the public order." 7
By common agreement, not all municipal legal rules are
a potential obstacle to the application of foreign law, not even
by any means all those considered "imperative" in the
domestic sphere. Only a "strong" public policy in the words
of the Restatement ( § 6 r 2), or an "international public
order," as the internationally relevant part of the national
public policy is commonly called in France, prevent enforcement of the law referred to by a conflicts rule. Just what
rules pertain to this class remains in intentional obscurity. The
fantastic use of the doctrine made in certain judicial decisions
has been shown in lists of horrible cases collected long ago. 8
5

See MAKAROV 4I9 (Systemat. Register); NIBOYET, IO Repert. 92ff.
Arts. I75-I82, 246.
7
Law on Foreigners of 1936, art. 23.
8
See, for instance, KAHN, I Abhandl. I 69, 214-2 I 7, 247 n. I 32, 248-25 t;

6

I

FRANKENSTEIN I 86.
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Over and over again, writers have emphasized that the cases
cannot be forced into any system, which is quite true in the
present state of things. Any scholar in any country, devoting
himself to a study of habits of court in this field, must feel
exactly as did the observer in this country who declared that
he retired baffied from an examination of the American cases:
"The conclusion must be, then, that a clearly developed
and defined concept of public policy cannot be found in
the cases .... We do know enough to say with considerable
confidence that an investigation to determine when the courts
will apply the doctrine of public policy to deny the recognition of a foreign right would result in the conclusion, 'you
never can tell.' m
You never can tell! The worst feature of the traditional
latent conflict between private international law and municipal law is precisely this resultant uncertainty. For the sake
of relatively few doubtful cases, the sword of Damocles hangs
over each and every contract. The courts usurp a discretionary
power when to apply conflicts rules and when to sacrifice
them, a freedom exercised at the cost of the parties' freedom
to contract outside the forum. The antiquated loose talk of
comity between states, not having any contractual rights to be
enforced, perpetuates a feeling that conflicts rules are inferior
to internal rules. 10 But, for a long time, the best informed
scholars and judges have agreed that an unqualified reservation in favor of the law of the forum is a menace to extrastate
business activity. The great majority of writers, it is true,
have been satisfied with the disconsolate and resigned statement that there is no rule or method of forecasting. Perhaps,
most of them share in the conviction of the courts that public
9

NuTIING, "Suggested Limitations of the Public Policy Doctrine,"

L. Rev. (1935) 196, zoo.
10 See for illustration the summary in 15 C.
ns. 2 7-29 ibid.

J.

I

9 Minn.

S. 836, 837 and the cases in
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policy ought to remain as an unlimited safety valve, although
they want it used only as an exception.
Full Faith and Credit Clause. In the United States, the
application of public policy in conflicts law must be distinguished from "matters of local concern" exempted from
the constitutional duty of states to enforce the laws and acts
of sister states. Although the Full Faith and Credit Clause
contains potential force to develop federal conflicts rules,
only few rudimentary elements for such development have
appeared. All theories for delimiting the domain of the Full
Faith and Credit Clause on the basis of the cases have failed.
As was stated in 1935, "it seems reasonably clear ... that the
Supreme Court has not constituted itself an arbiter in all conflicts cases and that there is a field, albeit of indeterminate
boundaries, where the public policy of the state may hold
sway." 11
At the beginning of 1945, a long series of elaborate decisions had led the Supreme Court to a point where one of the
Justices declared:
"I cannot say with any assurance where the line is drawn
today between what the Supreme Court will decide as constitutional law and what it will leave to the states as common
law." 12
It is certainly true that a slight connection of a case with
the forum not only makes application of the domestic law
ludicrous but ordinarily also calls for the sanction of the Full
Faith and Credit Clause. 13 But the inverse would not be true.
Although remaining in the sphere of constitutional independence, a court is by no means entitled to impress local views
on foreign transactions. The conflicts rule binds the court.
11 NUTTING, supra n. 9, at zos.
12
Mr. Justice }ACKSON, "Full Faith

and Credit-The Lawyer's Clause of the
Constitution," 45 Col. L. Rev. (1945) x, 13·
13 STUMBERG 253, Note in fine.
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Confusion is sometimes encountered even in recent cases. A
federal court sitting in Missouri considered a clause of restraint of trade stipulated in the employment contract of a
branch manager. 14 The clause was valid according to Missouri
law and void according to Michigan law. The employee had
never been in Michigan; the contract was negotiated in St.
Louis and performed first in Illinois and thereafter in St.
Louis. The one thing done in Michigan was that the company, resident there, assented to the contract. The court explains that authorities are divided between lex loci contractus
and lex loci solutionis, but that the true answer, independent
of both, is given by the principle laid down by the Supreme
Court of the United States that a state has to enforce a sister
state's law under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, except
where its own public policy prevails. In the case at bar,
Missouri had a major interest, while Michigan had practically
none. This is true, but if the contract had had sufficient connection with Michigan to render the application of the Michigan law natural, it would be very improper for a Missouri
court to declare the clause valid despite the Michigan prohibition, whatever its so-called "interest." Public policy
validating foreign void agreements is possible but rarely asserted, and for good reasons. Thus, the conflicts question
should have been plain. The decision was correct for the
simple reason that the entire contract was centered in Missoun.
Due Process Clause. From the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, it has
been occasionally deduced that a state may not resort to its
own public policy to invalidate a contract made and consummated in another state. It was thus decided in 1934 that
clauses of an insurance contract entered into in Tennessee in
14

Holland Furnace Co. v. Connelley ( 1 942) 48 F. Supp. 543·
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the presence of the parties and their employees, valid according to a decision of the Tennessee Supreme Court, could not
15
be challenged in Mississippi at the domicil of the insured.
The Supreme Court expressly recognizes that a state cannot
enlarge the obligations of the parties to accord with every
statutory policy. 16 While similar reasonings may normally be
based also on the Full Faith and Credit Clause, the Due
Process Clause can be used to cover the observance of the law
of foreign countries.
American repugnance to the use of the exception. Fortunately, American writers 17 and courts are more reluctant than
all others to avail themselves of this exception. The issue has
been clarified by frank emphasis on the independent reasons
of policy supporting conflicts law.
"There surely is a policy both of good morals and commercial stability in giving legal effect to agreement lawfully
made. To deny enforcement to the foreign made contract
makes the state of the forum a shelter for those who refuse
to perform their legal obligations. Unlike the cases where a
court refuses relief to persons in pari delicto, such a rule
penalizes the obligor who, by hypothesis, was doing nothing
forbidden by law when and where his contract was made.
Both morality and expediency are opposed to such a conclusion. Fortunately we may say with high confidence that
this attitude is passing ... we become not only less suspicious
towards other people's food and customs, but of their legal
institutions as well.ms
English courts are more impressed by regard for international comity, requiring the recognition of the legislation of
15
Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Delta & Pine Land Co. (I 9 34)
292
143·
16 /d. at 149; Home Insurance Co. v. Dick (1930) 281 U.S. 397,407-8.

u. s.

17 3 BEALE I 6 5 I agrees with the protest: the resort to the exception "should
be extremely limited. This is especially true between the states of the United
States."
18
GOODRICH, 36 W.Va. L. Q., supra n. r, at 171.
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other independent states/ 9 but the result is similar, inasmuch
as public policy serves only exceptionally to bar the application of foreign law. The courts are anxious to limit the public
policy doctrine to "clear cases in which the harm to the public
is substantially incontestable and does not depend upon the
idiosyncratic inferences of a few judicial minds." 20 It is true,
however, that the English extension of procedural, penal
and jurisdictional prerogatives reduces such liberality in
many instances, 21 although this is more notable in the field of
torts.
Recent European reaction. This highly desirable progress
in the general American attitude must be anxiously preserved,
in face of a strange literary reaction coming from Europe's
darkest currents of nationalism. Writers have consciously
yielded to a resurgent spirit that militates against the "liberal" and "cosmopolitan" tendencies of the nineteenth century. The usual approach has been reversed. Public policy,
far from furnishing a rare exception to conflicts law, is now
elevated to the foremost principle, and application of foreign
law subordinated, as a mercy granted when convenient to the
domestic system. No longer a kind of nuisance, resort to the
law of the forum is deemed an organic element of conflicts
law. The Italian sources of this new theory seem to flow from
fascism, on the one hand, and from the theories of "reception," on the other. That foreign law must not only be referred to by the conflicts rule but also "received" into the
domestic law, has become a dangerous proposition. It will
suffice to quote in translation a few passages found in texts
of writers who would not have been expected to foster such
VIews:
19

Scrutton, L. J., in Aksionairnoye Obschestvo. A. M. Luther v. Sagor & Co.

[I9ZI] 3 K. B. 532> ss8.
20 Lord Atkin in Fender v. St. John-Mildmay [I938] A. C. 1, IZ
21

M.

WOLFF,

Priv. Int. Law

I 78

§

I 70.
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The principle followed thus far as basis of the internationalistic conception, ought to be reversed by applying
the logically opposed nationalistic conception. This application purports to consider the problem of the clause of reservation or of public order, as a problem of interpretation.
The foreign law may be enforced as special internal law in
the cases of international nature, provided that it can be
assumed that the legislator has intended its enforcement as
such. . . . Where such application cannot be founded upon
the most probable intention of the legislator, automatically
the internal common law re-enters into force, that is, the
territorial law. 22
In the first place, the assertion seems legitimate that ...
the limitation by public order constitutes in a certain sense
a part of every rule of private international law. In every
conflicts rule a clause must be considered implied to the
effect that ... foreign rules are referred to only to the extent
that the insertion of such rules into the internal legal order
does not disturb the harmony of its system. 23
Recently, such a voice has been heard in this country. Nussbaum encourages the courts to a more uninhibited use of the
public policy doctrine on the ground of local conceptions of
the conflict of laws. In his opinion, the tendencies against
public policy were caused by "liberal" and internationalminded illusions and still more by "dogmatic" preferences. 24
To quote:
" ... in the question of 'public policy,' obnoxious though
this concept may appear from the cosmopolitan point of
view, the latter would practically lead to the weakening of a
country's position vis-a-vis of foreign powers.ms
"English and American courts . . . are most hesitant to
22

PACCHIONI, Elementi 207-208.
AGo, Teoria 3 r 9-po.
24
NusSBAUM, "Rise and Decline of the Law-of-Nations Doctrine in the Conflict of Laws," 42 Col. L. Rev. (I 942) I 89 at r 98 and in his other articles
cited id. 196.
2
" NussBAUM, op. cit. preceding note at 2oo.
23
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resort, in terms, to public policy.... In a few cases courts
have tried to rationalize their reserved attitude, but the
reasons advanced are unconvincing. The explanation must
probably be sought in the liberal tradition of the common-law
courts. . . . Liberalism postulates international-mindedness
favorable to the recognition of foreign law....
"Antipathy to public policy is not confined to common
law courts. It is even more intense in the majority of continental writers. To them, it is the 'Cerberus' lying at the
threshold of International Private Law. . . . In fact it is
not so much liberalism of the English brand as internationalist
dogmatism that is behind the prevailing attitude of Continental learning.... The most important part of the American problem of public policy bears upon interstate relations.
With respect to this area, American writers have taken a
particularly strong stand against the use of public policy....
Nevertheless, the several states, having been left in the
possession of an almost unlimited legislative power in the
private law field-a power actually exercised on the largest
scale-they can hardly dispense with the protection provided
by the public-policy rule against the infusion of disturbing
elements which may result from contrary legislative policies
of sister states.ll26
Is it necessary to say that even the most rigid positivism
can afford to give conflicts rules established by the state itself
the same value as other state law? Or to point out that perhaps liberalism but certainly not preconception enters into the
cause when arbitrariness is utterly disliked?
B. THE PROBLEM

The familiar formulas, declaring the priority of "public
policy, laws of the state, and morality" or reservations of
"imperative laws and good morals" are too vague and comprehensive. Others, more modestly referring to public order
and good morals, are exploited far beyond their literal mean26 NussBAUM,

Principles

I I 3, I

Is,

123.
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ing. If you establish a conflicts rule on the premise that a
certain situation of living should be governed by a certain foreign law and at the same time declare that this same situation
under unspecified conditions may require resort to the law
of the forum, you have indeed deprived the conflicts rule of
its legal character and reverted to the fabulous "comitas
gentium," which negatived legal rules of international behavior and left every decision to uncontrollable courtesy.
Perfectly well aware of this line of thought, courts like to
repeat the old slogan of comity every time they consider a
possible breach of their otherwise recognized conflicts rules.
In the field of contracts, it would seem that the difficulties
caused by the multiformity of our legal systems may be
considerably alleviated, if territorial claims of state legislation are definitely confined to those branches of law that have
to serve public interests. 27
I.

Policy of Public, Especially Administrative, Law

The prudent Roman jurists had a trichotomy of leges perfectae, leges minus quam perfectae, and leges imperfectae,
according to whether contracts violating a legal prohibition
were void, punishable only, or not affected by any sanction.
Modern legislators, with their multitude of commands and
prohibitions, rather take for granted the rule that offending
agreements are void, and leave to the courts the laborious
task of construing this or that prohibition so as not to affect
validity. Despite such attempts at restrictive interpretation, innumerable criminal, fiscal, and especially administrative provisions do entail, often by natural consequence, sometimes
27 The Continental literature discussing "territorial" law or lois de sureti et
police sometimes approaches the distinction used here. Particularly NIBOYET
550 § 443; to Repert. 95 No. 7, distinguishes public order from imperative
laws, and NEUMEYER, 4 Int. Verwaltungs R. zp, 431 separates public law
from public policy. However, nowhere to my knowledge has the view advocated
in this chapter been supported.
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wantonly, the nullity or at least unenforceability of contravening agreements. A purpose of general state administration or of the welfare of the population in general, is protected by interfering with private law. Sales of poison, arms,
or liquor, employment of children, creating of monopolies,
stipulations of gold clauses, trading with the enemy, are
ordinarily void to the extent that the transactions are forbidden, not to mention contracts to overthrow the governmen, or to forge money.
On the other hand, it is still true, after every imaginable
controversy in the last decades, that in establishing the rules
of behavior characteristic of private law, the state fulfills its
own interest only in so far as it is interested in fair justice
as the basis of mental and physical happiness. The particular
rules serve in the first place the interests of individuals and
organizations rather than those of state or society.
If a state, not contented with the broad inroads of modern
public law into the former spheres of private law, considers
every substantive rule as mingled with consideration of community interests, it is logical to deny the existence of private
law as the National-Socialist writers have done; they detested even the name of "Civil Code."
If a continuing fundamental difference between private
and public law is conceded, the position of conflicts law in
the meaning of private international law appears distinctly
attached to private law alone, while administrative and fiscal
rules have their own scope to be delimited for each according
to its specific purpose.
It will perhaps be objected that the distinction between
private and public law, not familiar to the older common
law, has been blurred in the civil law countries by wide
spheres of mixed policies. However, the interference of
public interest, great as it is, proceeds in discernible directions.

PUBLIC POLICY
To take the most important example, modern labor law is
composed of two parts. 28 The one, pertaining to public law,
which regulates the relations of employers and employees to
the state and other public corporations, has been extended
to include legislation on working hours, women and child
labor, social insurance, organization of unions, or compulsory
representative bodies, labor boards, and the procedure for
settlement of labor disputes. The other part consists of the
rules relating to individual contracts of employment as well
as to collective bargaining. That a tariff convention is a
contract of private law has been deduced in German law from
the three points of view that the parties are private persons,
the form is that of a private contract and the purpose is the
regulation of private relations. 29
In certain situations where the border line between private
and public relations may seem doubtful, the difficulty of
deciding on the exception of public policy exists under any
theory. It is nevertheless certain from the objective point of
view of critical jurisprudence that, for instance, a statutory
provision prohibiting premature termination of an employment contract pertains to private law, when it is a perpetual
regulation of the time requisite to give notice, since, then, it
primarily protects the private interests of the workers and
the enterprises, while it belongs to public law when it is an
emergency measure in a temporary national crisis of unemployment.
To analyze the significance of this distinction, however,
we have to contrast the application of domestic law with that
of foreign law.
28

See HuECK in Hueck and Nipperdey, 1 Lehrbuch des Arbeitsrechts ( 1931)
8, who points out that this essentially theoretical question has a great practical
significance for jurisdiction of courts and application of the general rules concerning contracts. Our query furnishes a third practical angle.
29
NIPPERDEY in 2 Lehrbuch, just cited n. 28, (1932) 131 § 12.

CONTRACTS IN GENERAL
Public law of the forum. The distinction is of great importance with respect to the various kinds of substantive rules
of the forum. Prohibitions, established in public law, apply
irrespective of the conflicts rules accompanying private law
institutions. As an example, we may recall the principles
elaborated in the American courts before Prohibition, in the
application of the laws of "dry" states against the sale of
intoxicating liquor.
A court of a dry state, as a matter of course, had to enforce
its own statute for the purpose of general welfare. Except
in so far as the legislature was restrained by constitutional
provisions, an annotator said, the state could forbid any action
for the recovery of the purchase price of intoxicating liquor,
even
"with respect to a sale every element of which, from the
solicitation of the order to the consummation of the executed
contract by delivery of the goods, had its situs in another
state the law of which permitted such sales; and this, too,
without reference to any intention upon the part of either
party to violate or evade the laws of the forum." 30
When a. court, however, was not bound by a statute, it
would not refuse to entertain such an action merely because
the sale, if made at the forum, would have been invalid, when
there was no intention to violate or evade the law of the
forum.
Thus, a sale made outside the state was commonly enforced even though the order was solicited by an agent in the
state. 31 But some local statutes were construed as prohibiting
also such preliminary steps, or as outlawing any transactions
that contemplated introduction of the liquor into the forum. 32
All this resembles private international law but is es30 Note, Conflicts of laws as to sales of intoxicating liquor, 61 A. L. R.
(1903) 417,418.
31 E.g., Wind v. Iller & Co. (1895) 93 Iowa 316, 321, 61 N. W. 1oo1, 1ooz.
32 STUMBERG 3 7 I.
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sentially independent. Whether the object of a sale be liquor
or anything else, no such grounds for invalidity as error, lack
of authority of a representative, or incapacity to contract, nor
the problems of nonperformance have ever been subjected
to the law of a jurisdiction where negotiations have merely
started. No statute would undertake to impress its normal
domestic rules on contracts, "every element of which has its
situs in another state." A state may also think it suitable to
insist on annulling a sale of intoxicating liquor, narcotics, or
weapons, despite an agreement of the parties submitting
them to another law, although there is no other reason for
challenging this choice of law by the parties.
If thus, for fundamental clarification, we have to recognize
the need of a separate delimitation of each administrative
prohibition of the forum, it must be emphatically postulated
that legislators and courts confine them within narrow
boundaries. Extensions such as those described a~e relating
to the domain of liquor laws, or of many tax statutes, do not
favor a sound development of international law, either administrative or private. In many cases, reasonable interpretation may well be satisfied with applying a domestic administrative prohibition exactly to the same contracts that ought
to be governed by the private law of the forum, namely, the
contracts centered there. Interfering with private contracts
for purposes of general welfare is a matter delicate enough
and should not be aggravated without cogent reasons by
attacks on foreign contracts too.
When a contract, however, is not within the local domain
of the forum's prohibition, the ordinary conflicts rules apply.
The courts know perfectly well that beyond those limits, an
administrative policy of the forum is not usually susceptible
of being taken as an absolute standard, overriding conflicts
law and foreign law. A contract made and to be performed
in Mexico could produce an action for payment of delivered
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intoxicating liquor, enforceable in Arizona despite the Eighteenth Amendment then in force. ~ While, the court said,
there were previous cases reluctant to enforce a foreign
transaction which the law of the forum would disapprove,
later decisions have realized the necessity that the course of
trade
3

" ... should be encouraged and fostered for mutual welfare.
Of those Mexicans with whom we make valid contracts in
this country, we expect faithful performance or the right
to secure redress through Mexican courts. Adverse decisions
on grounds of policy will breed suspicion or discrimination
against us. We should be careful not to give less than we
expect to receive."
Sunday contracts. Another informing example is the treatment of Sunday contracts in American courts. Among eight
cases cited by Beale, 34 in four the validity of the transaction
was recognized under the lex loci contractus. 35 In one case,
under the lex loci solutionis/ 6 and in two cases where the
contract was made between persons present and naturally
subject to the law of the place of contracting/ 7 invalidity
was pronounced, evidently for individual equitable considera33Veytia v. Alvarez (1926) 30 Ariz. 3I6, 329, 247 Pac. II?, 121, I22.
Contra: Ayub v. Automobile Mortgage Co. (Tex. Civ. App. I923) 252 S. W.
287, representing a minority view, as stated by STUMBERG 252 n. 7I·
34
2 BEALE I233 ns. I and 6 and I235 n. 6.
35
Swann v. Swann (E. D. Ark. I 884) 2 I Fed. 299, Caldwell, J., declaring
that the prohibition of Sunday contracts in Arkansas is not meant to constitute
a strong public policy; Brown v. Browning (I886) IS R.I. 422, 7 At!. 403
(contract made in Connecticut after sunset on Sunday valid by Conn. statute) ;
McKee v. Jones (I89o) 67 Miss. 405, 7 So. 348 (sale of a horse, clearly
governed by the law of Louisiana where it was permitted); Watkins Co. v. Hill
(I926) 2I4 Ala. 507, Io8 So. 244. Adde Stamps v. Frost (I935) I74 Miss.
32 5, I 64 So. 5 84 (terms agreed upon on Sunday in Tennessee, executed on
Monday; contract would have been void if agreed to on Sunday in Mississippi).
36 Brown v. Gates (I904) I2o Wis. 349, 97 N. W. 22I, rehearing denied
(I904) 98 N. W. 205. See the comment by BATIFFOL son. 1.
37
Strouse v. Lanctot (Miss. I9oo) 27 So. 6o6 (judgment for a resident who
had been persuaded by a traveling salesman on a Sunday to order a number
of suits); Lovell v. Boston & MaineR. Co. (I9Io) 75 N.H. 568, 78 At!.
62 I (the waiver of liability of the railway invalidated, but nevertheless the
liability affirmed on torts principles, the action being an "action on the case")·
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tions. Only one case remains where the court had some chance
to validate the contract under the law of the place of payment, but invalidated it under the law of the forum, in which
all other elements were located, as the court took care to
state. 38 Far from reading into the domestic statute an absolute standard of religious behavior, the courts are acutely
aware of the territorial limits. Prevailingly, the practice in
this field implements the policy described by Williston
whereby in the main, "the courts have been astute so to interpret contracts as to find them not to conflict with Sunday
statutes or to hold them to have become executed and, therefore, unassailable." 39
In a similar way, it has been held in British Columbia that
a contract of indemnity for bail, there illicit, is enforceable
when made in proceedings in the State of Washington
where the agreement is lawful, such contract not being "inherently repugnant to moral and public interests." 40
In a Texas decision, the antitrust laws of Oklahoma were
held to prevent enforcement of a contract made in Minnesota,
but performable in Oklahoma. Only because the Oklahoma
statutes were not proved and were presumed to be identical
with the Texas antitrust law the latter was applied; an added
reservation of the court's right to limit "comity" may be
taken as harmless. 41
Foreign governing law. We are on traditional ground,
when a transaction is governed by a foreign private law and
declared void by this law as a consequence of a provision of
its public law. Although rarely expressed in the literature,
the opinion seems common everywhere that on principle a
foreign-governed contract is subject to all prohibitions of the
38

Arbuckle v. Reaume (1893) 96 Mich. 243,55 N. W. 8oS.
6 Contracts 48 I 6 § 1700.
40
National Surety Co. v. Larsen [I 929] 3 D. L. R. 79 (Brit. Col. C. A.),
[1929] 4 D. L. R. 918, 943·
41
Watkins Co. v. McMullan (Tex. Civ. App. I928) 6 S. W. (2d) 823.
39 WILLISTON,
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governing law, irrespective of their purpose. The foreign
private law applies, whether or not it is influenced by administrative law. 42
For what reason the private law of Michigan avoids a contract governed thereby-be it because of measures exercised
under the police power or because of measures for the protection of children, employees, or insured persons-is of no
concern to the private international law of other jurisdictions.
When a corporation is doing business in a foreign state without authorization and that state avoids contracts thus made,
the nullity is recognized wherever the law of that state is
held to govern the contract. 43 Continental courts decide in the
same way. 44
This principle, of course, is exposed to the exception of
the public policy of the forum, when the latter clashes with
the foreign public interest underlying the decision of the private law problem. War measures of the enemy are absolutely
incapable of enforcement. Exchange restrictions serving
economic warfare in times of political peace, confiscation, or
impairment of private property, when reaching beyond the
borders of the foreign state, are repudiated. 45
Policy of Private Law
If, thus far, judicial practice as a whole agrees with the
facts of international legal life, the problem is different in
the narrower sphere of the typical interests safeguarded by
private law. The problem is this: Should such social policy
as pursued in insurance or usury statutes, or the economic
2.

42 MELCHIOR 267 §§ I79-I8I with instructive exposition of the German practice, a Dutch and a French case. Adde Swiss BG. (Dec. I4, I92o) 46 BGE.
II 490, 495· Contra: NEUMEYER, 4 Int. Verwaltungs R. 249 n. 67 without any
persuasive reason.
43
See supra pp. 2o6 n. I47, 2I4 n. I88.
44 E.g., OLG. Hamburg (May 2 3, I 907) Leipz. Z. I 908, 249·
45 For some comparative notes, see RABEL, "Situs Problems in Enemy Property Measures," I I Law and Cont. Probl. (I945) 122-I23.
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policy inspiring national legislation on the liability of public
carriers override the court's own conflicts rules? For in all
these cases the interests of the individual customers are primarily protected, although the frequency of these contracts
is deemed to warrant special legislation.
To face the problem more closely, the premise of this inquiry may be remembered, namely, that the contract at bar
is not sufficiently connected with the forum to call for the
application of the lex fori as the governing law; on the contrary, the contract is considered to be centered in a foreign
jurisdiction. The question, then, is: Should this contract,
nevertheless, be affected by the policy of the domestic law
concerning private interests?
It is submitted that this question should be strictly answered
in the negative, and that the courts, particularly the American courts, prevailingly do reach the same result, although
a few cases here and there uphold the pretension of an unrestricted sovereign discretion.
While we shall continue to discuss the present role of
public policy with each particular subject, we may contemplate here some popular prototypes of a paramount policy
of the forum. 46
6
' For an outstanding example of a borderline case, we may refer to the provision of the German law on revalorization of I925, mentioned above p. 547,
which revived debts paid with heavily depreciated money. Public policy was
advanced as an objection by Trib. civ. Seine (April 9, I93o) Clunet I930,
1012 and Trib. Geneve (May 31, I930) Revue 1930, 395, and implicitly by
the French Cass. (civ.) (April 14, 1934) S.1935.I.2o1, justly criticized by
NIBOYET ibid. The exception of public policy was, however, disregarded by
Trib. Mixte Cairo (Feb. 17, 1930) Clunet 1931,467, and thoroughly refuted
by the Swiss Federal Tribunal (Feb. 26, I932) 58 BGE. II 124,126. BARTIN,
Note, Clunet 1931, 470 asserted territorial limits for retroactive laws. ARMINJON, Revue I 93 o, 3 85 claimed that the German law was inapplicable as
"political." The French Court of Cassation in another case, Cass. (req.) (Oct.
19, 1938) Gaz. Pal. 1938 II 886 reached the same result by interpreting the
intention of the parties as directed to extinguishing definitely the debt; see
contra the note ibid. For a more powerful argument see supra Chapter 32,
p. 547 and n. I 14··
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1.

EXAMPLES

Wagering Contracts

Foremost under the typical examples of contracts unenforceable under cogent laws of the forum are gambling and
wagering contracts. Differences of legal treatment are frequent enough, particularly with respect to the more serious
problems of speculative bargains, to provoke conflicts of laws.
A well-known decision of the New Jersey Supreme Court of
1884 demonstrates the intransigent point of view. 47 A speculation in stocks upon margins was validly undertaken under
the rules of New York, but the court declared it an offense
against "the plain public policy" of New Jersey, because a
transaction of exactly the same kind would have been unlawful there. Enforcement, thus, was refused against a resident
of the forum. As Goodrich observed, "it would be hard to
find a more striking instance of an 'intolerable affectation of
superior virtue'-the famous words of Judge Beach-by one
state toward another." 48 That the Restatement has adopted
this decision 49 is inconsistent with its own praise of uniform
enforcement of rights acquired in other states.
But what in this country may count as an irregular solution, commonly occurs in many, if not most European jurisdictions. The domestic restrictions on dealing in futures are
either regarded as an absolute moral standard, or as an ineluctable screen of protection for the domiciliaries of the
forum. 50 Thus, the prevailing French doctrine always refuses
47
Flagg v. Baldwin (r884) 38 N.J. Eq. 219, 48 Am. Rep. 308; accord,
Coffe & Carkener v. Wilhite (r9r6) 56 Okla. 394, r56 Pac. r69.
48
GOODRICH, op. cit. supra n. I, at I 7 I.
49
Illustrations respecting gambling debts and dealing in cotton futures, to
§ 6I2.
50
See BRANDL, Internationales Borsenprivatrecht (Marburg 1925) I56ff.;
AMIEux, 2 Repert. 442 No. 2 Iff.; NIBOYET, r o Repert. 92; GuTZWILLER
I 5 72; BRANDL, 2 Rechtsvergleichendes Handworterbuch 599·
For'Switzerland, see 58 BGE. II 52; 6r id. II 1I7.

PUBLIC POLICY
enforcement, if it would be denied by the French law of
r885, which, it is true, allows a relatively large place for
dealing in futures at exchanges. Where the contract is unenforceable under the foreign governing law itself, even though
this law may follow from party agreement, this prohibition,
too, is mostly observed.~ The elaborate German law distinguishes between valid dealings at German stock and commodity exchanges (requiring specific personal qualifications) and
unenforceable speculative contracts. All foreign transactions
that would be subject to the exception of wager, if made in
Germany, are unenforceable against persons domiciled in
Germany. 52 Moreover, agreements involving business at legitimate foreign exchanges, such as an order of a domiciliary
to a broker in Liverpool53 or New Y ork54 to sell or buy <:!otton
or coffee at the local exchange, 55 or to sell stock for delivery
"ultimo" at the Stock Exchange in Paris, is open to the
exception that effective delivery or reception was not intended; foreign transactions, it is explained, are not certain
to afford the public the same guarantees as institutions under
the control of the German government. 56 In well-deserved
1

51 See for citations AMIEUX, z Repert. 443 Nos. 24, 27; PILLET, 2 Traite
239, 240 § 5I4; SURVILLE 359ff. § 248; NIBOYET, IO Repert. IJ2 No. 240
his, 246. To the same effect, Institute of International Law (Paris I 9 I o) Revue
1910, 956.
Greece: App. Athens (r9o4, No. usa) Clunet I9o8, 245.
Switzerland: C. Obi., art. 5 r 3 ; the identical section of the former text has
been treated as of public order, BG. (Feb. 10, 1905) JI BGE. II 55, 6o;
(Feb. 2, 1932) 58 id. II 48, 52; (June 4, 1935) 6r id.II l14·
App. Douai (Nov. z, I933) Clunet 1934, II95·
52 German Exchange Law (Borsengesetz) of I go8 § 6r; BGB. §§ 762, 764;
RG. (Feb. 7, r899) 43 RGZ. 9I; (July 8, I899) 44 RGZ. 52, 54 and many
subsequent decisions. See STAUB-HEINICHEN in 4 Staub § 376, Anhang 66
n. So, roo n. 197.
53
RG. (Jan. 30, I9r7) 89 RGZ. 358.
54
RG. (Oct. r4, 1931) 134 RGZ. 67, 70.
55 RG. (July r 3, I 90I) 49 RGZ. 59: the New York broker was represented
by an agent in Hamburg, but this does not change this aspect of the case. RG.
(June 15, I9o3) 55 RGZ. I83 involved stock transactions at exchanges in New
York and Chicago.
56
89 RGZ. 359, supra n. 53· The Austrian Supreme Court extended the
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criticism, this attitude has been termed an offense against the
natural international boundaries. 57 The Anglo-German
Mixed Arbitral Tribunal refused to consider the German
notions. 58 The Reichsgericht, however, drew a further undesirable consequence from them, by applying the principle
that prohibited contracts may not be enforced by agreement
for foreign arbitration, jurisdiction, or foreign law. 59
As another example of intolerance, a recent Belgian decision refuses enforcement to a stock exchange operation
validly made in Paris, if it can be proved that the parties did
not intend factual delivery of the securities. 60 The Seine
Tribunal even held that because the French law prohibited
"le pari aux courses de chevaux" other than "pari mutuel," 61
a partnership to exercise a license of the Hungarian Jockey
Club for race betting was unlawful and that a partner could
not ask for an accounting on the business done. 62
Contrary views definitely prevail in the Anglo-American
orbit. As is well known, Lord Mansfield's approach in case
of a foreign loan given for gambling purposes was different,
stressing the fact that the loan was valid where given and
domestic absolute prohibition on grain dealings in futures to foreign transactions and seems to have been followed in this claim by the Czechoslovakian
Supreme Court (March 2, I934) Io Z.ausl.PR. (I936) I68.
57
BRANDL, supra n. so, I76, I83.
58 Gruning and Co. v. Gebriider Fraenkel (Feb. 6/r 7, I922) I Recueil trib.
arb. mixtes 726 (contract made subject to the Rules of the Liverpool Cotton
Association).
59
Germany: RG. (May I 8, I904) s8 RGZ. I 52 (leading case). For thorough
criticism see LUDWIG RAISER, Das Recht der allgemeinen Geschaftsbedingungen
(I93S) I39, I43 and n. 2. For other countries, see BRANDL, supra n. so, 209
n. s2.
60
Trib. civ. Liege (Jan. 13, I936) summarized in 38 Bull. Inst. Int. (I938)
2s8 No. IOI9I.
61 Cf. the analogous American statutes in the cases discussed by WILLISTON,
6 Contracts 4703 § I 66s n. 6.
62
Trib. civ. Seine (June 2, I922) Clunet I924, 429. The court simply applied the French law, and as the note judiciously observes, the decision should
have referred to the French ordre public-as though then it would be correct.
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resulting in judgment for the plaintiff to the extent of the
money lent. 63 Several cases followed his application of English law qua lex loci solutionis, presumably intended by the
parties, 64 while, in a contrary opinion, the English gaming
statutes were held to have no bearing at all on foreign games. 65
In other cases, where the contract made no reference to
English localities, actions for recovery of gain in gambling or
of a loan for gambling, were enforced on the ground of the
validity of the transaction in Baden-Baden66 or Monte Carlo. 67
Whatever law may have been declared applicable, the courts,
during the growing complication of British legislation on
gaming,68 gave no quarter to the exception based on public
policy of the forum.
In a case of I 933, a Missouri court thought that "the
overwhelming weight of authority in this country is that
gambling transactions will not be recognized as valid in states
having statutes declaring such gambling contracts and transactions illegal and void, even where they are perfectly valid
in the state where entered into." 69 But the court in this case
was clearly impressed by suspicion of many dishonest manoeuvers, including false personation, narcotizing tablets, and
card sharpers, all this scenario being employed against rustic
innocence. Whether really much authority is available, seems
63
Robinson v. Bland (r76o) 2 Burr. ron, I w. Bl. 234; cf. CozensHardy, L. J., in Moulis v. Owen [I9o7] I K. B. 746, 755ff.

64
Story v. McKay (I 8 8 8) I 5 0. R. 69 (note executed in New York payable
in Ontario); Moulis v. Owen [1907] I K. B. 746 (baccarat game in Algiers,

check payable in London).
65
Fletcher Moulton, L. J., dissenting in Moulis v. Owen, supra n. 64, at
757; DICEY, Note, 23 Law Q. Rev. (1907) 249, approved in a Note by SIR
FREDERICK POLLOCK, id. at 251.
66
Quarrier v. Colston (1842) 1 Phillips 147.
7
;; Saxby v. Fulton [1909] 2 K. B. zo8; DICEY 6so illustration z n. (1)
approves.
68
See FALCONBRIDGE, "More Anomalies in the Law of Wagering Contracts,"
9 Can. Bar Rev. (1931) 331.
69
Maxey v. Railey & Bros. Banking Co. (Mo. 1933) 57 S. W. (zd) ro9r,
1093·
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doubtful; however, games of chance, indeed, are not worthy
of serious judicial consideration, nor of scholarly discussion.
With respect to dealings in futures, however, or, in another
0
version, with respect to contracts for commercial objects/ although the Supreme Court of the United States has rather
purposefully avoided deciding the issue under the Full Faith
and Credit Clause/ 1 in conflicts law the weight of authority
is represented again by holdings of the Missouri courts. Missouri has severe prohibitions against dealings in futures, but
these statutes are declared to have no extraterritorial effect
on contracts made in other states dealing with the rise and fall
of stocks, bonds, and commodities; the recognition includes
brokerage contracts made in the state when the transactions
are to be performed outside the state. 72 The governing law,
hence, also determines whether there is a gaming contract. 73
Peculiar difficulties seem to arise only from the doctrine
7

°CoRBIN, Cases on Contracts (ed. 2, 1933)

1128 n. 1o.
Bond v. Hume ( 191 7) 243 U. S. 15. The Supreme Court has not contested
however, the view of the Missouri Court in the cases of the following note.
72
Edwards Brokerage Co. v. Stevenson ( 1901) I 6o Mo. 5 I 6, 6 I S. W. 6 I 7;
dicta and citations in Elmore-Schultz Grain Co. v. Stonebraker (19I9) 202
Mo. App. 8I, 2I4 S. W. 2I6; Claiborne Commission Co. v. Stirlen (Mo. App.
I924) 262 S. W. 387. Strangely deviating, McVean v. Wehmeier (I923) 2I5
Mo. App. 587, 256 S. W. Io85 applying Missouri law because the contract was
made in the state and ignoring the string of cases in point. Cf. in general,
MINOR 384 § 16I, 422 § q6.
The cases cited seem simply to apply the law of the place of performance.
But the federal courts have employed various methods in order to validate
orders performable on a "contract-market" authorized by federal statute ( 7
U.S. C. A.§§ Iff., Supp. I945). See Notes, 40 Harv. L. Rev. (I927) 638;
8I U. of Pa. L. Rev. (I933) 88r.
The statutes in question, Mo. Rev. Stat. I939, §§ 47I4-47I6, 47I9, are
sharply distinguished from the provisions against bucket shops, Rev. Stat. I 9 3 9,
§§ 4706-4 713, which are considered to make contracts illegal irrespective of
transactions on a foreign market, and are not superseded by the federal statutes
on grain futures, see Dickson v. Uhlmann Grain Co. (I932) 288 U.S. 188,
196 n. 2. In a subsequent decision, Wolcott & Lincoln v. Humphrey (1938)
1I9 S. W. (zd) 1022, the Missouri Supreme Court seems to overrule the entire
distinction, but in fact emphasizes merely the section, then 43 I 8 (Rev. Stat.
I 939, § 4708), which belongs to the bucket shop law.
73
Hood & Co. v. McCune (Mo. App. I92I) 235 S. W. I 58.
71
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that recovery cannot be had on a note or bill or mortgage,
illegal or void for want of consideration in the place of performance. On the latter ground, English courts have refused enforcement of a check given as security for a foreign
gambling debt but allowed the creditor to sue on the debt
itsel£74 and American courts have been influenced by this
strange view. 75
To justify the German refusal to enforce foreign wagers,
the argument has been advanced 76 that enforcement is a matter of procedure, since in German law an obligation to pay
is recognized to the extent that money paid to discharge a
gaming debt cannot be recovered. 77 But in correct analysis,
the absence of the right to sue is a defect of the obligation,
to be classified along with voidness and other forms of inefficacy.
Lotteries. Also in the related field of lotteries, several
American courts have clearly applied the foreign law. As
early as a century ago, when an obligation was entered into
to sell lottery tickets in Kentucky, on the basis of an enactment by that state for the benefit of a college, a New York
court held that the contract, valid where performable, was
enforceable, irrespective of the prohibition of lotteries by
New York statutes. 78 In other cases, the law of the place
where the ticket was sold, or a partnership in lottery tickets
was formed, has been applied. 79 But that the policy of the
74

Moulis v. Owen, supra n. 64; Societe Anonyme des Grands Etablissements
du Touquet Paris-Plage v. Baumgart [I 92 7] W.N. 7 8.
75
Thuna v. Wolf (I928) 132 Misc. 56, 228 N.Y. Supp. 658, declares the
action on the gambling debt itself to be possibly enforceable.
76
KAHN, I Abhandl. I88 who characteristically referred at the same time
to the then treatment of the Statute of Frauds; recently RAAPE, D. IPR. 62
again argues to this effect.
77
See BGB. § 762 par. I sent. 2.
78
Commonwealth of Kentucky v. Bassford and Nones (I 844) 6 Hill p6.
79
M'Intyre v. Parks (Mass. I 84I) 44 Mass. 207; Thatcher v. Morris
(r854) II N.Y. 437; Roselle v. McAuliffe (1897) I4I Mo. 36, 39 S. W.
274; 2 BEALE 1240.
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forum does not decide by itself, is the generally accepted
doctrine, well grounded in the territorial character of such
statutory prohibitions. In a recent revival of Dicey's 80 contrary proposition, it has been asked: Why should the forum
be compelled, in a lottery action by or against a resident, to
subordinate its policy to the policy of another state? 81 But
the answer is simple. The policy of such a law does not extend to every suit coming before its courts nor to all contracts
"made" in its territory, but only to the contracts centered
within the forum. The old case in the matter of the Kentucky
lottery, mentioned before, is correct also on this point.
Indorsed gaming notes. Of particular informative value
is a series of cases dealing with innocent indorsees of notes
issued to pay gaming debts or to furnish the means for wagering. By a universally favored rule, any illicit cause of an obligation embodied in a negotiable instrument is no defense
against an indorsee ignorant of the facts. This, in the vast
majority of countries and courts, extends to notes and bills,
originating in gambling. 82 The North Carolina court has
remarked that it would encourage vice, if a successful gambler
could obtain the value of such a note by indorsement and then
render his obligation ineffective by pleading his own wrongdoing. 83 Statutes annulling private contracts for reasons of
general social welfare, if not handled with great caution, have
an unfortunate tendency to defeat their own purpose. However, the Illinois Supreme Court has maintained a practice,
allowing the plea of prohibited gambling against an innocent
indorsee despite a contrary law governing the indorsement.
80 DICEY 655 illustration 7> without any case citation to support it.
NussBAUM, Principles I23, as example for the thesis quoted supra n. 26.
82 WILLISTON, 6 Contracts 4729 § I 676; Restatement of the Law of Contracts § 590; FALCONBRIDGE, I Banking and Bills of Exchange (ed. 5, I935)
7I 2. The same is recognized even in Switzerland which has the most intransigent attitude in Europe against wagering, see C. 0BL., art. 5I4 par. I
81

in fine.
83 Wachovia Bank and Trust Co. v. Crafton (I 92 I)

S. E. 3I6.

I

8 I N. C. 404,

I
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The practice goes back to a decision where the notes were all
dated at St. Louis and payable at the same place. The bargain
consisted of mere speculations upon the future prices of grain
and under Missouri law was void, but this defense could not
be objected against an ignorant indorsee who had acquired
the notes before maturity. The Illinois court referred to the
Criminal Code of Illinois and to its own previous views, to
the effect that the transaction was
"Not only contrary to public policy but it is a crime-a·
crime against the state, a crime against religion and morality,
and a crime against all legitimate trade and business." 84
That this is still the law in Illinois,85 shows how muddled
the considerations of "public policy" are. Such violent moral
indignation, of course, may impel a court to protect the bench
from contamination with the outrageous foreign law. Not a
difference in laws or legal systems but deep-seated moral
inconsistency of a foreign-created right with the domestic
principles compels resort to public policy. However, the outburst is somewhat misplaced. A wise court should not take
the attitude of a conscientious objector, when it is asked to
give an innocent indorsee what he would receive in nearly
every other jurisdiction.
In the soundest decisions, the exception of public policy,
in fact, is reduced to the function of an objectively ascertained
moral sense:
"A contract that is valid where made and that does not
involve any morale turpitude, and is not pernicious and
detestable will be enforced in a state although the laws of
such state forbid the making of such contract." 86
84

Pope v. Hanke (I894) I55 Ill. 6I7, 630,40 N. E. 839,843.
Thomas v. The First Nat'l Bank of Belleville (I904) 2I3 Ill. 26I, 72
N. E. 8oi: although the contract is licit in Missouri and the District of Columbia, it is not enforceable, since it violates the penal laws of Illinois! See for
other cases, 3 8 Ill. Ann. Stat. (I 9 34) 4o6ff., annotations to § 329; the Supplement of I 944 has no additions.
86
American Furniture Mart Bldg. Corp. v. W. C. Redmon Sons & Co. (Ind.
I936) I N. E. (2d) 6o6 at 6o9, HARPER & TAINTOR, Cases 8oi (cognovit
85
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Various Contracts

Champerty. The old absolute prohibition of "champerty"
was conceived as a prohibitory law making void any agreement to share in the future proceeds of a law suit. The traditional English approach that the disapproval affected con88
tracts wherever made87 is hardly to be encountered any more.
On the one hand, the scope of the offense of champerty has
shrunk, in the opinion of American jurisdictions, so as to
embrace no more than an officious interference, without
proper interest, in other people's obligations, 89 and its collateral effects have been more or less weakened. 90 On the
other hand, the American courts usually admit any solution
offered by the law of the place where suit for enforcement of
the debt is brought. 91
Beale and other writers 92 have reproached this practice
for failing to distinguish between prohibited agreements to
be governed by the lex loci contractus and prohibited suits,
note validly executed in Illinois; if enforcement were refused, people in Indiana would be invited to fraud by signing notes in Illinois unavailable in
their own courts). The decision refers to International Harvester Co. of
America v. McAdam (19ro) 14z Wis. 114, rz4 N. W. ro4z; Garrigue v.
Keller (1905) 164 Ind. 676, 74 N. E. sz3, sz7. These cases follow one of
the rules in ELISHA GREENHOOD, The Doctrine of Public Policy in the Law
of Contracts (Chicago 1886) 46.
87
Grell v. Levy (1864) 16 C. B. N. S. 73; DICEY 654 illustration 3;
LEFLAR, Arkansas Conflict of Laws z r 7 n. 64 points to two Arkansas cases, viz.,
Arden Lumber Co. v. Henderson Iron Works (1907) 83 Ark. z4o, 103 S. W.
185; White-Wilson-Drew Co. v. Egelhoff (r9ro) 96 Ark. 105, 131 S. W. zo8.
But these cases deal with notes incorporating ten per cent for attorney's fees,
valid under Louisiana law, but declared unenforceable in Arkansas, being
private penalties. This is a different type of case.
88
Alberta: Waters v. Campbell (C. A. Alberta 1913) zs W. L. R. 838, 6
W. W. R. 957, LEFLAR, Arkansas Conflict of Laws z17§ 97·
89
Gilman v. Jones (r889) 87 Ala. 691, 5 So. 784, 787,7 So. 48. For details
see WILLISTON, 6 Contracts 48 34ff. § I 7 rz; Restatement, Contracts § 542.
90
WILLISTON, 6 Contracts 484rff. § 1713.
91
Richardson v. Rowland (1873) 40 Conn. 565; Gilman v. Jones (r888)
supra n. 89; Roller v. Murray (r9o7) 107 Va. sz7, 59 S. E. 4zr. In Blackwell v. Webster (r886) z9 Fed. 614 the law of the place of contracting was
applied.
92
z BEALE IZ3I; STUMBERG Z4I.
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enforceable or not according to the Jaw of the place of performance, which place seems to be identified with the place
where the court is sitting. At the same time, this border line
is described as practically difficult to trace. But the place of
the law suit is not necessarily the place of "performance" of
an accounting between the parties to the agreement; nor
should it be material for the question which statute applies,
whether some statutes continue to make the agreement void
and the others merely prohibit the law suit. The view of the
courts should be supported, not by mechanical rules but
rather by the fact that the agreement is centered at the place
where the suit is intended to be brought. However, in each
of these opinions, the idea of an absolute prohibition affecting
all foreign agreements is left far behind.
Other examples. Similarly, it has been held in Alabama
that assignment of a life insurance policy to a person with
no insurable interest in the life of the insured was validly
executed in New York and to be enforced as against the law of
the forum, since it comprised nothing inherently bad. 93 The
contrary, it is true, has recently been held to be the view
of Texas, by a federal court in that state. 94
Again, general opinion repudiates the use of public policy
to enforce the forum's conception of annulment for duress. 95
Examples can be multiplied. 916
Protection of personality. Statutory provisions for the protection of workers or employees in employment contracts (not
in the class of "territorial" provisions respecting health or
93

Haase v. First Nat'l Bank of Anniston (I9I9) 203 Ala. 624, 84 So. 76r.
Griffin v. McCoach (C. C. A. sth I94I) I23 F. (2d) 55o, 551. The
Supreme Court of the United States had previously recognized the constitutional
freedom in "public policy which protects citizens against the assumed dangers
of insurance on their lives held by strangers," Griffin v. McCoach (I 941) 3 I 3
U. S. 498. Cf. MoRGAN, "Choice of Law Governing Proof," 58 Harv. L. Rev.
(I944) I53 at I57 n. 8.
95
Supra p. 525.
96 For other examples see WILLISTON, 6 Contracts 5094 § 1 792.
94
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morality pertaining to public labor law) regularly apply
only as a part of the governing law. Some doubt has affected
the restrictions imposed on stipulations in employment contracts forbidding the employee to engage in activities competitive with the business for which he is engaged, during a
certain time after termination of his services. The statutes
vary greatly. Some nullify any such restraint of trade. Others
allow three months, a year, three years, or a reasonable time.
What law governs, is controversial, but prevailing opinion
seems to favor the law of the place or places where services
have been rendered. 97
The exception of public policy, however, has rarely been
used. Fry,]., did it with sweeping language in a well-known
case of a French employment, but in this instance English
law was the governing law. 98 In one case, an express stipulation for the law of the state controlling the employing company was disregarded, on the ground of public policy, as "ineffectual to avoid the statute of California, the place of performance."99 A German decision extended the local restriction to a foreign contract of a German national in a foreign
business place.Hlo These two solutions are plainly wrong. The
97 United States: 2 BEALE 1230; Davis v. Jointless Fire Brick Co. (C. C. A.
9th, N. D. Cal. I 924) 300 Fed. I, 3· On the other hand, Holland Furnace Co.
v. Connelley (D. C. E. D. Mo. I942) 48 F. Supp. 543 applies the local
Missouri law permitting the clause even in case Michigan law forbidding it
were the governing law. Cf. supra pp. 383, 554·
Germany: A natural effect of the rule of lex loci solutionis.
Italy: App. Genova (April I8, I904) Riv. Dir. Com. I904 II 36I (employment of a teacher in Switzerland by the Berlitz School of Milan; Italian law
applied, against the prohibition of the Swiss lex loci contractus).
98
Rousillon v. Rousillon (I88o) I4 Ch. D. 351, 369; see CHESHIRE q8.
99
Davis v. Jointless Fire Brick Co. (C. C. A. 9th I 924) 300 Fed. I, 3·
100
Germany: OLG. Hamburg (April 6, I907) 72 Seuffert's Blatter fiir
Rechtsanwendung 672, for employees of German nationality, strange, but approved by NussBAUM, D. IPR. 274 n. I and apparently by LEWALD 244· Another decision, OLG. Dresden (Jan. 25, I9o7) I4 ROLG. 345, forcibly introduces minimum terms for giving notice (HGB. § 67) ·into an English employment contract of a German employee; this has been criticized as going much
too far even by NusSBAUM, D. IPR. 274 n. I.
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first mtmmtzes without justification the agreement of the
parties on the applicable law, which would have satisfied
even the theory requiring substantial connection therewith.
A protective norm of California private law was treated as
if it were a police regulation for the general welfare. The
German case is typical for the unilateral "protection" of
nationals, which easily may turn out to cause unfavorable
discrimination against these nationals abroad.
On a broader plan, individuals are protected by modern
private law against binding themselves by excessive obligations. The prototype of these provisions was the rule of the
Code Napoleon that no one can engage his services but for
a time or for a certain enterprise. 101 This fundamental law of
emancipation from serfdom has justly been treated always as
imperative also in conflicts law. 102 It is clear, however, that
not the same exalted position belongs to the varying municipal
rules determining in detail the time or place for which an
individual may validly commit his services. 103
The same is true, for instance, in the case where an irrevocable and all-inclusive power of attorney, without valuable
consideration and any proper interest of the agent, was executed in New York for exercise in Germany. The two laws
differed in allowing remedies against exploitation of the principal, but either law, if governing the contract, was good
enough. 104 It would have been different, if one of the laws
involved had not provided any aid against thoughtless disposition by a person of all his assets; but there is scarcely such
a law.
101

C. C. art. I 780.
8 LAURENT 243 § I 69; WErss, 4 Traite 3 76 and n. 4; 3 FIORE § I I I 9·
103
RouAsT, Melanges Pillet 210; CALEB, 5 Repert. 2I2 No. 53; more
recently also BARTIN, "Une conception nouvelle de Ia loi locale," 52 Recueil
(I9J5) II 583, 627, denies the application of ordre public to employments in
foreign countries. To an opposite effect, 2 FRANKENSTEIN 336.
104
The problem is studied by RABEL, "Unwiderruflichkeit der Vollmachtt 7
Z.ausl.PR. (I934) 797, 8os, 8o7.
102
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J. Immoral Transactions105
Bribery. In I 8 So, the Supreme Court of the United
States106 refused enforcement to the petition of the Turkish
Consul General against the Winchester Arms Company for
payment of a ten per cent commission unquestionably promised him by the firm. He had, by his influence, induced the
purchasing agent of his government to accept the defendant's
offer for very considerable deliveries. The Court took into
account that the Turkish government at that time may have
considered the behavior of the plaintiff, not paid for his work,
as quite blameless; but the Court stated that the contract was
corrupt.
"The services stipulated and rendered were prohibited
by considerations of morality and policy which should prevail
at all times and in all countries.... Contracts permissible by
other countries are not enforceable in our courts, if they
contravene our laws, our morality, or our policy. The contract in suit was made in this country, and its validity must
be determined by our laws. But had it been made in Turkey,
and were it valid there, it would meet with the same reprobation when brought before our courts for enforcement.m07
The Court, in my respectful opinion, was right in deciding
the case because the contract was made and to be performed
in this country and gravely violated the American sense of
propriety. The same reason explains why the Court, as it
said, would always refuse enforcement to foreign contracts of
such kind. But that "our laws" and "our policy" are as compulsory as "our morality," cannot be conceded.
Lease of a gambling house. In a well-justified contrast to
the Italian decisions granting liberal enforcement to foreign
105
181

English cases are collected by

§

106

107

DICEY

653-655; M.

172.

Oscanyan v. Arms Co. (r88o) 103 U.S. 26r.
/d., supra n. ro6, at 271, 272 and 277.

WoLFF,
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valid gaming contracts, the Court of Cassation in Rome<'s
refused enforcement to an Egyptian judgment by which the
leaseholder of a gambling house was held obligated to pay
the rent. The offense was not seen so much in the aleatory
character of the games as in the exploitation of dangerous
human passions for egoistic purposes, as it was stressed that
morality was violated. This reasoning is sound, if the refusal
of the courts to deal with res turpes is ever considered sound.
D. CONCLUSIONS

Too great a margin has been left to the discretion of courts
in disregarding the normal effects of conflicts rules. In this
opinion, I feel encouraged by the results of Nutting. He suggests, however, a transfer from the courts to the legislatures
of the selection of the domestic interests that are to be safeguarded from foreign encroachment. 109 A similar proposal
was made in I 9 I o by the Institute of International Law:
Every lawmaker should determine with utmost care which of
his provisions may never be replaced by foreign law. 110 But
do legislatures, in this respect, deserve more confidence than
the majority of the judges who have learned to understand
the necessary restrictions of local views? The evil could easily
be aggravated by asking too many questions of the legislatures in each type of enactment.
The principle itself, rather, must be freed from its vague
and all-inclusive character. Although no mechanical rule can
shape the elusive exception of public policy, it may well be
defined in a more reliable manner. Our results are as follows.
108

Cass. Roma (March 26, 1926) Monitore 1926, 1, 406, Clunet 1926,

1092·

1. 09 NUTTING, I 9 Minn. L. Rev., supra n. 9, at
110 See Clunet 1910, 976. The same idea

zo3, 209.
was expressed by Mr. Baron
Parke in Egerton v. Earl Brownlow (I853) 4 H. L. Cas. I, 122, to the effect
that English judges should refrain from defining the public good.
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I. Conflicts rules delimiting the application of private law
rules exist because the substantive rules of the various civilized
jurisdictions are supposed to be exchangeable. This relationship should not be jeopardized at the forum by a pretended
superiority of its own policies or legal techniques. The task of
conflicts rules in the field of contracts is to determine to
what state a contract belongs. This done, no uncertainty arising from uncontrollable evaluations should be tolerated.
2. However, the rules of private international law are
limited to a part of the entire legal system. They have no
power over the rules of domestic public law, including all
rules serving the interests of the state itself and the general
welfare. These rules are, or should be, accompanied by their
own territorial delimitations. In their domain, they enjoy at
the forum unconditional precedence over private international
law. There is no uncertainty about that. But the boundaries
should and may very well be chosen, quite as for our ordinary
conflicts rules, so as to include in principle only the contracts
centered within the forum.
3· Foreign private law is applicable as it is, however it may
be influenced by foreign public interests. There is no way of
distinguishing the purposes of foreign enactments and no
reason why we should recognize the validity of transactions
repudiated by the law to which we ourselves subject them, or
to invalidate transactions only because we do not agree with
the purposes of the legislation competent under our conflicts rule.
4· The only general barriers to foreign law in the sphere
of private international law, that may prove indispensable,
arise from the depth of basic moral conceptions, which in our
times naturally include those of fundamental social justice.
Therefore, we may refuse unqualified enforcement to a
foreign law allowing serfdom, legalizing contracts involving
prostitution, or denying effectual relief to children or incompetent persons. Among civilized nations, we should not ex-
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pect to find any considerable number of such abnormities.
A step further, a court holding that in no case should a
debtor be forced to utter ruin by the enforcement of a contract, may admit such defense, thus far unknown to American
law, against an American contract. 111 But the differences of
views respecting overwhelming difficulty of performance
caused by unfavorable circumstances no longer appear so
widely separated as to warrant invocation of public policy. 112
Zitelmann contrasted good morals with offense to the internal law; likewise various modern laws literally restrict
the application of public policy to cases where recognition of
the foreign law would be inconsistent with public order and
morality. 113 The idea is sound, if only it were not dissolved
into blue fog.

5· We may thus summarize:
Under Dicey's exception of public policy, a contract
(whether illegal by its proper law or not) is invalid if it or its
enforcement is opposed to English interests of state, to the
policy of English law, or to the moral rules upheld by English law. 114
In the formulation advocated here, a contract valid by the
law governing it, is nevertheless subject to the public law of
the forum to the extent of proper territorial delimitation,
and to deeply rooted and reasonable objections of good
morals, including fundamental social justice.
6. What effect is due to a judgment refusing enforcement
of a foreign-governed right on the ground of local public pol111

'See BATIFFOL 404 § 487.
I am referring to a famous problem on which it suffices, for the present, to
consult for American law, WILLISTON, 6 Contracts SSII § I963, and for comparative law, RABEL, I Das Recht des Warenkaufs § 45·
113
I ZITELMANN 334, 368.
Brazil: Introd. Law (1916) art. I7; Introd. Law (I942) art. I7·
China: Int. Priv. Law, art. x.
Japan: Int. Priv. Law, art. 30.
Poland: Int. Priv. Law, art. 38.
114
DICEY 652 Rule I6o exception r.
112
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icy? The most common view in the conflicts laws of all countries takes it for granted that such a judgment has the full
effect of res judicata. Occasionally other ideas have been expressed. Mr. Justice Brandeis, speaking for the Supreme Court
of the United States, has asserted that, if a state declines to
enforce a foreign cause of action, "it merely denies a remedy,
leaving unimpaired the plaintiff's substantive right, so that
he is free to enforce it elsewhere." 115 The Court, of course,
operated on the sole basis of the Full Faith and Credit Clause,
and dealt with a special case of workmen's compensation.
Even so, the dictum raises serious problems. But to transfer
this solution into the sphere of conflicts hw, as has been recently suggested by an eminent authority/1<1 would promote
strange results. Evidently, if a court will deny enforcement
without altering the possible cause of action, it can sometimes
do so by refusing to take jurisdiction on the merits, 117 in
which case we should wish the court to pronounce expressly
that it does not decide the merits. Our discussions on the applicable law, however, always presume that jurisdiction has
been assumed. If so, a court should ordinarily enforce foreign
rights, but if it does not, the common effects of taking cognizance must apply to the plaintiff. It would be rather dangerous to open an easy middle road for provincial minds.

II.

VIOLATION oF FoREIGN LAw

The exception of public policy is generally understood to
point exclusively to the public policy of the forum. 118 A
115
Bradford Electric Light Co. v. Clapper (1932) 286 U. S. 145 at 160.
The question has also been touched upon in International Harvester Co. of
America v. McAdam (1910) 142 Wis. 114, 120, 124 N. W. 1042, 1044.
116 In addition to occasional dicta, recently this view has been taken by
MORGAN, "Choice of Law Governing Proof," 58 Harv. L. Rev. (1944) 153
at 156, 157·
117 This desperate method of avoiding injustice has been mentioned but not
applied in Precourt v. Driscoll (1931) 85 N.H. 28o at 283, 157 Atl. 525 at
527, cited by MoRGAN, mpra n. n6, at 190.
us See the interesting opinion of STORY §§ 245, 255-257.
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sharp contrast thereto is marked by the thesis of English
judges that they would not assist or sanction agreements
breaching the law of a friendly foreign country. 1111 It is a
remarkable proposition, despite its vague form and rare application. Apart from the mistaken rule giving the law at the
place of performance the power to invalidate the contract/ 20
the most important case is one by which the English courts
joined an international series of decisions against smuggling.
We shall contemplate this interesting though isolated regard for foreign law.
Smuggling. 121 Under an old inherited view, foreign revenue laws are refused enforcement. 122 On this ground, English
courts in the eighteenth century disregarded a Portuguese
prohibition on export of gold123 and a French prohibition of
assignats.' 24 In France, the Parlement d' Aix (I 759) and the
Court of Cassation (r835) held by the same approach that a
contract contemplating the import of contraband into another
country is not void, unless it includes 'corruption of the customs officers, clandestine measures (ruse) being immaterial. 125
However, Pothier was the first, in the name of hon~sty, to
protest against this indi:fference/ 26 and later many French and
119

Supra p. 535 n. 69.
Supra pp. 536 f.
121
A good comparative monograph: MESSINESI, La contrebande en droit
international prive (Paris I9 32).
122
State of Colorado v. Harbeck (I92I) 232 N. Y. 7I, IJ3 N. E. 357;
Lorenzen, Cases 269; for English cases, see WESTLAKE Z9I § ZIJ.
In re VISSER, H. M. The Queen of Holland v. Drukker [I928] Ch. 877,
884.
SACK, "(Non-) Enforcement of Foreign Revenue Laws, in International Law
and Practice," 8I U. of Pa. L. Rev. ( 1933) 559·
123
Boucher v. Lawson (I735) Hardw. 85, 89, 194, I95; dictum to the same
effect by Lord Mansfield in Holman v. Johnson (I 77 5) I Cowp. J4I in a teasmuggling case.
124
Smith v. Marconnay (I 796) Peake Add. Cas. 8I N. P.; cf. I 1 Eng. and
Emp. Dig. 403.
125
See MESSINESI, supra n. I zr, at I7ff.; BATIFFOL 359 § 4I8; Cass. (req.)
(August zs, r835) S. r83s.r.673 (secret importation of food into Spain).
126
Oeuvres de POTHIER, 5 Traite du contrat d'assurances (r847) § s8.
120
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other writers followed him. 127 The German Supreme Court
developed a consistently strict practice,128 repudiating sales
and agreements for carriage intended to infringe foreign
customs laws or prohibitions on importing or exporting, for
the protection of public welfare, such as, for instance, on importation of cocain into British India. 129 The refusal included
also loans to finance smuggling180 and sales of alcohol deliverable on the high seas near the territorial waters of Sweden
and Finland. 131 Three French appeal courts and that of
Brussels shared in this doctrine, 132 under which it is immaterial what law governs the contract.
Finally, the Court of Appeals of London joined this view
in a decision of 1928, with a dissenting vote maintaining the
old theory. 133 By a contract governed by English law,
whiskey was bought to be introduced into the United States
during prohibition. The sales contract was declared unen127
United States: 3 KENT 266; 2 WHARTON 1139 § 484.
England: PoLLOCK, Contracts 3 6 t.
France and Belgium: 8 LAURENT 174ff. §§ II4-II7; WEISS, 4 Traite 383 n.
3; DESPAGNET 909 § 307; VALERY 965ff. § 66 9 ; PILLET, 2 Traite 238 § 513
and in Clunet 1896, 1 at 8; 2 LYON-CAEN et RENAULT, Part I, 85ff. §§ 68-70.
Germany: VoN MoHL, 1 Staatsrecht, Volkerrecht und Politik (186o) 724;
HEFFTER, Europ. Volkerrecht (ed. 8, I888) § 32 n. 9; NEUMEYER, 4 Int.
Verwaltungs R. 423.
Switzerland: 2 BROCHER 92 § I 6o.
Against an isolated contrary view of PHILONENKO, Clunet I930, 441ff., see
BATIFFOL 356 § 414.
128
Germany: RG. (Nov. 5, I898) 42 RGZ. 295, 297; (Dec. 2, 1903) 56
RGZ. 179, 181; (Sept. 30, I9I9) 96 RGZ. 282; and others.
Austria: OGH. (May 5> 1928) Rspr. 1928, 122 No. 253; (March 3, 1931)
Rspr. I931, 7o, Clunet I93I, 118o.
129
RG. (June 24, 1927) JW. 1927, 2288, IPRspr. 1926/z7 No. 15; cf.
OLG. Stuttgart (Sept. 25, 1891) Clunet 1894, 896 (gold exportation from
Russia).
130
RG. (March 10, 1927) JW. 1927, 2287, IPRspr. 1926/27 No. 17.
131 RG. (Oct. 26, 1928) IPRspr. I928 No. 2o.
132 France: App. Pau (July 2, 1886) Clunet 1887,57 (affreightment); Trib.
com. Douai (Nov. I I, 1907) S. I 907.2.308 (partnership for smuggling contraband into Belgium); App. Alger (Feb. 20, 1925) Clunet 1926, 701 (partnership for smuggling tobacco into Spain).
Belgium: App. Bruxelles (Feb. 17, 1886) Clunet 1887, 214.
133
Foster v. Driscoll [1929] 1 K. B. 470,518, 510.
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forceable, by Lord Sankey with a reference to Dicey's rule
respecting all prohibitions of the law of the place of performance, but by Lord Lawrence on the ground that the contract's recognition "would furnish a just cause for complaint
by the U. S. Government against our Government ... and
would be contrary to our obligation of international comity,
. . . and therefore would offend our notions of public
morality."
The common basis of all these cases is the conviction that
organized smuggling violates good morals and undermines
the mores of the population along the frontiers~ Many
writers, therefore, have stressed the fact that the offense is to
the forum's own public policy rather than to the foreign law.
Nevertheless, Lord Lawrence's formulation, quite adequately, establishes as a basis respect for the foreign law
under the forum's conception of public or, as it has often been
put, of international morality.
This doctrine has encountered difficulties. Its most certain
application is that where it is proved that both parties knowingly intended to circumvent a foreign prohibition on importation. On the other hand, an affreightment merely preparatory to smuggling has been held valid even in German
courts/ 34 Moreover, the mere knowledge of the vendor that
the buyer intends to use the goods for smuggling is not sufficient; the contract must involve a promotion of smuggling.
Also contracts having the effect rather than the purpose of
violating foreign law have been approved. 135
Between these two extremes, courts have enforced contracts, because of the lack of some aggravating element which
they required for repudiating the bargain. Where a hotel
manager of Maine acquired liquor in Massachusetts for re134RG. (Feb. 9, 1926) 69 Gruchot's Beitrage 78, IPRspr. 1926/27 No.
I

6.

135 KG. (Oct. 10, 1928) IPRspr. 1928 No. 21.
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sale prohibited in Maine, Mr. Justice Holmes, then a judge
on the Massachusetts Supreme Court, recognized that it
would be "barbarous isolation" for a state "to enforce all
contracts made and to be performed within its territory, without regard to how much they might contravene the policy
of its neighbor's life." But, for the application of the foreign
prohibition, he required a not too remote connection of the
act of selling the liquor with the apprehended result, and in
refusing the action for the price in the instant case, he did
it on the assumption that the seller expected and desired the
unlawful sale and intended to facilitate it. As a principle,
Holmes found the sale void only when the illegal intent of
the buyer is not only known to the seller but encouraged by
the sale. 136 This requirement has been taken as an expression
of the widespread tendency of American courts to restrict
the extraterritorial effect of statutes concerning intoxicating
liquor, which were considered a disturbing element in commerce. But similar arguments were used abroad to validate
contracts during the American era of prohibition. When a
dock was leased in the Detroit River on the Windsor side
for storing liquor, the Ontario court upheld the contract. One
judge noted the absence of proof that by the lease the parties
intended to commit a breach of the laws of the United States,
a surmise not being sufficient, because the judge could not
take judicial notice of the "alleged rum-running conditions
in Windsor." Another left the question open whether a conspiracy to infringe the American laws by importing liquor
was existent, since whatever the plaintiff did in Canada, was
legal and valid. 137 Also the French Court of Cassation declared valid a contract of maritime insurance covering spirits,
although the insurer admittedly knew very well that the
136
Graves v. Johnson (1892) 156 Mass. 2II, 30 N. E. 818. Most cases concerning liquor sales are merely applying the law of the forum.
137
Westgate v. Harris (Ont. S. Ct., App. Div.) [1929] 4 D. L. R. 643.
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purpose of the voyage was to bring the vessel near American
territorial waters for transshipment. On this occasion, the
Court did not formally reiterate the century-old thesis of the
permissibility of clandestine smuggling, but thought that it
was licit to vend alcohol on the high seas and that the sellers
could not be sure of the intentions of the buyers. 138 Maritime
insurance in such cases is the more reprehensible, as it eliminates risk incurred by dishonest adventures. 1311 But strangely,
opinions are divided on this point. 140
Generalizations. Present American writers have adopted
the view now prevailing and seem willing to generalize it
to the effect that a contract should not be enforced, if it is
made with a view of violating the laws of another country or
at least of a sister state. 141 The English dicta mentioned before have the same tendency. They are in harmony with an
old case which rejected a contract that aimed at supporting
subversive activities. 142
A similar decision of the Tribunal de la Seine invalidating
a loan governed by French law by which a revolution in
Venezuela would have been supported, 143 inspired Niboyet
to enlarge the doctrine disapproving of smuggling con138 Cass. (req.) (March 28, I928) S. I928.r.3o5. NIBOYET's note ibid. and
in Gaz. Pal. I928.r.8u points to the court's denial of an international public
policy, whereas BATIFFOL 361 § 420 is somewhat encouraged by the hesitance
of the Court.
39
'
See NIBOYET, supra n. I 38.
140
United States: Cases for validity are cited by WILLISTON, 6 Contracts
495 3, 4954 n. 7·
In Germany, the OLG. Hamburg (Oct. 2I, 1927) Hans. RGZ. I928 B No.
2, IPRspr. I 92 8 No. r 9, validated maritime insurance for smuggling. Contra:
LG. Berlin III (Nov. 2, I928) IPRspr. I929 No. 13 (American Prohibition);
NUSSBAUM, D. IPR. 246.
The Netherlands: Condemning the insurance company, H. R. (Jan. 1o,
1924) 8 Revue Dor 299.
141 See WILLISTON, 6 Contracts 4950 § 1749·
142
Jones v. Garcia del Rio (I 823) T. & R. 297·
143 Trib. civ. Seine (July z, 1932) Florsheim v. Delgado-Chalbaud, S.
'934·2·73 at 75, Clunet 1933, 73; Revue Crit. 1934, 77o; recommended for
imitation, Note, 8 Tul. L. Rev. (1930) 283.
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tracts. 144 He calls for a true "ordre public international,"
determinative of conflicts law in all countries, instead of for
individual states. There has never been doubt about the desirability of mutual respect for legislation. But the slowness
of development in this field has evident reasons. Probably,
we have to be satisfied in the near future with a prudent expansion of the idea that violation of foreign law may be
immoral.
International treaties. The normal way of securing international assistance for the purposes of a state is, of course,
the conclusion of treaties. For example, the United States
made eleven treaties to improve its opportunities for inspecting and arresting vessels suspected of carrying alcohol. 145 Also
a few multipartite conventions for the suppression of smuggling have been signed. 14~;
This suggests a final consideration. We have discussed
the Brussels Convention sanctioning the Hague Rules and
the satisfactory middle course achieved in dealing with liability of shipowners. Certain concessions have been suggested,
recognizing prohibitions imposed by nonparticipant states on
the inclusion of exemption clauses in bills of lading. 147 It
should be expected that also, vice versa, states remaining
aloof from the multipartite treaty, nevertheless respect the
Hague Rules as adopted in the port of dispatch. If they do
not apply the law of this port as the law of the contract in
144

Note by NIBOYET, S. 1934.2.73-75; Revue Crit. 1934, 772.
MESSINESI, supra n. 121, 60-64; DICKINSON, Revue Dr. Int. (Bruxelles
1926) 371.
146 Conventions for the suppression of contraband traffic in alcoholic liquor:
of Brussels (July 2, r89o, art. 92, implemented June 8, 1899) 82 British
and Foreign State Papers 55 at 76 and 91 id. 6; of St. Germain on the liquor
traffic in Africa (Sept. ro, 1919) also ratified by the United States, 8 L. of N.
Treaty Series 12, HUDSON, r Int. Legislation 352 No. 8; of Helsingfors (August 19, 1925) 42 L. of N. Treaty Series 73, and 45 id. 183, HuDSON, 3 Int.
Legislation 1673 No. 144 and 7 id. 752 No. 484.
Pan-American Convention on the Repression of Smuggling, Buenos Aires
(June 19, 1935) HUDSON, 7 Int. Legislation 100 No. 415.
147
Supra Chapter 29, p. 426 and n. 139·
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general, still they ought to recognize the true international
public policy embodied in a treaty of such merits. 148
148 Correct international contract practice is illustrated by a bill of lading
written in English for shipments from Antwerp whereby the jurisdiction of
the courts of Hamburg is exclusively competent but the lawsuits are "to be
delivered according to article 91" of the Belgian Maritime Code (Hague
Rules). The Commercial Tribunal of Antwerp (Nov. 16, 1939) Jur. Port
d'Anvers I 940, 2 2 5 has accepted this clause as valid, since the foreign court
must be presumed to respect the Belgian public policy embodied in art. 91 cit.
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partnership, I 84 and n. 54·
party autonomy, J7I, n. 46, 372,
488, n. ro, 494, n. 35·
right to sue, I43, n. 97, 144, n. 98.
Broadcasting, 320-323, 335·
Brussels Convention I92I (Hague
.
Rules), 4I6
on collision, 340-341.
Burden of Proof
contracts, 545·
torts, 283-286.
Business Corporation, 7-8
personal law, Chapter I9, JI-67.
Business Organizations, 7-Io
mixed of corporate and incor
porate elements, 6, 7-10, and
Chapter 2I, 93-123.
Business Trust, 7, 97-99, I07.
Busse, 278.
Capacity. See also Powers.
of corporations, 7I-74, IS7-I67.
of partnership, II6.
to be a party 72-73, I42-I47
(corporation); u6-II7 and n.
99, II9-I22 (unincorporated
organization).
to sue, IJ9, q6, 204-2I 5 (corporations), 86, 89 (dissolved
corporation).
for tort, 74, 255
Carriage
duty of care, 288, n. I4I, 29I,
303, n. 7·
international conventions, 4I7,
ns. IOI-IOJ.
liability of carrier, 290-297, JI5,
4I 5 ff.
public policy of New York, 42I425.

INDEX
Carriage (continued)
on seas, 383, 389, 4I5-4I7, 4I8427.
Cartels, International, I6.
Causation, 257, 26o.
Cause Licite, 527-528.
Cautio Iudicatum So/vi, 20, n. 49,
23, n. 6o.
Central Office
concept, 39-40.
ascertainment, 4o-42.
real existence, 42-45.
transfer, 5o-56.
Cesena Sulphur Co. Case, 41.
Change of Law, 546-548.
Characterization. See also Classification.
causation and fault, 260.
corporate and unincorporate organization, IOQ-IOI, I02-I07,
I2I.
formal requirements, 496-498.
legal person, Ioo.
legal structure of contract, 528530.
merchant character, 73-74, I38,
I9I.
place of contracting, 452-456,
459, 505.
place of performance, 47I-472.
Charter of Corporation, 69, 85, I 25,
128, IJ9·
Charter Party, 389.
Chile. See also Table of Statutes.
foreign corporations, I84-I85.
party autonomy, .37o-37I.
China. See also Table of Statutes.
recognition of foreign corporations not doing business, I4I.
Choice of Law in Contracts
by the parties, Chapters 28 and
29, 357-429.
judicial, 43o-440.
of several laws, 388-393, 484.
CITEJA, 341.
Classification. See also Characterization.
burden of proof, 283, 545·

capacity to contract, 497, n. 47,
498.
capacity to sue (personal law and
procedure), 72-73, 104, n. 63,
II9, I2I, I47, I50.
contract and tort, 29o-294.
damages, 276-279, 542-545.
form and procedure, 498-503.
partnership and con tract, I I 6I I9.
presumptions, 283-286, 545·
revenue law, 498-504.
tort and family law, 257, 26o,
263, 265-267.
tort sanctions, 276-281.
"Clause Paramount," 383-384,
426-427.
Co/legit,, I27.
Collision of Aircraft, 345-346, 347·
Collision of Vessels, 336 ff.
on high seas, 347-350.
in territorial waters, 342-345.
Colombia. See also Table of Statutes.
contracts, 494, n. 35·
reciprocity, 25, I4o, n. 86.
Comity, I26, I73, 552.
Commercial Property, 61.
Company, Term, IO, I45·
Concurrence, of Contract and Tort
Claims
in conflicts, 29o-293.
in municipal law, 287-289.
of tort claims, 304-306.
Congregations
dissolution, 87, I36.
Congress of Antwerp, 332, 339,
349, 354·
Connection, Most Characteristic
in contract, 402-403, 442-443.
in tort, 3I7, 322-323, 333-335.
Connection, Substantial
of contract, 402-408, 477-478.
Consideration, 362, 527-528.
Consular Contracts
form, 487.
Contemplation of the Parties, 363,
437-439·

INDEX
Contracts in General
bilateral, 466-469.
conditional, 458.
consent in fact, 523-526.
consent in form, 5I9-523.
consideration, 527-528.
by correspondence, 453-457, 505.
damages, 542.
entailed, 406--407.
form of, Chapter 3I, 485-5I7.
formal, 458-459.
formation, 5I9-528.
informal unilateral, 457·
interpretation, 532-534.
nature, 528-530.
nonperformance, 539-545.
public policy, Chapter 33, 549584.
rescission, 542.
restitution, 54o-542.
rules governing, Chapters 28-33.
in absence of party agreement,
Chapter 30, 43o-484.
of closest connection, 402-403,
442-443·
general, 44o-443.
most favorable, 474-480.
by party agreement, Chapters
28 and 29.
primafacie, 44o-441.
renvoi, 387, 480.
and tort, 287-294.
types, 482-483.
validity, 359, 395-402, 448-452.
validity and effects distinguished,
448-45I, 487, n. 5, 532, n. 54,
537, 542, 576--577without foreign elements, 40o401.
Contracts of Unlicensed Corporations, 202-2I5.
Contributory Negligence, 258-259,
282.
Co-obligors, 263, 275.
Corporaci6n Creada o Reconocida,
I2, n. 27.
Corporate Acts
territorial restrictions, 62-63,
I27, I67.

Corporate Elements, 6, 93-99.
Corporation, Chapters I 8-20, 2223.
concept, 4, 7, 96.
terminology, 5·
acquiring by gift or will, I64-I66.
admittance, unconditional, I79I8o.
administrative local law, I90.
agency, I74, I77, I 82.
agents, I67-I72, I89.
law governing contracts, I89I90.
personal liability, 2I I, 2I3.
authorization of business, I73·
discretionary, I83-I85.
failure, 202-2I5.
under legal rules, I8I-I83.
branch
concept, I 77
nature, I87-I88.
bankruptcy, I 90.
local law, I89-I9I, I97-2oo.
personal law, I88-I89.
capacity, 7I-74, I64-I67.
for procedural acts, I47·
restrictions, I49-I57, I64-I67.
for torts, 74, n. 28, 255.
charter, 69, I 25, I 28, I 39·
modification, 85.
corporate acts, 62-63, I27, I67.
contracts of nonlicensed corporation, 2o2-2I5.
recognition of sanction in third
states, 2o6, n. I47, 2I4, n.
I 88, 566, ns. 43, 44·
creation, 68.
Germanic law, I27-I28.
Roman law, I25, 1'28.
directors, position, 79-80, I68.
dissolution, 85-92.
doing business, Chapter 23, I73225.
concept, I32, I42, I44-I45,
I75-I76.
systems of permission, I79I87.
domestication, I3I, 174, I85-I86.
compulsory, I3l and n. 26.

INDEX
Corporation (continued)
domicil, 4, 27-30.
necessary, 27-28.
end, 85-92.
equality, 26, I8o-I8I.
"exclusion," I27, I73, 220.
existence, 68, I24, I27, I45, I67.
external relations, 8o-85.
fiction theory, 4, 24-27, 55, 98,
I26-I28.
foreign corporation, concept, I9.
Gesellschaft mit beschriinkter Haltung, 8, 105.
guaranties, I97·
impositions, I74, I9I-2oi, (sanctions) 20I-2I7.
incorporation, 4·
for foreign purposes, 45-46,
83.
internal organization, 74-80.
issue of shares and bonds, I90.
jurisdiction, 79-80, 87, 92, I9II94·
Latin-American view, 24-27.
law applicable, 3I-67.
to branches, I88-I9I, I97-201.
renvoi, 50.
law of the place of central office,
4, 33·
meaning, 37-39.
change, so-ss.
exceptions, 46-49.
law of the state of incorporation,
4, 3I-33·
meaning, 32, 63-65.
change, 55·
exceptions, 45-46.
law of the place of the principal
object, 46-49.
legal character, 68 ff.
liability for branch obligations,
I89.
local law, I89-I9I, I97-201.
manager, authority, I90.
liability, I90.
meetings, 62-63, I27.
members
acquisition, 74-76, 496.
certificate, 75-76, 78.

liabilities, 78, 81-84, Io9, 224.
meetings, 62-63, I 27.
rights, 78.
seizure, 57, 6I, 76--78.
merchant character, 73-74, I9I.
modification of charter, so-s6,

8s.
mortmain, I64-I67.
name, 72, I82, I88-189.
nationality, n-27.
nationalization, I85.
nonprofit, 5, 6, I4-I5, I36--I37
(recognition), I8I-I82 (doing
business).
operation methods, 178.
organs, I 28, I 68.
permanent establishment, I76I77, I87 ff.
personal law, 5, 3I-92, I 88-I 89.
concurrence with other laws,
31.
distinguished from nationality,
I8.
renvoi, 50.
scope, Chapter 20, 68-92.
place of business, I74, I76-I78.
powers, 7I-74, 149-167.
general and special, I57-I65.
principal officers, 3I, I68.
promotion, 70.
principe de splcialit!, I 59·
public, II-I2.
publications, I96.
reciprocity, I33, n. 4, I38-I40,
I79, n. 26, I87, 2I7, 219.
recognition, Chapter 22. See Recognition.
registration, I77, I8o, r86, 194196.
failure, 2I5-2I7.
regulation, r8, I7J-I74·
representatives, I74, 177-J78.
residence, 28.
retaliatory statutes, I 87.
right to sue, 142-147, 204-21 5·
service of process, 191-194.
shareholder
liability 8o-84.
meetings, 62-63, 127.

INDEX
Corporation (continued)
shares
and certificates, 75-78.
issue, I90.
seizure, 77-78.
subscription, 7o--71.
single acts, I47-I49, 175-176.
societe en nom collectif, 95, 105.
societe anonyme, 8, I38.
Soviet nationalization, 86, n. 86,
87-92.
special purposes of business,
201.
statutory impositions, 191-201.
sanctions, 20I-2I7.
subscribers, 7o--71.
succursale, I76.
taking of land, 166-167.
taxation, 23, 24, 29, 64, n. I 22,
I23.
territorial law, 189-I9I.
theories, 47·
theory of control, 22, n. 55, 5662.
third party protection, IIo--III,
167-170, 224.
tort, capacity for, 74·
types, 3-17.
trading with, and within the
country, I75·
transfer of domicil, 5o-56.
treaties, 35-37, 141, 217-220.
ultra vires theory, 154, 158-165.
winding up, 85-87, 92.
Currency Problems, 466.
Damages, 276-280, 323-327, 542545·
Dealing in Futures, 399, n. 29, 568573·
Death
by shipwreck, 325.
statutes, 261, 263, 324.
of tortfeasor, 286.
Deceit, 325-327.
De Facto Corporation, 9, 92, 96,
IOI, I04, IIQ--1 I I, II5, 140 and
n. 82.

De Facto Partnership, 105.
Defamation, 30I ff., 309, 314 ff.
Defendant Out of State, Vicarious
Liability, 268-275.
Defendant, Proper in Torts, 263.
national protection, 247.
Denmark. See also Table of Statutes.
no party autonomy, 373·
Designs, Violation, 295.
Detention, 239, n. 37, 306-308.
Diplomatic Intervention, 24-27.
Discharge of Obligation, 53 I, 539 ff.
Disconto-Gesellschajt Case, 77·
Documents
Concerning Goods
Sold, 465-466.
Doing Business, Chapter 23, 173226.
concept, 132, 142, 144-I45,
175-176.
Dolus, Place, 332-333.
Domicil of Corporation, 4, 27.
Donatio Sub Modo, 13.
Duress, 526, 577, n. 95·
Ejfets et Suites, 448-449.
Egyptian Delta Land & Investment
Co., 54·
Employment Contract, 206, 405406.
Enemy Property, 57·
England. See also Table of Statutes.
foreign corporations, I29, I42,
I79, 192, 195·
foreign stamp laws, 504.
general maritime law, 336 ff., 348.
illegality in contracts, 397-398,
535-536, 538.
locus regit actum, 486, n. 4, 488,
n. 1 I.
party autonomy, 368-369, 407,
408.
presumably intended law, 446,
463, n. 120.
proper law theory, 363-364, 440441.
restitution, 540:-541.
smuggling, 586-587.

INDEX
England (continued)
trading with and within the
country, I75·
Enrichment, Undue, 19o-I9I, 2.092.ro, 54!.
Equal Position of Alien Corporations, 2.6, and n. 72..
Equitable Compensation, 2.55.
Error, 52.3.
Eskimo Pie Co. Case, 50, 72..
Estoppel, no.
Etablissements Publics, 12..
Evasion, 40o-4or, 42.8-42.9.
Exchange Transactions, I 85.
Exemptions from Liability
in contracts, 415-42.7, 42.8.
in torts, 2.93.
Family Law and Tort, 2.57, 2.6o,
2.63, 265-2.67.
Fault, 2.58, (place) 332.-333.
Federal Incorporation, 19.
Fellow Servant Doctrine, 2.50.
Fiction Theory, 4, 2.4-2.7, 55, 94,
98, I 2.5, I 26-I 2.8.
Filiale, 178.
Flooding, 330.
Foreign Public Policy, 584-590.
Form and Procedure, 72-73, I I 9,
I'll, 147, 150, 276-279, 498504, 542-545·
Formal Requirements
of contract of association, 71.
of contracts, Chapter 31,
concept, 496-498.
characterization, 497-498.
defective form, 513-514.
law governing the contract,
490, 495-496, so6-sro.
imperative, 490, 5II-5I'l.
law of the forum, 493-495.
imperative, 493, 494·
law of the place of contracting,
485, 49o-491, 51o-5I'l.
imperative, 486 ff., 508.
oral evidence, sor-5o3.
renvoi, 513.
statute of frauds, 498-soo.

history, 503, n. 74·
of suit, 286, 354·
Forme Habilitante, 497·
Foundations, 6, 13-14, 137, 140.
France
acte authentique, 509, 510.
commercial association, 74, n. 25.
contracts, 446.
controltheory,22, 23.
foreign corporations, recognition,
138-qo, 142.
formalities, 488, n. 10, 497, n.
47, 501-503, 512.
fraude a fa loi, 400.
partnership, 135, n. 56.
powers of directors, 170.
principe de specialite, 159.
proofs, classification, 502.
seat transfer, 5I.
smuggling, 585-586, 588-589.
torts, 244-245, 345·
wagering, 568-569, 570.
writing requirement, 501-503.
Fraud
in contract, 523.
Fraude a fa Loi, 4oo, 407, 428-429.
Gambling, 571.
Gardien, 274.
Gefiihrdungshaftung, 230.
General Maritime Law, 336-339,
348.
Germany. See also Table of
Statutes.
bilateral con tracts, split, 467468.
collision, 349·
dealing in futures, 568-570, 573·
foreign business corporations,
135-136, 183, 195-196.
foreign stock corporation, 130,
183.
law of the place of performance,
463, n. II6, 471.
nationals, in torts, 246, 247, 295,
297, n. 178.
party autonomy, 367.
place of wrong, 304-306.

INDEX
powers of directors, I 69.
seat of corporation transfer, 51.
unfair competition, 297-299.
unincorporated associations, 7·
Geschiiftsbetrieb, 176.
Geschiiftssitz, 4, n 3·
Gesellschaft mit beschriinkter Haltung, 8, 105, 496.
transfer of membership, 74-76,
496.
Gift to Corporation, 164.
Good Morals, 4oo-4or, 582-583.
Greece. See also Table of Statutes.
foreign corporations, recognition,
133, n. 35, 139, n. 77·
Guatemala. See also Table of
Statutes.
party autonomy, 372.
Hague Rules, 383, 416-427, 590.
The Halley Case, 242.
Halter, 274.
Harter Act, 416 ff.
clauses referring to, 383, 389390, 424-425.
Holding Companies
bids to them, 64.
Holy See, rs.
Hutchison v. Ross, 14.
Illegality, 397-400, 535, 585, n.
II9.
by the governing law, 535, 537·
at the place of contracting, 397399·
at the place of performance, 535539·
Illicit Conduct, 256.
Immoral Contract, 58o-58r.
Immovables
law of situs, 490.
Imperative Law, 360 ff., 394 ff.
Incorporation, 4, 63.
federal, 19.
multiple, r6-r7, 64-65.
for out of state purposes, 45-46,

8J.
Indemnity for Bail, 565.

Indirect Harm, 262.
Individualized Conflicts
rules, 481-483.
Injunction, 281.
Injury
and damage, 323-327.
place, 301-303.
Insurable Interest, 577·
Insurance Company, Russian, 8990, 91.
Insurance Contracts, 412-415, 523524.
Insurer of Tortfeasor, Suable, 263265.
Intention of the Parties, 363 ff.
bona fide, 404-405.
express, 363, 367, 376-384.
hypothetical, 363, 367, 431 ff.
"indicia," 432.
presumed, 363, 368, 431 ff.
tacit, 363, 367, 384-387.
Intentional Acts, Place, 332.
International Legal Persons, 15-17.
"International Theory" on Foreign
Corporation, 127.
Interpretation of Contracts, 53o535·
Interstate Commerce, 173.
Irresponsible Persons, Tort, 270, n.
73, 317.
Isle of Guernsey, Incorporation, 63.
Italy. See also Table of Statutes.
foreign corporations, 51, n. 79,
72, n. 22, 132, n. 31, 133-134.
Joint Stock Company, 7, 38, n. 22,
97, 99, 107, II5, II9, 12o-121.
Jurisdiction
corporation matters, 79-81, 87,
92, 191-194·
stipulation for, 380, n. 89.
Juristic Person, 6.
Jury, 282-283.
Labor Law, s6o-s6r.
Latin America
contracts, 441.
form, 493-495, sn, n. 109·

INDEX
Latin America (continued)
contracts (continued)
party autonomy, 37o--373, 40I.
foreign corporations
theory, 24-27.
authorization, J40-J4I, 145146, 151, 182-186.
domestic law applied, 197-200.
land acquisition, 166.
Law of Aliens, 18, 106, 130, 173 ff.
Law Common to the Parties
in contracts, 432, 440, n. 31.
in tort, 244-246, 345·
Law of the Contract, 483-484.
scope, Chapter 32, 518-548.
change of, 546-548.
consent, 51 cr527.
consideration, 527-528.
effects, 528 ff.
interpretation, 53o--535.
legality, 535-539.
nature, 528-530.
nonperformance, 539-545.
Law of Corporations, 4, 31-67
as to branches, I8g-Igi, 197-201.
Law of the Domicil
of contracting party, 522 and n.
I

g.

of debtor, 473-474.
Law of the Flag, 339, 345, 347·
Law of the Forum
in contracts, 401, 493, 519, 529·
exclusive, 401.
in corporation matters, 73, 100,
JOg.
in torts, 237, 278, 297, 322, 350,
352-353·
types of organizations unknown
to the forum, I04-105, 151,
1 53·
Law Most Favorable to Contract,
409, 474-480.
Law of the Place of Contracting,
445-462. See also Place of
Contracting.
history, 443-445, 448-449.
countries involved, 445-452.
criticism, 46o--462.

for effects of contract, 53 I.
exclusive, 445, 448.
for form, 485 ff., 515-516.
Law of the Place of the Most Important Acting, 317, 322-323,
333-335·
Law of the Place of Performance,
462-472.
history, 443-445, 462-463.
countries involved, 463-464.
criticism, 469-470, 472.
exclusive, 37o--371, 463, n. IIg.
for mode of fulfillment, 464-466.
Law of the Place of Wrong, Chapters 24-27, 301-335.
scope, Chapter 25, 255-300.
Law of the State of Central Office
corporations, 4, 33, 45·
change, 5o-55·
exceptions, 45-49.
unincorporated
organizations,
Chapter 21, 93-123.
partnership, I 13.
Law of the State of Incorporation,
4, 31-33.
meaning, 32, 63-65.
change of, 55·
exceptions, 45-46.
Legal Person, 6.
international, 15-17.
plurinational, 15-16.
public, 6, Io--12.
supranational, I 5.
Letters
place of wrong, 318-319, 333·
Lex Causae. See Form, Law of the
Contract.
Lex Loci Contractus. See Law of the
Place of Contracting.
Lex Loci Delicti, 229.
Lex Loci Solutionis. See Law of the
Place of Performance.
Liability.
absolute, 283-284, 310, 328.
of agents of corporation, 84, 137,
2II, 213.
of agents of unincorporated association, 19, 106, n. 53·

INDEX
Liability (continued)
of aircraft, 329.
of automobile owner, 269 ff.
of bailor of motor vehicles, 275.
of broadcaster, 320-322.
of carrier, 292, 302 f., 3I5, 4I5.
for compulsory pilot, 242, 276,
34I, n. 27, 343·
of co-signer, 530.
of dog owner, 273, n. 78.
of directors of corporation, So,
224.
of employer, 292-293.
extent, 289 f.
exemptions, 293.
of owner of building, 3I2-3I3.
of partners, I I 7-I I 8.
of railway, 283, 290-292, 3IO f.,
3I5, 3I6, 330.
for risk, 230, 274.
of shipowner (restrictions) 352.
of stockholders, So-84, Io9, 224.
of subscribers of shares, 70-71.
strict, 329.
of supplier, 3I9.
vicarious, 267-276.
without fault, 229 ff., 26o, 273,
3IO, 328-330.
Libel, 240.
Libre Acces, 20, n. 49·
Licensing, I 8 r.
Limited Partnership, 7, 97, I07,
IIO, II5-II6,496.
Limited Partnership Association, 7·
of Michigan, I07.
Liquor Sales, 562-564, 587-588.
Litvinoff Agreement, 89.
Liverpool Cotton Association, 378,
399·
Loan, International, 379, 390-39I
and n. I29, 392-393.
Loan
legal structure, 529.
rate of interest, 408 ff.
Local Actions, 246.
Lockout, 3I4.
Locus Contractus, 444, 461.
Locus Regit Actum, 447, 485 ff.

function, 517·
Lois de Surete et de Police, 252.
London Corn Trade Association,
377, 400, 406.
Lotteries, 573-574.
Louisiana
domicil principle abandoned,
266-267.
mercantile partnership, 93, n. r.

Machado v. Fontes, 240-241.
Marine Insurance, 379, 390, 407,
n. 6I.
Maritime Torts, Chapter 27, 336354· See also General MaritimeLaw.
Marriage Relations
and tort, 26 5.
Master and Servant, 272 ff.
Materiellrechtliche f/erweisung, 36I,
39I-392.
Matrimonial Agency Fee, 400.
Merchant Quality
branch, I9I.
of corporation, 73-74.
of partnership, I38.
Messenger, 3I7.
Mexico. See also Table of Statutes.
contracts, 494-495.
foreign corporations, personality,
I45, n. IOI, I8o, n. 32, I84
I85, n. 6o.
oil expropriation, 26.
Mine Damage, 330-332.
Misrepresentation, 523 ff.
Missouri, In re, Case, 397·
Mistake, 523 ff.
Mixed Arbitral Tribunals
'on applicable law invoked by
both parties, 386-387.
on control theory, 57-59.
on party autonomy, 369, n. 39·
on partnership, I05, I23.
Mixed Types of Organizations, 6,
9-ro, 93-99.
Moratory, 545·
Mortmain, I64-I67.
Most Favored Nation, 2I8-'2I9.

INDEX
Name of Corporation, 72, I82, I88I89.
Nationality
of corporation, I7-27.
of partnership, I22-I23.
Nationality of Origin of Corporation, 30, 33, n. I I.
Navigation, Rules, 336 ff., 34I, 351.
Negligence, Place, 333·
Neighborhood Relations, 330-332.
The Netherlands. See also Table of
Statutes.
contracts, 446, n. 57, 486, n. 5·
foreign corporations, 142.
New York
liability of foreign corporation
officers, etc., 224.
notaries, 509-510.
restriction on wills, I6S-I66.
Newspaper, Tort by, 309-321.
Niederfiillbach Foundation, I3.
Nonprofit Corporation, 5, 6, q-I 5,
I36-I37 (recognition), I8II 82 (doing business).
Normative Conditions
of incorporation, 69, I25, I28,
I39·
Norway. See also Table of Statutes.
no party autonomy, 373·
Notarial Documentation, so6-510.
Notice of Accident, 286-287.
O.ffentliche Beurkundung, 509.
O.ffene Handelsgesellschajt, 94, I05.
Offer, Binding Force, 5I9.
Omissive Torts, 256, 3I2.
One-Man Company, 70, n. I3.
Ordre Public International, Veritable, 549,
I, 590.
Organization, Types, Chapter I8,
3-I?.
Organs of Corporation, I28, I68I69, I7I-I72.
Ormsby Rule, 63.

n:

Pan-American Union
power of attorney, I96, n. 115,
508, n. 96.

recognition of corporations, I45I46.
Parol Evidence, 503.
Partnership
capacity, I I6-I22.
to be a party, II9-I22.
corporate elements, 9, 93--{j9·
between corporations, I9o, n. 89.
domicil, 115.
law applicable, I I 3- I I 5.
of the seat, I I 3
scope, II6-I22.
liability of partners, I I I-I I3, I I7II8.
limited, 7, 107.
of Cuba, 108.
of Pennsylvania, 97, 110, 116.
merchant quality, I38.
nationality, I22-I23.
nature, 93-95, 99, I23.
O.ffene Handelsgesellschajt, 94,
I05.
personal law, IOQ-I07, I I I-I I3,
II6-I22.
United States, I II-I I3.
as to branches, I 89.
recognition, I35, n. 56, I37-I38.
rights of partners, II8-II9.
right to be a party, II9-I22.
Scotch, I I 8.
societe civile, 93, n. 2, I07.
societe en nom collectij, 95, I05.
Party Agreement
on the applicable law, Chapters
28, 29.
for the law of charter state, 4546.
Party Autonomy, Chapters 28 and
29. See also Agreement of the
Parties.
theories, 36o-368, 394 ff.
on formal requirements, 506.
present systems, 368-388.
restrictions, Chapter 29, 394429.
Patent, Violation, 295.
Penance, 278.
Personality, Protection, 577-579.
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Personal Law
for consent, 522.
of corporations, Chapters I 9 and
20, 31-92.
of partnerships, IOo-107, II III3, II6-I22.
of quasi corporations (United
States), I07-III, 113-II4,
IIS-II6.
of unincorporated organizations,
93-122.
Peru. See also Table of Statutes.
party autonomy, 372.
Phillips v. Eyre, 239 ff.
Phonographic Records, 321.
Pilot, Compulsory, 242, 276, 341,
n. 27, 343·
Place of Business, 174, 176-!78.
Place of Contracting
contracting by correspondence,
453-457. sos.
court discretion, 459·
determination, 452-459, sosso6.
Place of Performance
characterization, 4 7 I -472.
lack of, 470-471.
several, 466-470.
Place of Wrong, Chapter 26, 30!335·
theory, 301-311, 328-335.
acting, 311-320.
at a distance, 317-323.
injury, 301-303, 323-328.
Plaintiff in Torts, 261-263.
de Plessis-Belliere Case, II, n. 20.
Plurinational Legal Bodies, 15-16.
Poisoning, 301, 327.
Power of Attorney, 196, n. IIS,
so8, n. 96.
Powers
of corporation, 71-74, 149-167.
domestic standard, I 49- I 57.
general and special, 157-165.
Preconstituted Proofs (France),
502.
Preparatory Acts, 311,318, 333·
Presumptions, 283-286.

Principal and Agent, 270-273.
Principe de Specialite, 159.
Pritchard v. Norton, 362, n. 16,
SIS, 527.
Privacy, 325.
Private Law
subject of conflicts law, 558 f.,
s66-567, 581.
Private Limited Company (Gesellschaft mit beschrankter
Hajtung), 8, 105, 496.
Procedure
rules of civil procedure, 121.
and substance, 72-73, I 19, 121,
147, ISO.
in torts, 276-286.
Prohibition (Liquor Sales), 562 f.,
564, s88.
Prohibitions, Legal, 397-398, 534539, ssg-s68.
sanctions, 559 ff., s88.
Promoters, 70, 106.
Proper Law, 363-367.
Public Law
distinguished from private law,
s6o-s61.
foreign, s6s-s66.
of the forum, 561-565.
relation to conflicts law, ssgs66, 582.
Public Legal Persons, 5, 6, II-12.
Public Policy
contracts, Chapter 33, 54g-5go.
defense, attitude of courts, sssss6.
effect, 583-584.
employment contract, 579·
foreign, 584-590.
formalities, 511-512.
Harter Act, 421.
one-man corporation, 70, n. 13.
private law, 558-568, 582.
public law, ssg-s66, 582.
recognition of foreign corporation, 155-157, 224.
Soviet nationalization, 8g, 91.
tort, 240, n. 41, 247, 248-250,
274·

INDEX
Quasi Corporations, I07-III, II3IJ4, II5-II6.
Railway, Liability, 283, 290-292,
3I0-3II, 3I5, 3I6, 330.
crossing, 256, n. 6, 3I3.
Ralli Case, 538.
Reciprocity
permission of business, I87, 2I7,
2I9.
recognition of corporation, I38I40.
treaties, I40, 2I9.
Recognition of Foreign Government, 88, 90.
Recognition of Foreign Organizations, Chapter 22, I24-I72.
concept, I3I-I32, I42, I44q6, I49 ff.
authority of agents, I67-I72.
authorization
general, I38-I40.
special, I4o-I41.
capacity to be a party, I42-I47,
204-2I 5 (corporation), 86, 89
(dissolved corporation), 116117 (partnership).
distinguished from permission
for doing business, I29, I32,
I44-I45·
domestic standard, I49-I 57·
effects, I42-I57·
minimum, I42-I49·
foundation, I37, I40.
nonprofit corporations, I36-I37·
Pan-American Union, I45-I46.
partnerships, I35, n. s6, I37-I38.
powers, 7I-74, I49-I67.
general and special, I57-I65.
no more than under domestic
standard, I49-I 57·
public policy, I55-I57.
reciprocity, I38, qi, n. 88, I45,
n. IOI, I49, n. I22.
refusal, arbitrary, I4I, n. 88,
I45, n. IOI, 149, n. I22, 2I7.
requirements, I32-I4I.
restrictions on capacity, I64-I67.
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theories, I24-I3o.
trading associations, I35-I36.
treaties, I4I.
ultra vires doctrine, I 58-I6s.
unconditional, I32-141.
Reference to Foreign Law
conditional, 393·
special, 36o-36I, 388-393.
Reference to Local Conceptions,
533-534·
Regina v. Lesley, 306, 308.
Registration of Foreign Corporations, I77, I8o, I86, I94-I96.
Renvoi
contract, 387, 480.
corporation, 50.
formalities, 5I3.
Rescission, 542.
Restatement of the Law of Conflict
of Laws
contracts
form, 485.
interpretation, 531.
law of the place of contracting,
358, 397, n. I7, 448-449,
451-452.
law of the place of perform-,._
ance, 466.
·
place of contracting, 456-459.
corporations, etc.
acts of corporation, I70.
corporation, 4-6.
domestic standard, I5I-I52.
domicil of partnership, I IS.
law of the state of incorporation, 32.
liability of stockholders, 82, n.
67, 84.
meeting place, 63.
mortmain, I66-167.
unincorporated associations, 46, 93, Io8, n. 59, II2, n'. So,
I33, n. 33·
torts
authorized acts, 257, 306-308.
defendant out of state, 271.
place of, 30I-302.
principle, 229.
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Restitution, 28I, 541.
Restraint of Trade in Employment Contracts, 383, 554, 578,
n. 97·
Retaliatory Statutes, I 87.
Revalorization, 547, 567, n. 46.
Right to Be a Party
corporation, 72-73, I42-147.
partnership, II9-I22.
unincorporated associations, I I~
I22, 147·
Right to Sue, I42-147, 204-215,
262-263.
Russian Corporations, 86, 88-92.
Sale, Theory of Two Laws, 466-468.
Scheer v. Rockne Motors Corp., 270ff.
Scotland
partnership, II 8.
Seat, 4 and n. 3, 13.
secondary, 177.
Security for Costs, 20, n. 49, 23, n.
6o, I23.
Seizure
of goods, 230, 239, n. 35·
of shares, 51, 76-78.
Service of Process, I9I-194.
Shareholder
liability, 8o-84.
meetings, 62-63, I27.
whether a person is a, 523-524.
Shares
and certificate, 75-78.
issue, 190.
seizure, 76-78.
subscription, 70-71.
Shooting Across Border, 301, 307.
Siege, 4, n. 3, 42, n. 40.
Siege d'Exploitation, 39·
Similarity Rule
corporations, I49-I57.
tort, 237-244.
Single Acts of Foreign Corporation,
I47-I49, 175-I76.
Smuggling, 585-590.
Sociedad, 8, IO.
Societas, 6, 7, 9, 93·

Societe dnonyme, 8, 138.
SociEte Civile, 93, n. 2, 107.
SociEte en Nom Collectij, 95, 105.
Sodalitates, 127.
Solemnities of Contract, 506-510.
Spain. See also Table of Statutes.
contracts, 446, n. 55·
foreign corporations, I So.
Soviet Union. See also Table of
Statutes.
commercial agencies, 345, n. 45·
contracts, 373, 447, n. 6o, 448.
foreign corporations, 130, I35·
government recognition, 88.
nationalization of corporations,
86, n. 86, 87-92.
torts, 237, n. 27.
unenforceability of obligations,
547 f.
Special Law (Applicable to Special
Problems), 360 ff., 388 ff., 484.
Standard Contract Forms
on applicable law, 377-384.
State as Person, 6, IO-I I.
Statute of Frauds, 498-501, 503.
Statutes of Limitations, 294-295.
Stijtung o.ffentlichen Rechts, I2.
Stock Corporation, 8.
Stock Corporation en Commandite,8.
Subcontractor, Rights of, 384.
Subscription, 7o-7I.
Substance and Procedure. See Procedure.
Substantial Connection of Contract, 402-408, 409, n. 69, 427,
471-478.
Succursale, 176.
Sunday Contracts, 564-565.
Supplier, 319-320.
Supranational Legal Bodies, 15.
Switzerland. See also Table of
Statutes.
contracts, 386, 442.
bilateral, 467, 471.
validity and effect, 396-397,
449-450, 529.
foreign corporations, 142, I79,
n. 22.

INDEX
Taxation, 23, 24, 29, 97, 98, n. 20,
12J.
Telephone, Defamation by, JI7JI8.
Territorial Theory of Foreign Corporation, 124-127, 167-172.
Territorial Waters, Torts in, 342346.
Theory of Control, 22, n. 55,56-62.
Third Parties, Protection in Dealing with Foreign Organization,
IIo-I II, 167-170, 224.
Tochtergesellschajt, 178.
The Torni Case, 398, 405, n. 53,
426-427.
Tort Moral, 278.
Torts, Part 7, 227-354.
concept, 229-235.
acting place, JII-J2J.
by aircraft, 328, Chapter 27.
arrest, 230, 239, 308.
burden of proof, 283-286.
capacity to commit, 74, 255.
causation, 257, 260.
characterization, 232-235.
concurrence of tort claims, 304306.
with contract, 287-293.
conflicts principle, 235, (exceptions) 244-250.
contacts, 31 1 ff.
contributory negligence, 258-259,
282.
damages, 276-280, 323-327.
death of tortfeasor, 286.
statutes, 261-263, 324.
deceit, 325-327.
defamation, 301 ff., 309, 314 ff.
defendant, proper, 263-265.
delict, 229 ff.
detention, 239, n. 37, J06-Jo8.
and family relations, 265-267.
fault, 258.
general principles, 2JJ.
on high seas, 346-351.
industrial property, 295-301.
injury, 323 ff.
maritime, Chapter 27, 336-354.

omissive, 256, 312.
option for plaintiff, 287 ff.
penal law, 237, 31 I.
place, Chapter 26, JOI-335·
plaintiff, proper, 261-263.
policy of law of, 309-311.
preparatory acts, 311, 318, 333·
presumptions, 284-286.
procedure and substance, 276287.
public policy, 240, n. 41, 247,
248-250.
quasi delict, 229.
restitution, 279-281.
sanctions, 276-281.
scope of governing law, Chapter
25, 255-JOO.
seizure, 230, 239, 308.
separate torts, 314·
service of notice, 286.
in several states, JI4-317.
similarity rule, 237-244·
statutes of limitation, 294-295.
structure, 328-333·
unlawful act, 255-257.
on ungoverned territory, 244.
vicarious liability, 267-275.
Trademark, Violation, 295, 296,
JI I, J22.
Trading Associations, Recognition,
IJ5-IJ6.
Traffic Regulations, 272.
Tramways d'Alexandrie Case, 54·
Transfer
of domicil of corporation, 50-56,
64.
of stock, 75·
Treaties
doing business, 217-220.
recognition of organizations, 141.
seat principle, 35-37.
smuggling, 590.
unincorporated
organizations,
10'2-IOJ.
Trust, 6, IJ.
charitable, 14.
common law (business), 97-99,
107, 108, 109, 110, 11&

INDEX
Ultra Vires Doctrine, 154, 158-165.
Unfair Competition, 246, 295-298,
313, 315, 335·
Uniform Partnership Act, 94·
Unincorporated Business Organizations, Chapter 21, 93-123.
branches, 189.
characterization, Ioo-Ioi, I02I07.
common law trust, 97-99, 109,
II6.
conflict with domestic classification, 103-107.
joint stock company, 7, 38, n. 22,
97-99,107, 115, IIg, I20-I2I.
law applicable, II3-I I 5.
scope, II5-I22.
limited partnership, 7, 97, 108,
IIO, II6.
method of construction, 93-99.
O.ffene Handelsgesellschajt, 94,105.
partnership, 9, 93-99. See Partnership.
personal law, roo--II5.
civil law doctrine, IOo--Io7.
United States, I07-II5.
SCOpe, IOO, I I 5-122.
application to branches, 189.
quasi corporation, I07-III, II3I I{, II5-II6.
right to be a party, I rg-122.
suability, ng-122.
trade unions, 121.
treaties, Io2-1o3.
trust (common law business), 9799, 108.
types unknown to forum, I04105.
United States. See also Table of
Statutes.
acknowledgments, by foreign officials, 507.
in the United States, 509-510.
airplane accidents, 342, 347, n.
59·
authority of agent, Igo.
automobile owner liability, 26g274·

burden of proof, 28 5-286.
carriers' liability, 292 ff., 415 ff.
champerty, 576-577.
choice of law by parties, 357,
360, 374-376, 401-402.
contracts, general conflicts rules,
357-360, 451, 456, 464, 491492.
consent in fact, 525.
corporation, terminology, 5·
directors of corporation, 17o--172.
doing business, 148, I73, 175.
domestic law, 190.
domestic standard, I 52-156.
domestication, I 86.
domicil, of corporation, 28.
transfer, 55.
ofpartnership, 115.
employers' liability, 292-293.
evasion, 401, 410, 413.
family relations, 265-267.
Harter Act, 383 ff.
insurance statutes, 412-415.
intention of the parties, 374-376.
jurisdiction, 79-80, 192-194.
law of the state of incorporation,
31-32.
license statutes, I 8 I ff.
noncom pi iance, 202-2 I 5.
liquor sales, 562-564, 587-588.
local actions, 246-247.
local law, rgo--Igi, Ig8.
maritime law, 338 ff.
maritime torts
damages, 352-353.
formal requirements, 354, n.
g6.
party autonomy, 401-402.
place of wrong theory, 301-303,
316, 323-328, 335·
presumptions, 285-286.
prohibition of liquor, 562-564,
587-589, 590.
public policy, defense of, 555·
railway liability, 2go--2g2.
service of process, Igi-Ig2.
shareholder liability, 81-84.
Soviet recognition, 88.

INDEX
United States (continued)
statute of frauds, 498-501.
Sunday contracts, 564.
supplier's liability, 319-320.
territorial theory, 167.
unfair competition, 296, 299-300.
usury statutes, 408-412, 478479·
wagering, 568-575.
Universitas, 128.
Unlawfulness, 255-257.
Usury Cases, 405, n. 52, 408-412,
427.

143, n. 97·
Vessels, 336 ff., 415 ff.
internal management, 344·
state vessels, 344-345.
Vita Food's Case, 398, 404-405.
Wagering Contracts, 568-576.
Waiver of Tort, 288.
War Damage Compenstion, 61.
Warsaw Convention, 342, 417, n.
106.
War Seizures of Stock, 76-78.

Young v. Masci, 269 ff.
Venezuela. See also Table of
Statutes.
foreign corporations, 8, n. 26,

Zappa Case, II, n. I 9·
Zweigniederlassung, 177.

